Judgment 1. BY the Court -The petitioner No. 1 is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act. Its administration is being run in accordance with its bye-laws. This society is running an institution at Dildar Nagar, district Ghazipur, in the name of Sayeed Kamsor-O-Bar Muslim Intermediate College, Dildarnagar. The Scheme of Administration of the aforesaid Intermediate College was made in accordance with the provisions of the Intermediate Education Act (hereinafter referred to as ' the Act '). Clause 4 of the Scheme of Administration provides for constitution of a Committee of Management, which is responsible for running the institution in accordance with the provisions of the Act, the Regulations and the instructions issued from time to time by the authorities of the Education Department of the State of U. P. Clause 7 lays down that the term of the office bearers and members, other than ex officio members, shall be three years from the date they are chosen As stated above, the petitioner no. 1, which is a society, is running the aforesaid institution. The society has its own bye-laws providing for the enrolment of members, their rights and privileges, their termination of membership, the procedure as to how general meetings be held, and further that the institution will be run by the society in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Regulations. 2. IN the instant case, the election of the society was held in 1979, which formed the Committee of Management under the Scheme of Administration of the College. Samiullah Khan is alleged by the petitioners to have been elected as Manager of the Committee of Management. The term of the Committee of Management, including its office bearers, expired after three years, but the elections were, admittedly, not held within three years. It is, however, not necessary for us to go into the reasons for not holding of the elections. The petitioners' case is that in pursuance of the notice dated 27-4-1985, a meeting was held on 12-5-1985 of the society. The meeting decided to hold the election of the society, briefly stated as Anjuman, on 28-7-1985. Office bearers of the Anjuman were elected on that date and, thereafter, an application for its registration, as is required by Section 3-A of the Societies Registration Act, 1860, was made and the renewal certificate obtained. 3. The meeting decided to hold the election of the society, briefly stated as Anjuman, on 28-7-1985. Office bearers of the Anjuman were elected on that date and, thereafter, an application for its registration, as is required by Section 3-A of the Societies Registration Act, 1860, was made and the renewal certificate obtained. 3. A meeting of the society for electing the members of the Committee of Management was held on 3-11-1985. In that meeting, fifteen persons were elected as members of the Committee of Management, and in that very meeting Shamshuddin Khan and Iftikhar Husain Khan were elected as the President and Manager respectively. Of these two persons, Iftikhar Husain Khan is petitioner no. 2. The petitioners have alleged that respondents 2 to 4 by fraudulently claiming that the elections of the Committee of Management were held on 30-10-1985, applied to the District Inspector of Schools for recognition that Mohammad Shafiq Khan, Respondent 2, and Taufiq Khan Respondent 3, were elected on that date, Manager and President of the Committee of Management. When the application made by the aforesaid two respondents was under investigation by the District Inspector of Schools, the petitioner no. 2 Iftikhar Husain Khan and Shamshuddin Khan, claiming that they had, in fact, been elected as Manager and President in the meeting held on 3-11-1985, approached the District Inspector of Schools for their recognition. 4. FINDING that the dispute was incapable of being resolved by the District Inspector of Schools, he referred the same under Section 16-A (7) of the Act to the Deputy Director of Education, Vth Region, Varanasi, for deciding the controversy arising out of the two rival claimants. Section 16-A (7) of the Act provides that whenever there is dispute with regard to the management of an institution, persons found by the Regional Deputy Director of Education, upon such enquiry as he deemed fit to be in actual control of its affairs, for the purposes of this Act, be recognised to constitute the Committee of Management of such institution until a Court of competent jurisdiction directs otherwise. The Explanation to the aforesaid provision reads as under :- " Explanation-In determining the question as to who is in actual control of the affairs of the institution, the Regional Deputy Director shall have regard to the control over the funds of the institution and over the administration, the receipt of income from its properties, the scheme of administration approved under sub-section (5) and other relevant circumstances " 5. IN the instant case, both the parties led evidence before the Regional Deputy Director of Education. They made oral arguments as well before him. After the proceedings were over, the parties gave in writing that none of them had anything further to say or to file any documentary evidence in support of their cases. It was after the writings were given by the parties, the hearing was concluded. 6. THE Regional Deputy Director of Education held that the actual control of the Committee of Management was with Respondents 2 and 3. On that basis, he held that Taufiq Khan and Mohammad Shafiq Khan were being recognised as President and Manager respectively for the purposes of administration of the College, It was, however, made clear that this recognition was till the rights of the parties had not been decided otherwise by a competent civil court. Before us, learned counsel for the petitioners urged that the finding of the Regional Deputy Director of Education was factually wrong and, in fact, no meeting, as was alleged by respondents 2 and 3, was held on 30-10-1985. It was further pointed out that under Bye-law 20 of the society, it was the Secretary of the said society who was competent to convene the meeting and as the meeting had not been convened by the Secretary, the same was null and void, and the election of respondents 2 and 3 alleged to have been held on that date could not confer on them any rights capable of being recognised for the purposes of the Intermediate Education Act and the Regulations made thereunder. Learned counsel urged that the minutes had not been signed by Samiullah Khan and the fact of his signatures on the minutes of the meeting of 30-10-1985 had been wrongly relied upon by the Regional Deputy Director of Education. 7. WE have heard counsel for the concerned parties, and examined the order of the Deputy Director of Education, Vth Region, Varanasi. 7. WE have heard counsel for the concerned parties, and examined the order of the Deputy Director of Education, Vth Region, Varanasi. Since we are unable to find that his order suffers from any mistake apparent on the face of the record or any such error which could justify us to interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution, we cannot reverse the order on the arguments made by the learned counsel for the petitioners. This Court under Article 226 of the Constitution has only supervisory jurisdiction and does not sit in appeal over the findings of the tribunals or other authorities as against whose judgments writ petitions are filed. The High Court is not competent to consider the question whether the evidence before the Regional Deputy Director of Education was insufficient or unreliable to come to the finding that the order given against the petitioners was illegal. It could consider only the fact whether there was any evidence at all which, if believed by the Regional Deputy Director of Education, would establish that the finding recorded is perverse Adequacy of the evidence to sustain the finding cannot be a question before the High Court when exercising the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. This view was taken by the Supreme Court in Union of India v. S. C. Goel, AIR 1964 SC 364 and The State of Madras v. G. Sunderam, AIR 1965 SC 1103 . 8. IN State of Andhra Pradesh v. Shree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1773 it was said that the High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution, a court of appeal over the decision of the authority holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant. It is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf and according to the procedure prescribed in that respect, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. In the instant case, counsel urged that, according to the Muslim Law, nobody can be disbelieved if he refuses to take oath by ' Kalam Pakh, ' and, as such, the Regional Deputy Director of Education having discarded the statement of Samiullah Khan on that basis, the entire order should be held to be vitiated by an apparent error. In the instant case, counsel urged that, according to the Muslim Law, nobody can be disbelieved if he refuses to take oath by ' Kalam Pakh, ' and, as such, the Regional Deputy Director of Education having discarded the statement of Samiullah Khan on that basis, the entire order should be held to be vitiated by an apparent error. Had the Deputy Director of Education confined his order only to that aspect, there could be an occasion for us to consider the argument made by the petitioners' counsel. In the present case, the Regional Deputy Director of Education went through the evidence of the parties led before him and considered the circumstances emerging from the record and then found that the respondents 2 and 3 were in actual control of the management of the affairs of the institution. 9. OUR attention was drawn to Annexures 10 and 10-A to the writ petition and it was urged by the petitioners' counsel with the support of those annexures that since the Regional Deputy Director of Education bad admitted in these letters written to the Additional Director of Education that pressure was being put on him to decide the case pending before him under Section 16-A (7) by unruly elements in favour of Respondents 2 to 4, the case be transferred to some other Regional Deputy Director of Education and, ultimately, the decision having been given in favour of respondents 2 and 3, this Court must hold that the order was given by the Deputy Director of Education, Vth Region, Varanasi, in favour of the said two respondents on account of pressure and on extraneous considerations. We find no merit in this argument. By means of the two letters written by the Regional Deputy Director of Education, he informed the Additional Director of Education that the case under Section 16-A (7) could be transferred to some other Regional Deputy Director of Education. There is nothing in these letters to indicate that the Deputy Director of Education, Vth Region, Varanasi, had framed his mind or formed his opinion against one party or the other. He was fair enough to intimate to his higher authority about a fact narrated therein. There is nothing in these letters to indicate that the Deputy Director of Education, Vth Region, Varanasi, had framed his mind or formed his opinion against one party or the other. He was fair enough to intimate to his higher authority about a fact narrated therein. This narration by itself could not lead anyone to the conclusion that the order was biased or that it was given in favour of respondents 2 and 3 on extraneous considerations, and not on the basis of the evidence and circumstances available on the record. If the argument of the petitioners' counsel was accepted, it would unnecessarily lead the Court to hold that the order of the Deputy Director of Education, "Vth Region, Varanasi, could be fair only when the case was decided in favour of the petitioners and against Respondents 2 to 4. 10. IT is a matter of common knowledge that on transfer applications being filed against the Presiding Officers, they often submit in their explanations that they are not interested in any one of the two parties and the cases in which transfer applications are moved could be sent to another court. This, however, does not mean that if transfer applications are rejected and judgments are given by the Presiding Officers in favour of the parties against whom allegations were made, those judgments would be liable to be set aside merely on the ground taken before us. In the instant case, nothing could be brought to our notice excepting annexures 10 and 10-A that the Regional Deputy Director of Education was biased against the petitioners. An inference of bias, dishonesty and unfairness cannot normally be made from the conclusion recorded by the Court on merits, In Vishwanathan v. Abdul Wajid, AIR 1963 SC page 1 the argument of bias was repelled. 11. LEARNED counsel next urged that in the circumstances of the present case, the rule of necessity required that the case was transferred to some other Regional Deputy Director of Education. The argument for applying the rule of necessity is based on misconception. This rule does not empower a superior authority to transfer a case pending before one officer or authority subordinate to him to another if the former in law is not authorised to do so. The power of a superior officer or authority are governed by the Act by which his office is created. This rule does not empower a superior authority to transfer a case pending before one officer or authority subordinate to him to another if the former in law is not authorised to do so. The power of a superior officer or authority are governed by the Act by which his office is created. He will have only those functions to perform which are conferred on him. A superior officer may have several subordinate officers below him, but if he does not have the power to transfer a case from one of the subordinate officers to another, the transfer order, if made, would be invalid. In the instant case, the case under Section 16-A (7) was not transferred from the Deputy Director of Education, Vth Region, Varanasi, to another Regional Deputy Director of Education because the Additional Director of Education was advised that he had no power to do so. 12. RULE of necessity is an exception to the general rule that an adjudicator who is biased or prejudiced must disqualify himself from participating to the proceedings. The rule is that disqualification of an adjudicator will not be permitted to destory the only tribunal with power to act. In Brinkley v. Hassiq, 83 F 2d 351, Kansas State Medical Board had revoked the licence of the notorious Dr. Brinkley on the grounds of unprofessional conduct. In the enquiry before the Medical Board, Dr. Brinkley argued that the Board was disqualified for bias because it had acted as both prosecutor and judge and also because some members of the Board had personal knowledge of various facts alleged by reason of their having heard the radio broadcasts and having formed preconceived opinions. Rejecting the argument, Circuit Judge remarked at page 367 : "The statute provides but one tribunal with power to revoke a doctor's license, just as the Supreme Court of Kansas is the only body with power to debar a lawyer. If such powers may not be exercised if the members of the board or court are prejudiced, then any lawyer or doctor who commits an offence so grave that it shocks every right-thinking person, has an irrevocable license to practice his profession if he can get the news of his offence to the court or board before the trial begins. That will not do. That will not do. From the very necessity of the case has grown the rule that disqualification will not be permitted to destory the only tribunal with power in the premises." It would be seen from the above that on the basis of rule of necessity it was found in that case that even if the tribunal was disqualified on account of personal bias, the case would have to be decided by it, and unless it was found on merits that its judgment was wrong, it would not be set aside simply on the ground of bias. 13. DEALING with a similar matter, de Smith in his book on Judicial Review of Administrative Action, Fourth Edition, at page 276, observed : "An adjudicator who is subject to disqualification at Common Law may be required to sit if there is no other competent tribunal or if a forum cannot be formed without him. Here, the doctrine of necessity is applied to prevent a failure of justice. So, if proceedings were brought against all the superior judges, they would have to sit as Judges in their own cause. Similarly, a judge may be obliged to hear a case in which he has a pecuniary interest 14. RULE of necessity is wrongly applied to justify the transfer of a case pending in one Court to another although the latter has no jurisdiction to entertain it and decide the same. Jackson in his book on Natural Justice at page 138 has observed : "Practical considerations equally dictate that the rule nemo iduex in re sua yield to necessity as if, for example, all available judges, who are members of a tribunal, are or may be thought to be biased." The rule of necessity, therefore, in our opinion, could not confer upon the Additional Director of Education the power to transfer the case under Section 16-A (7) from the Director of Education, Vth Region, Varanasi, to another Regional Deputy Director Education. Such a transfer would have been invalid. The rule of necessity could not come to the rescue to save it. 15. WHAT jurisdiction belongs to a particular statutory tribunal is to be determined from the provisions of the relevant statute by which that tribunal has been created. Jurisdiction conferred by that statute can neither be enlarged nor restricted. Such a transfer would have been invalid. The rule of necessity could not come to the rescue to save it. 15. WHAT jurisdiction belongs to a particular statutory tribunal is to be determined from the provisions of the relevant statute by which that tribunal has been created. Jurisdiction conferred by that statute can neither be enlarged nor restricted. The administrative control of the Additional Director or Director of Education also can be only in respect of matters conferred upon them. Neither can the Director of Education nor the Additional Director assume the power to transfer a case pending under Section 16-A (7) before one Regional Deputy Director to another inasmuch as the legislature has not chosen to confer such a power on him. Administrative controls of these officers have to circle round the ambit provided for by law. In case of a transfer made by the Director or Additional Director of Education from one Regional Deputy Director to another, the decision rendered under Section 16-A (7) would be corum non judice and void. Rule of necessity, as has already been stated above, cannot be resorted to in such a situation. This rule has a different amplitude and is meant for application for different purposes. It is not open to any Court to assume jurisdiction over a subject matter on which it does not have jurisdiction. To do so would amount to legislation which power neither does a statutory authority nor a Court has. 16. WE may at the end emphasise that we have upheld the order of the Regional Deputy Director of Education on merits, having found that there did not exist any ground to interfere with the same under Article 226 of the Constitution. WE further find that since his order is binding till the rights of the parties have not been decided by a competent civil court, it would not be appropriate to exercise the discretionary power in the instant case. Our finding further is that no bias against the impugned order has been established. For the reasons given above, we dismiss the writ petition summarily, and vacate the interim order dated 18-6-1986. Petition dismissed.