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Allahabad High Court · body

1986 DIGILAW 593 (ALL)

Kamla Devi v. 2nd Addl. Dist. Judge, Fatehpur

1986-08-21

B.L.YADAV

body1986
JUDGMENT B. L. Yadav, J. - By this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution the petitioner has challenged the order dated 4-4-81 (Annexure 2 to the petition) and the order dated 30-3-82 (Annexure 3 to the petition) passed by the Prescribed Authority and the Additional Commissioner, Fatehpur respectively in proceedings under S. 13-A of the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, (for short the Act), for rectifying the alleged mistake apparent on the face of record in declaring certain area of the land of the petitioner as surplus by the earlier order dated 13-12-75, which has become final. Against that order an appeal was filed by the petitioner, which was dismissed and the writ petition against that order also failed. The proceedings are the second innings. 2. The case has got a chequered history. After the enforcement of the Act a notice under S. 10 of the Act was served on the petitioner for the first time and an area of 11.79 acres of land was declared as surplus. On 6-4-76 the petitioner moved an application that she was suffering from wind trouble and has rheumatic pains hence could not move the application within time and the order dated 13-12-75 was ex parte. But this application was dismissed by the Prescribed Authority by order dated 28-7-76. Against this order the petitioner preferred an appeal which was dismissed by the learned District Judge on 9- 12-76. Against that order the petitioner preferred a writ petition in this Court which was dismissed by order dated 2-2-7 and that order of this Court became final as there is nothing on record to indicate that the petitioner preferred any Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court. The petitioner again made an application in proceedings under S. 111-A presumably to indicate her choice. The said application was dismissed on 28-2-78 against which the petitioner preferred an appeal before the District Judge which was dismissed on 23-7- 77. Against that order the petitioner again filed a writ petition in this Court which was allowed and remanded by order dated 23-1-79 with a direction to look into the .grievance of the petitioner in respect of choice of I and to to be retained by her as required by S. 12-A of the Act. Against that order the petitioner again filed a writ petition in this Court which was allowed and remanded by order dated 23-1-79 with a direction to look into the .grievance of the petitioner in respect of choice of I and to to be retained by her as required by S. 12-A of the Act. By order dated 15-5-79 the adjustment as far as possible in respect of the choice of land to be retained by the petitioner was made. But the petitioner felt aggrieved and filed an appeal before the learned District Judge. The said appeal was allowed and remanded by order dated 22-8-80 to the extent that the Prescribed Authority may look into the matter in respect of plot No. 19O in respect of which choice was indicated, and consistent with that adjustment may he made from the land in north and eastern side. 3. After the remand made by order dated 22-8-80 the petitioner made another application on 25-1(-80 purporting to he under S. 13-A of the Act for correcting the mistake committed in respect of the land treated to be irrigated or unirrigated and the order passed in pursuance thereof. But the Prescribed Authority dismissed the same by order dated 14-4-81 (Annexure 3 to the petition) holding that the petitioner has already moved an application to set aside the first order passed by the Prescribed Authority alleging that the order was ex parte and that application of the petitioner was dismissed. f hereafter the petitioner's appeal failed and the writ petition was also dismissed. Hence it was held that the matter cannot be re-opened on an application under S. 13-A of the Act. In case the petitioner was feeling aggrieved against the order of the Prescribed Authority declaring certain area of the petitioner's land as surplus. the petitioner should have taken this plea of irrigated and unirrigated land in the appeal. The appeal against that order was dismissed by order dated 30th Mar.. 1982 i Annexure 4). Challenging these two orders the present petition has been filed. 4. the petitioner should have taken this plea of irrigated and unirrigated land in the appeal. The appeal against that order was dismissed by order dated 30th Mar.. 1982 i Annexure 4). Challenging these two orders the present petition has been filed. 4. Sri V. K. Singh appearing for the petitioner urged that the first order passed by the Prescribed Authority in proceedings under S. 10 declaring 11.79 acres of land of the petitioner as surplus, was manifestly erroneous inasmuch as that order was not passed after considering the relevant extracts of Khasra for the years 1378 Fasli to 1380 Fasli as provided by S. 4-A of the Act. These extracts of Khasras have been filed along with the writ petition as Annexure I. It was urged that the principles of res judicata was not applicable as the statutory provisions of S. 13- A make it abundantly clear that if there is some mistake apparent on the face of record the same can be corrected. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner there was mistake apparent on the face of record and the petitioner's application to rectify the same was maintainable in accordance with the provisions of S. 13-A, but the ceiling authorities erred in dismissing the said application. It was urged that the impugned orders may he quashed by issuing a writ of certiorari. 5. Learned standing counsel on the other hand urged that the application of the petitioner purported to be under S. 13-A of the Act was barred by the provisions of res judicata and further that there was no mistake apparent on the face of record which could he rectified. It was further urged that the earlier order of the Prescribed Authority has taken into account the relevant extracts of Khasras and other evidence on record as provided under S. 4-A. Against that order the petitioner has also preferred an appeal and also a writ petition, but she could not succeed. This Court dismissed the writ petition as mentioned on page 19 of the petition in the order dated 4-4-81 (Annexure 3). Against that order the petitioner did not file any appeal in the Supreme Court. This Court dismissed the writ petition as mentioned on page 19 of the petition in the order dated 4-4-81 (Annexure 3). Against that order the petitioner did not file any appeal in the Supreme Court. In that appeal or petition the petitioner could have challenged successfully that the order of the Prescribed Authority was not correct as it was not based on consideration of the relevant extract of Khasras for the years 1378 to 1380 Fasli as provided under S. 4-A. But as the petitioner did not challenge on that basis, and even if she challenged, that was not accepted. Hence the petitioner's claim was barred by res judicata or in any case by constructive res judicata. It was further urged that there was no mistake apparent on the face of record which could be rectified in proceedings under Ws. 13-A. It as also urged that the present is not a case fit for interference by this Court. 6. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties I am of the view that the petition is of merits. The first point for consideration is as to whether the present petition was barred by provisions of res judicata or by constructive res judicata and the second question is as to whether there was any mistake apparent on the face of record which could be rectified by an application under S. 13-A and the last point is as to whether the petitioner was entitled for a qrit of Certiorari. 7. As regards the first point it is clear that as admitted by the petitioner in para 5 of the petition, that the Prescribed Authority has decided the case against the petitioner in proceedings under S. 10 by order dated 28-5-76, which was alleged to be ex parte and she moved a restoration application, which was dismissed by order dated 28-5-76. Against that the petitioner preferred an appeal which was dismissed on 9-12-76 and the petitioner's writ petition against this order was also dismissed. It was under these proceedings that the petitioner should have urged that the order of Prescribed authority was not based on consideration of evidence including the extracts of Khasras for the years 1378 to 1389 Fasli as required under S. 4-A and that there was some mistake committed by the Prescribed Authority in declaring the petitioners' land as surplus. It was under these proceedings that the petitioner should have urged that the order of Prescribed authority was not based on consideration of evidence including the extracts of Khasras for the years 1378 to 1389 Fasli as required under S. 4-A and that there was some mistake committed by the Prescribed Authority in declaring the petitioners' land as surplus. The petitioner could have urged this point even before the appellate Court or in any case before this Court in the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. But she did not do so and even if she would have urged, that was repelled. Even though the petitioner alleged that the order of the Prescribed Authority in proceedings under S. 10(2) was ex parte, but that was not correct. In paras 3 and 4 of the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the State it has been averred that the notice under S. 10(2) of the Act was issued to the petitioner on 25-9-75 and the same was served on her personally on 6-10-75. But she did not file any objection within time and the Prescribed authority passed an order on 13-1-75 (not on 13-12-75 as mentioned in the writ petition) and an area of 11.79 acres of land of the petitioner was declared surplus. The petitioner's plea that she was not feeling well and she has rheumatic pain and was suffering from wind trouble, hence could not file objection within time, was not accepted either by the Prescribed Authority or by the appellate Court or by this Court. It is only in those proceedings that she should have raised the plea that the question of irrigated and unirrigated land has not been correctly decided by the Prescribed Authority. It shall be assumed that the petitioner urged this point in proceedings under S. 10(2), but that was negatived. In such situation as it was open to the petitioner to have urged the plea of irrigated and unirrigated land, but she failed to do so, hence the principle of res judicata or in any case constructive res judicata was applicable. 8. I need not emphasise much that the doctrine of res judicata or the rule of conclusions of judgment is based on public policy. In English Law it is known as estoppel by judgment. 8. I need not emphasise much that the doctrine of res judicata or the rule of conclusions of judgment is based on public policy. In English Law it is known as estoppel by judgment. It is well known principle that res judicata or constructive res judicata is based on the principle that there should be end to law suits (i.e. Interest Reipublicae Ut Sit Finis Litium). It is also based on equally another salutary principle that no one should be vexed twice for the same cause (i.e. Nemo Debet Bis Vexaripro Una Et Eadem Causa). But for these principles there would be no end to litigation and the rights of persons would be involved in endless litigation and great injustice would be done under the cover of law. In fact, these principles are intended not only to prevent the new decision on the matter or controversy between the parties. which had already been decided, but they are intended to prevent new investigation so that the same persons as parties to the litigation or persons deriving title from those persons who were parties to earlier litigation may not be harassed again in various proceedings on the same question.+There would be. more possibility of conflicting orders being passed. These are the reasons why principles of res judicata or constructive res judicata have not been made applicable to the writ petition under Article 226 f the Constitution. I am, therefore, of the view that what the petitioner could have challenged in earlier proceedings under S. 10(2) of the Act, could not challenge in proceedings under S. 10(3-A) or 13-A of the Act I See H. E. N. Mohammad v. Competent Officer, Lucknow, AIR 1967 SC 1244 , para 9; Gulab Chand C. Parekh v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1965 SC 1153 , paras 60, 61 and 62 of page 1167; P. L. Lakhanpal v. Union of India, AIR 1967 SC 908 , paras 3 and 111. 9. There is another aspect of the matter that provisions of Sections 10(2) and 13-A are not overlapping but they operate within well defined domain. 9. There is another aspect of the matter that provisions of Sections 10(2) and 13-A are not overlapping but they operate within well defined domain. If a plea about irrigated or unirrigated land has been taken on the basis of extract of Khasra for the years 1375-1380 Fasli as provided under S. 4-A in proceedings under S. 10(2), that controversy cannot be raised again in proceedings under S. 13-A. It is a different matter that in case the extracts of Khasras (i.e. 1378 to 1380 Fasli) have not been considered by the Prescribed Authority or by the appellate Court in proceedings under S. 10(2), and some mistake apparent on the face of record has been committed, which requires correction,' certainly that can be rectified in proceedings under S. 13-A. But here the controversy is entirely different. What the petitioner could have urged in proceedings under S. 10(2), but did not urge and now she cannot be permitted to urge the same in proceedings under S. 13-A. The order of the Prescribed Authority under S. 10(2) has to be accepted as it is and it has not to be corrected by adding some evidence i.e. extracts of Khasra of 1378 to 1380 Fasli. But in proceedings under S. 13-A it shall be looked into as to whether any mistake apparent on the face of record has been committed. To appreciate this point it is convenient to set out the relevant statutory provision of S. 13- A, which is as follows : "13-A Redetermination of surplus land in certain cases. - (1) The Prescribed Authority may, at any time, within a period of two years from the date of notification under sub-sec. (4) of S. 14 rectify any mistake apparent on the face of record." 10. The clause "mistake (error) apparent on the face of record" obviously means error in misconstruing any statutory provision of law. It has nothing to do with the factual basis. It is certainly not concerned with some additional evidence to be filed or to be taken into account to prove as to whether the earlier order under S. 10(2) was correct or not. It is a different matter that some documentary and oral evidence might have been overlooked and discarded or ignored by the Prescribed Authority. It is certainly not concerned with some additional evidence to be filed or to be taken into account to prove as to whether the earlier order under S. 10(2) was correct or not. It is a different matter that some documentary and oral evidence might have been overlooked and discarded or ignored by the Prescribed Authority. Even if there are two interpretations possible for any statutory provision it has not to be treated as mistake or error apparent on the face of record. The error committed in appreciation of oral and documentary evidence also cannot be said to be mistake apparent on the face of record. (See Principal Patna College v. Kalyan Srinivas Raman, AIR 1966 SC 707 , para 20, page 713; Kaushalya Devi v. Bachitter Singh, AIR 1060 SC 1168, para 8, page 1171; and Dr. Chetkar Jha v. Dr. V. P. Verma, AIR 1970 SC 1832 ), wants (sic) to prove that the earlier order of the Prescribed Authority under S. 10(2) was erroneous or there was some mistake after filing some new documentary evidence, which was not there on record. But this is not the scope of S. 13-A of the Act that fresh evidence can be filed and after referring to fresh evidence it can be proved that there was some mistake in the earlier order passed in proceedings under S. 10(2). I am, therefore of the opinion that it cannot be said that there was any mistake apparent on the face of record in proceedings under 9. 10(2), either in the order of Prescribed Authority or of the appellate Court which required rectification in proceedings under S. 13-A of the Act. Even assuming that there was some mistake in the order of the Prescribed Authority or appellate authority, in that event the petitioner could have brought all those mistakes to the notice of this Court in the earlier writ petition filed by her, which was dismissed by this Court as admitted by the petitioner in para 5 of the petition. The point which could have been urged by the petitioner in the earlier writ petition and could have been decided, then cannot be permitted to be urged again in this petition. The earlier decision of this Court became final The claim of the petitioner is barred by res judicata or in any case by principles of constructive res judicata. 11. The point which could have been urged by the petitioner in the earlier writ petition and could have been decided, then cannot be permitted to be urged again in this petition. The earlier decision of this Court became final The claim of the petitioner is barred by res judicata or in any case by principles of constructive res judicata. 11. As regards the scope of writ of certiorari, by now it is well settled that it cannot be issued as a matter of course. There must be some error or mistake apparent on the face of record or if the Court below exceeded its jurisdiction or refused to exercise its jurisdiction. Even if there is some mistake in drawing inference from documentary or oral evidence, that cannot be said to be an error apparent on the face of record. The petitioner had come to this Court earlier and the writ petition filed by her was dismissed and the petitioner wanted to urge that the earlier order of the Prescribed Authority or the appellate Court was manifestly erroneous. This she could have challenged in the earlier writ petition filed by her and now she cannot be permitted to challenge the same in the present writ petition, as the principle is that there must be conclusiveness and finality of litigation. This is based on public policy as stated earlier that there should be an end to litigation and nobody should he vexed twice over the same matter which has once been set at rest. 12. In view of what has been stated above, the writ petition lacks merit and deserves to be dismissed. 13. In the result, the petition fails and it is accordingly dismissed. There shall. however, be no order as to costs.