JUDGMENT B.L. Yadav, J. - These two petitions Under Article 226 of the Constitution of India have been filed against common order dated 13-3-1975 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Varanasi. The Petitioner in Writ Petition No. 3991 of 1975 has prayed for a (sic) Consolidation Authorities. In Writ Petition No. 7746 of 1975 the prayer is for a writ of certiorari quashing the orders dated 13-3-75 and 20-10-74. As these petitions arise out of a common order, it is convenient to dispose them of by a common judgment. 2. The facts of the case need not detain much. As regards the Writ Petition No. 7746 of 1975, in the basic year the plots in Khata Nos. 495, 183, 114, 487 and 379 were entered in the name of Salgoo, son of Sitlu. An objection was filed u/s 9A(2) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, by Amar Nath, Respondent No. 4, stating that he was the grand-son of Salgoo and was entitled to be recorded as bhumidhar over all the Khatas on the basis of a registered of Hori, predeceased (sic) son of Salgoo, recorded tenure holder, has re-married, she lost all the rights and was not entitled to be recorded as co-tenant. 3. The Petitioner, Smt. Munia, on the other hand filed another objection alleging that the will alleged to have been executed in favour of Respondent No. 4 was not genuine rather it was forged and fictitious. The testator Salgoo, the recorded tenure holder was not in sound disposing mind when he is alleged to have executed the will and no right accrued in favour of Respondent No. 4 who is the widow of Hori, the predeceased son of testator, she was entitled to be recorded over half share as co-tenant along with the Respondent No. 4. A short genealogical table is given below to appreciate the facts: Salgoo. |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------| |Purshottam Hori| =Smt. Munia (Widow)Amar Nath 4. The Consolidation Officer by his order dated 16-1-74 held that the will was not legally proved, the Petitioner has not remarried and was not entitled to half share in Khata Nos. 495, 183 and 1/3 share over Khata No. 483, over another 1/3 share the Respondent No. 4 was entitled and one Bhalla was given 1/3 share, whereas over Khata Nos. 495, 183 and 1/3 share over Khata No. 483, over another 1/3 share the Respondent No. 4 was entitled and one Bhalla was given 1/3 share, whereas over Khata Nos. 144 and 379 the Petitioner had 1/6 share and Respondent No. 4 another 1/6 share and remaining share was of one Mewa, Heera and Jwala. The appeal of Respondent No. 4 was allowed by order dated 22-10 74 and it was held that over all the Khatas the name of Salgoo, Purshottam and Smt. Munia shall be expugned and the name of Respondent No. 4 Amar Nath, shall be entered as sole tenure holder. The Petitioner's revision was partly allowed to the extent that over Khata No. 487 the Petitioner was held to be co-tenure holder to the extent of half share and over remaining Khatas only the name of Respondent No. 4 Amar Nath was entered as sole tenant. Writ Petition No. 7746 of 1975 has been filed by Smt. Munia against the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation and the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) in respect of 4 Khatas other than Khata No. 487, whereas Writ Petition No. 3991 of 1975 has been filed by Respondent No. 4, Amar Nah, against the claim of Smt. Munia for being recorded as co-bhumidhar along with Amar Nath. 5. The dispute between the parties in respect of Khata No. 487 may be decided first in writ petition No. 3991 of 1975, filed by Amar Nath. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner urged that the findings of the Deputy Director of Consolidation about deposit of twenty times rental to acquire bhumidhari rights, were erroneous. It was the case of Amar Nath, the Petitioner, that Salgoo deposited the twenty times rental on 26-8-70 and executed a will on the same date, whereas it has been found that the entire twenty times rental was not deposited. On 26-8-70 only a part of the same was deposited and the remaining part was deposited on 19-9-70, when in fact, Salgoo has died on 12-9-70. When the entire amount of twenty times rental was deposited, Salgoo, the testator was not alive. The deposit on behalf of a dead person cannot be deemed to have been made on behalf of the testator when he was alive. It is better to have statutory provisions in respect of deposit of ten times/twenty times rental and its procedure. 6. When the entire amount of twenty times rental was deposited, Salgoo, the testator was not alive. The deposit on behalf of a dead person cannot be deemed to have been made on behalf of the testator when he was alive. It is better to have statutory provisions in respect of deposit of ten times/twenty times rental and its procedure. 6. Section 134 of the ZA and LR Act (for short the Act), provides that if a sirdar mentioned in Clause (a) of Section 131 pays or offers to pay the credit of the State Government, an amount equal to the twenty times land revenue payable on the date of application for the land of which he is sirdar, he shall be entitled, with effect from the date on which the amount has been deposited, to a declaration that he has acquired the rights mentioned in Section 137 in respect of such land It is crystal clear that the sirdar has to make the deposit himself or through an agent during his life time and not after his death. In the instant case part of the amount was deposited after the death of Salgoo, hence the same cannot ensure for the benefit of the testator in respect of acquisition of bhumidhari rights. As the testator did not make the deposit of twenty times rental during his life time in respect of Khata No. 487, he cannot, accordingly, be deemed to be bhumidhar on the date when actually the will in question was executed. Consequently the will was executed in respect of sirdari rights and was illegal. The inescapable corollary is that this Khata would have been inherited by Hori, the son of testator had he been alive along with another son of testator, namely, Purshottam. Hori was husband of Smt. Munia, hence she would inherit his interest. The findings recorded by the Deputy Director of Consolidation in respect of Khata No. 487 are correct and legal. 7. In Writ Petition No. 7746 of 1975 it was urged by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that over these Khatas the name of Amar Nath was entered as sole bhumidhar on the basis of will dated 26-8-70. The Deputy Director of Consolidation has not applied his mind to the legal aspects of the execution and the attestation of will. In Writ Petition No. 7746 of 1975 it was urged by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that over these Khatas the name of Amar Nath was entered as sole bhumidhar on the basis of will dated 26-8-70. The Deputy Director of Consolidation has not applied his mind to the legal aspects of the execution and the attestation of will. Section 169 of the UP ZA and LR Act enacts that every will made under provisions of Sub-section (1) shall notwithstanding anything contained in any law, custom or usage, shall be in writing and attested by two persons. This provision is mandatory. Further the attestation of the will was not proved according to law. It was further urged that a Court called upon to decide the validity of a will should also take into account the suspicious circumstances surrounding the will. A propounder or the person deriving benefits has to remove the doubts of the Court about suspicious circumstances surrounding the will. In the present case, why should a father-in-law deprive his widowed daughter-in-law from inheritance and making no provision to maintain her. The will was executed in respect of entire property in favour of grand-son. There were other suspicious circumstances. The registration of will was not necessary in law. The learned Counsel for the Respondent, on the other hand, urged that the will in respect of these Khatas was legal and attestation has been formally proved. The impugned orders are perfectly correct. 8. Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties, the first point that falls for determination is as to whether the attestation of the will in question has been proved as required by Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act and by Section 169(3) of the Act. Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act defines the word 'attestation', which means that the witnesses must have seen the executant signing or affixing their marks to the instrument or have received from the executant a personal acknowledgement of his signatures or mark and must have put his signature on his instrument. 9. Ordinarily the word 'attest' means to bear witness to a fact. 9. Ordinarily the word 'attest' means to bear witness to a fact. In view of Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act the essential conditions of a valid attestation are that (i) two or more witnesses have seen the executants sign or affix his mark to the instrument or have received from him a personal acknowledgment of his signature; (ii) with a view to bear witness to this fact each of them has signed the instrument in the presence of the executant. It is essen tial that the witnesses should have put signature 'animo attestendi', i. e. for the purpose of attesting that they have seen the executants sign or has received from him a personal acknowledgment of his signature. If a person, in other words, puts his signature on the document for some other purpose, i. e. to certify that he is a scribe, or identifier or a registering officer, he is not an attesting witness. In the instant case as the Deputy Director of Consolidation who was last court of fact and was exercising wide and comprehensive power u/s 48 of the Act, has not cared to look into the evidence of attesting witness, rather he had made a sweeping and stray remark that the will was registered and was proved by Iltija, the attesting witness. Without reading the entire statement of Smt. Munia it has been erroneously observed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation that she has accepted the will and it was accordingly held that the will was proved. 10. Attestation was a mandatory requirement as provided by Section 169(3) of the UP ZA and LR Act. Unless Iltija, the attesting witness states that he has seen the executant sign the instrument or has received from him a personal acknowledgment of signature and that he also put his signature or thumb impression in presence of the executant, the essential conditions of attestation as required by Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act cannot be fulfilled. If the law requires a thing to be done in a particular manner on the basis of particular evidence, the Court deciding the validity of that document was called upon to apply its mind to that legal requirement and should not just assume it by implication. If the law requires a thing to be done in a particular manner on the basis of particular evidence, the Court deciding the validity of that document was called upon to apply its mind to that legal requirement and should not just assume it by implication. Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act dealing with formal proof of a will may not apply in terms to the consolidation proceedings, but its substance and spirit had to be made applicable to secure the ends of justice. The Deputy Director of Consolidation certainly did not discuss the evidence of attesting witnesses, whereas the Consolidation Officer rejected the will by applying his mind to the relevant circumstances leading to the execution of will. 11. The second point for determination is as to whether the suspicious circumstances have been removed by the propounder. The formal proof and interpretation of a will involves some difficulties. The will is a solemn document and unlike other documents it speaks from the death of testator and so when it is produced before the Court, the testator, who is already dead, cannot be produced in the Court and no question can be put to him as to whether It is his will or not. This aspect of the matter about proving the will makes the task of the Court heavier while deciding the validity of will. The Court has also to take into account the surrounding suspicious circumstances, if there are any. The onus probandi rests on the propounder, to prove the will, removing suspicious circumstances. In the instant case the testator died just few days after the execution of the will. The facts indicate that somebody else may be propounder, was interested in depositing the ten times 20 times amount and getting the will executed. As stated above even though literally Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, dealing with formal proof of will may not apply to consolidation proceedings, but its substance and spirit has to be applied to the proceedings under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, to secure the ends of justice. 12. As stated above even though literally Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, dealing with formal proof of will may not apply to consolidation proceedings, but its substance and spirit has to be applied to the proceedings under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, to secure the ends of justice. 12. In Rani Purnima Debi v. Kunwar Bhagendra Narain Deb AIR 1962 SC 567 at pages 569-70 Paras 6 and 7, the Supreme Court held that where a testator executed a will in favour of another person and left behind him as wife and daughter, but in the will the provision made was that the wife and daughter would be suitably maintained by the legatee during their life time. No amount was specified to be paid as maintenance uor any charge was created on the properties left by the testator. The result was that daughter etc. would be disinherited. It was, accordingly, held by the Supreme Court that the will was most unnatural and that was a suspicious circumstance which must be satisfactorily explained before the Respondent could get letter of administration. The suspicious circumstance in the present case was that there was no reason why a father-in-law must not make any provision after his death in favour of his widowed daughter-in-law when she did not re-marry, and that why should she not be provided with any land, and why should she be deprived of the right of inheritance. There was no provision even for her maintenance. It was for the propounder of the will to remove the doubts from the mind of the Court. 13. There was no provision even for her maintenance. It was for the propounder of the will to remove the doubts from the mind of the Court. 13. In H.V. Iyenger v. B.N. Thimmajamma AIR 1959 SC 443 it has been held under paras 20 and 21 as follows ; The disposition made in the will may appear to be unnatural, improbable or unfair in the light of relevant circumstances or the will may otherwise indicate that the said dispositions made may not be the result of the testator's free will and mind In such cases the court would naturally expect that all legitimate suspicions should be completely removed before the document is accepted as the last will of the testator On page 452, para 22, it has been held: It may how ever, be stated generally that a propounder of the will has to prove the due aid valid execution of the will and that if there are any suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the will, the propounder must remove the said suspicions from the mind of the Court by cogent and satisfactory evidence. On page 459, para 39, it has been held: What circumstances would be regarded as suspicious cannot be precisely defined or exhaustively enumerated. That inevitably would be a question of fact in each case. Unfortunately the learned trial Judge did not properly assess the effect of suspicious circumstances in the present case to which we have already referred and that has introduced a serious infirmity in his final conclusion. 14. The Deputy Director of Consolidation appears to have assigned much importance to the fact that the will was registered. Even though u/s 18 of the Indian Registration Act, registration of the will was optional. The provisions of Section 18 are directory and not mandatory. The effect of registration or otherwise of a will has been considered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Rani Purnima Devi v. Kunwar Khagendra Narain Deb (Supra). On page 574, para 23, it has been held as under: There is no doubt that if a will has been registered, that is a circumstance, which may, having regard to the circumstances, prove, its genuineness. But the mere fact that a will is registered will not by itself be sufficient to dispel all suspicion regarding it where suspicion exists, without submitting the evidence of registration to a close examination. But the mere fact that a will is registered will not by itself be sufficient to dispel all suspicion regarding it where suspicion exists, without submitting the evidence of registration to a close examination. If the evidence as to registration on a close examination reveals that the registration was made in such a manner that it was brought home to the testator that the document of which he was admitting execution was will disposing of his property and thereafter he admitted its execution and signed it in token thereof the registration will dispel the doubt as to the genuineness of will. But if the evidence as to registration shows that it was done in a perfunctory manner, that the officer registering the will did not read it over to the testator or did not bring home to him that he was admitting the execution of a will or did not satisfy himself in some other way (as, for example, by seeing the testator reading the will) that the testator knew that it was will the execution of which he was admitting, the fact that the will was registered would not be of much value. I am of the view that the Deputy Director of Consolidation did not even take the factum of registration to a close scrutiny. There was nothing to indicate that officer registering the will read it over to the testator nor there was any evidence to indicate that the testator admitted the execution before the cfficer registering the will. In order to decide genuineness of will a number of facts have to be considered and even if the will happens to be registered, the proceedings before the Registrar have to be scrutinised and taken into account before deciding as to whether the will was a genuine document or not. Simply because the will was registered would not lead to the inference that it has to be held as genuine, when, in fact, there were a number of other suspicious circumstances surrounding the will. 15. Simply because the will was registered would not lead to the inference that it has to be held as genuine, when, in fact, there were a number of other suspicious circumstances surrounding the will. 15. In Gorantla Thatiah v. Thotakura Venkata Subbaiah AIR 1968 SC 1332 it has been held on page 1334, para 6 as follows: It is well established that in a case in which a will is prepared under circumstances which raise the suspicion of the Court that it does not express the mind of the testator it is for those who propound the will to remove that suspicion. What are suspicious circumstances must be judged in the facts and circumstances of each particular case. If, however, the propounder takes a prominent part in the execution of the will which confers substantial benefits on him that itself is a suspicious circumstance attending the execution of the will and in appreciating the evidence in such a case, the court should proceed in a vigilant and cautious manner. Williams on " Executors and Adminstrators ", Vol. I, 13th Edition, page 92, held as follows: Where a person who prepares the instrument, or conducts its execution, is himself benefitted by its dispositions, that is a "circumstance which ought generally to excite the suspicion of the Court, and calls on it to be vigilant and zealous in examining the evidence in support of the instrument in favour of which it ought not to pronounce unless the suspicion is removed, and it is judicially satisfied that the paper does express the true will of the deceased. In Fulton v. Andrew, (1875) 7 HL 448 it was held as follows l- " Those who take a benefit under a will, and have been instrumental in preparing or obtaining it, have thrown upon them the onus of showing the righteousness of the transaction. 16. Applying the aforesaid dictum to the present case it is clear that Respondent No. 4 Amar Nath was benefitted by the execution of the will and except him no body could have been instrumental in getting the will executed. The burden was accordingly upon him to remove the suspicious circumstances from the mind of the Court. 16. Applying the aforesaid dictum to the present case it is clear that Respondent No. 4 Amar Nath was benefitted by the execution of the will and except him no body could have been instrumental in getting the will executed. The burden was accordingly upon him to remove the suspicious circumstances from the mind of the Court. No evidence to that effect was considered by the Deputy Director of Consolidation and he appears to have been swayed by the fact that the will was registered and he just made a sweeping remark that Smt. Munia executed the same and Iltija, the attesting witness proved the same. A copy of the statement of Smt. Munia has been filed as Annexure-4 to the petition and she has given detailed circumstances leading to the execution of will and has stated that there was some litigation pending and that appears to be the reason why the testator was feeling inimical to her and, therefore, he executed a fictitious will. It is well known principle that if a statement has been considered, it has to be read as a whole and not in piecemeal. In the instant case the Deputy Director of Consolidation has just accepted that she has made admission about the execution of will, but (on page 31 of the paper book) a bare reading of her statement makes it clear that she did not admit the execution of will rather she narrated the circumstances that on account of litigation pending beteen her and the testator, the latter was feeling inimical to her and, therefore, he executed a fictitious will. The word ' fictitious ' indicates that Smt. Munia herself stated that it was not a genuine will. How her statement can be accepted to be an admission, has not been explained by the Deputy Director of Consolidation. 17. In view of the aforesaid discussions, it is crystal clear that the statement of the attesting witness has been appreciated as required by definition of attestation ' given u/s 3 of the Transfer of Property Act. The formal proof of the will has not been considered as required by Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act and Section 169(3) of the UP ZA and LR Act. The suspicious circumstances surrounding the will have not been considered. The formal proof of the will has not been considered as required by Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act and Section 169(3) of the UP ZA and LR Act. The suspicious circumstances surrounding the will have not been considered. I am of the opinion that the findings of the Deputy Director of Consolidation in respect of the genuineness of the will, cannot be sustained. 18. In the result, Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 7746 of 1975 Smt. Munia v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated 13th March, 1975 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation in respect of Kbata Nos. 114, 183, 379 and 495 is hereby quashed. The case is, however, remanded back to the Deputy Director of Consolidation to decide the same in accordance with law and in the light of observations made above. The case has certainly dragged on for too long and what is, however, necessary, is expedition. Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 3991 of 1975 Amar Nath v. Deputy Director of Consolidation is hereby dismissed. Under the circumstances, however, I refrain from making any order as to costs in both the petitions.