Judgment S.C. Mathur, J. 1. SURESH Jaiswal son of Kamta Prasad has directed this petition against his preventive detention under the provisions of the National Security Act. 1980. The order of detention was passed on 6-9-85, a copy of which is Annexure no. 1. Grounds of detention served upon the petitioner are contained in Annexure no. 2. 2. THE order of detention is baaed on two occurrences in which the petitioner was allegedly involved. These first occurrence is alleged to have taken place on 13-11-84 at 2.45 p.m. Report of this occurrence was lodged the same day at 16.05 hours by the victim of the occurrence Shiva Kumar son of Sukh Ram. In the report the informant has stated that he was standing near the office of Nagar Mahapalika Lucknow, at about 2.45 p.m., along with Radhey Raman Singh and Uma Shanker. At this time the petitioner, Shanker Dey, Sharik, Bablu and two others came there on jeep No. USS 4180 and started firing from the revolvers which they were carrying. A pellet struck the back side of Radhey Raman Singh's head. THE occurrence was alleged to have taken place on account of the enmity which the main assailants bore with the informant. It is stated that as a remit of the firing people ran helter skelter. THE assailants were alleged to belong to the group of Subhash Bhandari and Ram Gopa). The second occurrence is alleged to have taken place in the night intervening 29th and 30th July, 1985. Report of this occurrence was lodged at police station Nakahindola, Lucknow at 3.45 a.m., on 30-7-85. It is alleged that the police party comprising of S.O. Incharge O. P.Sharma, S. I. Nasiruddin, S. I. Gaya Dip, H. C. Dashrath Singh, Constables Ram Gopal, Rajveer Singh, H. C. Ramesh Kumar Singh, constables Durgezsh Giri, Ran Bahadur Singh, Ram Krishna Misra, H. C. Rakshpal Singh, constables Munni Lal, Indra Bahadur Singh and driver Shri Krishna were on patrol duty when at 12 in the night they were informed that at about 1 in the night certain miscreants will collect at the field of DAV College with a view to commit dacoity in the house of the propritor of Bharat Icecream. On receipt of this information the police patty went to the DAV College and waited for the arrival of the miscreants. On receipt of this information the police patty went to the DAV College and waited for the arrival of the miscreants. The miscreants, it is alleged, came there at about 1 in the night and held some discussion amongst them. The police party challenged them to stop On this one of the miscreants fired two shots towards the police party. From the police side Ram Gopal and Ramveer Singh also fired one shot each. The police party rushed towards the miscreants and succeeded in apprehending the petitioner Suresh, Ram Sabad, Ashok, Kaviraj, Ramesh Kumar Rana and lshrat Ali. On search of the persons so apprehended cartridges and fire-arms were recovered. In the grounds of detention it is mentioned that after investigation charge-sheet had been filed in court where the case was pending. 3. THE petitioner's detention has been challenged by the learned counsel for the petitioner on two grounds viz, (1) THE incidents relied upon for the detention are not related to public order but only to law and order ; and (2) there has been inordinate delay in deciding the petitioner's representation. We shall deal with these two grounds in the order in which they have been stated. 4. IN the second ground of detention the main allegation is that the petitioner fired upon the police personnel who had gone to the place of occurrence in the discharge of their official duty. The learned counsel for the State has submitted that attack on police personnel is a matter related not to only law and order but to public order. IN support of his submission he has placed reliance on 1985 AL3 132, Shiva Shanker v. Incharge Police Station Hasanganj, Lucknow and 1985 ALJ 1151, Kali Charan v. State of Uttar Pradesh. As against the above authorities the learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon 1984 SCC (Cr.) 625, Ajay Dixit v. State of U. P. and 1985 ALJ 514, Bundu v. State of U. P. 5. SECTION 3 (2) of the Act, so far as is relevant for the purposes of the present case, reads as follows :- "The Central Government or the State Government may, if satisfied with respect to any person, that with a view to prevent him from acting in ............ SECTION 3 (2) of the Act, so far as is relevant for the purposes of the present case, reads as follows :- "The Central Government or the State Government may, if satisfied with respect to any person, that with a view to prevent him from acting in ............ any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.....................it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained." Under this provision, before passing an order of detention, the detaining authority has to acquire certain satisfaction. The satisfaction that is to be acquired is that the detention is necessary in order to prevent the detenu from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. In the present case we are not concerned with the satisfaction regarding other matters and we are, therefore, omitting them from consideration. Public order is intimately connected with crime or offence. Therefore, satisfaction will invariably have to be acquired on the basis of certain crimes or offences already committed by the detenu. Bull these offences or crimes need not have actually disturbed public order. It is enough that these crimes and offences had the potentiality of disturbing public order. This follows from the word "preventing" used in section 3 (2). If it is insisted that the act, crime or offence relied upon for detention should have itself lead to the disturbance of public order, then the detention would not be preventive ; it would be for an act already done. It is in this context that we have to see the impact of the second incident relied upon in the grounds of detention. 6. IN the second incident the detenu and his party are alleged to have fired at police party which tried to check them from committing dacoity for which they had made preparations. Preparation to commit dacoity is itself an offence under section 399 of the Indian Penal Code When the police tried to check the petitioner and his party from committing dacoity they were discharging their official duty. The police are charged with the duty of maintaining law and order as well as public order. When such custodians of law and order and public order are attacked the confidence of the public in the efficiency of police is likely to be shaken and thereby public order is likely to be disturbed. The police are charged with the duty of maintaining law and order as well as public order. When such custodians of law and order and public order are attacked the confidence of the public in the efficiency of police is likely to be shaken and thereby public order is likely to be disturbed. Public order is not synonymous with people running helter skelter on the streets. When even tempo of life is disturbed, public order is said to be disturbed. What is even tempo of life ? Even tempo of life is also not synonymous with smooth flow of traffic on the streets. When the normal life is disturbed, even tempo of life can be said to have been disturbed. If in the occurrence in question the police party would have been injured as a result of firing indulged in by the petitioner and his party and they had been unable to apprehend the culprits, the confidence of the people living in the locality in the police would have been considerably shaken. This has the potentiality of leading people to seek shelter from other sources which may not be very desirable. The people should seek security from the police which is an establishment organisation of the State and not from private individuals who may organise themselves to run a parallel police force. If such a situation comes about, it would be contrary to the even tempo of life. This has its own snags and dangerous tendencies. It has the tendency of creating mafia gangs. We are, therefore, of the opinion that when there is an attack on the police personnel while they are discharging their normal duties the attack has the potentiality of disturbing public order, although in the particular attack itself public order may not have been actually disturbed. It is immaterial whether the attack takes place at day time or at night, in a busy locality or in a lonely place in the locality. The view that we have taken has the support of authorities. In Shyamal Chakarvarty v. Commissioner of Police, Calcutta, AIR 1970 SC 269 a Bench of three Hon'ble Judges of the Supreme Court was dealing with a case where the petitioner was detained in pursuance of an order passed under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950. The view that we have taken has the support of authorities. In Shyamal Chakarvarty v. Commissioner of Police, Calcutta, AIR 1970 SC 269 a Bench of three Hon'ble Judges of the Supreme Court was dealing with a case where the petitioner was detained in pursuance of an order passed under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950. Under this Act also an order of preventive detention could be passed only when the detaining authority was satisfied that detention of the detenu was necessary in order to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. In one of the grounds of detention it was mentioned that the detenu along with his associates being armed with lathis, iron rods, hockey sticks etc., attacked constables Shanker Lal Bose and Jagdish Singh both of Shyampukar P. S. on Kaliprosad Chakraborty Street near the Gaudiya Math who went there to discharge their lawful duties, as a result of which constable Shanker Lal Bose sustained bleeding injuries on his person. This was held by their Lordships to be related to public order. It was observed in paragraph 6 at page 272 thus :- ".........Similarly, in the second ground,, he alongwith his associates prevented the police constables from discharging their lawful duties and thus affected everybody living in the locality. '' 7. IN Shiv Shanker v. Incharge Police Station Hasanganj, Lucknow, 1985 ALJ 132 a Division Bench of this Court was dealing with a case where the detenu had been detained under section 3 (2) of the National Security Act. IN this case three instances bad been relied upon for passing the order of preventive detention. IN the first incident it was alleged that the police party who was on patrol duty, received information through an informer that a person was carrying illicit arm with him. The police party intercepted the petitioner and with the help of witnesses taken from the locality it was able to arrest the petitioner who fired at the police party although the fire missed and could not cause injury to the police personnel. On search of his person being taken the petitioner was found to be in possession of a country-made pistol and two live cartridges, besides one empty cartridge in the barrel. A case under section 307 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 25 of the Arms Act was registered and was pending in the: Court. On search of his person being taken the petitioner was found to be in possession of a country-made pistol and two live cartridges, besides one empty cartridge in the barrel. A case under section 307 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 25 of the Arms Act was registered and was pending in the: Court. This incident was held by the Division Bench to be related to public order and not merely law and order. IN paragraph 7 of the report the Bench observed :- " IN our opinion firing on the police party which is supposed to be the custodian of law and order and is responsible for maintaining public order too is a serious act, and has to be distinguished from firing on an individual with whom the culprit may have a grievance.........." 8. KALI Charan v. State of U. P., 1985 ALJ 1151 was also a case of preventive detention under section 3 (2) of the National Security Act. In this case the order of preventive detention was passed on the basis of five incidents mentioned in the grounds of detention. In the second incident it was alleged that the detenu along with his companions, after arming themselves with illegal weapons, were trying to raise illegal constructions on Janam Bhumi near Keshav Dev Temple in the city of Mathura. On receiving information the police force from police station Kotwali, Mathura arrived at the spot, when the detenu with the intention of killing the police personnel opened fire at the police party who narrowly escaped. As a result of this firing panic and fear was created in the public which ran helter-skelter to save their lives. The police party also opened fire in self-defence and succeeded in arresting the detenu Certain illicit arms were recovered from him A case was registered and after investigation charge sheet was submitted in Court where it was pending. Relying upon Shiv Shanker' case (supra) this occurrence was held to be related to public order. The Bench observed in paragraph 15 at page 1155 thus '.- "The police is the custodian of law and order and is also responsible for maintenance of public order. Opening of fire on the police in the middle of the day in a thickly populated place near Temple in the heart of the city has a much wider spectrum than ordinary law and order situation. Opening of fire on the police in the middle of the day in a thickly populated place near Temple in the heart of the city has a much wider spectrum than ordinary law and order situation. In our view it has the potentiality of generating a sense of fear in the society and disturb the even tempo of the public life and affect the normal flow of the public life in the locality It concerns public order........." The detention order in this case was, however, quashed on another ground. In Fahim Ahmad v. Superintendent, Naini Central Jail, Naini, Allahabad, 1985 ALJ 1204 second ground of the detention order mentioned that the detenu along with his companion ware proceeding on the road and they reached a place where the Station Officer along with police party was present. On seeing the police party the detenu and his companion turned back. At this the police intercepted them to stop. The detenu and his companion with the intention of threatening the police party, fired one shot each in the air from their respective revolvers. On hearing the shots being fired the public present there got scared and started running helter-skelter. Out of fear, the shops in the bazar were closed and the public life became insecure. The police party advanced and arrested the detenu and his companion. Certain arms were recovered from them. Cases were registered under section 25 of the Arms Act. After investigation charge-sheets were submitted and the cases were pending in court. This incident was held to he related to public order. In this case Shiv Shanker's case (supra) was relied upon and Ajay Dixit's case relied upon on behalf of the petitioner was distinguished. At page 1210 it was observed thus :- ".........The two incidents certainly had the effect of adversely affecting public order inasmuch as public servants were being deterred in the performance of their public duty........." The petition was, however, allowed on another ground. 9. WE may now examine the two authorities cited on behalf of the petitioners. 10. AJAY Dixit's case (supra) was decided by a Bench of two Hon'ble Judges. 9. WE may now examine the two authorities cited on behalf of the petitioners. 10. AJAY Dixit's case (supra) was decided by a Bench of two Hon'ble Judges. In one of the grounds on which detention was based it was stated that on September 27, 1982 at 3.10 p.m., the detenu collected Goondas in his house and when the police party reached in order to arrest the Goondas, he fired at the police party on which a case against him under section 307/34 of the Indian Penal code was pending trial in the court. This incident was not considered by their Lordships as capable of leading to the apprehension that even tempo of the community would be endangered. This authority thus supports the learned counsel for the petitioner. However, this authority is in conflict with the proposition of law laid down by the larger Bench in Shyamalal Chakaravarty's case (supra). The attention of their Lordships does not appear to have been drawn to the judgment of three Judges Bench in Chakaravarty's case as there is no reference to it in the report. In our opinion so far as the proposition of law is concerned, there is no distinction in the two cases. It is true that in Chakaravarty's case two constables had been actually injured while in AJAY Dixit's case, as in the present case, the police personnel did not suffer any injury. But that is a difference without distinction because it is potentiality of the act that is material and not what has actually happened. Since Chakaravarty's case was decided by a larger Bench, we are bound to follow the proposition laid down in the said case. The decision in Bundu's case is based upon the decision in Ajay Dixit's case. In Bundu's case also the attention of the Division Bench of this Court was not invited to the decision of their Lordships in Shyamal Chakaravarty's case. Accordingly the decision in Bundu's case cannot be followed. 11. ON a consideration of the authorities referred to hereinabove we are of the opinion that the second incident: relied upon in the grounds of detention is related to public order and cannot be said to be related to law and order alone as contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 11. ON a consideration of the authorities referred to hereinabove we are of the opinion that the second incident: relied upon in the grounds of detention is related to public order and cannot be said to be related to law and order alone as contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Under the amended provisions of the National Security Act if the detention order can be sustained on one of the several grounds, it need not be quashed even if it cannot be sustained on another ground, which may be irrelevant. In this view of the matter it is not necessary to consider the first incident which has been referred to in the grounds of detection. 12. IN order to appreciate the submission of the learned counsel that there has been delay in the disposal of the petitioner's representation, certain dates need to be stated. As stated by the learned counsel the representation was preferred on 25-9-85. The representation was delivered to the jail authorities who forwarded it to the District Magistrate in whose office it was received on 27-9-85. The District Magistrate called for comments of the Superintendent of Police on 28-9-85. The comments were submitted by the Superintendent of Police on 3-10-85. The District Magistrate wanted further comments from the Superintendent of Police which he invited on 5- 10-85. Further comments were submitted by the Superintendent of Police on 6-10-85. The representation with the comments of the District Administration were received in the Confidential Section of the State on 7-10-85 and the representation was rejected on 11-10-85. The submission of the learned counsel is that in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the State no explanation has been offered for 29th and 30th September and 1st October, 1985. The learned counsel conceded that no explanation was required to be given with regard to 2nd October, 1985 as it was a public holiday. When the District Magistrate had called for comments from the Superintendent of Police, he will naturally have to consult records. The Superintendent of Police is incharge of the entire district and he has to deal with a variety of matters and not only the representation of one detenu. IN the circumstances we are: of the opinion that three days delay in submission of the comments by the Superintendent of Police is not fatal. The Superintendent of Police is incharge of the entire district and he has to deal with a variety of matters and not only the representation of one detenu. IN the circumstances we are: of the opinion that three days delay in submission of the comments by the Superintendent of Police is not fatal. In view of the above the petition fails and is hereby dismissed but without any order as to costs. Petition dismissed.