Das, J.- We are not at all convinced by the strenuous ar­gument of Mr. C.R. De, learned public prosecutor that it is a fit case where the provision of Section 5(1)(d) read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act is attracted. The le­arned Special Judge before whom the trial proceeded had rightly come to the conclusion that the trial was not within the juri­sdiction of the learned Special Judge as because there was no prima facie material to show that the accused persons could be tried Section 5(1)(d) reed with Section 5(2) of the P. C. Act and Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code. The four accused persons against whom offence report was submitted under sections 420/468/477A/409 IPC read with Section 5(2) of the P. C. Act read with Section 109 of the Indian Penal Code were sent up for trial before the learned Special Judge, Assam at Gauhati. The learned Judge considered all the materials on record which were made available before him and found that there was no prima facie case against the opposite patty No. 1 to frame cha­rge under Section 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(d) of the P. C. Act and under Section 120B of (he Indian Penal Code. There fore, the learned Judge who was empowered to try the offence under Section 6 of the Criminal law (Amendment) Act, found that it was not within the jurisdiction of the learned Judge to try the case against the opposite parties under the provision of law. The learned judge further held that as the case was not covered by those materials to be tried by the Special Judge and the learned Judge having no jurisdiction to try the same, the office alleged to have been committed by the accused could be tried by the Court of ordinary jurisdiction and on that rending, the learned Judge declined to proceed further with the case. 2. We have heard Mr. C.R. D. learned public prosecutor at length as well as Me. J. P. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite party No. 1, Mr. S. Medhi appearing for the opposite party No. 2 and Mr. M. A. Laskar, and Mr. Sulairtsan learned counsel on behalf of opposite party No. 3 and 4. The learned public prosecutor ha? led us to the impugned order of the learned Special Judge. J. P. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite party No. 1, Mr. S. Medhi appearing for the opposite party No. 2 and Mr. M. A. Laskar, and Mr. Sulairtsan learned counsel on behalf of opposite party No. 3 and 4. The learned public prosecutor ha? led us to the impugned order of the learned Special Judge. We have perused the impugned order and have found that the learned Judge while considering the material evidence on record found that the facts did not indicate dishonest mind of accused R. N. Bhattacharjee. It might be an act of angularly, care­lessness or rashness. But in a criminal charge if there is no material to show that the act of the accused was tainted with dishonest intention, it cannot amount to criminal misconduct wit-bin the meaning of Section 5(1)(d) of the P. C. Act unless a corrupt practice is illegally adopted to abuse the official posit­ion. The learned Judge found that there was no such dishonest intention appearing in the case against the accused R. N. Bhattacharyya to come to the conclusion that offence under Section 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(d) of P. C. Act and under Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code to rope the accused persons in the trial. Reliance is sought to be placed by Mr. C. R. De, learned public prosecutor on two decisions of their Lordships of the Supreme Court as reported in AIR 1962 SC195 (Dhane shwar Narain Sixeni vs. The Delhi Administration) and AIR 1963 SC 1116 (M. Narayanan Nambiar vs. State of Kerala). There cannot be any dispute as to the proposition of law laid down by their Lordships in catena of cases of like nature relating to the offence under section 5(2) of the P. C. Act read with Section 120B and Section 109 of I. P. C. In S.P. Bhatiagar vs. State of Maharashtra as reported in (1979) 1 SCC 535 their Lor­dships held that Section 5(1)(d) of the P. C. Act requires that the abuse of the position in order to come within the mischief of this section must necessarily be dishonest so that it may be proved that the accused caused deliberate loss to the department. Also it is for the prosecution to prove affirmatively that the accused, by corrupt or illegal means or by abusing his position obtained any pecuniary advantage for some other parson. Also it is for the prosecution to prove affirmatively that the accused, by corrupt or illegal means or by abusing his position obtained any pecuniary advantage for some other parson. Therefore, the ques­tion in to is case arises as to whether the first accused obtained pecuniary advantage either for himself or for some other person by adopting corrupt or illegal means or by abusing his position of the office with dishonest intention. In the present case after going through the documents the learned Judge found that the facts revealed could not show that the accused No. 1 acted with dishonest intention and that other material ingredients were avai­lable to frame a charge under Section 5(2) read with Section 5J) (d) of P. C. Act and under Section 120B read with Section 109 IPC. The opposite party No. 1 (first accused) filed an affidavit in-opinion in this case. Along with affidavit in-opposition he has produced certain documents which were very much available before the learned Special Judge. It appears that the accused No. 1 acted at the direction of S.D.O. (Civil) Nalbari. The learned Special Judge also found that the materials available were not sufficient to rope the accused with charge under Section 5(2) read with Section 5(1) (d) and Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code. We have also found that the learned Special Judge correctly held that there was no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused No. 1 along with others under Section 5(2) read with Section 5(1) (d) of P. C. Act and under Section 120B read with Section 109 of I. P. C. 3. As regards dishonest intention Mr. J. P. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel appearing on behalf of accused No. 1 has drawn our attention to the decisions of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in AIR 1977 SC S22 (Major S. K. Kale vs. State of Maha­rashtra), AIR 1977 SC 1489 (State of Karnatake vs. L. Munis-warny & others) & (1979) 1 SCC 535 (S. P. Bhatnagar vs. State of Maharashtra). There cannot be any dispute on the principles as laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in this regards. On being through the materials on record before us we do not find any reason for our interference with the impugned order passed by the learned Special Judge. The petition is acco­rdingly dismissed being merit ness.