JUDGMENT K.N. Misra, J. - The dispute in the present writ petition relates to plot No. 148-M area 8 Biswas 18 Biswansis situate in village Kohala district Pratapgarh. The total area of this plot is 13 Biswas 15 Biswansis to the basic year Khatauni name of Raj Nath Singh was recorded as Bhumidhar over an area of 8 biswas 18 biswansis of plot No. 148. The remaining area of this plot was recorded in the name of the petitioners. An objection was hied by the petitioners praying that they are the tenure-holders and in possession over the land in dispute and the name of Raj Nath Singh, the opposite party No. 3, be expunged. This case was contested by opposite party No. 3 Raj Nath Singh, who asserted to be tenure-holder and in possession over the land in dispute. After taking evidence of the parties, the consolidation officer vide order dated December 29, 1967 dismissed the objection of the petitioners and maintained the entries in the name of Raj Nath Singh. Aggrieved by this order, the petitioners preferred appeal which was heard and allowed by the Assistant Settlement Officer, Consolidation vide order dated July 16, 1970. The order passed by the consolidation officer was set aside and the name of the petitioners was directed to be recorded as sirdar over the aforesaid plot in dispute. Against this order, opposite party No. 3 Raj Nath Singh preferred revision which was allowed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation vide order dated April 26, 1973. The order passed in appeal was set aside and the order passed by the consolidation officer was restored. The Assistant Settlement Officer, Consolidation had recorded a finding to the effect that the land in dispute was mortgaged by the predecessors of opposite party No. 3 with the predecessors of the petitioners through registered mortgage deed dated April 5, 1965, a copy of which is on record. Ayodhya and Vishwanath had mortgaged with possession the entire property with Sri Sheo Gulam. The petitioners are successors of Sheo Gulam. In the record of II Settlement, name of Sheo Gulam was recorded. In the year 1891 Sheo Gulam had gifted his entire property to Balkaran, who is predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners. Ayodhya and Vishwanath had mortgaged with possession the entire property with Sri Sheo Gulam. The petitioners are successors of Sheo Gulam. In the record of II Settlement, name of Sheo Gulam was recorded. In the year 1891 Sheo Gulam had gifted his entire property to Balkaran, who is predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners. The Assistant Settlement Officer has further mentioned that Raj Nath Singh, opposite party No. 3 had filed a redemption suit against the predecessors of the petitioners for redeeming the mortgaged property. This suit was dismissed by the Civil Judge vide judgment and decree dated July 13, 1945. This decree was maintained by the Chief Court in appeal filed by Raj Nath Singh. These facts were admitted by Raj Nath Singh in his suit, a copy of which has been annexed as Annexure No. 1. Learned Assistant Settlement Officer, Consolidation has, thus, observed that the appellants, who are petitioners in the present writ petition, were in possession over the land in dispute, and, as such, acquired rights by adverse possession. He, thus, ordered the name of the petitioner to be recorded as Sirdar over the land in dispute. Learned Deputy Director of Consolidation, while setting aside the order passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer, Consolidation has observed that no such case regarding mortgage of the property in suit or about the dismissal of the suit for redemption was pleaded by the petitioners in their objection. He had, thus, observed that no new case can be made out by the lower appellate court and on that ground interfered with the order passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer, Consolidation. Learned Deputy Director of Consolidation further considered the oral evidence led by the petitioners and while rejecting it held the opposite party No. 3 to be in possession and maintained the entries in the basic year Khatauni in his name as tenure-holder thereof. This order has been challenged in the present writ petition. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner Sri K.P. Singh urged that the petitioners had filed an objection claiming to be Sirdar - tenants of the land in dispute. They had also pleaded to have perfected rights by adverse possession. This order has been challenged in the present writ petition. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner Sri K.P. Singh urged that the petitioners had filed an objection claiming to be Sirdar - tenants of the land in dispute. They had also pleaded to have perfected rights by adverse possession. This claim of the petitioners could be considered and decided on merits on the basis of evidence led by the petitioners and it could not be rejected merely on the technical ground that the case with regard to mortgage of the property in question by predecessor-in-interest of the opposite parties with the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners was not specifically pleaded. His contention was that it was a matter of evidence as to whether the property was subject matter of the mortgage or not and what would be the effect and legal consequence of the dismissal of redemption suit filed by the opposite parties could be considered on merits. Ho thus, urged that the learned Deputy Director of Consolidation has acted illegally and with substantial irregularity in exercise of jurisdiction in rejecting the claim of the petitioners on the ground that no such case could be made out by the lower appellate court. Hi; further strenuously contended that there was no question of making out a new case by the Assistant Settlement Officer, Consolidation when the same was supported by evidence already on record and the factum of the mortgage was admitted by opposite party No. 3 Raj Nath Singh in his statement, a copy of which has been annexed as Annexure No. 1. find much substance in his contention. 3. The claim of a party deserves to be decided on merits on the basis of evidence on record. It was not disputed by Raj Nath Singh that the property in question situate in village Kohala was mortgaged by the predecessor-in-interest of the opposite parties. It was also admitted by him that the redemption suit filed by him was dismissed and he had also received compensation in respect of the property in dispute. Thus, if the facts regarding to the mortgage and filing of the redemption suit was not specifically pleaded in the objection of the petitioners, the same could not be rejected on the technical ground of want of pleading. It is well settled that facts admitted need not be pleaded and proved. Thus, if the facts regarding to the mortgage and filing of the redemption suit was not specifically pleaded in the objection of the petitioners, the same could not be rejected on the technical ground of want of pleading. It is well settled that facts admitted need not be pleaded and proved. Since opposite party No. 3 had admitted that he had mortgaged the property situate in aforesaid village to which the land in dispute appertains, there could be no ground for rejecting the claim of the petitioners on the basis of mortgage merely on the ground that the case was not pleaded. In my opinion the learned Deputy Director of Consolidation erred in not taking into consideration the factum regarding possessory mortgage and about the dismissal of i.e redemption suit filed by opposite party No. 3. The order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, therefore, cannot be sustained. 4. It was urged by the learned counsel that since plot in suit was mortgaged with possession along with all other properties belonging to the predecessor-in-interest of the opposite party No. 3 to the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners, and, as such, the continuity of possession of the mortgagee and his successors would be presumed unless proved otherwise. Learned counsel had urged that the redemption suit filed by opposite party No. 3 was dismissed, and, as such, there could be no occasion for the opposite party No. 3 to have acquired possession over the land in suit. It was also contended by him that opposite party No. 3 had not stated that he had forcibly disposed the petitioners although his suit for redemption was dismissed. Learned counsel had further contended that the testimony of the witnesses examined by the petitioners have been wrongly rejected by the Deputy Director of Consolidation who ignored to consider the fact that the land in dispute was in possession of the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners on the basis of aforesaid mortgage and they continued to remain in possession when the suit for redemption was filed by opposite party No. 3 was dismissed. Learned counsel urged that since the petitioners had continued to remain in possession over the land in suit even after dismissal of the suit for redemption, they acquired Sirdari rights by prescription. The mortgage suit was filed prior to Abolition of Zamindari and it was dismissed prior to the dale of vesting. Learned counsel urged that since the petitioners had continued to remain in possession over the land in suit even after dismissal of the suit for redemption, they acquired Sirdari rights by prescription. The mortgage suit was filed prior to Abolition of Zamindari and it was dismissed prior to the dale of vesting. It was contended that since the suit redemption was dismissed, and, as such, on the date of vesting the land in dispute, which was sir land of the opposite party, could not become Bhumidhari tenure of the mortgagors under Section 14(1) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act. There appears to be much force in the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioners. 5. To get the benefit of Section 14 of the said Act, it had to be shown that on the date of vesting the land in dispute was in possession of mortgagee on the basis of subsisting mortgage. Since the suit for redemption was already dismissed prior to the date of vesting, and, as such, the mortgage could not be taken to be subsisting on the date of vesting and the case would not fall within the ambit of Section 14(1) of the said Act so as to create Bhumidhari rights in favour of the mortgagor under Section 14(2) (a) of the Act. The possession of the mortgagee after dismissal of the suit for redemption would not be deemed to be possession as a mortgagee or as a licensee. The mortgagee would acquire rights by adverse possession if he continues to remain in possession of the mortgaged property after dismissal of the suit for redemption. The Assistant Settlement Officer, Consolidation had, thus, rightly held the petitioners to have acquired rights by adverse possession as he had held them to have continued in possession. The learned Deputy Director of Consolidation had, however, recorded a different finding on the question of possession. But while recording this finding he has refused to take into consideration the evidence on record to the effect that the petitioners' predecessors were mortgage in possession and the suit for redemption filed by Raj Nath Singh was dismissed. The learned Deputy Director of Consolidation had, however, recorded a different finding on the question of possession. But while recording this finding he has refused to take into consideration the evidence on record to the effect that the petitioners' predecessors were mortgage in possession and the suit for redemption filed by Raj Nath Singh was dismissed. In these circumstances, the findings recorded by the learned Deputy Director of Consolidation cannot be sustained as he has ignored to take into consideration the material evidence on record relating to mortgage of the property by the predecessors of the opposite party No. 3 and the dismissal of the suit for redemption filed by him. The learned Deputy Director of Consolidation is, therefore, directed to decide the case afresh after taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances referred to above. 6. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is hereby allowed and the impugned order dated April 26, 1973 passed by the Deputy Director off Consolidation is hereby quashed and he is directed to restore the revision filed by Raj Nath Singh and decide it afresh according to law and in the light of observations made above. 7. No order as to costs.