JUDGMENT K.N. Misra, J 1. Both these writ petitions are directed against the common judgment and order dated 3.5.1979 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation in Revision under Section 48 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act (for short, the Act) arising out of proceedings under Section 9A (2) of the Act, and,, as such, these are taken up together for decision and are disposed of by this common judgment. 2. Briefly stated, the facts of the case ate that the name of opposite party No. 2 Bhagwati was recorded in the basic year Khatauni on Khata No. 365 of village Chapatia, Pargana Dharmapur, Tahsii Nanpara, District Bahraich. An objection was filed by the petitioner Ambika Prasad claiming that he is Bhumidhar of the land of the said holding on the basis of registered sale deed dated 14.10.1977 executed by the Additional Munsif, Bahraich in his favour in pursuance of a decree passed in suit for specific performance filed by him against Sarju Dei on the basis of agreement for sale dated 23.3.1969 executed by Smt. Sarju Dei. The petitioner claimed to be in possession over the land in dispute ever since the date of agreement for sale and he contended that the name of opposite party Bhagwati was wrongly recorded over Khata No. 365 whose name was recorded on the basis of an alleged sale deed dated 24.4.1969 executed in his favour by Smt. Sarju Dei, who had already entered into agreement for sale with the petitioner in respect of the land of the disputed holding on 23rd March, 1969. It has been averred that in the suit for specific performance of contract the petitioner had arrayed Smt. Sarju Dei and Bhagauti as defendants. This suit was initially dismissed by the Additional Munsif, Bahraich vide order dated 19.2.1971, but in appeal filed by the petitioner the suit was decreed by the Additional District Judge vide order dated 19.9,1972. The opposite party No. 2 Bhagauti had preferred Second Appeal against said decree, but his appeal was dismissed by this Court on 14.7.76. Tae defendants judgment debtors Smt. Sarju Dei and Bhagauti Prasad had, however, refused to execute the sale deed. The Additional Munsif, Bahraich, in execution of the decree had, therefore, executed registered sale deed dated 14.10.77 in respect of land of the aforesaid Khata 365. Tae defendants judgment debtors Smt. Sarju Dei and Bhagauti Prasad had, however, refused to execute the sale deed. The Additional Munsif, Bahraich, in execution of the decree had, therefore, executed registered sale deed dated 14.10.77 in respect of land of the aforesaid Khata 365. The petitioner, thus, claimed to be Bhumidhar and in possession over the land in dispute and prayed that the name of opposite party No. 2. Bhagauti, be expunged. This objection was contested by opposite party No. 2 who asserted that the sale deed is invalid on the ground that the learned Additional Munsif, prior to executing sale deed on 14.10.1977 had not secured permission of the Settlement Officer, Consolidation for making transfer as was required by Section 5 (1)(c)(ii), and Secondly, the sale deed is invalid being hit by the provisions of Section 154 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act as the petitioner held land more than 12.50 acres together with the land of Khata sought to be transferred in his favour. It was, thus, asserted that the sale deed executed by the learned Additional Munsif, Bahraich, was void and the petitioner cannot claim to be Bhumidhar of the land in dispute on the basis of aforesaid sale deed dated 14.10.1977. The opposite party No. 2 had further claimed that he is the bona fide purchaser for value having purchased the land from Smt. Sarju Dei through registered sale deed dated 24.4.1969. It was also asserted that he had no notice of the alleged agreement for sale dated 23.3,1969 executed by Smt. Sarju Dei in favour of the petitioner. The opposite party No. 2, thus pleaded that his name is correctly recorded as Bhumidhar of the disputed holding Khata No. 365. 3. After taking evidence of the parties, the learned Consolidation Officer vide order dated 17.3.1978 allowed the objection filed by the petitioner and held that he is Bhumidhar of the land of the disputed Khata on the basis of sale deed dated 14.10.1977 executed in his favour by the Additional Munsif, Bahraich in execution of the decree for specific performance of contract. He also held that the decree passed in suit No. 280 of 1969 in favour of the petitioner operates as res judicata between the parties. He also held that the decree passed in suit No. 280 of 1969 in favour of the petitioner operates as res judicata between the parties. He rejected the claim of opposite party No. 2 which he had pressed on the basis of sale deed dated 24.4.1969 executed in his favour by Smt. Sarju Dei. Aggrieved by it, the opposite party no. 2 preferred an appeal which was dismissed by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation vide order dated 26.7.1978. Thereupon a revision was filed by the opposite party No. 2 which was dismissed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation vide order dated 3.5.1979. The learned Deputy Director of Consolidation had, however, held that the sale deed dated 14.10.1977 executed by learned Additional Munsif, in favour of the petitioner was void as no permission was obtained by him of the Settlement Officer, Consolidation as requited under Section 5 (1)(c)(ii) of the Act. He further held the sale deed to be void also on the ground that it is hit by Section 154 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act because the petitioner held land more than 121/2 acres including the land sold to him through aforesaid sale deed. He, therefore, directed that the name of Gaon Sabha Chaparia be recorded over the disputed holding Khata No. 365 as having vested in it because the said sale deed was void and the petitioner acquired no title on its basis. This order has been challenged by the petitioner, Ambika Prasad, in Writ Petition No. 1377 of 1979 and by Bhagauti in Writ Petition No. 1880 of 1979 who asserted that entry in the basic year Khatauni in his name should be maintained by setting aside the orders passed by the consolidation authorities against him. 4. I have heared learned counsel for the petitioner Sri H.S. Sahai and Sri A.K. Verma and Sri L.P. Misra for the opposite parties and perused the impugned orders very carefully. 5. The first question which crops up for consideration in this writ petition is whether the sale deed dated 14.10.1977 executed by Additional Munsif, Bahraich, is void as no permission to make transfer in favour of the petitioner was obtained by him from the Settlement Officer, Consolidation under Section 5(1)(c)(ii) of the Act or not. It was urged by the learned counsel Dr. It was urged by the learned counsel Dr. L.P. Misra that no distinction can be drawn between the transfers made by private parties and the transfers made by Court in execution of decree for specific performance of contract passed in favour of the vendee on behalf of the defendantjudgment debtors. It was urged that upon publication of notification under subsection (2) of Section 4 the consequence provided in the Act shall follow where the tenure holder without the permission of the Settlement Officer, Consolidation previously obtained makes transfer by way of sale, gift or exchange, of his holding or any part thereof in the consolidation area. It was urged that if a transfer is made in contravention of the provisions of Section 5 (1) (c) (ii) of the Act, the same shall not be valid or recognized notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being enforced to the contrary as provided in subsection (2) of Section 45A of the Act, There should be no distinction made between transfer made by a tenureholder on his own accord and a sale deed executed by court in execution of a decree for specific performance of contract or in execution of a money decree. Learned counsel, thus, contended that since in the present case the Additional Munsif had admittedly not obtained prior permission for executing the sale deed in favour of the petitioner in respect of the land in dispute as was required under Section 5(1) (c) (ii) and, as such, the sale deed is not valid and the petitioner cannot be said to have acquired Bhumidhari rights on its basis. At the first flash the argument appears to be attractive, but on careful scrutiny I find no merit in it. 6. The restrictions imposed by Section 5 (1)(c)(ii), in my opinion, relate to transfers made by the tenure holder voluntarily and it cannot be construed to relate to transfer made by court in pursuance of a decree passed in a suit for specific performance of contract on the refusal of the judgmentdebtor/tenure holder to execute sale deed in pursuance of the decree passed against him. The said provision cannot be construed to cast a duty upon the court to apply for and seek permission of the Settlement Officer, Consolidation under Section 5(1)(c)(ii) of the Act to execute sale deed and there appears to be no such restriction in the matter relating to compulsory sales in execution of the decree of the Court passed in favour of decree holder. 7. Similar question cropped up for consideration in Smt. Bhagwati v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Ghaziabad and others, 1983 All LJ 731 (2) wherein K. P. Singh, J. held: If the tenure holder refuses to execute sale deed in pursuance of an agreement to sell and the Civil Court is called upon to execute necessary sale deed in favour of the decree holder, it would be too much to expect that the Civil Court should seek permission of the Settlement Officer of Consolidation for executing the necessary sale deed in favour of the decree holder. If the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner are accepted, there are chances that the decree passed by the Civil Court would become ineffective if the Settlement Officer of Consolidation refused to grant permission. The provisions of Section 5 (2) of the Act do not apply to suits for specific performance of a contract to sell as is evident from several decisions of this Court. If the bar contained in Section 5 (c) (ii) is imposed upon the Civil Court, the net result would be that an unwilling tenure holder can get an opportunity to thwart the civil court decree in an undesirable manner. I respectfully agree with the view expressed above and in my opinion the bar contained in Section 5 (c) (ii) of the Act is only applicable to voluntary transfer made by tenure holder and it cannot be stretched to sale deeds executed by Civil Court against the will of the tenure holder in execution of a decree for specific performance of contract in favour of decree holder. If the Civil Court executes a sale deed against the will of the tenure holder judgment debtor, it would not at all be necessary for the Civil Court to seek permission of the Settlement Officer, Consolidation under Sections (1) (c) (ii) of the Act. If the Civil Court executes a sale deed against the will of the tenure holder judgment debtor, it would not at all be necessary for the Civil Court to seek permission of the Settlement Officer, Consolidation under Sections (1) (c) (ii) of the Act. Similar view was expressed by S.D. Agarwal, J. in Ram Saran v. The 1st Additional District Judge, Rampur & others wherein the vendee had purchased land in execution of a decree for sale of the land belonging to a Schedule Caste. It was urged by the judgmentdebtor that since the land could not be purchased by the auction purchaser in view of the provisions contained in the mandatory provisions of section 157A of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, and, as such, the auction purchaser would not get any right in the land purchased in the auction sale in execution of Civil Court decree. This contention was repelled and it was held: Section 157A of the Act in terms only prohibits a Bhumidhar who is of Schedule Caste or Schedule Tribe from transferring by way of sale, gift or mortgage or lease any land to a person not belonging to the Schedule Caste or Scheduled Tribe except with the previous approval of the Collector. It applies to voluntary sales. This prohibition has been made so far as the Bhumidhar is one who either belongs to the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled tribe, The prohibition is against such a Bhumidhar. It is only when a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe Bhumidhar wants to sell or transfer any land then only the previous approval of the Collector is required and not in other cases. In the instant case, the petitioner who is admittedly the Bhumidhar and belongs to a Scheduled Caste is not transferring the land to any person and as such this provision does not apply to the present case at all. In the instant case the Court would be executing a sale deed in execution of a decree passed against the Scheduled Tribe Bhumidhar. In my opinion, therefore, the prohibition contained in Section 15 7A of the Act does not prohibit in any manner the attachment and sale of the property belonging to the Scheduled Caste. 8. In the instant case the Court would be executing a sale deed in execution of a decree passed against the Scheduled Tribe Bhumidhar. In my opinion, therefore, the prohibition contained in Section 15 7A of the Act does not prohibit in any manner the attachment and sale of the property belonging to the Scheduled Caste. 8. In view of the above it is quite clear that whereever restriction has been imposed on the tenure hotder in making transfer of land without obtaining prior permission of the competent authority, the same would apply only to voluntary sales and not to sale deed executed by Court in execution of decree where the tenure holder refuses to execute sale deed in pursuance of decree passed against him. Thus, in this view of the matter 1 do not rind any merit in the contention of the learned counsel for the opposite parties and I find that the Deputy Director of Consolidation has legally erred in holding invalid the sale deed dated 14.10.1977 executed by Additional Munsif, Bahraich in favour of the petitioner in execution of decree for specific performance of contract passed in his favour in Suit No. 280 of 1968. The sale deed, being perfectly valid, the petitioner acquired Bnumidhari rights on its basis and the two subordinate consolidation authorities have rightly upheld the contention of the petitioner. 9. The next question which crops up for consideration is the other ground on which the learned Deputy Director of Consolidation had held the sale deed to be void and inoperative. It was held that the aforesaid sale deed dated 14.10.1977 was hit by the provisions contained in Section 154 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. It was urged before the learned Deputy Director of Consolidation that since the petitioner held land more than 12 1/1 acres including the land covered by the aforesaid sale deed, and, as such the restrictions imposed on the transfer by the Bhumidhar as contained in Section 154 would make the sale deed void and ineffective. Section 154 and 166 are quoted below: 154. Section 154 and 166 are quoted below: 154. Restriction on transfer by a Bhumidhar: (1) Save as provided in subsection (2) no bhumidhar shall have the right to transfer by sale or gift any land other than tea gardens to any person where the transferee shall, as a result of such sale or gift, become entitled to land which together with land, if any, held by his family will in the aggregate, exceed 5.0586 hectares (12.50 acre) in Uttar Pradesh, (2) . 166, Transfer made in Contravention of this Chapter to be void: Every transfer made in contravention of the provisions of this Act shall be void. 10, Referring to the aforesaid sections, it was urged by the learned counsel for the opposite party Dr. L.P. Misra that the Deputy Director of Consolidation has correctly held the aforesaid sale deed to be void as the petitioner, as per finding recorded by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, had held land measuring 6065 acres excluding the land covered by sale deed. Thus, the total land held by him Comes to more than 121/2 acres. It was held that the land held by the petitioner together with the land Covered by the sale deed amounted to 15.166 acres. It was, thus, in excess of the prescribed limit to the extent of 2.66 acres. Referring to these findings, the learned counsel urged that the sale deed was rightly held to be void by the Deputy Director of Consolidation as it was hit by the provisions of Section 154. 11. In reply to it, teamed counsel for the petitioner Sri A.K. Varma urged that the sate deed in question cannot be held to be void and the provisions of Section 154 would not be attracted to the present case as the sale deed was executed by Court in execution of decree in a suit for specific performance of contract. In the alternative learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the Sale deed in question Cannot be void ab initio, but it would at the most be void, if at all, only to the extent of the area which falls beyond the ceiling limit of 12 1/2 acres referred in the amended Section 154 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. Learned counsel for the petitioner, referred to a Division Bench decision in Mst. Learned counsel for the petitioner, referred to a Division Bench decision in Mst. Janatun Nisan v. Mustafa Husain Khan and another (1955 All LJ 242), wherein referring to Section 154, as it stood prior to its amendment, it was held: This Section clearly restricts the transferable rights of a Bhumidhar to this extent only that a Bhumidhar cannot make a voluntary transfer of his Bhumidhari interests by sale or gift to a person where such person would own more than 30 acres (now 12 1/2 acres) of land in Uttar Pradesh if he makes the purchase. A person who after the purchase will own less than 30 acres (now 121/2 acres) of land in Uttar Pradesh may very well acquire Bhumidhari land by means of sale or gift. There is, therefore, no restriction for the sale or gift being made by a Bhumidhar to a person who does not fall under the category of persons mentioned under Section 154. It is doubtful whether the restriction contained in Section 154 is applicable to an execution sale. But assuming that an executing sale must comply with the provisions of Section 154, the execution sale will be restricted to persons who do not fall within the mischief of Section 154. There is, therefore, no basis for saying that Bhumidhari rights cannot be sold in execution of a decree at all. 12. In the aforesaid decision it has been expressly laiddown that Bhumidhari land can be sold in execution of a decree irrespective of the restrictions provided in Section 154. In Gaon Sabha of village Sikri Buzurg v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, U.P., Lucknow and others ( 1968 RD 168 ) it was held by Satish Chandra, J. (As he then was) that: Section 154 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act does not make any part of Bhumidhari land nontransferable. It places restrictions on right of the Bhumidhar to effect transfer. A bhumidhar has a right to transfer his holding except to a person who will possess more than 12 1/2 acres of land. Such a restriction would not affect any other person like the State from compulsorily acquiring the bhumidhari holding for the benefit of a person who may possess more than 12 1/2 acres of land. The right of the State to acquire is not trammeled by Section 154. Such a restriction would not affect any other person like the State from compulsorily acquiring the bhumidhari holding for the benefit of a person who may possess more than 12 1/2 acres of land. The right of the State to acquire is not trammeled by Section 154. Similarly that section does not deal with the situation which may raise by attachment and sale of the holding in execution proceedings. (Emphasis supplied) 13. It was further held: Section 154 places a personal restriction upon the bhumidhar himself in relation to his right of transfer voluntarily. That restriction is not applicable to compulsory sales. (Emphasis supplied) 14. In Ram Saran v. 1st Additional District Judge Rampur and others (1981 All LJ 794), S.D. Agarwal, J,, while considering the effect of restriction imposed in Section 157A of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act observed: The prohibition in the Section of transfer of land applies only to voluntary sales. It does not apply where the court is only executing a sale deed in execution of a decree passed against the Scheduled Caste Bhumidhar. Such a conclusion is also supported by absence of specific provision relating to auction sales in execution of decree made in Section 23(2). 15. In Fakirey v. Board of Revenue (1968 RD 49) Satish Chandra, (as he then was), while considering the question whether transfer made in Contravention of Section 154 would be void and ineffective or not, observed A transfer made by a bhumidhar in contravention of Section 154 does not become void. 16. Similar view was expressed by V.G. Oak, I (as he then was) in Barjor v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, ( 1968 RD 66 ) wherein it was held: ..Upon an examination of the provisions of Sections 163, 166 and 189 of the Act, it appears that a transfer in Contravention of Section 154 is not void The transferee is only liable to the penalty laid down in Section 163. Subject to that liability, the transferee becomes the owner of the bhumidhari. 17. Subject to that liability, the transferee becomes the owner of the bhumidhari. 17. In Jai Prakash v. Deputy Director of Consolidation and others (1970 All Weekly Reporter 670) S. N. Singh, J. observed: A transfer made in contravention of Section 154 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act is not void, the only liability which is incurred by a transferor or transferee in the case is that they are liable to ejectment under Section 163 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act, till they are ejected the transferee continues to be the tenure holder of the property purchased. The right of the transferee is only affected when there is a suit by the Gaon Sabha for ejectment. Till then the transferee has good title in the property transferred. 18. In Kripashanker v. Director of Consolidation, ( 1979 AWC 458 ) similar question cropped up for consideration before Supreme Court as to whether the sale deed executed in contravention of the provisions of Section 154 would be void or voidable and to what extent. The Supreme Court after considering the relevant provisions of the Act observed Subsection (1) of Section 154 merely places a restriction on transfers by a Bhumidhar but does not deal with the effect of a deed executed in breach of the restriction imposed. The effect of the contravention of Section 154 has been specified in Section 163 and all that Section 163 provides is that where such a transfer in contravention of Section 154 has been made the transferee shall be liable to ejectment but the question is from what portion he is liable to be ejected ? The section provides the transferee shall, notwithstanding anything in the law, be liable to ejectment from such holding or part. The expression holding or part which undoubtedly refers to the holding or part that has been transferred by the Bhumidhar, is preceded by the word such and that whole expression such holding or part clearly means that holding or part thereof which has been transferred in contravention of Section 154. In other words the use of the word such clearly suggests that the ejectment should be from the land transferred in contravention of section 154 that is to say, from the land in excess of the prescribed limit. In other words the use of the word such clearly suggests that the ejectment should be from the land transferred in contravention of section 154 that is to say, from the land in excess of the prescribed limit. It has further been held: ...Section 189 deals with extinction of interest of a transferor Bhumidhar who has effected a transfer in contravention of sec. 154 and has no bearing on the question as to how and to what extent the transferee is affected by the contravention. 19. I am, thus, of the opinion, that transfer made in contravention of Section 154 of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act is not void but voidable only to the extent the land transferred, together with the land held by the transferee tenure holder, exceeds the prescribed limit of 12 1/2 acres. The transfer even in respect thereof will not be void although the transferee may be liable to ejectment by the Gaon Sabha. He would continue to be tenure holder of the land purchased and so mutation cannot be refused merely on the round that the vendee would be liable to ejectment on a suit filed by Gaon Sabha from the purchased land to the extent it exceeds the prescribed limit of 12 1/2 acres specified in Section 154 of the Act. 20. It also appears to be well settled that the consolidation authorities cannot refuse to mutate the name of the transferee on the basis of sale deed which may be said to be voidable to some extent. (See Mithan Singh v. Chandra Pal Singh and others, 1982 All LJ 1445). 21. Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, further urged that since the sale deed was executed by the Additional Munsif in execution of the decree for specific performance of contract, and, as such, it will not be hit by Section 154 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. No opinion was expressed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation on this question as he had held the entire sale deed to be void being hit by the provisions of Section 154. 22. It has already been expressed above that the sale deed in question cannot be said to be void because transfer made in contravention of Section 154 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act is not void. 22. It has already been expressed above that the sale deed in question cannot be said to be void because transfer made in contravention of Section 154 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act is not void. The only liability which is incurred by the transferee in such cases would be that he will be liable to ejectment by the Gaon Sabha. The right of the transferee is affected only when there is suit by the Gaon Sabha for his ejectment and such suit is decreed. Till then the transferee will hold good title in the property covered by the sale deed which cannot be held to be void, but voidable to certain extent as aforesaid. So far as the question whether the sale deed in question, which was executed by Court when the tenureholder judgment debtor had refused to execute sale deed in execution of decree for specific performance of contract would or would not be voidable to the extent it falls beyond 12 1/2 acres including the land covered by the sale deed concerned. I abstain from expressing any opinion on it as this question has not been dealt with by the consolidation authorities. However, in any view of the matter, I find that until such suit is filed and decreed, the sale deed cannot be said to be void or inoperative in respect of land which is said to be in excess of 12 1/2acres of land held by the tenure holder including the land covered by sale deed in question (see Barjor v. Dy. Director of Consolidation (Supra) 1968 RD 66 ) and Jai Prakash v. Deputy Director of Consolidation and others, 1970 All WR 670). 23. Thus, in view of the above I find that the Deputy Director of Consolidation has legally erred in holding the sale deed to be void on the aforesaid two grounds, which, in my opinion, cannot be sustained and the impugned order deserves to be quashed. 24. In the result, the Writ Petition No. 1377 of 1979 succeeds and is hereby allowed and the impugned order dated 3.5.1979 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation is hereby quashed and the name of the petitioner Ambika Prasad is directed to be recorded as Bhumidhar over the land of Khata No. 365 after expunging the entry in the name of opposite party No. 2 Bhagwati. The other writ petition No. 1880 of 1979, filed by Bhagwati deserves to be rejected being devoid of merits in view of what has been said above and it is accordingly dismissed. 25. No order as to costs. (Decided accordingly)