JUDGMENT 1. 1. This is plaintiff's second appeal against the judgment and decree passed by Additional District Judge, Kota, confirming the judgment passed by Munsif, Kota and dismissing the suit of the plaintiff appellant, for permanent injunction. 2. The plaintiff appellant was appointed as Chief Designer by M/s Instrumentation Limited, Kota, defendant No. 2, by an order dated 18th December, 1964 (Ex. A-2) which contained condition No. 13, Condition No. 13 runs as under: "Not with standing anything to the contrary here in before contained, the Company reserves the right to terminate your appointment during the period of training without assigning any reason upon giving you one calendar month's notice in writing on either side; On successful completion of your training your services will be continued, subject to satisfactory performance, and the appointment will be terminable by 3 months notice by the company or pay with allowances as admissible in lieu thereof, during the period of currency of the Bond referred to in para 10(a); After termination of the period of the Bond, your services will be continued subject to satisfactory performance, and the appointment will be terminable by 3 months notice on either side, or pay with allowances as admissible, in lieu thereof." The designation of the plaintiff was later on changed as Research and Training Manager. The plaintiff was served with a notice (Ex. A-1), dated 16-3-1970, terminating his services without assigning any person, which runs as under: Instrumentation Limited, Kota Admn. PP/62(1) 16th March, 1970 To, Mr. P.P. Dwivadi, Manager (Research and Training), Instrumentation Limited, Kota-5 (Rajasthan). The undersigned regrets to inform you that your services are terminated with immediate effect as per Clause 13 of the terms of your appointment dated 18-12-1964. As required under the said clause, three months pay with allowance as admissible in lieu of notice, is here by offered for payment to you. (i) You are requested to hand over the office charge to the Deputy Manager (Research); (ii) You are further requested to settle your account with the Company. Sd/- (Brig Q.B.J. Shahaney) Managing Director" 3. According to the plaintiff, this order was passed because Shri B.J. Shahaney, Managing Director was unduly biased against the plaintiff and was very much annoyed. 4. The plaintiff contended in the plaint that the order dated 16-3-1970 (Ex. Sd/- (Brig Q.B.J. Shahaney) Managing Director" 3. According to the plaintiff, this order was passed because Shri B.J. Shahaney, Managing Director was unduly biased against the plaintiff and was very much annoyed. 4. The plaintiff contended in the plaint that the order dated 16-3-1970 (Ex. A 1) was void and unauthorised as also ineffective for the reasons mentioned in para 3 of the plaint. One of the grounds taken in para 3(3) of the plaint was that the services of the petitioner could not be dispensed with after payment of three months salary. The plaintiff made the following prayer in the plaint: oknh dh izkFkZuk gS fd ,d LFkkbZ fu"ks/kkKk bl vk'k; dh izkFkZuk dh izpkfjr dh tkos fd izfroknh dze 2 oknh dh voS/k ,oa izHkko 'kwU; vkKk dz0 ,Mh0 lh0ih0 162%1% fnukad 16&3&1970 ds vuqikyu ,oa vuq'kj.k es lsok eqfDr u djs vkSj u lsok eqfDr le>dj oknh dk osru gh jksds u ,slk Loa; djs vkSj u vius deZpkjh;ks }kjk gh djok;sA [kpkZ eqdnek o vU; lehphu lgk;rk Hkh iznku dh tkosA 5. Along with the suit, the plaintiff also filed an application for grant of temporary injunction for the similar relief. 6. An ad-interim order was granted in favour of the plaintiff but the same was vacated by the trial court by order dated 9-5-1970. 7. The plaintiff preferred an appeal against the said order dated 9-6-1910 dismissing his application for grant of temporary injunction. The appeal was accepted and the order of the trial court, dated 9-5-1970 was set aside and ad-interim injunction passed on 17-3-1970 by the trial court was confirmed till the decision of the suit. 8. The defendants went in revision before the High Court against the order of the first appellate court, where the defendant Company filed an undertaking to the following effect: "M/s Instrumentation Limited, Kota here by gives this undertaking that in case the suit is decreed in favour of the plaintiff and the decision becomes final, the defendant company M/s Instrumentation Limited, Kota shall pay all arrears of the salary and other emoluments of the plaintiffs from the date of the suit to the date of the decision. In case the plaintiff secures some other job during this period, he will have to get the amount of emoluments received by him from his employer adjusted in the amount to be paid by the defendant company." 9. In case the plaintiff secures some other job during this period, he will have to get the amount of emoluments received by him from his employer adjusted in the amount to be paid by the defendant company." 9. In view of this undertaking, the revision petition was accepted and the order of the first appellate court dated 26-11-1970 was set aside and that of Munsif, Kota, dated 9-5-1970, dismissing the application for grant of temporary injunction was restored. 10. The suit was contested by the defendants. It was also submitted that defendant No. 2 is a private limited company. The relations between the company and the plaintiff was that of master and servant only and for breach of this relationship, suit for permanent injunction could not be brought and that services of the plaintiff were terminated in accordance with law. 11. The plaint was amended more than once, and the last amended plaint was filed on May 4, 1974. 12. Amended written statement was filed on 18-5-1974 to which a rejoinder was also filed by the plaintiff on May 20, 1974. This rejoinder was allowed by the court vide order dated May 5, 1974 and thereafter, the defendants did not file any reply to the said rejoinder. 13. The trial court after recording evidence, dismissed the suit vide its judgment dated 10-9 1974. On appeal, learned Additional District Judge, Kota confirmed the said judgment of the trial court and dismissed the appeal. 14. The plaintiff has filed this second appeal against the judgment and decree passed by the trial court which has been affirmed by the lower appellate court. 15. On 17-7-1986, the plaintiff appellant moved an application under Order 41, Rule 2, CPC, craving leave of the court to challenge the impugned order on the following grounds: (a) That the termination of service of the appellant who was a permanent employee is clearly arbitrary, unreasonable and unjust and, is therefore, violative of the provisions of Articles 14, 21 and 41 of the Constitution of India; (b) That clause/para 13 contained in the Contract of employment (Ex. A 2) is void under Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, as it is opposed to public policy and is wholly unreasonable, such a clause which permits termination of service by giving a notice of three months is wholly arbitrary and confers unbridled direction on the employer to terminate the service of an employee. Such a condition violates Articles 14, 21 and 41 of the Constitution of India; (c) That the respondent is a Government Company and is an agency/instrumentality of the Government and is, therefore, a State under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. Its employees like the appellant are entitled to a specific performance of a contract of employment and the Civil Court is entitled to quash the order of termination and also order reinstatement with consequential relief. 16. During the course of arguments, learned Counsel for the appellant has moved an application on 26-7-1986 for amendment of the plaint, and has sought to challenge the legality of Clause 13 of the letter of appointment (Ex. A 2), dated 18-12-1964 on the basis of the latest authority of the Supreme Court in Central Inland Water Transport Corporation v. Brojonath Ganguly ( 1986 3 SCC 156 ) . The appellant has also sought permission to add an additional prayer clause of the plaint and has also filed the amended plaint along with the application for amendment. No reply has been filed by the defendant respondents to either of these applications. 17. Learned Counsel for the appellant has submitted that the defendant company is a Government company totally financed and administratively controlled by the Government of India and is, therefore, a 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, it is bound to act fairly and reasonably and it cannot dispense with the services of its employees without giving reasons or without complying with the principles of natural justice. It was also submitted that the order terminating service of the appellant has been passed in total disregard of and in violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. He further submitted that Clause 13 of the appointment letter is also unconscionable, unfair, unreasonable, opposed to public policy and is violative and Article 14 of the Constitution of India and thus void and inoperative. 18. He further submitted that Clause 13 of the appointment letter is also unconscionable, unfair, unreasonable, opposed to public policy and is violative and Article 14 of the Constitution of India and thus void and inoperative. 18. On the question of amendment, learned Counsel for the appellant has submitted that the frame of prayer is not material. One should look to the substance as to what relief has been claimed. There is no restriction that court may not grant a relief which has not been prayed specifically, and in this connection, has placed reliance on Radha Bai v. Nandlal AIR 1966 Bombay 649 , Smt. Indumati Ben v. Union of India AIR 1969 Bombay 423 and Prabhu Dayal v. Gaon Samaj 1969 All. Law Journal 426 and wherein it has been observed that in a suit for injunction, the plaintiffs right to injunction is based upon some title which he must establish to the satisfaction of the court. It is not necessary for him to add a formal prayer for declaration of his right as a prayer for injunction necessarily involves declaration of title which is denied by the defendant in the suit. In the present case, the appellant has moved an application for amendment of the plaint and has specifically included a prayer for declaration. He has also urged that the additional legal submissions are based on the latest Supreme Court pronouncement and, therefore, the same should be allowed to be raised. 19. It has been argued by the learned Counsel for the appellant that the last decade has seen a tremendous development of law relating to the employees of Government and public bodies and now, there hardly remains any distinction between a Government servant on the one hand, and the servant of a public corporation of public company or institution financed/controlled by the Government. Employees of the bodies, authorities or institutions which are instrumentalities or agencies of the Government are entitled to the protection of various constitutional provisions except Article 311. They are entitled to the same relief from a court of law as can be granted to a civil servant. Employees of the bodies, authorities or institutions which are instrumentalities or agencies of the Government are entitled to the protection of various constitutional provisions except Article 311. They are entitled to the same relief from a court of law as can be granted to a civil servant. He has placed reliance on Ramanna Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority ( AIR 1979 SC 1628 ) , Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib ( AIR 1981 SC 487 ) , Som Prakash Rakhi v. Bharat Petroleum ( AIR 1981 SC 212 ) , U.P. Warehousing, Corporation v. Vijay Narayan ( AIR 1984 SC 1361 ) , P.K. Ramchandra Iyre v. Union of India ( AIR 1984 SC 541 ) , S.L. Soni v. RSMDC 1985 RLR 857 , Kunju Mohammad v. State of Kerala 1984 (II) LLJ 1 ; and Central Inland Water Transport Corpn. Ltd. v. Brojonath (supra). 20. He has further submitted that the forward march which the law has taken during last one decade cannot be put in reverse gear. A suit for declaration and injunction or a writ may not have been maintainable in 1970 when Praga Tools Corporation v. C.V. Imamual ( AIR 1969 SC 1306 ) , U.P. State Ware Housing Corporation v. Chandra Kiran Tyagi ( AIR 1970 SC 1244 ) or Indian Airlines Corporation v. Sukhdeo Rai ( AIR 1971 SC 1828 ) held field. But this position has completely changed now. The change in legal position which commenced with Sirai Municipality v. CKF Tellis ( AIR 1973 SC 1331 ) has now reached its peak with the pronouncement in Central Inland Water Transport Corporation's case (supra). According to the counsel for appellant, Sabhajit Tiwari's case ( AIR 1975 SC 1329 ) , has been considered by various benches of the Supreme Court in Rammnna Dayarom Shetty, Ajay Hasia, Som Prakash Rakhi, P.K. Ramchandra Iyre and Central Inland Water Transport Corporation (supra) and has been fully explained and it has been observed in the later decisions that the propositions enunciated in Sabhajit Tiwari's case (supra) should be read as confined to its own facts. Moreover, according to appellants counsel, the later decision of the Supreme Court should be followed in preference to the earlier one. Moreover, according to appellants counsel, the later decision of the Supreme Court should be followed in preference to the earlier one. He has placed reliance on State v. Kamlesh Hari AIR 1960 Allahabad 451 , M/s Sovachand Mulchand v. The Collector of Central Excise AIR 1968 Cal 174 ; and Chenaram v. State of Rajasthan 1972 WLN 1025 . 21. Learned Counsel for the appellant has further submitted that there is no difference between a suit and the writ petition. The only difference is with regard to procedure, High Court has got the same power when it is hearing a civil writ petition or a civil second appeal. More over, in the original plaint also, There was a clause in the relief: vU; lehphu lgk;rk Hkh iznku dh tkosA . A which meant appropriate relief on the facts and circumstances of the case. He has further submitted that appeal is nothing but a continuation of suit and if a relief could be granted in the suit, the appellate court has also got the same powers like the trial court. 22. He has invited the attention of the court to the case of Sirsi Municipality (supra) and other cases which ware cases arising out of a suit and the grant of relief of declaration for reinstatement was upheld by the Apex Court. He has further submitted that there is nothing like contract of personal service in public employment and the service in all public companies, Corporations, institution is always impersonal in nature. He has referred to the following observations of Hon'ble Bhagwati, J. as he then was, in Executive Committee, Vaish Decree College v. Laxmi Navain AIR 1976 SC 888 . "This rationale obviously can have application only where the contract of employment is a contract of personal service involving personal relations. It can have little relevance to conditions of employment in modern large scale industry and enterprise or statutory bodies or public authorities where there is professional management of impersonal nature. It is difficult to regard the contract of employment in such cases as a contract of personal service save in exceptional cases. There is no reason why specific performance should be refused in cases of this kind where the contract of employment does not involve relationship of personal character. It is difficult to regard the contract of employment in such cases as a contract of personal service save in exceptional cases. There is no reason why specific performance should be refused in cases of this kind where the contract of employment does not involve relationship of personal character. It must be noted that all these doctrines of contract of service as personal, non assignable, unenforceable, and so on, grew up in an age when the contract of service was still frequently a 'personal relation' between the owner of a small workshop or trade or business and his servant. The conditions have now vastly changed and these doctrines have to be adjusted and reformulated in order to suit needs of a changing society. We cannot doggedly hold fast to these doctrines which correspond to the social realities of an earlier generation far removed from ours. We must rid the law of these anachronistic doctrines and bring it in accord with the felt necessities of the times." 23. He has further submitted that it will be a peculiar anomaly if a worker in an industrial unit can claim reinstatement and is entitled for a declaration under the Industrial Law, why not an officer who is not a workman should also get this relief. Two persons working in the same industry should be entitled to the similar relief, otherwise it will amount to violation of Article 14. 24. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the defendants has very vehemently submitted that the present case is not a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India but is a second appeal arising out of a civil suit and we have to be guided by the pleadings of the parties. He has seriously opposed the amendment of the plaint also and the points which learned Counsel for the appellant has sought to raise in this appeal but which do not find place any where in the pleadings. Learned Counsel for the respondents has further submitted that the powers of the High Court while hearing writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are quite different and much more wide than while hearing a civil second appeal arising out of a suit. Civil Suit has to be tried in accordance with the Civil Procedure code. Learned Counsel for the respondents has further submitted that the powers of the High Court while hearing writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are quite different and much more wide than while hearing a civil second appeal arising out of a suit. Civil Suit has to be tried in accordance with the Civil Procedure code. According to him, the plaintiff in the suit has to plead his case and a particular relied has to be claimed and the court cannot go beyond the reliefs which the plaintiff has claimed. In the present case, the only relief claimed by the plaintiff was that of permanent injunction against the defendants that they may not terminate his service in pursuance of order dated 16-3-1970 nor they should stop payment of his salary, taking his services to have been terminated. The plaintiff has not prayed for a declaration that the order dated 16-3-1970 should be quashed or the same is void nor even damages have been claimed. Moreover, the plaintiff did not amend his plaint inspite of objection in the written statement and merely filing a rejoinder to the written statement does not amount to amendment in the plaint. In the rejoinder also, it was submitted that the relief of declaration was not specifically asked for but was treated as implied in the pleadings. It has further been submitted that in view of Section 38, 40 and 41 of the Specific Relief Act, the plaintiff is not entitled to the relief that he wants to avail, as no declaration has been sought nor any damages have been claimed and the suit is purely and simply for grant of permanent injunction and injunction cannot be granted to prevent the breach of a contract, the performance of which would not be specifically enforced. 25. He has further submitted that the defendant Company cannot be held to be a 'State' within meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India and even if it is so held, it is only for the purpose of Part-Ill and Part-IV of the Constitution and not for the purpose of Article 311 of the Constitution which is in Part-XIV or any other provision of the Constitution. Learned Counsel for the respondents has placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Sabhajit Tiwari v. Union of India and Ors. Learned Counsel for the respondents has placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Sabhajit Tiwari v. Union of India and Ors. ( AIR 1975 SC 1329 ) and some observations in Sukhdeo Singh v. Bhagat Ram ( AIR 1975 SC 1331 ) in support of his submission. He has further submitted that the plaintiff will be entitled to the relief that he could get on the date of filing of the suit in accordance with law as it existed when the suit was filed. In this connection, he has placed reliance on Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbish Choudhary and Ors. ( AIR 1957 SC 540 ) . He has further submitted that it is only the industrial court that can take into the matter and substitute its own decision and give proper relief that is not so in the case of High Court hearing civil second appeal and in this connection, he has placed reliance on S. Amarjeet Singh v. Punjab National Bank 1986 (2) SLR 121 . Learned Counsel for the respondent further submitted that employees of the Companies are not entitled to reinstatement. In this connection, he has placed reliance on Ram Chandra v. Ram Rekhmal AIR 1971 Rajasthan 292) . He has further placed reliance on Vaish Degree College v. Lakshmi Narain AIR. 1976 SC 888) where in it was held that the Executive Committee of a degree college registered under the Registration of Co-operative Societies Act, and affiliated to Agra University, is not a statutory body and a contract of personal service of an employee of such a degree college, cannot ordinarily be specifically enforced and the court normally would not give a declaration that the contract subsists and the employee deemed to continue in service. 26. Reference has also been made to Mysore State Road Transport Corporation v. Mirja Nhasim Ali Beg and another ( AIR 1977 SC 747 ) where in while relying on Vaish Degree College (supra), it has been held, a declaration to enforce a contract of personal service can be granted in appropriate cases of public servants who have been dismissed from service in contravention of Article 311 of the Constitution but the relief of declaration is discretionary. In Usha Das v. Arati Kar (AIR 1982 Calcutta 174) , it has been held that an employee of a private school does not acquire statuary status and cannot claim a declaration and the remedy is only by way of suit for damages as the contract of personal service cannot ordinarily be specifically enforced. 27. According to the learned Counsel for the respondents general rule is this that a contract of service cannot specifically be enforced and there are only three well recognised exception to this rule i. e. the contract of service cannot entered only in three types of cases. (i) Where a civil servant is removed in violation of Article 311 of the Constitution (ii) Where a statutory body has acted in breach of statutory regulations or has violated the principles of natural justice and (iii) Where a workman has been removed from service in contravention of the provisions of Industrial Legislations. He further submits that the case of the appellant does not fall in any of the exceptions to the general rule and, therefore, no declaration can be given in favour of the appellant. 28. Learned Counsel for the respondents has also submitted that view expressed by the Supreme Court in Sabhajit Tiwari's. case (5 Judges) (supra) should prevail and the latter decisions by smaller benches cannot be preferred. In this connection, he has placed reliance on Union of India v. K.S. Subramanyan ( AIR 1976 SC 2433 ) , State of U.P. v. Ram Chandra ( AIR 1976 SC 2547 ) and Mattulal v. Radheylal ( AIR 1974 SC 1596 ) . 29. I have considered the rival contentions advanced by the counsels for the parties and also gone through the various pronouncements of the Supreme Court. 30. Order 6, Rule 17, CPC gives ample power to the Court to allow amendment of the plaint at any stage of the proceedings. Since much water has flown after the present suit was filed and the Supreme Court has given new dimensions to the service law, it will be in the interest of justice to allow amendment of the plaint. The plaintiff could not have thought of raising these objections which he wants to raise now in view of the decisions and view of the Supreme Court in 1970. The plaintiff could not have thought of raising these objections which he wants to raise now in view of the decisions and view of the Supreme Court in 1970. It is only during later years that the Supreme Court has altogether changed its view and therefore, the plaintiff cannot he held guilty of laches or negligence in not applying for amendment earlier. 31. Hence application under Order 6, Rule 17, CPC filed by the plaintiff for amendment of the plaint is allowed. The amended plaint has already been filed which is taken on record. Since there is no question of fact which is sought to be impleaded by amendment and since the suit is pending since 19(SIC), I do not think it advisable or necessary to formally give time to the defendant respondents to file amended written statement as there is nothing on facts to be controverted by the defendants. It is only a matter of arguments which learned Counsel for the respondents has already made during the course of arguments. Since amendment of the plaint is allowed, the application under Order 41, Rule 2, CPC should also be allowed. The appellant is allowed to raise these additional points in this appeal as the appellant could not have raised these points in, his memo of appeal earlier, therefore, leave is granted. The defendant had sufficient opportunity to meet those objections. 32. On the merits of the case, both the counsels argued the case at length and have cited a number of authorities. I would like to mention as to how the law with regard to service matters in the present context developed by the various judgment of Supreme Court. 33. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Sunil Kumar ( AIR 1964 SC 847 ) (3 Judges) it was held that an employee of the statutory Corporation or a company is entitled to a relief of declaration and reinstatement against wrongful termination of services. Similarly, in Mafatlal v. Divisional Controller ( AIR 1966 SC 1364 ) (5 Judges) an order of dismissal by the State Transport Corporation was quashed as the employees, who was permanent, was not given a reasonable opportunity to show cause against the action proposed which amount to violation of principles of natural justice. Similarly, in Mafatlal v. Divisional Controller ( AIR 1966 SC 1364 ) (5 Judges) an order of dismissal by the State Transport Corporation was quashed as the employees, who was permanent, was not given a reasonable opportunity to show cause against the action proposed which amount to violation of principles of natural justice. However, in U.P. State Wareshousing Corporation v. Chandra Kiran Tyagi (2 Judges), (supra) the Supreme Court took a totally different view and held that the rules and regulations framed by the statutory Corporations do not have force of law and the employee of such bodies cannot claim relief of declaration and reinstatement, and dismissal cannot be declared as null and void. The same proposition was reiterated in Indian Airlines Corporation, Sukhdeo Rai (supra). However, in a latter decision in Sirsi Municipality (supra), the Supreme Court held that the regulations framed under the Act had the force of law and the employee was entitled to the relief of declaration that an action taken in breach of the regulations or the principles or natural justice was void and that he was entitled to reinstatement. This judgment was given by a breach consisting of 5 Judges. The same view has been taken in Sukhdev Singh's case (5 Judges) (supra) after considering Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Sunil Kumar Mukherjee Mafatlal ( AIR 1964 SC 847 ) (supra), Sirsi Municipality (supra) as well as the two decisions in Chandra Kiran Tyagi and Sukhdeo Rai which took a contrary view. This position was strongly reiterated in Vijay Narain's case . 34. Similarly, with regard to the Government companies, the view of the Supreme Court in Praga Tools Corporation, C.V. Imamual, S.L. Agarwal v. Hindustan Steel Ltd. (5 Judges) and Sabhajit Tiwari (5 Judges) (supra) was that the employees of the Government company are not entitled to the protection under Article 311 of the Constitution of India and that employees of such institutions are not entitled to a declaration of invalidity of the termination of their services and are also not entitled to decree of reinstatement. Their services were purely contractual and such contract of service could not specifically be enforced. Similar view was expressed in regard to the employees of public bodies which were registered under the Societies Registration Act or Co-operative Societies Act. Their services were purely contractual and such contract of service could not specifically be enforced. Similar view was expressed in regard to the employees of public bodies which were registered under the Societies Registration Act or Co-operative Societies Act. However, since 1979, the Supreme Court has Consistently taken the view that the Government companies, Corporations, public instructions which are not created by order under the statute but are Incorporated and/or registered under the Companies Act, the Societies Registration Act or Co-operative Societies Act would fall within the ambit of the term 'State' used in Article 12 of the Constitution. I once it is found that such a Government company, Corporation, Society or Institution is an agency or instrumentality of the Government. Several tests have been laid down in various authorities of the Supreme Court to determine as to whether a particular body is an agency or instrumentality of the Government. Some of them are financial control/assistance, administrative control, Government interference and management and audit and accounts. It has further been held that employees of such authorities are entitled to protection of constitutional provisions contained in Part-III and other chapters of the Constitution, except the provisions contained under Article 311 of the Constitution. It has also been held that such authorities are bound to follow the principles of natural justice in dealing with their employees and that such authorities are bound by their own rules, regulations, bye laws etc. even though the same may not be statutory in character. It would be useful to make a reference to some of the decisions in this regard. (i) Damanna Hayaram Shetty's case (3 Judges); [Noticed cases of Sabhajit Tiwari, Praga Tools and Dr. S.L. Agarwal v. Hindustan Steel]. (ii) Vijay Narain's case (supra) (2 Judges); [Noticed cases of Sabhajit Tiwari, Dr. S.L. Agarwal, Indian Airlines Corporation, Sirsi Municipality, Mafatlal and Chandra Kiran Tyagi (supra)] (iii) Som Prakash Rekhi's case (3 Judges) (supra); [Noticed case of Sabhajit Tiwari, Sukhdev Singh, Sirsi Municipality, Praga Tools; Ramanna Dayaram Shetty, Dr. S.L. Agarwal, Som Prakash Rekhi and Vijay Narain (supra)]. (iv) Ajay Hasia's case (5 Judges); [Noticed cases of Sabhajit Tiwari, Sukhdeo Singh, Ramanna Daya Ram Shetty and Vijay Narain]. (v) B.S. Minbas v. Indian Statistical Institute (2 Judges); [Noticed cases of Sukhhev Singh Ajay Hasia and Ramanna Daya Ram Shetty]. S.L. Agarwal, Som Prakash Rekhi and Vijay Narain (supra)]. (iv) Ajay Hasia's case (5 Judges); [Noticed cases of Sabhajit Tiwari, Sukhdeo Singh, Ramanna Daya Ram Shetty and Vijay Narain]. (v) B.S. Minbas v. Indian Statistical Institute (2 Judges); [Noticed cases of Sukhhev Singh Ajay Hasia and Ramanna Daya Ram Shetty]. (vi) P.K. Ramchandra Iyer's case (2 Judges) (supra) [Noticed cases of Sabhajit Tiwari, Sukhdeo Singh, Ajay Hasia, Ramanna Dayaram Shetty and Vijay Narain]. (vii) A.L. Kalra's case (3 Judges) [Noticed Sukhdeo Singh, Ajay Hasia and Vijay Narain's cases]. (viii) Man Mohan's case, (2 Judges) [Noticed case of Ajay Hasia]. (ix) Central Inland Water Transport Corpn.'s case. 35. As a result of this series of costs, the following principles emerge: (i) An employee whether he is a Government servant or servant of a statutory body or a Government company or society being an instrumentality or agency of the Government is entitled to claim relief of declaration and injunction as well as reinstatement against unlawful action in the matter of removal/dismissal/termination or other punishment. (ii) Employees of such body are entitled to the protection of Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution and other constitutional provisions. (iii) The relationship between the employees and the employer is not purely of matter and servant but there is relationship of status. Ordinarily, they do not enter into contract of personal service and their services are impersonal. (iv) Services of such employees may be regulated by statutory rules, enactments or administrative rules or even by the terms and conditions incorporated in the matter of appointment but the method of laying down the service conditions cannot make any difference, so far as the question of protection of the constitutional provisions and other principles, like that of natural justice, is concerned. 36. A bare look at the Articles of Association of the Company would show that applying these principles to the facts of the present case, the defendant company is an agency or instrumentality, of the Government, President of India has a final control in various matters. It is totally financed by the Government of India and the Government has got wide administrative control over the functions and affairs of the company. It is totally financed by the Government of India and the Government has got wide administrative control over the functions and affairs of the company. Thus, the respondents will come within the ambit of word 'State' used in Article 12 of the Constitution of India and its employees are entitled to protection of Articles 14, 16, 21 and 41 of the Constitution of India, in view of the observations of the Supreme Court in various authorities quoted above and specially the latest pronouncement of the Supreme Court in 1986(3) SCC 166 (supra), Clause 13 of the letter of appointment (Ex. A-2) dated 18-12-1964 is void being violative of Articles 14, 16, 21 and 41 of the Constitution. It is also unconscionable, unfair, unreasonable and opposed to public policy. 37. The appellant was in service since 1964 and no reason has been assigned for termination of his services nor any opportunity was given to the appellant to show cause why his services should not be terminated thus, it was clearly arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. 38. The appellant cannot be said to be in personal service of the respondents. Looking to the conditions of employment and the duties assigned to the appellant in the large industry like the respondent company, it is difficult to regard the contract of employment in such cases as a contract of personal service as it does not involve relationship of personal character. Therefore, Specific Relief Act will not come in the way while granting relief to the appellant. 39. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the impugned Order (Ex. A-1), dated 16-3-1970 is hereby quashed. The appellant will be deemed to be in continuous service of the respondent company. However, in view of the undertaking given by the respondent company on 16-11-1971 in this court in S.B. Civil Revision Petition No. 593/70. decided on 17-11-1971 the defendant respondent company shall pay to the plaintiff appellant all arrears of salary and other emoluments from the date of filing of the suit, after adjusting the amount which the plaintiff might have received as emoluments from his other employer during this period. The parties are left to bear their own costs.Appeal allowed. *******