Judgment Brijesh Kumar, J. 1. THIS writ petition has been filed, on being aggrieved by the order of Vice Chancellor, disapproving the recommendation of selection committee for appointment of the petitioner as Lecturer for B. Ed. classes in Nagrik Degree College, Janghai, District Jaunpur. The petitioner had approached the Chancellor by means of representation 'as provided under Section 68 of the State University Act but without any success. 2. THE relevant facts, briefly stated are, that four posts for teaching B. Ed. classes in Nagrik Degree College, Janghai, District Jaunpur, were advertised in the Newspaper dated 17-11-76. THE Principal of the Institution wrote to the Vice Chancellor for nominating experts on the selection committee. By means of Annexure-4 dated 17-12-76 the Registrar of the Gorakhpur University communicated the names of two experts for constituting the selection committee. THE two experts nominated are Prof. S. P. Chaubey, Head of the Department of Education, Gorakhpur University and Dr. Sita Ram Jaiswal, Education Department, Lucknow University. THE selection committee was scheduled to be held on 3-3-1977 but it was not held on that day and the selection was postponed until further orders. It appears, that in certain Circumstances, the posts in question were re-advertised in the month of September, 1977 in the News Paper. True copies of the News Papers making first advertisement dated 17-11-76 and the second advertisement made in September 1977 have been annexed as Annexures 1 and 2 respectively to the writ petition. After the posts were re-advertised in September, 1977, 6-11-1977 was fixed for holding the meeting of the selection committee. THE meeting, as scheduled, was held and the candidates were interviewed. THE selection committee consisted of Rajendra Prasad Shukla as Acting Principal of the Institution, Tarak Nath Tripathi, the nominee of the Principal, Damodar Misra the President of the Institution, Dr. Sarjoo prasad Chaubey, Expert and Dr. Sita Ram Jaiswal, Expert. A true copy of the minutes of the selection committee has been filed as Annexure-6 to the writ petition. A perusal of the same indicates that the selection committee had recommended the names of four persons unanimously, including the name of the petitioner, Avadh Behari Pandey, at serial no. 3 of the list of selected candidates. THE committee had recommended for appointment of the selected candidates on probation in the scales approved by the Government. A perusal of the same indicates that the selection committee had recommended the names of four persons unanimously, including the name of the petitioner, Avadh Behari Pandey, at serial no. 3 of the list of selected candidates. THE committee had recommended for appointment of the selected candidates on probation in the scales approved by the Government. Although under Section 31 (11) (a) of the U. P. State Universities Act it is provided that no Teacher recommended by the selection committee shall be appointed unless prior approval by the Vice Chancellor has been obtained yet it appears that the Management appointed the petitioner by means of an appointment letter dated 7-11-77, a true copy of which has been filed as Annexure-7 to the writ petition. It has, however, been mentioned that the appointment was subject to the approval by the Vice Chancellor. Clause (b) of sub-section (11) of Section 31 of the U. P. State Universities Act (for short the Act) provides that the Management, as soon as possible, after meeting of the selection committee shall submit the recommendation of the committee alongwith other relevant documents to the Vice Chancellor for approval. In compliance with the above noted provisions the Management forwarded the recommendation of the selection committee alongwith some other papers to the Vice Chancellor. According to the petitioner the papers were sent to the Vice Chancellor on 3-2-1978 but were received by the Vice Chancellor only on 10-6-78. However, on behalf of the University it has been stated in the counter affidavit that the said papers were received on 12-6-78. Since it was thought by the Vice Chancellor that all the relevant papers were not sent by the Management by means of a registered letter dated 26-6-78 written by the Registrar, the Management was asked to furnish the papers mentioned therein. A true copy of the letter has been filed on behalf of the Gorakhpur University. A perusal of this letter indicates that it was written in reference to the Management's letter dated 3-2-1978. It, therefore, appears that the letter requesting for according approval, sent by the Management, to the Vice Chancellor, is dated 3-2-1978, as averred by the petitioner but it seems to have been delivered to the Vice Chancellor only on 12-6-78. A perusal of this letter indicates that it was written in reference to the Management's letter dated 3-2-1978. It, therefore, appears that the letter requesting for according approval, sent by the Management, to the Vice Chancellor, is dated 3-2-1978, as averred by the petitioner but it seems to have been delivered to the Vice Chancellor only on 12-6-78. A reply to the letter of the Registrar, requiring the Management to furnish certain documents, is said to have been given by Sri Ram Dularey Tripathi, the Principal of the College by means of his letter dated 22-7-78. A true copy of the letter of the Principal has been filed as Annexure B-2 to the counter affidavit of the University. In his letter Sri Tripathi has pointed out several illegalities and irregularities in the selection held for the post in question. THE University, in its counter affidavit, has stated that the letter written by the Principal was received by the Vice Chancellor. However, the petitioner, in the writ petition has stated that the information required by the Vice Chancellor was submitted by the Manager under covering letter on 4-11-78. A true copy of the letter enclosing the required information has been filed as Annexure-10 to the writ petition. THE above averment has been made in the writ petition and I find that the reply submitted by the University by means of a counter affidavit does not specifically controvert the averments of the petitioner to the effect that the required information was furnished on 4-11-78 through letter; Annexure 10, to the writ petition. The case of the petitioner is that although the required information was furnished yet no communication was received from the Vice Chancellor, within one month, disapproving the proposal. It has been averred that the petitioner, in pursuance of the selection held, was given appointment by means of appointment letter dated 7-11-1977 and he had been teaching but he has not been paid his salary inspite of repeated requests and demands made. Ultimately the petitioner had no option but to file a writ petition in this Hon'ble Court. The writ petition was, however, dismissed, by order dated 10th April 1980, a true copy of which has been filed as Annexure No 11 to the writ petition, on the ground that the petitioner had already preferred a representation to the Chancellor which was then pending. The writ petition was, however, dismissed, by order dated 10th April 1980, a true copy of which has been filed as Annexure No 11 to the writ petition, on the ground that the petitioner had already preferred a representation to the Chancellor which was then pending. The Chancellor sent representation of the petitioner, to the Vice Chancellor, as the representation dated 19-12-78 preferred by the petitioner did not fall within the purview of Section 68 of the U. P. State Universities Act. A true copy of the communication sent on behalf of the Chancellor has been filed as Annexure-12 to the writ petition. It also mentions that the Vice Chancellor shall take appropriate action and apprise the petitioner of the action taken by him in the matter. The Vice Chancellor disposed of the representation by his order dated September 10, 1980, a true copy of which has been filed as Annexure-13 to the writ petition. The Vice Chancellor in his order said that there was no question of according approval to the selection of Teachers as fresh nomination of experts was not asked for after the posts were re-advertised. The Management had called the experts who were nominated earlier. Aggrieved by the order passed by the Vice Chancellor the petitioner approached the Chancellor by means of a representation, a true copy of which has been filed as Annexure-14 to the writ petition. The Chancellor rejected the representation by his order dated March 7, 1981, a true copy of which has been filed as Annexure 19 to the writ petition. From a perusal of the order passed by the Chancellor, it appears, that on behalf of the petitioner it was claimed that the petitioner should be deemed to have been approved by the Vice Chancellor, under the proviso to Section 31 (11) (c) of the Act, since the disapproval was not communicated within one month of submission of the relevant papers under Section 31 (11) (b) of the Act. This contention was, however, rejected by the Chancellor observing that the Management had submitted required documents after great delay, as a result of which the matter got delayed and disapproval could not be communicated within the time namely within one month. This contention was, however, rejected by the Chancellor observing that the Management had submitted required documents after great delay, as a result of which the matter got delayed and disapproval could not be communicated within the time namely within one month. It has also been observed that communication for furnishing relevant papers was sent by the Vice Chancellor within one month of the receipt of the relevant documents which were first submitted by the Management on 12-6-1977, therefore, benefit of deeming clause was not available to the petitioner. On merits, it was held by the Chancellor that a fresh request should have been made for nominating experts after re-advertisement of the posts. Another ground, which has been taken into account by the Chancellor in holding the selection invalid, is that the constitution of the selection committee was invalid as the rightful Principal and his nominee had not participated in the meeting of the Committee, instead Sri Shukla and his nominee had participated. 3. IT is in the above circumstances that the present writ petition has been filed impugning the orders passed by the Vice Chancellor and the Chancellor. Counter affidavits have been filed on behalf of opposite party no. 2 the Vice Chancellor of the Gorakhpur University and by Sri R. D. Tripathi, the Principal of the Institution, the opposite party no. 3 The case of the opposite parties is that the selection was bad and invalid as held by the Vice Chancellor and the Chancellor on the grounds enumerated in their orders. 4. AS noted earlier, the reason given by the Vice Chancellor for not according approval was that the names of new experts were not asked for after the re-advertisement of the post. The Principal, in his reply dated 22-7-/8, had pointed out in paragraph 6 that a request for nomination of experts should be made within 14 days from the date of advertisement and in that connection had referred to the provisions of Statute 13 D of Statutes but I find that it deals with some other matter. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that he has not been able to lay his hands upon any such provision under the Act or Statute requiring fresh nomination of experts after re-advertisement of the post in respect of which experts had already been nominated. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that he has not been able to lay his hands upon any such provision under the Act or Statute requiring fresh nomination of experts after re-advertisement of the post in respect of which experts had already been nominated. However, on behalf of the University Sri Umesh Chandra, has shown, ' Interpretation of First Statutes of Gorakhpur University by the Vice Chancellor in exercise of his powers under Section 13 (1) and 13 (4) of the U. P. State Universities Act, 1973. Clause 13 of the said interpretation prescribes procedure for selection and appointments of Teachers in the affiliated colleges. Sub-clause (e) of Clause 13 provides that the request for experts from the Vice Chancellor shall be made by the Principal of the College within a fortnight from the first issue of advertisement. The Chancellor while upholding the order passed by the Vice Chancellor disapproving the proposal, gave an additional ground for disapproving the recommendation of the Selection Committee. The Chancellor in his order has held that the Selection Committee was illegally constituted inasmuch as the regularly appointed Principal Sri R. D. Tripathi and his nominee were not included in the Selection Committee instead the Acting Principal and his nominee had participated. The Chancellor in his order has found that the order of suspension passed against Sri R. D. Tripathi has been stayed on 16-9-77 but he was not allowed to resume charge before 6-12-77. Since the order of suspension stood stayed on the date on which the Selection Committee met, it was only Sri R. D. Tripathi and his nominee who could participate in the meeting. In reply to the said argument the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the Chancellor was not competent to hold the selection and proposal of appointment illegal on the ground which was not a ground for disapproval by the Vice Chancellor. The Chancellor under Section 68 of the State Universities Act Could only examine the decision of an authority, in the light, whether it was in conformity with the provisions of the Act, Statutes or Ordinance, or not. The Chancellor could only examine the order passed by the Vice Chancellor and could not add a fresh ground for holding selection invalid. According to the learned Counsel for the petitioner, the Selection Committee of an affiliated College is not an authority or Officer of the University. The Chancellor could only examine the order passed by the Vice Chancellor and could not add a fresh ground for holding selection invalid. According to the learned Counsel for the petitioner, the Selection Committee of an affiliated College is not an authority or Officer of the University. Learned counsel for the petitioner also pressed into service the provision of Section 66 of the Act which provides that no proceeding of any authority or body or committee of University shall be invalid merely by reason of some defect in constitution of the body or for the reason that some person took part in the proceedings who was not so entitled or because of any irregularity in procedure not effecting the merits of the case. It has been submitted that the decision of the Selection Committee was unanimous in favour of the petitioner. Even if the Acting Principal and his nominee had not participated the requisite quorum would be there and recommendation with experts and the representation of the Management would have been quite valid and legal. In reply. Sri Umesh Chandra submitted that the whole proceedings of the committee would be vitiated if two persons who were not authorised to participate did participate knowingly in an authorised manner. 5. THE third point involved in the case is about deemed approval of the selection and proposal to appoint the petitioner, in view of the proviso to Clause (c) of sub-section (11) of Section 31 of the Act. THE case of the petitioner is that since the order of disapproval has not been conveyed within one month from the date of receipt of papers submitted to the Vice Chancellor under Clause (b) of Sub-section (11) of Section 31 of the Act, it would be deemed that the selection of the petitioner was approved. THE question to be considered is whether the period of one month for deemed approval under proviso to Section 31 (11) (c) of the Act, can be reckoned from the date when the query made by the Vice Chancellor is replied to and relevant documents are submitted as required by the Vice Chancellor, even though Vice Chancellor may have asked for the supplementary documents within one month from the date of initial submission and receipt of the recommendation of the Selection Committee and relevant documents. 6. 6. I propose to deal with the above mentioned last point first as in case it is found that the selection of the petitioner would be deemed to have been approved under the relevant provisions then it would not at all be necessary to go into the merits of the other two grounds mentioned earlier. Sub-section (11) of Section 31 of the Act reads as follows :- (a) No teacher recommended by the Selection Committee shall be appointed by the Management of an affiliated or associated College (other than a college maintained exclusively by the State Government), unless prior approval of the Vice Chancellor has been obtained. (b) The Management shall, as soon as possible, after the meeting of the Selection Committee, submit the recommendations of the Committee, alongwith other relevant documents, to the Vice Chancellor for approval. (c) The Vice Chancellor, if he is satisfied that the candidate recommended by the Selection Committee does not possess the minimum qualifications or experience prescribed, or that the procedure laid down in the Act for the selection of the teacher has not been followed, shall convey to the Management his disapproval : Provided that if the Vice Chancellor does not convey his disapproval within a period of one month from the date of receipt of the documents referred to in clause (b), or does not send to the Management any intimation in connection therewith, he shall be deemed to have approval of the proposal." In accordance with the above provisions, the Management has to submit the recommendation of the Selection Committee alongwith other relevant documents to the Vice Chancellor for approval. If the Vice Chancellor is satisfied on the grounds as indicated in clause (c), he shall convey his disapproval to the Management. Then comes the proviso providing that in case the Vice Chancellor does not convey his disapproval within one month from the date of receipt of documents which are required to be furnished under clause (b) or, does not send to the Management any intimation in that connection, it would be deemed that he has approved the proposal. 7. Then comes the proviso providing that in case the Vice Chancellor does not convey his disapproval within one month from the date of receipt of documents which are required to be furnished under clause (b) or, does not send to the Management any intimation in that connection, it would be deemed that he has approved the proposal. 7. IN view of the provisions quoted above, the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that according to University the Vice-Chancellor has required the Management to furnish some relevant documents on 26-6-1978 through a letter, a copy of which has been filed as Annexure B-1 to the counter affidavit of the University. The letter was replied to, according to the University, by the Principal on 22-7-78, a true copy of which has been filed as Annexure B-2 to the counter affidavit of the University whereas according to petitioner the required documents were furnished by the Management on 4-11-1978. However, the Vice-Chancellor did not convey his disapproval either within one month from 22-7-78 or from 4-11-78. The disapproval was conveyed only through order dated September 10, 1980. It was submitted, since the disapproval was not Conveyed within one month of receipt of the documents furnished by the Management, as required by the Vice-Chancellor, the approval would be deemed to have been accorded. 8. ON behalf of the University the learned counsel has contested the proposition set forth on behalf of the petitioner and it has been submitted that proviso to clause (c) is a deeming clause i. e. only by fiction a particular situation is presumed on given conditions. Stress has been given, on behalf of the University, on the following line accruing in the proviso "or does not send to the Management any intimation in connection therewith". The argument is that if any intimation is sent to the Management by the Vice-Chaneellor within one month from then the benefit of deeming provision would not be available. It has been submitted on behalf of the University that in this case initially the documents referred to in clause (b) were received by the Vice-Chancellor on 12-6-78. Since all the relevant documents were not furnished an intimation was sent to the Management for furnishing those documents on 26-6-78, this, according to the learned counsel for the University, was an intimation within one month, therefore, no question of deemed approval arises. Since all the relevant documents were not furnished an intimation was sent to the Management for furnishing those documents on 26-6-78, this, according to the learned counsel for the University, was an intimation within one month, therefore, no question of deemed approval arises. In case, after receipt of the relevant documents lateron as required to be submitted, there was undue delay in disposing of the matter, the Management could approach the appropriate forum, for early disposal of the matter but in no case the benefit of deeming provision would be available to the petitioner. The purpose of the proviso to clause (c), according to the learned counsel for the University, is that the matter of approval of selection should receive the attention of the Vice Chancellor at the earliest so that the question of appointment of Lecturers may not hang for long and the Vice Chancellor must apply his mind to the question of approval within one month from the date of receipt of the documents referred to in clause (b). If this is not done within the period specified the deeming provision comes into operation but once the Vice Chancellor applies his mind within one month the benefit of deemed clause would not be available. If the submission made on behalf of the University is accepted then any intimation in connection with the matter of approval, within one month from the date of receipt of the relevant documents would give free hand to the Vice Chancellor to take his own time to decide the matter, no matter howsoever long it may be. To examine the position, let us see the provision contained in clause (b) of Section 31 (11) of the Act. It requires submission of recommendation of the Selection Committee by the Management to the Vice Chancellor alongwith other relevant documents (Emphasis supplied). Amongst the documents to be submitted only the recommendation of the Selection Committee is named in the provision. So far other documents are concerned they are described as "other relevant documents", i. e. the other relevant documents are not specified. In a given case the Management may not consider a particular document to be relevant so it may not send it alongwith recommendation of Selection Committee whereas it may be considered relevant by the Vice Chancellor. In that event, as in the present case, the Vice Chancellor may require submission of that document. In a given case the Management may not consider a particular document to be relevant so it may not send it alongwith recommendation of Selection Committee whereas it may be considered relevant by the Vice Chancellor. In that event, as in the present case, the Vice Chancellor may require submission of that document. In my view, a document, which is required by the Vice Chancellor to be submitted by the Management as relevant document, when received by the Vice Chancellor amounts to receipt of relevant documents referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (11) of Section 31 of the Act. According to the proviso, the period of one month is to be reckoned from the date of receipt of documents referred to in clause (b). That being the position, the period of one month can be reckoned from the date of receipt of relevant documents subsequently submitted by the Management on being asked to do so by the Vice Chancellor. I am not impressed by the submission made on behalf of the University that the period of one month is to be reckoned only from the date of receipt of relevant documents which were initially submitted by the Management at the first instance. Had all the relevant documents, required to be submitted, been specified in clause (b), it might have been open to the opposite parties to advance the argument about date of receipt of documents at the first instance. There is no reason to support the contention that the document, which may be furnished as relevant document on the asking of the Vice Chancellor, such a supplemental submission of document and its receipt be not considered as receipt of relevant document under clause (b). A matter, which is intended to be decided within a specified period from the date of receipt of relevant documents, why should it not be decided within the same specified time from the date when complete relevant documents are received. It also does not stand to reason that merely by asking for any document within a period of one month from the date of receipt of the documents under clause (b), should have the effect of postponing the decision in the matter indefinitely, or in any case, time to be taken should be left at the choice of the Vice Chancellor. The phrase used in Clause (c) which is being relied upon on behalf of the University namely, "or does not send to the Management any intimation in connection therewith" does not materially alter the position and has only limited import. Such an intimation like one in this case viz. asking for more relevant documents has only an effect of postponing the date of deemed approval, so long the required document is not received. If period of one month lapses, after the intimation but before the required supplemental relevant documents are received, there would be no deemed approval. As soon as required documents are received by the Vice Chancellor, he will have to intimate the disapproval, if any, within one month from the date of receipt of supplemental documents failing which deemed approval would become effective. The interpretation which has been canvassed on behalf of the University does not stand to reason and it would only frustrate the whole purpose of the proviso to clause (c), as then by sending any intimation within one month from the date of the receipt of the relevant documents, the effect of the deeming provision would be rendered nugatory and inoperative. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on a case reported in 1982 U. P. Local Bodies and Educational Cases 378-Regional Deputy Director of Education v. The Managing Committee of Shanker Anglo Vedic Intermediate College, Bharthana. The matter related to Sub-section (2; of Section 16-F Intermediate Education Act which provides as follows : - " The Inspector or Regional Deputy Director of Education,' as the case may be, shall give his decision within two weeks of the receipt of the relevant papers, failing which approval should be deemed to have been accorded. " The relevant papers were initially sent on March 3, 1967. The next day namely on March 4, 1967 the Regional Deputy Director asked some more papers. The papers asked for were sent by the Management and were received by the Deputy Director of Education on March 23, 1967. The Deputy Director of Education disapproved the selection by his order dated May 29, 1967. It was challenged on the ground that the decision of disapproval was not given within two weeks failing which the approval be deemed to have been accorded. The Deputy Director of Education disapproved the selection by his order dated May 29, 1967. It was challenged on the ground that the decision of disapproval was not given within two weeks failing which the approval be deemed to have been accorded. The petition was allowed by the single Judge on the said ground and the order was upheld by the Division Bench in Special Appeal observing that all the relevant papers had been received by the Deputy Director of Education on March 23, 1967, so in the said case the relevant date which has been considered for reckoning the period of two weeks was the date on which the relevant documents, as required by the Deputy Director of Education, were sent and received by the Deputy Director of Education. The case has been cited in support of the contention that in the present case also the period of one month should be reckoned from the date of receipt of supplemental relevant documents by the Vice Chancellor. The learned counsel for the University has submitted that the case is not applicable to the present case in view of the phrase used in clause (c) "or does not send to the Management any intimation in connection therewith." It is submitted, to the extent mentioned above the provisions of section 16-F (2) of the Intermediate Education Act and proviso to clause (c) of section 31 (11) of the Act differ and they are not similar. No doubt, the two provisions are not exactly similar but in this connection I have already observed earlier that the phrase which is being relied upon by the University has only limited effect and does not materially effect the main import of the deeming clause. It has only the effect of postponing the deemed approval. 9. IN the light what has been held above, let us now examine the facts of this case to find out if the petitioner is entitled for the benefit of deeming clause. A request for approval was made by the Management through letter dated 3-2-1978 which, according to the University, was received by the Vice Chancellor alongwith some other documents on 12-6-78. By means of letter dated 26-6-78 the Vice Chancellor required furnishing of some more documents. A request for approval was made by the Management through letter dated 3-2-1978 which, according to the University, was received by the Vice Chancellor alongwith some other documents on 12-6-78. By means of letter dated 26-6-78 the Vice Chancellor required furnishing of some more documents. According to the University, in reply to the aforesaid letter of the Vice Chancellor the Principal Sri R. D. Tripathi gave his reply dated 22-7-78 whereas, according to the petitioner, the Management had sent the relevant documents on 4-11-1978. This averment has been made by the petitioner in paragraphs 19 and 20 of the writ petition. Annexure-10 is a copy of the covering letter sent by the Management with documents. There is no denial of above facts in the counter affidavit filed by the University. IN any case, it is the case of the University itself that in response to the letter of the Vice Chancellor dated 26-6-78 a reply dated 22-7-78 given by the Principal Sri Tripathi had been received by it. The Vice Chancellor chose to keep quite and sit tight over the matter after the receipt of the reply by the Principal on July 22, 1978. There was no reason why the disapproval should not have been communicated within one month from 22-7-78 or within one month from 4-11-78 when according to the petitioner the letter of Vice Chancellor was replied to by the Management. Sending of communication dated 26-6-78 by the Vice Chancellor does not give the authority concerned a licence to sleep over the matter indefinitely. It is no body's case that any order of disapproval was passed by the Vice Chancellor or was ever communicated except by means of order dated 10-9-80 i. e. more than two years after the Principal had sent his reply, and that too, after the petitioner had to take recourse to initiate proceedings in the court. IN those proceedings, it was found that the representation of the petitioner was also pending before the Chancellor and this court had thought it proper that the representation of the petitioner be decided first. Had all this not happened, perhaps no orders would have ever been passed on the question of approval or disapproval of the selection in question. IN those proceedings, it was found that the representation of the petitioner was also pending before the Chancellor and this court had thought it proper that the representation of the petitioner be decided first. Had all this not happened, perhaps no orders would have ever been passed on the question of approval or disapproval of the selection in question. I find no reasonable ground to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the University that once intimation was sent within one month of the receipt of the relevant documents deeming clause become ineffective and inoperative, This question was raised before the Chancellor also, From the discussion, in the order passed by the Chancellor, it appears that the case of the petitioner before the Chancellor was that the letter of request for approval alongwith the relevant documents was sent on 3-2-1978, therefore, the deemed approval should be taken effective on lapse of one month from 3-2-78. It may be noted that the letter sent by the Management requesting the Vice Chancellor to accord approval is dated 3-2-78 but according to the University it was received by the Vice Chancellor only on 12-6-78. The fact that the letter sent by the Management is dated 3-2-78 is supported by Annexure B-1 filed on behalf of the University namely the letter by which the University had required submission of some more relevant documents. This letter of University Annexure B-1 refers to the Management's letter dated 3-2-78 in connection with approval of proposed appointment. The Chancellor had accepted that University had received it on 12-6-78. The Chancellor has observed in the order that the Vice Chancellor had to requisition relevant documents which the Management was bound to send alongwith the recommendation of Selection Committee for approval. It has also been observed that the Management took unduly long time in sending those documents and it was in those circumstances that the decision could be taken on 10-9-80. 10. FIRSTLY, it may be pointed out that section 31 (11) (b) clearly requires submission of recommendation of Selection Committee alongwith other relevant documents. The only document specified under the provision is the recommendation of the Selection Committee. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Management was bound to furnish all those documents at the first instance. 10. FIRSTLY, it may be pointed out that section 31 (11) (b) clearly requires submission of recommendation of Selection Committee alongwith other relevant documents. The only document specified under the provision is the recommendation of the Selection Committee. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Management was bound to furnish all those documents at the first instance. It is a different matter that the Management did not think those documents to be relevant, therefore, it did not send them along with the recommendation of the Committee but the Vice Chancellor considered those documents to be relevant and asked for them. The other observation, in the order, that the Management took unduly long time in sending the documents shows that it was brought to the notice of the Chancellor that at some particular time the required documents were submitted by the Management but that matter had been left there without recording a finding as to whether the Vice Chancellor had disposed of the matter within one month thereof or not. The view that appears to have been taken is that since the intimation was sent to the Management within one month i.e. on June 26, 1978, requiring the Management to furnish documents the deeming clause became inoperative and then there was no question of deemed approval. This view, as I have found earlier, is not the correct view. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the approval should be deemed w.e.f. 5-12-78 i.e. on the expiry of one month from 4- 11-78 when the documents sent by the Management and were received by the Vice Chancellor. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the University has submitted that this particular case that the deemed approval should be w.e.f. 5- 12-78 was not taken before the Chancellor, therefore, the petitioner cannot Claim deemed approval from that date. In my view, it is not very material whether a particular date was pleaded or not before the authorities concerned for the purpose of deemed approval. What was necessary to be considered was whether disapproval was communicated within one month of receipt of the relevant document or not. Instead of Considering the matter from that point of view it appears to have been considered in context with the date of the letter namely 3-2-1978 which is the date of the letter through which approval was requested for by the Management. 11. Instead of Considering the matter from that point of view it appears to have been considered in context with the date of the letter namely 3-2-1978 which is the date of the letter through which approval was requested for by the Management. 11. SINCE the learned Chancellor has himself recorded a finding that the required documents were submitted by the Management the matter can be sent back to the Chancellor for recording a finding as to on which date the supplemental relevant documents were received by the Vice Chancellor but I find that matter is very old, the petitioner was selected as far back as in 1977 i. e. about 9 years ago. No disapproval was communicated for more than two years. In the above Circumstances he had to approach this Court earlier as well. He is not being paid his salary. In the above circumstances I am of the view that no useful purpose would be served in remanding the case to the Chancellor to ascertain the date of receipt of supplemental relevant documents by the Vice Chancellor. This will only be prolonging the agony of the petitioner who seems to be a victim of internal tussle between the Management and the Principal as well as of inaction on the part of the Vice Chancellor in not taking an early decision in the matter. There is no absolute bar to consider the question of fact by the High Court itself provided main plea was raised and the question was involved before the Tribunal below and the High Court has before it undisputed and clear evidence on the record. I, therefore, proceed to examine as to when documents, were submitted in response to the letter of the Vice Chancellor requiring furnishing of more relevant documents. 12. THE date can either be 22-7-78 or 4-11-1978. THE admitted case of the University is that the Principal had sent a letter dated 22-7-78 in response to the letter of the Vice Chancellor dated 26-6-78 requiring to furnish more documents. A true copy of the letter of the Principal dated 22-7-78 has been filed as Annexure B-2 to the counter affidavit of the University. A perusal of this letter indicates that the Principal has communicated only some irregularities which, according to him, were committed by the Management in holding the selection. A true copy of the letter of the Principal dated 22-7-78 has been filed as Annexure B-2 to the counter affidavit of the University. A perusal of this letter indicates that the Principal has communicated only some irregularities which, according to him, were committed by the Management in holding the selection. There was also a complaint that he was not included in the Selection Committee though he was the rightful Principal to participate in the selection proceedings. It does not indicate that the required documents were being submitted alongwith letter dated 22-7-78. In any case the University admits to have received the letter of the Principal but it is not the case of the University that the Vice Chancellor had communicated the disapproval within one month from 22-7-78. So far the petitioner is concerned it has been stated in paragraph 19 of the affidavit that the required documents were submitted by the Management to the Vice Chancellor on 4-11-78. A true copy of the covering letter has been annexed as annexure 10 to the writ petition. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the University paragraph 19 of the writ petition has been replied to in paragraph 18 of the counter affidavit. There is no denial about the averments made by the petitioner in paragraph 19 of the writ petition to the effect that the relevant documents were submitted by the Management on 4-11-1978. In the absence of denial, it can safely be inferred, as admission of that fact by the University. A perusal of Annexure 10 to the writ petition namely the covering letter, sent with the documents, indicates about the enclosures accompanying the letter. It mentions that the documents, which were under submission, were those which were required by the Vice Chancellor to be submitted by the Management. The required documents do not seem to have been submitted by the Principal but by the Management on 4-11-78 with the covering letter annexure 10. The learned Chancellor has also recorded a finding that the required documents were sent by the Management though after unduly long time. So that can be no denying of the fact that the relevant documents referable to Clause (b) of sub-sec. (11) of Sec. 31 of the Act were received by the Vice Chancellor on his asking by the Management. The learned Chancellor has also recorded a finding that the required documents were sent by the Management though after unduly long time. So that can be no denying of the fact that the relevant documents referable to Clause (b) of sub-sec. (11) of Sec. 31 of the Act were received by the Vice Chancellor on his asking by the Management. In view of the above discussion I find that the supplemental relevant documents were submitted to the Vice Chancellor by the Management on 4-11-78, therefore, the approval of the Vice-Chancellor would be deemed to be effective on lapse of one month from 4-11-78 namely w.e.f. 5-12-78. 13. SINCE I have held that the selection is deemed to have been approved on lapse of time, it is not at all necessary to go into the merits of the other two points mentioned earlier. 14. LASTLY the learned counsel for the University has submitted that the petitioner was illegally appointed without prior approval of the Vice Chancellor which is against the provisions of the Act, therefore the petitioner cannot seek any relief on the basis of the said appointment. It is true, in view of the provisions contained in Section 31 (11) (a) no appointment could be made unless prior approval had been obtained by the Vice-Chancellor. This provision places a prohibition on such appointments but still the Management issued a letter of appointment to the petitioner on 7-11-77 itself subject to the approval by the Vice Chancellor. The case of the petitioner is that on the basis of the said letter of appointment he had started working In reply to the above submission the learned counsel for the petitioner had argued that even though the appointment was not in conformity with the provisions of the Act, but it became so, on the day the recommendation was deemed to have been approved and thereafter the petitioner had to be treated as regularly and validly appointed. In support of this contention he has placed reliance upon a case decided by Single Judge of this Court Hon'ble Mr. Justice R. B. Misra, as then he was, in Second Appeal No. 3075 of 1971, Nand Kishore Shukla v Krishna Education Society Hariharpur. The matter related to the Intermediate Education Act. Under the Act also there was a provision for appointment only after prior approval by the District Inspector of Schools. Justice R. B. Misra, as then he was, in Second Appeal No. 3075 of 1971, Nand Kishore Shukla v Krishna Education Society Hariharpur. The matter related to the Intermediate Education Act. Under the Act also there was a provision for appointment only after prior approval by the District Inspector of Schools. Again there was a provision for deemed approval in case disapproval was not communicated within two weeks of the receipt of the relevant papers by the District Inspector of Schools. The teacher concerred was appointed without prior approval of the District Inspector of Schools and subsequently his services were terminated without prior approval of the District Inspector of Schools. The contention raised was that the appointment of the Teacher was illegal and was without the approval of the District Inspector of Schools, therefore it was not necessary to take approval before his termination. This argument was not accepted and it was held that though the appointment was made without prior approval of the District Inspector of Schools and on that ground his appointment might have been illegal but the same would become legal atleast from the date when the approval of the District Inspector of Schools was obtained. It was further held that even if there was no approval intact within two weeks of the receipt of papers, there would be deemed approval by the District Inspector of Schools within the meaning of Section 16-F (2) of the intermediate Education Act. I am m agreement with the view taken in the above noted case. Thus, even if, the appointment dated 7-11-77, given to the petitioner was not valid in view of lack of prior approval by the Vice Chancellor, it would become valid w.e.f. 5-12-78. On behalf of the University reliance was placed upon a case reported in 1984 U. P. Service Cases Page 131, Dr. Kshetra Pal v. Vice Chancellor, Kanpur University. The facts were that after recommendation of the Selection Committee for appointment the Manager had issued a letter of appointment before the recommendation of the Selection Committee could be considered by the Committee of Management. The condition attached with the appointment letter issued by the Manager was that the appointment was subject to the approval of the Committee of Management and the services could be terminated without notice. The condition attached with the appointment letter issued by the Manager was that the appointment was subject to the approval of the Committee of Management and the services could be terminated without notice. The Committee of Management did not agree with the recommendation of the Selection Committee and referred the matter to the Vice Chancellor for his decision. The Vice Chancellor upheld the view taken by the Committee of Management disagreeing with the recommendation of the Selection Committee. In the above circumstances the services of the petitioner were terminated. The contention raised, was that the termination order was passed without prior approval of the Vice Chancellor. A Division Bench of this Court held that the appointment of the petitioner made by the Secretary of the Institution even before the Committee of Management had considered the recommendation of the Selection Committee was not valid, therefore, no approval of the Vice Chancellor was necessary before termination of the services. It has further been observed that even if its approval was necessary the same stood granted by the Vice-Chancellor when he agreed with the Committee of Management. The services of the petitioner were terminated after the Vice Chancellor had agreed with the proposal of the Committee of Management not to appoint him in pursuance of recommendation of the Selection Committee. In the above circumstances, court was of the view that the approval for termination of the services of the petitioner stood granted by the Vice Chancellor. In my view, the facts of the present case are different from the one cited above. The appointment was no doubt without prior approval of the Vice Chancellor but the deemed approval came into effect on lapse of one months' time. Once the approval of the Vice Chancellor came into existence it cannot be said that the continuance of the petitioner as Lecturer would remain illegal despite the requisite approval. 15. THE learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner is also entitled for arrears of salary w.e.f. from the date of his deemed approval. No doubt, there is an averment that the petitioner had started working on being appointed as Lecturer but it does not bear out from the record as to how long the petitioner actually worked as Lecturer. It is not very certain that he continued to teach during all this period. No doubt, there is an averment that the petitioner had started working on being appointed as Lecturer but it does not bear out from the record as to how long the petitioner actually worked as Lecturer. It is not very certain that he continued to teach during all this period. THEre is also no doubt, as submitted by the petitioner, that he was put to great harassment and hardship and to approach the Vice Chancellor, Chancellor and this Court once earlier also. In these circumstances, in my view, it would be equitable for both the parties, aswell as in the interest of justice if the petitioner is paid haif of the arrears of the salary from the date of the deemed approval till date and hence forth he would be entitled to and be paid his full salary. 16. IN the result the petition is allowed with costs The orders passed by the opposite parties 1 and 2 contained in Annexures 19 and 13 to the writ petition respectively are quashed. The opposite parties are directed to treat the petitioner in service as Lecturer for B Ed. classes w.e.f. 5-12-78 and shall pay half of the amount of the arrears of salary to the petitioner w.e.f. 5-12-78 at the earliest, say within a period of four months from today. Henceforth he shall be regularly paid his full salary. Petition allowed.