ORDER B.D. Agrawal, J. - This group of petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution gives rise to common question of law and is being decided by a common judgment. 2. The Ordnance Parachute Factory Kanpur owned and controlled by the Central Government in the Ministry of Defence is engaged in the production of material for defence requirement, namely, parachutes, tents, military garments and uniforms. As an aftermath of the Chinese Aggression, the establishment recruited temporarily a number of persons as Tailors Grade `C' in the grade of Rs. 85-110/- in or about November 1963. In 1966 it was felt to have become necessary to retrench them since the workload was reduced. Government took a decision that the existing Tailors may not be thrown out of employment but might be given opportunity of alternative employment so that they be adjusted in any Ordnance Factory by absorbing them in another grade if they chose to accept the same. Tailors in Grade `C' volunteered for being absorbed in the grade of labour `B'. Government had no objection in treating them as such so that their employment might continue. The absorption as labour `B' in the grade of Rs. 70-85 was brought about accordingly with effect from August 19, 1966 or near about. The grades remained unchanged till 1973 when the grade of Tailors `C' was revised to Rs. 210-290/- and the grade of labour `B' came to be revised to Rs. 196-232/-. On June 17, 1980 the respondents put in applications individually under S. 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, in the Labour Court contending that they had been appointed as Tailor `C' and were entitled to receive the money pertaining to that grade and further that they had been admitted wrongfully in the year 1966 as labour `B' and have ever since been paid the wages in the grade of labour `B'. The claim laid is for the payment of the differential in the two grades for the period of 1966 till the date when the applications were made. These were resisted by the petitioner on various grounds including the lack of jurisdiction of the Labour Court to accord relief under S. 33C(2) without there having been a reference made under S. 10(1) of the Act on the footing that the question raised gave rise to an industrial dispute. These were resisted by the petitioner on various grounds including the lack of jurisdiction of the Labour Court to accord relief under S. 33C(2) without there having been a reference made under S. 10(1) of the Act on the footing that the question raised gave rise to an industrial dispute. The Labour Court under the impugned order dated April 9, 1985 did not consider the question of jurisdiction under S. 33C(2) but recorded the finding that the reversion made of the respondents led to the reduction of the wages payable and this was illegal being brought about without a notice under S. 9-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. The applications have, as a result, been allowed granting to the respondents the differential in the wages between the two grades during the period of 1966-1980. These are, in brief, the facts relevant common to these cases. Aggrieved, the petitioner has approached this Court. 3. Section 33-C of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, in so far as material, reads as under : "33-C. Recovery of money due from an employer (1) Where any money is due to a workman from an employer under a settlement or an award or under the provisions of Chap. V-A or Chap. V-B, the workman himself or any other person authorised by him in writing in this behalf, or in the case of the death of the workman, his assignee or heirs may, without prejudice to any other mode of recovery, make an application to the appropriate Government for the recovery of the money due to him, and if the appropriate Government is satisfied that any money is so due, it shall issue a certificate for that amount to the Collector who shall proceed to recover the same in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue : Provided that every such application shall be made within one year from the date on which the money becomes due to the workman from the employer; Provided further that any such application may be entertained after the expiry of the said period of one year, if the appropriate Government is satisfied that the applicant had sufficient cause for not making the application within the said period. (2) Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, be decided by such Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government." 4. Sri A. Mohiley, Additional Standing Counsel, appearing for the petitioner urged that the respondents' applications fell outside the ambit of S. 33-C(2) and the question involved raised industrial dispute which could be the subject matter for reference under S. 10 to be adjudicated upon by the Industrial Tribunal. The contention of Sri Kameshwar Prasad and Sri K.P. Agarwal, counsel on the respondents' side, on the other hand, is that the applications did lie before the Industrial Tribunal under S. 33-C(2) and it is incorrect to assert that the Tribunal has usurped jurisdiction in the matter. In the course of arguments before me learned counsel on the respondents' side have not disputed that the petitioner did raise the question of jurisdiction before the Tribunal which, however, did not deal with the same. 5. Certain basic propositions in this connection, as will presently appear, are well settled and are not disputed before me on either side : (1) the proceedings under S. 33-C are a kind of or analogous to execution proceedings the Labour Court called upon to certify the money due under sub-sec. (1) or to compute any money or any benefit capable of being computed in terms of money under sub-sec. (2) is in the position of an executing court; (2) the word "benefit" used in S. 33-C (2) is not confined merely to non-monetary benefit which could be converted in terms of money, but it takes in all kinds of benefits which may be monetary as well as non-monetary if the workman is entitled to them; (3) the sub-sec. (2) is in terms wider in scope than sub-sec. (1), the latter covers a case where "any money is due" under a settlement or an award or under the provisions of Chap. V-A or V-B to a workman from the employer; sub-sec. (2) is in terms wider in scope than sub-sec. (1), the latter covers a case where "any money is due" under a settlement or an award or under the provisions of Chap. V-A or V-B to a workman from the employer; sub-sec. (2) applies where though there be no amount specified but computation required of any money or other benefit, not flowing from an award, settlement or under the provisions of Chap. V-A or V-B. (4) the jurisdiction of the Labour Court under sub-sec. (2) is not ousted by a mere plea raised by the employer denying the workman's claim thereunder; the determination of the question about computing the benefit in terms of money may in some cases have to be preceded by an incidental enquiry into the existence of the right. 6. These propositions may be found enunciated in Central Bank of India Ltd. v. P.S. Rajagopalan AIR 1964 SC 743 ; Bombay Gas Co. Ltd. v. Gopal Bhiva AIR 1964 SC 752 ; Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. AIR 1974 SC 1604 : (1974 Lab IC 1018); Punjab National Bank Ltd. v. K. L. Kharbanda AIR 1963 SC 487 besides others including the decisions of various High Courts which it is not necessary to refer. 7. The crux of the controversy centres round the scope or ambit of the enquiry which may precede before the Labour Court as incidental to the determination or computation in terms of money contemplated under sub-sec. (2) of S. 33-C. It is this which needs careful demarcation. In Punjab National Bank v. K. L. Kharbanda (supra) the claim raised in application under sub-sec. (2) was that the respondent was entitled to certain benefits capable of being computed in terms of money under the Sastry Award but the appellant had made a wrong calculation in fixing the basic salary. The Supreme Court held that the sub-sec. (2) applies also to monetary benefits to which a workman may he entitled but which have not been calculated or computed and observed :- "...........Section 33-C is a provision in the nature of execution and where the amount to be executed is worked out (for example, in an Award) or where it may be worked out without any dispute. S. 33-C(1) will apply. S. 33-C(1) will apply. But where the amount due to a workman is not stated in the award itself and there is a dispute as to its calculation sub-sec. (2) will apply and the workman would be entitled to apply thereunder to have the amount computed provided he is entitled to a benefit, whether monetary or non-monetary which is capable of being computed in terms of money. 8. In Central Bank of India v. P.S. Rajagopalan AIR 1964 SC 743 , strongly relied for the respondents the claim was that besides attending to routine duties as Clerk the workmen had been operating the adding machine and were entitled as such to special allowance. Their Lordships referred to the legislative history and observed that S. 33-C is a provision whereunder individual workman can enforce his rights without having to take recourse to S. 10(1) or without having to depend upon his Union to espouse his cause. Two relevant considerations, it was laid down have to be borne in mind in construing S. 33-C, namely : (1) the construction should not he so broad as to bring within the scope of S. 33-C cases which would fall under S. 10(1);(2) the cases of existing rights which are sought to be implemented by individual workman should not be excluded from the purview of S. 33-C. "In other words, though in determining the scope of S. 33-C we must take care not to exclude cases which legitimately fall within its purview, we must also bear in mind that cases which fall under S. 10(1) of the Act, for instance, cannot be brought within the scope of S. 33-C." 9. Learned counsel for the respondents have laid stress on the following observations appearing in this pronouncement of the Supreme Court : "In our opinion, on a fair and reasonable construction of sub-sec (2) it is clear that if a workman's right to receive the benefit is disputed that may have to be" determined by the Labour Court. Before proceeding to compute the benefit in terms of money, the Labour Court inevitably has to deal with the question as to whether the workman has a right to receive that benefit. Before proceeding to compute the benefit in terms of money, the Labour Court inevitably has to deal with the question as to whether the workman has a right to receive that benefit. If the said right is not disputed, nothing more needs to be done and the Labour Court can proceed to compute the value of the benefit in terms of money: but if the said right is disputed. the Labour Court must deal with that question and decide whether the workman has the right to receive the benefit as alleged by him and it is only if the Labour Court answers this point in favour of the workman that the next question of making the necessary computation can arise. It seems to us that the opening clause of sub-sec. (2) does not admit of the construction for which the appellant contends unless we add some words in that clause. The Clause "where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any benefit" does not mean "where such workman is admittedly, or admitted to be, entitled to receive such benefit". The appellant's construction would necessarily introduce the addition of the words admittedly or admitted to be" in that clause, and that clearly is not permissible. Besides, it seems to us that if the appellant's construction is accepted, it would necessarily mean that it would be at the option of the employer to allow the workman to avail himself of the remedy provided by sub-sec. (2), because he has merely to raise an objection on the ground that the right claimed by the workman is not admitted to oust the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to entertain the workman's application. "The claim under S. 33-C(2) clearly postulates that the determination of the question about computing the benefit in terms of money may, in some cases, have to be preceded by an enquiry into the existence of the right and such an enquiry must he held to be incidental to the main determination which has been assigned to the Labour Court by sub-sec. (2). As Maxwell has observed "where an Act confers a jurisdiction, it impliedly also grants the power of doing all such acts, or employing such means, as are essentially necessary to its execution". (2). As Maxwell has observed "where an Act confers a jurisdiction, it impliedly also grants the power of doing all such acts, or employing such means, as are essentially necessary to its execution". We must accordingly hold that S. 33-(2) takes within its purview cases of workmen who claimed that the benefit to which they are entitled should be computed in terms of money, even though the right to the benefit on which their claim is based is disputed by their employers. Incidentally, it may be relevant to add that it would he somewhat odd that under sub-s. (3), the Labour Court should have been authorised to delegate the work of computing the money value of the benefit of the Commissioner if the determination of the said question was the only task assigned to the Labour Court under sub-s. (2). On the other hand, sub-s. (3) becomes intelligible if it is held that what can be assigned to the Commissioner includes only a part of the assignment of the Labour Court under sub-s. (2)." "Besides, there can be no doubt that when the Labour Court, is given the power to allow an individual workman to execute or implement his existing individual rights, it is virtually exercising execution powers in some cases, and it is well settled that it is open to the Executing Court to interpret the decree for the purpose of execution. It is, of course, true that the Executing Court cannot go behind the decree, nor can it add to or subtract from the provision of the decree. These limitations apply also to the Labour Court: but like the Executing Court, the Labour Court would also be competent to interpret the award or settlement on which a workman based his claim under S. 33-C(2). Therefore, we feel no difficulty in holding that for the purpose of making the necessary determination under S. 33-C(2), it would, in appropriate cases, be open to the Labour Court to interpret the award or settlement on which the workman's right rests.". 10. True, the claim raised under S. 33C(2) to be covered under the purview thereof need not necessarily be such as is admitted to the employer: it may even be a disputed one but the range within which the Labour Court may travel under this provision is not unbounded. 10. True, the claim raised under S. 33C(2) to be covered under the purview thereof need not necessarily be such as is admitted to the employer: it may even be a disputed one but the range within which the Labour Court may travel under this provision is not unbounded. It is of considerable significance to my mind that in Central Bank of India ( AIR 1964 SC 743 ) (supra) their Lordships have qualified their dictum with the use of the words "in some cases" appearing in the portion extracted above. In para 19 the Supreme Court further indicated illustratively some of the claims which would not fall under S. 33-C(2) observing : "If an employee is dismissed or demoted and it is his case that the dismissal or demotion is wrongful, it would not be open to him to make a claim for the recovery of his salary or wages under S. 33-C(2). His demotion or dismissal may give rise to an industrial dispute which may be appropriately tried, but once it is shown that the employer has dismissed or demoted him, a claim that the dismissal or demotion is unlawful and, therefore, the employee continues to be the workman of the employer and is entitled to the benefits due to him under a pre-existing contract, cannot be made under S. 33-C(2).". 11. The instant case falls squarely on its facts within this excluded category. 12. This decision was referred to in Bombay Gas Co. AIR 1964 SC 752 where it was stated that just as where a decree is put to execution the executing court can refuse to execute it if the decree is a nullity. The Labour Court may under S. 33-C(2) refuse to implement an award if it is satisfied that the, award was without jurisdiction. 13. The decision in Chief Mining Engineer, East India Coal Co. v. Rameshwar AIR 1968 SC 218 : (1968 Lab IC 197) also relied for the respondents only reiterated that proceedings under S. 33-C(2) are analogous to execution proceedings and the Labour Court called upon to compute in terms of money the benefit claimed by workmen is in such cases in the position of executing' court. v. Rameshwar AIR 1968 SC 218 : (1968 Lab IC 197) also relied for the respondents only reiterated that proceedings under S. 33-C(2) are analogous to execution proceedings and the Labour Court called upon to compute in terms of money the benefit claimed by workmen is in such cases in the position of executing' court. It was also reiterated that the right to the benefit which is sought to be computed must be an existing one, that is to say, already adjudicated upon or provided for and must arise in the course of and in relation to the relationship between an industrial workman and his employer. In that case the application was for computation of benefit provided in the bonus scheme made under the Coal Mines Provident Fund and Bonus Schemes Act, 1948 and this was found to be within the Labour Court's jurisdiction under S. 33-C(2) - the power invoked being on facts analogous to that of executing court. 14. We find an elaborate comparison made of the powers of ordinary civil court in execution matters and of the Labour Court under S. 33-C(2) in Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd., ( AIR 1974 SC 1604 : 1974 Lab IC 1018). Palekar J. speaking for the Division Bench observed : "In a suit, a claim for relief made by the plaintiff against the defendant involves an investigation directed to the determination of (i) the plaintiff's right to relief: (ii) the corresponding liability of the defendant, including, whether the defendant is, at all, liable or not: and (iii) the extent of the defendant's liability, if any. The working out of such liability with a view to give relief is generally regarded as the function of an execution proceeding. Determination No. (iii) referred to above, that is to say, the extent of the defendant's liability may sometimes be left over for determination in execution proceedings. But that is not the case with the determinations under heads (i) and (ii). They are normally regarded as the functions of a suit and not an execution proceeding. Since a proceeding under S. 33-C(2) is in the nature of an execution proceedings it should follow that an investigation of the nature of determinations (i) and (ii) above is, normally, outside its scope. They are normally regarded as the functions of a suit and not an execution proceeding. Since a proceeding under S. 33-C(2) is in the nature of an execution proceedings it should follow that an investigation of the nature of determinations (i) and (ii) above is, normally, outside its scope. It is true that in a proceeding under S. 33-C(2) as in an execution proceedings it may be necessary to determine the identity of the person by whom or against whom the claim is made if there is a challenge on that score. But that is merely `incidental'. To call determinations (i) and (ii) `incidental' to an execution proceeding would be a perversion. Because execution proceedings in which the extent of liability is worked out are just consequential upon the determinations (i) and (ii) and represent the last stage in a process leading to final relief. Therefore, when a claim is made before the Labour Court under S. 33-C(2) that court must clearly understand the limitations under which it is to function. It cannot arrogate to itself the functions - say of an Industrial Tribunal which alone is entitled to make adjudications in the nature of determinations (i) and (ii) referred to above, or proceed to compute the benefit by dubbing the former as `incidental' to its main business of computation. In such cases determinations (i) and (ii) are not `incidental' to the computation. The computation itself is consequential upon,and subsidiary to determinations (i) and (ii) as the last stage in the process which commenced with a reference to the Industrial Tribunal. It was, therefore, held in State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. R. L. Khandelwal (1968) 2 Lab LJ 589 (SC) that a workman cannot put forward a claim in an application under S. 33-C(2) in respect of a matter which is not based on an existing right and which can be appropriately the subject matter of an Industrial Dispute which requires a reference under S. 10 of the Act." 15. Their Lordships made a pointed reference to Central Bank of India AIR 1964 SC 743 . It was stated that in that case the clerks had laid claim to special allowance on the basis of the Sastry Award contending that they operated the adding machine. Their Lordships made a pointed reference to Central Bank of India AIR 1964 SC 743 . It was stated that in that case the clerks had laid claim to special allowance on the basis of the Sastry Award contending that they operated the adding machine. The Bank denied the claim that the clerks came within the category referred to in the award and further that S. 33-C(2) could not be availed. The Supreme Court held that the enquiry as to whether the four clerks came within that category was purely `incidental' and necessary to enable the Labour Court to give the relief asked for, and, therefore, the court had jurisdiction to enquire whether the Clerks answered the description of the category mentioned in the Sastri Award "which not only declared the right but also the corresponding liability of the Employer Bank". With this narration their Lordships distinguished that case stating as follows :- "This was purely a case of establishing the identity of the claimants as coming within a distinct category of clerks in default of which it would have been impossible to give relief to anybody falling in the category. When the Award mentioned the category it, as good as named everyone who was covered by the category and hence the enquiry, which was necessary, became limited only to the clerks' identity and did not extend either to a new investigation as to their rights or the Bank's liability to them. Both the latter had been declared and provided for in the Award and the Labour Court did not have to investigate the same. Essentially, therefore, the essay of the Labour Court was in the nature of a function of a Court in execution proceedings and hence it was held that the Labour Court had jurisdiction to determine, by an incidental enquiry, whether the 4 clerks came in the category which was entitled to the special allowance". 16. After referring then to the illustration appearing in Central Bank of India case, ( AIR 1964 SC 743 ) concerning a workman who is dismissed or demoted by his employer, their Lordships in Central Inland Water Transport Corporation, (1974 Lab 1C 1018) (SC) (supra) laid down : "By merely making a claim in a loaded form the Workmen cannot give the Labour Court jurisdiction under S. 33-C(2). The workman who has been dismissed would no longer be in the employment of the employer. It may be that an industrial tribunal may find on an investigation into the circumstances of the dismissal that the dismissal was unjustified. But when he comes before the Labour Court with his claim for computation of his wages under S. 33-C(2) he cannot ask the Labour Court to disregard his dismissal as wrongful and on that basis compute his wages". "In such cases, a determination as to whether the dismissal was unjustified would be the principal matter for adjudication, and computation of wages just consequential upon such adjudication. It would be wrong to consider the principal adjudication as `incidental' to the computation. Moreover, if we assume that the Labour Court had jurisdiction to make the investigation into the circumstances of the dismissal, a very anomalous situation would arise. The Labour Court after holding that the dismissal was wrongful would have no jurisdiction to direct reinstatement under S. 33-C(2). And yet if its jurisdiction to compute the benefit is conceded it will be like conceding it authority to pass orders awarding wages as many times as the workman comes before it without being reinstated. Therefore, the Labour Court exercising jurisdiction under S. 33-C(2) has got to be circumspect before it undertakes an investigation, reminding itself that any investigation it undertakes is, in a real sense, incidental to its computation of a benefit under an existing right, which is its principal concern." 17. The controversy in S.M. & P. Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, AIR 1975 SC 1745 : 1975 Lab IC 1224) was limited to the issue whether the compensation to be paid to the workmen be under S. 25F or S. 25 FFF of the Industrial Disputes Act and this was considered as only incidental (See also in re : Eastern Coalfields Ltd. 1983 Lab IC 1707 (Cal)). 18. Sri K.P. Agarwal relies also on Shri Ambika Mills Co., AIR 1961 SC 970 but that does not advance the respondents' case further. 18. Sri K.P. Agarwal relies also on Shri Ambika Mills Co., AIR 1961 SC 970 but that does not advance the respondents' case further. An employee designated as a out-looker could apply under S. 15 Payment of Wages Act; an employee not so designated but falling under the said category by virtue of the work assigned to him, it was asserted, could not apply under S. 15 because the authority could not deal with the question as to whether the said employee properly fell under the said category or not. This contention of the employer was repelled by the Supreme Court on the finding that the question is so intimately and integrally connected with the problem of wages as defined in S. 2(vi) of that Act that it would be unreasonable to exclude the decision of such a question from the jurisdiction of the authority under S. 15. At the same time there was the note of caution appended defining the scope of questions incidental to payment of wages : "In determining the scope of these incidental questions care must be taken to see that under the guise of deciding incidental matters the limited jurisdiction is not unreasonably or unduly extended. Care must also be taken to see that the scope of these incidental questions is not unduly limited so as to affect or impair the limited jurisdiction conferred on the authority." 19. In Punjab Beverages Pvt. Ltd. v. Suresh Chand, (1978) 2 SCC 144 : (1978 Lab IC 693), it was found that the contravention of S. 33(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act did not have the effect to render the order of dismissal of the workman void. Dealing with the claim of such a workman under S. 33 C(2), it was held that it is only if an order of dismissal passed in contravention of S. 33(2) is null and void that the aggrieved workman would be entitled to maintain an application under S. 33-C(2) for determination and payment of the amount of wages due to him, on the basis of that he continues in service despite the order of dismissal. The observations appearing in para 19 of Central Bank of India Ltd., (AIR 1904 SC 743) extracted above) were cited with approval and it was reiterated that it is not competent to the Labour Court exercising jurisdiction under S. 33-C(2) to arrogate to itself the functions of an industrial tribunal and entertain a claim which is not based on an existing right but which may appropriately be made the subject matter of an industrial dispute in a reference under S. 10 of the Act. Their Lordships further specified : "The workman, who has been dismissed, would no longer be in the service of the employer and though it is possible that on a reference to the Industrial Tribunal under S. 10 the Industrial Tribunal may find, on the material placed before it, that the dismissal was unjustified, yet until such adjudication is made the workman cannot ask the Labour Court in an application under S. 33-C(2) to disregard his dismissal as wrongful and on that basis to compute his wages. The application under S. 33-C(2) would be maintainable only if it can be shown by the workman that the order of dismissal passed against him was void ab initio:" 20. In Dahyabhai Ranchhodas Shah v. M/s. Jayantilal Mohanlal, (1973) 1 Lab LJ 604 : (1973 Lab IC 967) (Guj) cited by Sri Mohiley, the Division Bench comprising P. N. Bhagwati C. J. and Hon'ble D. A. Desai, J. (as their Lordships then were) proceeded on the same principle thus enunciated at page 607 (of Lab LJ): (at Pp. 968-69 of Lab IC): "The benefit sought to be recovered must necessarily be a pre-existing benefit or benefit flowing from a pre-existing right. While construing the scope an ambit of S. 33-C(2), it is necessary to bear in mind the vital difference between a pre-existing right or benefit, or the right or benefit which is considered just and must, therefore, be acquired or granted by the employer. The workman approaching the Labour Court under S. 33-C(2) for enforcement of right or benefit must be able to point to some pre-existing right or benefit which he seeks to enforce. If he seeks some new rights or change in conditions of service, or some new benefit, neither acquired nor granted nor conferred by the statute, he must pursue his remedy under S. 10. He cannot approach the Labour Court under S. 33(2). If he seeks some new rights or change in conditions of service, or some new benefit, neither acquired nor granted nor conferred by the statute, he must pursue his remedy under S. 10. He cannot approach the Labour Court under S. 33(2). If the workman is in a position to show that there is right in his favour or there existed some right to which he is entitled, the case would squarely fall under S. 33-C(2). If, on the other hand, he claims what ought to be the relation between him and his employer, remedy does not lie under S. 33-C(2). 21. Upon facts in that case the application was held to be within the Labour Court's jurisdiction because the workman claimed compensation under S. 25FFF on the basis of his pre-existing right while the employer maintained that the petitioner was not discharged on account of closure of the undertaking but his services were terminated on account of his old age. 22. The question arising in Natarajan (R) v. Lakshmi Mill Co. Ltd., (1964) 2 Lab LJ 296 (Mad) was similar to that in the instant case. The Division Bench was of the view that S. 33-C(2) could not be invoked. It was observed : "It will be noticed that there is no dispute in the present case that the appellants were placed by their respective employers as unskilled workman and clerk respectively and that they were being paid salaries during all these years appropriate for such posts. The contention of the appellants is that the nature of the work done by them is such that they should have been placed on a higher category, in which case they would be entitled to draw salaries appropriate to that higher category. The dispute, therefore, is not about the actual posts which the workers occupied, but what they deserved by way of their salary and other emoluments for the duties claimed to have been performed by them. A claim of that kind cannot obviously come under that section which speaks of benefits to which the workman is entitled". 23. In Mysore Sugar Co. Ltd. v. Manavendra, (1966) 2 Lab LJ 463 (Mys) the relief claimed was that the applicants under S. 33-C(2) were entitled to be placed in the higher grade and paid a higher salary on account of their qualifications and the nature of their duties. 23. In Mysore Sugar Co. Ltd. v. Manavendra, (1966) 2 Lab LJ 463 (Mys) the relief claimed was that the applicants under S. 33-C(2) were entitled to be placed in the higher grade and paid a higher salary on account of their qualifications and the nature of their duties. This, it was held, falls within the ambit of industrial dispute and not within the scope of S. 33-C(2). The claim to a different job or a different grade is quite distinguishable from getting a benefit for doing the same job. An independent claim for being placed in a different job or a higher scale falls outside S. 33-C(2) Vide R.L. Kapur v. Punjab National Bank Ltd. (1974) 29 Fac LR 384 (Delhi) see also Katta Lakshmai, (1966) 12 Fac LR 173 (Andh Pra). 24. Reference is made by Sri K. P. Agarwal to the decision of a learned single Judge of this Court reported in (1975) 30 Fac LR 362, Khem Chand v. Labour Court, Meerut. Facts relevant therein were that the Wage Board Award conferred a benefit on workmen who may he performing the duties of a mate as contemplated by the Award. The employers contested that the workmen were not entitled to benefits as made and their claim was one for promotion to higher grade. The Labour Court rejected the claim of the workmen. This Court held that the question whether the workmen were performing the work and duties of mate was ancillary and incidental to the workman's claim that they were entitled to certain benefit under the Wage Board Award which had been implemented by the State Government and in that situation the denial of that right by the employers did not take away the jurisdiction of the Labour Court. This thus does not lay down anything different on principle. The claim was founded on a pre-existing right flowing from an Award which Government had enforced and the employer's denial gave rise to a question which was only incidental. The same is true of Bishan v. Labour Court, (1979) 38 Fac LR 409 :1979 All LJ 528) also referred by Sri Agarwal in which the claim was for overtime wages on the footing of provisions of the Dukan Aur Vanija Adhiniyam 1962 without challenge to any dismissal or demotion order or settlement or award. The Division Bench, it is worthy of note. The Division Bench, it is worthy of note. endorsed the view citing the Central Bank of India, ( AIR 1964 SC 743 ) (supra) that "It is true that claim for wages etc. based on a challenge to an order of dismissal or demotion.... would not be covered by S. 6H(2) of the Act (which is in Pari materia to S. 33- C(2) of the Central Act) and industrial dispute would have to be raised". 25. Reliance was placed by Sri Kameshwar Prasad on the decision of a learned single Judge of P. & H. High Court in Ambala Bus Syndicate, 1984 Lab IC 1955 which, however, proceeded on its own facts as is manifest from the observations contained in the penultimate paragraph the report and wherein too it is accepted. "If once it is held that this was neither a case of dismissal nor of demotion. the authorities afore-cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner are of no avail". 26. The position emerging on consideration of these authorities clearly is that the jurisdiction conferred on the Labour Court under S. 33-(2) is in the nature of that of an execution Court. The foundation for the workman's claim thereunder is the pre-existing entitlement to money or any benefit capable of computation in terms of money against the employer. A mere denial by the employer of such right does not take away the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to determine whether the right in question exists. In making this determination the aspects which are incidental or ancillary to the question can as well be gone into by the Labour Court, but this cannot extend to matters which lie within the domain of Industrial Tribunal upon reference under S. 10(1) of the Act. including a case where the challenge of the workman is that he has been wrongfully demoted and the wages being paid in a lower grade is consequential to such demotion. 27. Now what did the respondents-workmen in the present claim in their applications under S. 33-C(2). In each of these their statement was : "that applicants have been appointed on the permanent existing vacancy of skilled Tailor grade `C' in the year 1963. As such applicant is entitled to receive money towards the benefit of Grade/Scale of pay. It is also mentioned to you in this context that applicants have been demoted wrongfully in the year 1966." 28. As such applicant is entitled to receive money towards the benefit of Grade/Scale of pay. It is also mentioned to you in this context that applicants have been demoted wrongfully in the year 1966." 28. In the paras following the assertion is that in consequence the applicants are being paid wages in the lower grade though they are entitled to the benefit of Grade `C' Tailor (Rs. 85-110/-) up to 1973 and thereafter Rs. 250/- in the revised scale of Rs. 210-290 fixed for skilled Tailor Grade `C'. 29. It is not the case set up by the respondents as is revealed also from the above that (i) the wages they are being actually paid is not of the grade of Labour `B' or that Labour `B' is placed in some higher grade; or (ii) they were placed in the category of Labour `B' with the understanding or an agreement that despite this they would continue to draw wages in the higher grade pertaining to skilled Tailor `C'. 30. The case pleaded plainly on the contrary was that they have been demoted; the demotion is wrongful and the payment of the wages in the lower grade is the resultant thereof. The question which this gives rise to is not ancillary or incidental to what is contemplated under S. 33-C(2); in the facts and circumstances the determination of the pre-existing right could be had only upon reference under S. 10(1) and the respondents' right to the relief sought or the corresponding liability of the petitioner as employer, could not be determined in the execution side by the Labour Court under S.33-C(2). I am unhesitatingly of the opinion therefore that these applications did not lie within the jurisdiction of the Labour Court under this provision. 31. Assuming in the alternative, however, that the Labour Court had jurisdiction in the matter. I proceed now to consider the merits also for that too has been argued before me on both sides. Sri Mohiley contends that the finding reached by the Labour Court is arbitrary, incoherent and perverse. It is not in dispute that the initial appointment of these workmen was made in December 1963 or near about as Tailor `C' in the then sanctioned grade of Rs. 85-110/-. In August 1966 these were faced with the situation of being retrenched due to being rendered surplus. It is not in dispute that the initial appointment of these workmen was made in December 1963 or near about as Tailor `C' in the then sanctioned grade of Rs. 85-110/-. In August 1966 these were faced with the situation of being retrenched due to being rendered surplus. To avert the crisis there was mooted the alternative to absorb them as Labour `B'. The Labour Court in the impugned order dated 9-4-1985 records the finding :- "It appears that as the workmen apprehended retrenchment they agreed to work at another place meant to be provided alternative work of Labour `B' in factory T.P.I. The G.M. of the Ordnance Parachute Factory ordered such alleged reversion on their own request". 32. There is reference also to the application made by these respondents requesting for reversion from Tailor `C' to Labour `B' in addition to the testimony recorded on oath (including the admission of Abdul Majid representing the respondents). Having recorded this finding, the Labour Court proceeds abruptly to observe on mere conjecture; "Had the workmen been told about the reduction in pay or a notice about reduction of pay been given to them they might have contended with one month's pay as retrenchment compensation and sought fortune elsewhere". This overlooks altogether that the willingness offered to join as Labour `B' was unqualified with no reservation made regarding salary etc. There is nothing on the record indeed to suggest that the arrangement arrived at was subject to any such understanding. The fact that these respondents continued to serve in the grade of Labour `B' throughout for a long period of nearly 14 years during 1966-80 without demur till the applications under S. 33-C(2) were made for the first time on 17-6-1980 speaks voluminously as rightly submitted for the petitioner against there having been any understanding or term of this nature. This material aspect apparent on the record is also left untouched by the Presiding Officer. It is not that there is any bar of limitation arising. The decision in Bombay Gas Co., AIR 1964 SC 752 rules that out. The relevancy is from the point of conduct suggesting factually as it does, in the absence of anything to the contrary provided by way of explanation or otherwise, that faced with retrenchment the respondents did opt for the lesser evil to serve as Labour `B' in the grade admissible to that category. 33. The relevancy is from the point of conduct suggesting factually as it does, in the absence of anything to the contrary provided by way of explanation or otherwise, that faced with retrenchment the respondents did opt for the lesser evil to serve as Labour `B' in the grade admissible to that category. 33. Sri Kameshwar Prasad invited my attention to the minutes of the Director General of Ordnance Factories Industrial Council meeting held on Nov. 4, 5 and 6, 1966 vide Annexure 6 to the Writ Petitions. These minutes were filed before the Labour Court from the side of the petitioner on request made in writing by the respondents in this behalf. In the minutes we find mentioned inter alia : "This council also solemnly resolved that the workers who cannot be found sufficient work in their parent trade, and if they so desire, should be trained in alternative trades and that during their training period their pay should be protected and after their successful training they be absorbed in a grade not lower than the grade in which they were last working in their parent trade". 34. It was submitted on the footing of the above that the grade/ pay admissible to the respondents in capacity as Tailors `C' ought to have been protected. It may not be overlooked in this connection that the council is a recommendatory body comprising the representatives both of the workmen and the management. The recommendation was no doubt there but this, by itself, could not be operative. On this subject Central Government in the Ministry of Defence wrote in its letter dated May 9, 1973 vide Annexure 68 which too was placed by the petitioner before the Labour Court as follows :- "I am directed to say that in order to avoid retrenchment of workmen in the grades of Tailors `C' & `D' and other allied categories of semi skilled workers who became surplus to the requirements to the clothing factories during 1966-67 due to reduction of workload in the said factories, 790 employees of the clothing factories group were reverted to Labourer Grade `B' for being imparted training with a view to this absorption in alternative trades. 2. 2. To ameliorate the hardships faced due to reversion the President is pleaded to accord to the protection of pay last drawn by them just before their reversion as Labourer Grade `B' for the period of the training only subject to a maximum period of one year before being absorbed in the alternative trades. The protection of pay is to be allowed by fixing their pay in the lower scale of Labour Gr. `B' under the normal rules and by allowing them the balance as personal pay. 3. This issues with the concurrence of Ministry of Finance (Defence) vide their UO No. 938/Proj-1 dated 24-7-73". 35. From this it is clear that Government was agreeable to accord protection for the period of training only and that too for the maximum period of one year and not beyond the same. It would not be right, therefore, to contend on the footing of the minutes of the council aforementioned that the respondents became entitled to draw wages in the higher grade of Tailor `C' despite being absorbed as Tailor `B' with effect from August 1966 or nearabout. 36. The next contention of Sri Kameshwar Prasad is that the agreement dated 19th Aug, 1966 amounts to introducing a change in the conditions of service in respect of wages - a matter specified in the Fourth Schedule to the Industrial Disputes Act and being not preceded with notice, this is hit by the provisions of Section 9A of the said Act. Section 9A lays down that change in the condition of service in respect of any matter specified in the Fourth Schedule shall not have effect unless a notice is given to the workmen likely to be affected by such change in the prescribed manner of the nature of the change proposed to be effected or within 21 days of giving such notice. Proviso (a) says that the notice shall not be required for effecting any such change where the change is effected in pursuance of any settlement, award, or decision of the Appellate Tribunal constituted under the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act 1950. Proviso (B) is not relevant for our purposes. The argument advanced is that in the present case there was neither an award nor a decision of the Appellate Tribunal nor is there a settlement within the meaning of this Act. Proviso (B) is not relevant for our purposes. The argument advanced is that in the present case there was neither an award nor a decision of the Appellate Tribunal nor is there a settlement within the meaning of this Act. The expression "settlement" is to be found defined in S. 2(1) which has to he read along with R. 58 of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules 1957. In terms thereof the `settlement' means a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceeding and includes a written agreement between the employer and workmen arrived as otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding where such agreement has been signed-by the parties thereto in the prescribed manner and a copy thereof has been sent to the officer authorised in this behalf by the Government and the Conciliation Officer. Rule 58 prescribes form H for the settlement to be arrived in the course of conciliation proceedings or otherwise and also specifies in detail as to by whom the settlement is to be signed. No such settlement was arrived at in the present case. The contention is that S. 9A would, therefore, stand in the way of the arrangement brought about in August 1966 being made effective in law. I am unable to agree with this contention. 37. Section 9-A is in reference to a change proposed in the condition of service applicable to any workman in respect of any matter specified in the Fourth Schedule. It is doubtful whether this is attracted where the service itself has changed instead of there being a change proposed or brought about in the conditions of services to which the workman belongs. For so long as the workman is in service there may be no change in the condition thereof in respect of any matter specified in the Fourth Schedule without the requisite formalities including notice to the workman being gone into. But where there is a cessation of the services and the workmen are absorbed differently, it does not appear that that would also be a case covered under S. 9A. It is not that there was a change in the Wages admissible to Tailors `C' to which service the respondents belong; the respondents were instead taken in as Labour `B' which may not be classed as the same service even though it was under the same employer. It is not that there was a change in the Wages admissible to Tailors `C' to which service the respondents belong; the respondents were instead taken in as Labour `B' which may not be classed as the same service even though it was under the same employer. This apart, it also does not appear that the lack of formal-notice to the workmen could be material whereas in the present case, the change was brought about with their volition. The real object and purpose of enacting S. 9A is to afford an opportunity to the workmen to consider the effect of the proposed change and if necessary to present their point of view on the proposal vide Tata Iron and Steel Co., AIR 1972 SC 1917 : (1972 Lab IC 1128). In Assam Match Co. v. Bijoy Lal Sen, (1973) 27 Fac LR 61 : (1973 Lab IC 1158) (SC). It was pointed in reference to the object underlying this provision that there is no question of contravention of S. 9A where the workmen themselves suggested to the employer to make the alteration. In Tamilnadu Electricity Workers Federation v. Madras State Electricity Board (1964) 2 Lab LJ 392 : ( AIR 1965 Mad 111 ) the Division Bench was of the opinion that where a statutory corporation offers certain changes in the service conditions of its employees with an option to the employees to opt for the existing service conditions and such offer is accepted by some of the workmen after consideration, a writ of mandamus does not lie by the Union representing some of the employees to direct the corporation not to give effect to the change in the service conditions on ground that S. 9 A has not been complied with and that amounts to the workmen, who agreed to the change, were not aware of its implications. It was pointed out that the workmen if aggrieved by such change should move the machinery set up under the Industrial Disputes Act. A reference to the manner in which the change referred to as such was brought about in this case, would show that this was with the consent of the respondents, even if not, on the request proceeding from their side. A reference to the manner in which the change referred to as such was brought about in this case, would show that this was with the consent of the respondents, even if not, on the request proceeding from their side. As a consequence of the short-fall in the workload retrenchment of Tailors `C' was in the offing; a proposal to absorb such persons in the alternative job as labours `B' was under consideration for quite some time; the respondents applied in writing expressing their choice to be taken in as labour `B' and it is thereupon that they came to be posted as labour `B' at various places at which position they continued working in the basic scale admissible thereto for the period of 1966-80. In face thereof it may not be maintained that their absorption as labour `B' is vitiated for want of a formal notice as contemplated under S. 9A, though it is true, as urged for the respondents, that no formal settlement within the meaning of S. 2(p) read with Rule 58 could be executed herein. 38. The submission made by the respondents learned counsel Sri K.P. Agarwal based upon the recent decision of the Supreme Court reported in (1986) 3 SCC 156 : (1986 Lab IC 1312) (Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly) also is that the parties did not stand on an equal footing and did not enjoy the same bargaining power and, therefore. the change brought about under the order dated 19-8-1966 be discarded as unsconscionable and void. I have given careful thought to the argument but am unable to agree in the backdrop hereof. In the Central Inland Water Transport Corporation case just mentioned above the contention advanced was that R. (9)(i) of the Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. Service Discipline and Appeal Rules which provided that the employment of a permanent employee shall be subject to termination on three months' notice on either side was arbitrary and uncanalized, the parties not being on an equal footing enjoying same bargaining power and there being no guidelines for the exercise of the power under the said Rule and also since it offended Article 14 of the Constitution as it conferred an absolute and arbitrary power upon the Corporation. Hon'ble Madon J. speaking for the Division Bench considered at length the English and American authorities as also Ss. Hon'ble Madon J. speaking for the Division Bench considered at length the English and American authorities as also Ss. 16/23 of the Contract Act and Article 14 of the Constitution and concluded- "The principle deducible from the above discussions on this part of the case is in consonance with right and reason intended to secure social and economic justice and conforms to the mandate of the great equality clause in Article 14. This principle is that the Courts will not enforce and will, when called upon to do so, strike down an unfair and unreasonable contract, or an unfair and unreasonable clause in a contract, entered into between parties who are not equal in bargaining power". 39. The view expressed was that such contracts which affect a large number of persons or a group or groups of persons. if they are unconscionable, unfair and unreasonable, are injurious to public interest and ought to be adjudged void. The type of contracts to which the principle formulated by us above applies are not contracts which are tainted with illegality but are contracts which contain terms which are so unfair and unreasonable that they shock the conscience of the Court. They are opposed to public policy and require to be adjudged void. This essentially is a question depending on the facts and circumstances of a case. 40. Do we have in the instant case a contract of this type? It may not be disputed that the respondents did not stand on equal footing with the petitioner and could not have the equal bargaining power. It is also apparent that there was the economic duress staring on its face. But then it would not be justified to contend that in the situation obtaining the arrangement arrived at was unfair, unreasonable or unconscionable. Due to the manufacture being curtailed since the contingency leading to the recruitment of Tailors on a large scale was over, the establishment had to retrench them of necessity. It is not the respondents case that this was a cloak or that there were others recruited as Tailors in their place. In the event of retrenchment, the workmen would have been the recipients of the benefit under Section 25-F no doubt but it is not irrational to imagine that the other alternative namely, of continuing in employment as Labour `B' in a lower grade may have seemed more appealing. In the event of retrenchment, the workmen would have been the recipients of the benefit under Section 25-F no doubt but it is not irrational to imagine that the other alternative namely, of continuing in employment as Labour `B' in a lower grade may have seemed more appealing. The employer herein provided alternative job on its standing terms and conditions lest the respondents be thrown out as jobless; it is nobody's case that the nature of duty assigned to Labour `B' is at par with that of Tailor `C' nor is it borne out that it was ever contemplated to place Labour `B' in the same grade as Tailor `C'. The case practically is of recruitment offered afresh in the grade of Labour `B' that was to the liking of the respondents and which in the circumstances may not be classed unreasonable or arbitrary nor may this be treated as unconscionable. 41. For the discussions made above, these petitions succeed and are allowed. The order made by the Labour Court-the respondent 1 dated 9th April 1985, is quashed. There will be no order as to costs.