JUDGMENT 1. - This is a defendants' revision against the order of the learned Munsif and Judicial Magistrate, Nimbahera dated 17-3-1986, by which he dismissed the defendants' application under Order 7, Rule 11, Civil Procedure Code and held that the suit was triable by it. 2. The brief facts giving rise to this revision are that the plaintiff Nana Lal instituted the suit against Smt. Chandi and others for the cancellation of two sale deeds and declaring them void against the plaintiff and further praying that the defendants may be restrained from interfering with the plaintiff's possession over the land in dispute. The case of the plaintiff was that Khasras No. 330 measuring 2 bighas, 2 biswas, No. 950 measuring 2 bighas, 8 biswas. No. 962 measuring 2 bighas, 4 bishwas and No. 963 measuring 1 bigha, 17 biswas were in 'Khatedari' of Madan Lal, Moti Lal and Ramjas sons of Ram Dayal. Moti Lal died leaving behind his widow Jawer Bai. Before the death of Moti Lal all three brothers Moti Lal, Ramjas and Ram Dayal had sold Khasras No. 330 and 962 to the plaintiff's father Nandaji in Samvat 2017-18 and had handed over the possession thereof to him. The sale deed is alleged to be in a 'bahi'. The plaintiff further Against order dated 17-3-1985 passed by Shri Megha Ram Choudhary, Munsif and Judicial Magistrate, Nimbahera alleged that his father died about 15 years back leaving behind the plaintiff and his brother Prabhu. The case of the plaintiff further was that his brother Prabhu improperly wanted to deprive the plaintiff of his share of the land and with this intention he joined hands with Ramjas and Madan Lal and taking advantage of the fact that the land continues to be recorded in the names of Jawer Bai, Madan Lal and Ramjas he manipulated to show that the land belonged to Ramjas and Madan Lal alone and got a sale deed of the land executed by them in favour of his wife Smt. Chandi. He conveniently concealed the fact that the land had already been sold by Madan Lal, Ramjas and Ram Dayal to Nandaji. He conveniently concealed the fact that the land had already been sold by Madan Lal, Ramjas and Ram Dayal to Nandaji. Further, it was alleged that earlier in 1975, there had been a family settlement between the plaintiff and his brother Prabhu and Khasra No. 330 came to the share of the plaintiff and Khasra No. 962 fell to Prabhu's share and they had been cultivating the land according to their shares, still these facts were also concealed and the sale deed was got executed in favour of Smt. Chandi. The plaintiff further goes on to allege that Smt. Chandi had further sold one third share of the property in dispute by a bogus sale deed got registered in the name of defendant No. 3 Fateh Mohd. The plaintiff alleged that these sale deeds are not binding on him and he continues to be in possession of khasra No. 330, which had fallen to his share on account of the family settlement in 1975. He, therefore, prayed that these two sale deeds may be declared to be void and ineffective against the plaintiff and for an injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the plaintiff's possession over khasra No. 330. The defendants contested the suit and raised objection to the suit being entertained by the civil court. Their case was that the suit was exclusively triable by a revenue court and, therefore, the plaint should be rejected by the civil court. They moved an application under Order 7, Rule 11, Civil Procedure Code in this respect and after hearing the parties, the learned Munsif rejected that application on the ground that since declaration to the effect that the two sale deeds were void and ineffective against the plaintiff had been asked for in the suit, the suit was triable by a civil court because such a relief can only be granted by a civil court and not by a revenue court. Aggrieved of this order of the learned Munsif dated 17-3-86, the defendants have come up in revision. 3. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record. 4. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the learned Munsif has wholly mis-construed the plaint and has assumed jurisdiction to entertain the suit which did not vest in him. 3. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record. 4. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the learned Munsif has wholly mis-construed the plaint and has assumed jurisdiction to entertain the suit which did not vest in him. It is contended that the real relief asked for by the plaintiff is a relief for injunction on the ground that he continues to be in possession of the land in dispute as a 'khatedar' and the defendants have no right in it and the other relief for declaring the sale deeds referred to above to be void was not at all necessary & the plaintiff need not have asked for the same. According to the learned counsel their relief has been asked for merely in order to justify the filing of the suit before a civil court. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the non-petitioner has supported the order of the learned Munsif on the ground that it was necessary for the plaintiff to have asked for the declaration of the sale deeds being void and ineffective against him. 5. Having given my careful consideration to the rival contentions I am clearly of the opinion that the learned Munsif has wholly mis-construed the plaint and has also ignored the settled law propounded by this Court in various authorities. It may at once be stated that from a long series of authorities beginning from Asala v. Narain (1963 RLW 323) to Jaswant Singh v. Board of Revenue (1984 RLW 573) , the later authority has been relied by the learned counsel for the non-petitioner himself, it has been laid down by this Court that in order to ascertain whether the suit is exclusively triable by a revenue court or not, the court has to ascertain the real nature of the suit and the relevant averments in the plaint. The mere fact that the plaint has been couched in the manner to show that some of the reliefs are such as can be granted only by a civil court, whereas in fact the necessity for asking for such reliefs was not at all there, should not mis-lead the court it has to arrive at a clear rinding as to the real nature of the suit. If the real relief sought in the suit is such as can be granted by the revenue court, the suit must be deemed to be triable by it irrespective of the fact that some ancillary reliefs have been sought which can properly have been granted by a civil court or such other reliefs have been sought which could only be granted by a civil court but were not at all necessary to be asked for. In this connection it has to be borne in mind as to what is the real nature of the suit and for that purpose the plaint has to by carefully scrutinised. In the present case, from the facts stated above it is clear that the main relief asked for by the plaintiff is the, relief for injunction as according to him he continues to be the 'khatedar' and in possession of khasra No. 330. The relief that sale deeds, namely, the one which has been got executed by Ramjas and Madanlal in favour of Smt. Chandi and the later said to have been executed by Smt. Chandi in favour of Fateh Mohd. are not binding on him and are void and ineffective against him is a relief which need need not have been asked for because if the case of the plaintiff is that he is not bound by those documents he is entitled to ignore them, he can maintain a suit for injunction in his own right. In this connection reference may be made to Jaswat Singh's case referred to above in which after referring to the various decisions of this Court as also the decision of the Privy Council in Pethernermal Chetty v. Muniandy Serval (ILR 35 Cal. 551) it was held that "thus upon a consideration of the several cases of this Court on the point, it clearly emerges that if the suit was filed by the plaintiff for possession treating the dead as wholly void or a nullity, then a prayer for cancellation of the deed was unnecessary and was not required to be made by the plaintiff, who could ignore the void document. In such cases there was no unsurmountable difficulty in the way of the plaintiff in seeking relief by way of declaration of tenancy rights and claiming possession before a competent Revenue court. In such cases there was no unsurmountable difficulty in the way of the plaintiff in seeking relief by way of declaration of tenancy rights and claiming possession before a competent Revenue court. The present case is not one in which the alleged sale-deed was admitted to have been executed by the plaintiff or her predecessor-in-interest or that she sought to avoid the same on the ground that she was made to execute the deed by fraud or misrepresentation. The plaintiff claimed in the suits that sale-deeds were not executed by her. In such circumstances the sale-deeds were alleged to be void and not voidable and the same could be ignored by the plaintiffs." The suits in that case were held to be triable by a Revenue Court irrespective of the fact that the plaintiff had prayed for cancellation of the sale-deeds. I need not multiply the authorities which have already been referred to in this case. Applying this principle to the present case, it clearly appears that the suit was one for injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the plaintiff's possession over the land in dispute. The relief for declaration of the sale deeds was not at all necessary as it is not the case of the plaintiff that those documents had been executed by him or his predecessor-in-interest or they were binding on him. That being so, he could have ignored these documents and established his own title in order to enable him to obtain the relief for injunction. Such a suit is clearly governed by section 92 and Item 8(A) of the third schedule appended to the Rajasthan Tenancy Act & is clearly triable by a Revenue Court. The learned Munsif was, therefore, wrong in entertaining the suit. 6. I, therefore, allow this revision, set aside the order of the learned Munsif & Judicial Magistrate, Nimbahera dated 17-3-1986 and direct that the plaint shall be returned to the plaintiff for presentation before a competent Revenue Court. I shall leave the parties to bear their own costs of this revision since the revision is being disposed of at the admission stage.Revision allowed. *******