SWAMY, J. ( 1 ) THOUGH the respondents are served, they are absent and un-represented. As this petition can be disposed of on a short point, it is taken up for final disposal. ( 2 ) IN this petition under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution, the petitioner has sought for quashing the order dated 24-12-1985 HCA 34 : 85-86 F 12 passed by the second respondent, produced as Annexure 'a'. ( 3 ) BY the impugned order, the second respondent has suspended the plumbing licence of the patitioner. It is contended on behalf of the petitioner that the impugned order is passed without notice to the petitioner and without affording him an opportunity of hearing. It is submitted that as the suspension of the licence affects the petitioner very much inasmuch as it disables him from carrying on the work of a plumber and also to execute the work relating to providing water supply, which is the main profession of the petitioner, he ought to have been heard before passing the impugned order. It is also further contended that the allegations mada in the order are not true. ( 4 ) HAVING regard to aforesaid contentions, the point for consideration is, whether the second respondent ought to have issued notice and heard the petitioner before suspending the licence. ( 5 ) SUB-SECTION (9) of Section 218 of the Karnataka Municipal Corporations act (hereinafter referred to as the 'act') empowers the Commissioner to suspend or cancel the licence issued for plumbing if the licensee contravenes sub-section (8) thereof. The power of cancellation includes the power of suspension also. As in sub-section (9) of Section 218 of the Act, both the powers have been specifically conferred, it follows that the licence can be suspended by way of punishment or it can be suspended pending the enquiry regarding cancellation of licence. In the event the licence is suspended pending an enquiry, it cannot be for an indefinite period. It must be for a limited period. In Siddappa D. v deputy Commissioner (Excise) and another, reported in 1985 (2) Karnataka Law Journal, 264, while construing section 29 of the Karnataka Excise Act which also empowers the authority to cancel or suspend licence, this Court has held as follows :-"no doubt in the aforesaid section there is no special provision made regarding suspension of licence pending enquiry. In Siddappa D. v deputy Commissioner (Excise) and another, reported in 1985 (2) Karnataka Law Journal, 264, while construing section 29 of the Karnataka Excise Act which also empowers the authority to cancel or suspend licence, this Court has held as follows :-"no doubt in the aforesaid section there is no special provision made regarding suspension of licence pending enquiry. The question is whether power to cancel the licence includes the powar to suspend the licence pending enquiry. It is an accepted principle of interpretation of law that whenever a statute empowers an authority to do a certain thing it must be deemed to have empowered that authority to do all those things which are necessary for the purpose of effective exercise of that power. In addition to this it is brought to my notice by learned Government pleader Sri Abdul Khadar that under similar circumstances the Supreme court has also held that the power of suspension is necessary concomitant to the power of grant and cancellation of licence. (M/s. Sukhwinder Pal bipan Kumar v State of Punjab-A. I. R. 1982 S. C. page 65 ). No doubt thesup- reme Court was considering an ORDER issued under Section 3 of the Essential Commodities act, which contained specific provision including the power to suspend a licence without giving reasonable opportunity to the licencee of stating his case for a period not exceeding 90 days during the pendencyof the proceeding for cancellation of the licence. The Supreme court observed in that case: "the power of suspension conferred by the second proviso to sub-clause (1) of Ci. 11 of the Order is by way of an interim measure, pending the holding of an inquiry as to whether there is any breach which must result in cancellation of the licence. It is true that the suspension of licence is a drastic measure, if taken without affording to the dealer a reasonable opportunity of stating his case, but it is a measure of social control in the interests of community. The power of suspension is necessary concomitant of the power to grant a privilege or a licence. "thus it follows that the power of suspension is necessary concomitant to the power to grant or cancel the licence. The power of suspension is necessary concomitant of the power to grant a privilege or a licence. "thus it follows that the power of suspension is necessary concomitant to the power to grant or cancel the licence. If that be so even though section 29 does not specifically provide that pending enquiry licence can be suspended it necessarily follows that such a power is implied under section 29 of the Act, because that is necessary for the purpose of effective implementation of in other words, for effectuating the legislative intentment of the statute. Learned Government pleader has also placed reliance on a division Bench decision of the High court of Andhra Pradesh in Dr. K. M. Lakshmana Rao and other v Govt. of andhra Pradesh and another, reported in 1984 Labour and Industrial Cases 223. In the said decision also it has been held that the power of suspension is ancillary to and is incidental to enforce the power conferred under the Statute. ( 6 ) HOWSVER, in the instant case, the impugned order does not state that the licence is suspended pending enquiry. Having regard to the finding recorded in the impugned order it is D!so not possible to construe it as an order passed pending enquiry. In addition to this suspension of licencs is neither limbed to a particular period nor it is stated that it is suspended pending enquiry. Therefore, there is no alternative but to construe it as the one passed by way of punishment. It that be so, the petitioner ought to have been afforded an opportunity to file his objections and the objections ought to have been enquired into and then it would have been decided after hearing the petitioner. As the impugned order is passed by way of a punishment without notice to and without hearing the petitioner, it cannot be sustained. As pointed out in Siddappa's case referred to above, the power to suspend the licence pending enquiry, can be exercised without notice and without hearing provided it is limited for a particular period. For the reasons stated above, this writ petition is allowed. The order dated 24-12-1985 bearing No. HCA 34 : 85-86 f 12, produced as Annexure-A, passed by the second respondent, is hereby quashed. For the reasons stated above, this writ petition is allowed. The order dated 24-12-1985 bearing No. HCA 34 : 85-86 f 12, produced as Annexure-A, passed by the second respondent, is hereby quashed. It is made clear that this order does not come in the way of the second respondent to proceed in the matter afresh and in accordance with law. Petition is allowed. --- *** --- .