P. C. Warriar v. K. Lakshmikutty Warassiar — 1986 DIGILAW 62 (KER)

ORDER Varghese Kalliath, J. 1. These two Civil Revision Petitions arise from a proceeding under the Kerala Buildings [Lease and Rent Control] Act, 1965 [Act 2 of 1965], hereinafter referred to as the Act. 2. The landlady is the revision petitioner in C. R. P. No. 438 of 1984. The tenant is the revision petitioner in C. R. P. No. 3456 of 1983. Both the landlady and the tenant challenge the order of the revisional court. 3. The landlady filed a petition under S.11(2) and (3) of the Act. She was not successful before the Rent Controller as well as before the Rent Control Appellate Authority. But the revisional court held that the landlady had established her bona fide need for own occupation. It remitted the case for the consideration of the second proviso to S.11(3) of the Act. The landlady objects to the latter part of the order of the revisional court while the tenant objects to the former part of the order of the revisional court holding that the landlady has proved her bona fide need for own occupation. 4. These are the facts: The petition schedule building was allotted to the landlady under a partition karar. The partition karar is Ext. A2. It is dated 5-9-1967. The building in question is in Cochin Corporation. The landlady (hereinafter in C. R. P. No. 438 of 1984 the landlady will be referred to as the petitioner and the tenant as the respondent in this order) has no other building other than the building in question in the Corporation of Cochin. She also stated that she had no possession of any other building anywhere, other than the petition schedule building for her residence. Her case is that she had only a right of residence in the common tarwad house. 5. When the petitioner filed the petition before the Rent Controller, she was residing with her children in the common tarwad house at Mazhuvannoor which is said to be about 50 kilo meters away from Ernakulam. It is in evidence that in the said house, besides the petitioner and her children her parents and a brother are also residing. Further it is proved that the petitioner's son is a college student attending a college at Kolenchery. One of the daughters of the petitioner on the date of the petition was to join a college for Pre Degree course. Further it is proved that the petitioner's son is a college student attending a college at Kolenchery. One of the daughters of the petitioner on the date of the petition was to join a college for Pre Degree course. The second daughter is a student in a local school. The petitioner also stated that she feels 'discomfort' to continue her residence with her family in the common tarwad house. 6. Some more facts have been elicited during the trial. These facts J would reveal that the building in question was occupied by her paternal uncle for a period from 1967 to 1972 and from 1972 to 1973 her maternal uncle a Doctor was occupying the building They were living in the building without any obligation to pay any rent to the petitioner. It was only a family courtesy shown to the uncles by the petitioner. During the end of 1972, the Doctor uncle left India for England leaving his wife Doctor Santha to continue her residence in the disputed building. The respondent and his wife began to live with Dr. Santha from 1972 onwards so as to have company for Dr. Santha. In 1973, Dr. Santha also left India to join her husband. Thus from 1973 onwards, the present tenant was occupying the building. 7. It is brought out in evidence that from 1973 to 1977, the present tenant was not paying any rent and that in 1977, the landlady wanted the present tenant to surrender the building. But as a result of mediation, the tenant began to occupy the building on a rental arrangement, agreeing to pay a rent of Rs. 400/- The definite case of the petitioner is that the respondent was allowed to occupy the building as a tenant only for a short period as a temporary adjustment. Though the above stated facts are not very material to the issue in question, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that these facts would reveal the tenderness and consideration shown by the petitioner for the respondent. 8. The respondent contended that the case of the petitioner that she required the building for her own occupation is only a ruse for obtaining possession of the building and that she does not bona fide need the building for her own occupation. 8. The respondent contended that the case of the petitioner that she required the building for her own occupation is only a ruse for obtaining possession of the building and that she does not bona fide need the building for her own occupation. The tenant says that the statement that the landlady is residing in the family house at Mazhuvannoor in the common family building is untrue; she is residing at "Rathinivas" along with her husband at Mazhuvannoor. Rathinivas is not a common family house. Further in the objection it is stated that the house in which the landlady is residing belonged to her and that the landlady is running a textile and a stationery shop in the name and style "Laxmi Emporium". The tenant submitted that there is no bona fides in the claim of the landlady that she required for her residence the petition schedule building at Ernakulam, which is far away from Mazhuvannoor. The 'discomfort' alleged in the petition to continue to reside in the family house is characterised in the objection as unreal and is only a pretext for getting an order of eviction. The tenant also invoked the aid of the proviso to S.11(3) of the Ad in so far as he contended that he is carrying on a business in the scheduled building and that he is depending for his livelihood mainly on the income derived from the business carried on in the building. He submitted that no suitable building is available in the locality for him to carry on his business. 9. The Rent Controller held that the petitioner failed to prove her bona fide need for own occupation. The landlady filed an appeal before the Rent Control Appellate Authority. The appellate authority confirmed the order of the Rent Controller. 10. Against the orders of the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority, the landlady filed a revision before the District Court. The District Judge reversing the findings of the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority held that the landlady has proved her bona fide need for own occupation. The Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority did not consider the application of the proviso to S.11(3) of the Act. Hence the revisional court remitted the case to the Rent Controller. Now, as stated earlier, both the landlady and the tenant have filed these revision petitions. C. R. P. No. 3456 of 1983: 11. The Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority did not consider the application of the proviso to S.11(3) of the Act. Hence the revisional court remitted the case to the Rent Controller. Now, as stated earlier, both the landlady and the tenant have filed these revision petitions. C. R. P. No. 3456 of 1983: 11. This is the revision petition by the tenant. The learned counsel for the tenant submits that the revisional court exceeded its jurisdiction when it reversed the findings recorded by the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority that the landlady failed to establish her bona fide need for own occupation. The only question that has to be answered in this revision petition is whether the revisional court was right in reversing the findings of the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority on the question of bona fide need for own occupation set forth by the landlady. 12. The learned counsel for the tenant and the landlady referred me to several decisions of this court and of the Supreme Court on the question of the ambit of jurisdiction exercised by the revisional court under S.20 of the Act. 13. Although the principle to be applied in determining the limit of the jurisdiction of the revisional court under S.20 of the Act is well established, there has undoubtedly been some fluctuation of authority as to the limit of the power of the revisional court. The learned counsel for the tenant referred me to Doraswami Chettiar v. Nhandammadan Kunhiraman ( 1969 KLJ 227 ). He relied on the observations of Balakrishna Eradi, J. as he then was, to the effect that in order that a finding can legitimately be characterised as 'improper' it must be so wholly unreasonable or perverse that no reasonable tribunal or authority could have come to such a conclusion on the evidence on record, or the subordinate tribunal should have recorded its finding without adverting to a single piece of evidence. Further the learned counsel wanted to rely on the observation in the same judgment that the District Judge exercising revisional jurisdiction under S.20 of the Act will not be justified in interfering with a finding of fact recorded by the appellate authority merely because he is of the view that on a correct appreciation of the evidence, a different conclusion should have been arrived at by the appellate authority. 14. 14. The counsel for the tenant also referred me to Kadeesaha v. Venkitaswamy ( 1978 KLT 260 ). In this decision, Kochu Thommen, J. held B that the jurisdiction of the revising authority under S.20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, is not unlimited; he does not sit in appeal; his jurisdiction to interfere with finding of fact is limited to cases where the impugned order is perverse or arbitrary in the sense that, on the basis of the evidence on record, no reasonable tribunal would have come to such a decision: or the decision was rendered on the basis of irrelevant consideration; or, that it was unsupported by any evidence whatsoever. 15. The learned counsel for the landlady referred me to Mathai v. Subordinate Judge ( 1969 KLT 348 ), Moti Ram v. Suraj Bhan ( AIR 1960 SC 655 ), Ramankutty v. Ittiachan ( 1960 KLT 895 ) and Perumal Pillai v. Venkiteswara Iyer ( 1965 KLT 476 ). In 1960 KLT 895 , Vaidialingam, J., as he then was, has taken the view that whether the District Judge has exercised his powers properly on the clear terms of S.20 will have to be considered from the circumstances of each case. His Lordship held that the District Judge has the jurisdiction to consider and examine the propriety and legality of the findings made by the subordinate authorities. In the same volume, at page 1383, Madhavan Nair, J. has observed that the jurisdiction to examine the propriety of an order necessarily involves the power to canvass the correctness of the order on the merits of the facts and circumstances on which it is based. His Lordship also held that the interference with the findings of fact entered by the subordinate judge in appeal is not excluded from the revisional power of the District Judge. M. S. Menon, C. J., in 1965 KLT 476 said that the words legality, regularity or propriety of the order are wide enough to cover both questions of law and fact and go far beyond the revisional jurisdiction strictly so called. His Lordship also held that the word 'propriety' is of wider import. It means "fitness, appropriateness, aptitude, suitability, appropriateness to the circumstances or conditions; conformity with requirements, rule or principle, rightness, correctness, justness, accuracy. His Lordship also held that the word 'propriety' is of wider import. It means "fitness, appropriateness, aptitude, suitability, appropriateness to the circumstances or conditions; conformity with requirements, rule or principle, rightness, correctness, justness, accuracy. The counsel for the landlady very much relied on the observation of the Supreme Court in 1969 KLT 348 . "The words of S.20 of the Act of 1965 are much wider than those in S.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. On the words of the section it cannot be said that a revision is limited to a mere question of jurisdiction. The District Judge was empowered to consider whether on the evidence the finding of the Subordinate Judge was proper" I may also refer to Rajee B. Ambadi v. Gopala Pillai ( 1985 KLT 894 ). M. P. Menon, J. has observed that S.20 of 1965 gives the District Judge the power to examine not only the legality, but also the propriety of the order passed by the appellate authority, and for considering whether the decision under challenge is proper or not, the District Court must, in appropriate cases, be able to survey the entire material on record. M P. Menon, J. of course, clipped the width and scope of the survey by saying that the 'survey' should not be in the nature of a de novo appraisal as in the case of an appeal. But it was said that an examination of all the facts and circumstances of the case is not excluded from the purview of the power under S.20 of the Act. 16. The power of the District Judge under S.20 of the Act is certainly to call for and examine the records relating to any order passed or proceedings taken under the Act by the subordinate authorities for the definite purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of the orders passed by the lower authorities in the case. This power, in my view comprehends a power to examine the evidence to test whether the finding of the subordinate judge is proper (vide 1969 KLT 348 SC) Proper means 'fit', 'correct', 'apt', 'suitable'. I find it difficult to say in view of the Supreme Court pronouncement that the District Court's power under S.20 of the Act is so frail and slight made to correct only perverse findings or finds which are wholly unreasonable. I find it difficult to say in view of the Supreme Court pronouncement that the District Court's power under S.20 of the Act is so frail and slight made to correct only perverse findings or finds which are wholly unreasonable. The mandate to call for the records to examine the propriety of an order implicits in itself a right to canvass the correctness of the order on the merits of the facts and circumstances on which the order is based. In this view, I feel that the revisional power under S.20 comprehends a limited power to interfere with findings of fact recorded by the subordinate judge in appeal. But the examination of the correctness of the findings of fact by the District Court should be only for satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity and propriety of the orders passed by the lower authorities. The correctness of the order, can be tested only on the basis of legality, regularity and propriety of the order. 17. Having now stated the width and ambit of the power under S.20 of the Act, I think I have to state how far this court can interfere under S.115 CPC with an order passed by the revisional court under S.20 of the Act. 18. It is well settled that the High Court's powers under S.115 CPC. are limited to examine whether in a case decided, there has been an assumption of jurisdiction where none existed, or a refusal of jurisdiction where it did or there has been material irregularity or illegality in the exercise of that jurisdiction. 18(a). The orbit of the jurisdiction of the High Court under S.115 C. P. C. has been authoritatively laid down as far back as 1894 by the privy Council in Raja Amir Hassan Khan v. Sheo Baksh Singh (1883-1884) H Ind App. 237 (PC). Again in Udayar v. Vasudeva Ayyar ( AIR 1917 PC 71 ), the Privy Council said that the power under the section is not intended to examine the conclusions of law or fact in which the question of jurisdiction is not involved. This view was approved by the Supreme Court in Keshar Deo v. Radha Kissan ( AIR 1953 SC 23 ), AIR 1956 SC 391 and AIR 1971 SC 2324 D.L.F. Housing etc. co. This view was approved by the Supreme Court in Keshar Deo v. Radha Kissan ( AIR 1953 SC 23 ), AIR 1956 SC 391 and AIR 1971 SC 2324 D.L.F. Housing etc. co. v. Sarup Singh) In AIR 1953 SC 23 , the Supreme Court held that the errors contemplated relate to material defects of procedure and not to errors either of fact or of law, after the formalities which the law prescribes, have been complied with. 18(b). In this context, I am tempted to quote a passage from R. v. Governor of Brixton Prison (1968) AC 192, Lord Reid said: - "If a magistrate or any other tribunal has jurisdiction to enter on the enquiry and to decide a particular issue, and there is no irregularity in the procedure, he does not destroy his jurisdiction by reaching a wrong decision. If he has jurisdiction to go right he has jurisdiction to go wrong. Neither an error in fact nor an error in law will destroy his jurisdiction." I may at once say that this statement by Lord Reid, he himself C thought, would be of a little confusion and he said in Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission (1969) 2 AC 147 thus: - "I understand that some confusion has been caused by my having said ............ that if a tribunal has jurisdiction to go right it has jurisdiction to go wrong." In the opinion of H. W. R. Wade (a learned author on Administrative Law) the passage that "neither an error in fact nor an error in law will destroy his jurisdiction" is capable of causing more confusion. 18(c). Of course, in their proper setting, the states of Lord Reid Governor of Brixton Prison are unexceptionable. It may be correct that so long as jurisdiction exists, mere error on point of law or on point of fact, as such will not destroy it. But, considering the ratio of Anismintc Ltd. v. Foreign Compensating, I feel that it does not in the least follow that no sort of error made in the course of the proceedings can affect jurisdiction. The word jurisdiction has been used in a very wide sense. But, considering the ratio of Anismintc Ltd. v. Foreign Compensating, I feel that it does not in the least follow that no sort of error made in the course of the proceedings can affect jurisdiction. The word jurisdiction has been used in a very wide sense. In fact, the inveterate and deep rooted meaning of jurisdiction is very wide in the sense it is synonymous with power, for plainly a tribunal or court must not only have jurisdiction at the beginning but must retain it unbroken and unfaded, bright and fresh, until it has discharged its task of deciding the case. I am of the view that when we want to examine what is a jurisdictional error, it is possible to hold that it may comprehend errors occasioned if the court in the course of its enquiry, addresses itself to a wrong question or decides a question of law vita! to the decision of case wrongly, or violates the rules of natural justice. They are cases where the court has stopped outside its jurisdiction. Lord Justice Diplock has cautioned that "Jurisdiction is an expression which is used in a variety of senses and takes its colour from its context". I am reminded of the extreme example in Anisminic case, of an error of law which was held to be a jurisdictional error. In that case, the Foreign Compensation Commission had negatived a claim for compensation for a property already sold to a foreign buyer on the erroneous ground that the statutory order in Council required that the successor in title should have been of British nationality at a certain date The majority of the House of Lords held that this error blasted the commission's jurisdiction and rendered their decision a nullity since on a true view of the law, they had no jurisdiction to take the successor in title's nationality into account. It has to be noted that plainly the commission had jurisdiction in Lord Reid's narrow sense for they had power to entertain and determine the claim. But by asking themselves the wrong question and deciding upon irrelevant grounds they overstepped their powers. It has to be noted that plainly the commission had jurisdiction in Lord Reid's narrow sense for they had power to entertain and determine the claim. But by asking themselves the wrong question and deciding upon irrelevant grounds they overstepped their powers. There are a number of English decisions which would tell us that English courts have continually stretched the meaning of jurisdiction, to cover errors of this kind in cases where they had power to intervene only if they could show that the decision in question was made outside the jurisdiction or of excess of power. After Anisminic Case the rule in English Law has out stepped a defined channel because of the fine distinction between errors of law within the jurisdiction and outside the jurisdiction. The position is that the superior court has a choice before it whether to interfere with an inferior court on a point of law. Lord Denning said: "If it chooses to interfere, it can formulate its decision in the words." The court below had no jurisdiction to decide this point wrongly as it did. If it does not choose to interfere, it can say, "The court had jurisdiction to decide it wrongly and it did so". 18(d). The rule that this court should not interfere under S.115 CPC with orders even if they are grossly erroneous in law is founded on the principles of law on the subject very much entrenched in old English case. A marked change in the concept of what is jurisdictional error is discernible in Anisminic Case and cases decided thereafter by the House of Lords and Court of Appeal. The great Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission Case revolutionaised law on the subject. Later Lord Denning in Pealman v. Governors of Harrow School (1979) 1 All E R 365 suggested that whenever a tribunal goes wrong in law, it goes outside the jurisdiction conferred on it and its decision is void. 18(e). I feel I should stop the discussion on this aspect, spotlighting how Lord Denning reacted to the fine distinction between an error of law which entails absence of jurisdiction and an error of law made within the A jurisdiction. He said: - "I would suggest this distinction should now be discarded. The High Court has, and should have, jurisdiction to control the proceedings of inferior courts and tribunals by way of judicial review. He said: - "I would suggest this distinction should now be discarded. The High Court has, and should have, jurisdiction to control the proceedings of inferior courts and tribunals by way of judicial review. When they go wrong in law, the High Court should have power to put them right. Not only in the instant case to do justice to the complainant, but also so as to secure that all courts and tribunals, when faced with the same point of law, should decide it in the same way. It is intolerable that a citizen's rights in point of law should depend on which judge tries his case, or in what court it is heard. The way to get things right is to hold thus: no Court or tribunal has any jurisdiction to make an error of law on which the decision of the case depends." 18(f). However I am bound by the decisions reported in AIR 1953 SC 23 followed by the Supreme Court in a number of cases. I have to remember that the High Court is not empowered while exercising its jurisdiction under S.115 CPC to correct errors of fact however gross they may be or even errors of law. So even if the District Court exercising its jurisdiction under S.20 of the Act, decides the case erroneously, on a point of law or fact, this court will be slow in exercising its revisional jurisdiction to correct those errors. 19. Now T turn to sketch the basis of the findings of the lower authorities to size up the arguments of the counsel The point postulated is that the landlady has not chosen to appear before the rent controller as a witness Her father was examined as PW 1. The Trial Court said that P. W. 1, the father did not offer any explanation as to why the landlady did not appear before the court to prove her bona fide need of the building. The Rent Controller found the case of the landlady that she is residing in her tarwad house is true and that the case pleaded by the tenant that the landlady is living in Rathinivas with her husband is not correct. After holding that she is living in the tarwad house, the rent controller held that the landlady was not able to substantiate her contention that she felt discomfort in her tarwad house. After holding that she is living in the tarwad house, the rent controller held that the landlady was not able to substantiate her contention that she felt discomfort in her tarwad house. The rent controller also said that this aspect would have been proved in a better manner if the landlady has been examined. The further basis for holding that there is no bona fides on the part of the landlady is that feeling of discomfort has not been revealed in the notice issued by the landlady and that details regarding the discomfort have not been given in the notice or in the petition. The rent controller observed thus: - "The mere averment in the petition that the petitioner feels some discomfort without any explanation in regard to the nature of the discomfort will not constitute a reasonable ground for claiming eviction of the tenant. Mere assertion on the part of the landlord that the premises are required for his own use or occupation is not sufficient." The appellate authority also based its decision to hold that the landlady failed to establish the bona fide need for own occupation on the reasoning of the rent controller. 20. The revisional court has undoubtedly the power to examine the reasonableness of the conclusion reached by the subordinate authorities on the facts and circumstances revealed in the case. As I said, the reasoning given by the subordinate authorities to hold against the landlady is that she did not offer herself as a witness to speak to the case. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the ground being a requirement for own occupation under S.11(3) of the Act, the non examination of the landlady as a witness is fatal and on that ground, the petition is certainly liable to. be dismissed. I have to examine this aspect of the case. The counsel submitted that the bona fide need of the landlady involves a subjective element and no one is competent to speak about this subjective element other than the landlady. I think the counsel is not very correct in his submission. Of course, he has relied on Nanalal Goverdhandas and Co v. Samrathai (AIR 1981 Bombay 1). I think proof regarding the bona fide need of a landlord can be established at least in certain circumstances by the evidence of persons other than the landlord. I think the counsel is not very correct in his submission. Of course, he has relied on Nanalal Goverdhandas and Co v. Samrathai (AIR 1981 Bombay 1). I think proof regarding the bona fide need of a landlord can be established at least in certain circumstances by the evidence of persons other than the landlord. In all cases it is not imperative that the landlord has to be examined. I do not think that it is a must. 21. In Mattulal v. Radhe Lal ( AIR 1974 SC 1596 ), the Supreme Court has said in regard to bona fide need thus: - "It is for the court to determine the truth of the assertion and also whether it is bona fide. The test which has to be applied is an objective test and not a subjective one." If the test is objective, proof can be given by objective facts which do not require as a must an examination of the landlord as a witness in the proceedings. In AIR 1981 Bombay 1, the Bombay High Court said that the non examination of the landlady can be taken as a ground sufficient to dismiss the petition of the landlady for eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement for own use. The court has observed that the "bona fide requirement is in the first place a state of mind though it may be something more." I think the above statement of the Bombay High Court is not very correct particularly in view of the observations of the Supreme Court, I have quoted above. 22. Of course, whether a landlord requires the building is a matter for the landlord to determine. There it may have a subjective element. But the question whether the requirement is bona fide in the sense that the requirement is reasonable is a matter for the court to decide on the objective facts. In K. Nagappa v. T. D. Krishnasa ( AIR 1971 AP 243 ), the Andhra Pradesh High Court held that the "bona fide requirement of the landlord does not mean his absolute requirement without which it is impossible for him to get on. In K. Nagappa v. T. D. Krishnasa ( AIR 1971 AP 243 ), the Andhra Pradesh High Court held that the "bona fide requirement of the landlord does not mean his absolute requirement without which it is impossible for him to get on. Bona fide requirement is none other than reasonable requirement." In Bhaskaran v. Unni ( 1984 KLT 1016 ), this court has held that in all cases where a landlord wants eviction of the tenant on the ground of bona fide need for own occupation, it is not necessary that the landlord has to be examined as a witness. Distinguishing AIR 1981 Bombay, 1, the court held thus: - "There may be a variety of justifiable grounds which preclude the landlord from giving evidence in the case directly and in person. To consign a petition for eviction to an irredeemable doom in such cases, for the only reason that the landlord did not himself give the evidence, even when there was abundance of other evidence establishing the claim, would be a gross deflection of the course of justice." 23. In the light of what I have discussed above, I think the reliance placed by the rent controller and the appellate authority on the fact that the landlady has not been examined for holding that there is no proof regarding the bona fide need of the landlady for own occupation is improper. The revisional court. I think, can, in the circumstances, exercise its powers under S.20 of the Act. 24. The learned counsel for the tenant submitted that one of the main points urged by the landlady to establish her bona fide need is her discomfort in continuing her residence in the tarwad house. The counsel submits that when the landlady relied on this fact (discomfort), she ought to have given the details of the discomfort she was experiencing in her tarwad house. This also was a matter which influenced very much the subordinate authorities. The counsel referred me the decision Rangater Sons (P) Ltd. v. Rukhivabi ( 1982 KLT 658 ) where this court has held that "a failure to disclose the particulars relating to the business proposed to be set up was fatal to such a petition seeking eviction." I do not think that the counsel can persuade me to apply this decision on the facts of this case. 25. 25. In this case, the bona fide need set fourth as a ground was for residential purpose. In the case reported in 1982 KLT 658 , the need was for business purpose and in a case where the need was for business purpose, the details of the nature of the business is a matter which should be disclosed in the petition so as to enable the tenant to counter the claim of the landlord effectively. But it is quite different to say that in a case where the landlord seeks eviction on the ground that he needs the building for his own residence, he should say the details of the difficulties he was experiencing in living with his/her parents or living in a tarwad house. The subordinate authorities relied on very much on the lack of pleadings regarding the nature of the discomfort experienced by the petitioner. The revisional court thought correctly that the approach made by the subordinate authorities was improper. 26. It has to be remembered in ordinary circumstances, when a landlord who has no building of his own in his possession says that he bona fide needs his premises for own occupation, the court can legitimately start with a premise that the claim of the landlord is true even though the tenant has controverted the claim of the landlord by filing his objection. The word bona fide need in the context appears to denote something less than the absolute necessity. It should not be a mere wish or desire. The word bona fide means in good faith or genuinely. In other words, it conveys absence of intent to deceive. If the landlord is not seeking eviction on the false pretext that he requires the building for his own occupation, if he had no oblique or collateral motive or for achieving some other ulterior purpose, his claim deserves to be upheld as bona fide. 27. It seems to be reasonable and legitimate for one to entertain a feeling that he should live under his own roof and as of right. When a landlady who is living with her own family with her parents, thinks that she should have an independent and separate establishment, normally, it is a most justified claim. 27. It seems to be reasonable and legitimate for one to entertain a feeling that he should live under his own roof and as of right. When a landlady who is living with her own family with her parents, thinks that she should have an independent and separate establishment, normally, it is a most justified claim. Sadasivan, J. in Ramakrishan v. Gopala Moothan ( 1971 KLT 427 ) said: - "When the members constituting a joint family feel that accommodation is insufficient and, for maintaining healthy relationship between members interse, it is better that other accommodation is found, the matter has to be viewed from a practical and humane stand point". In this case, the counsel for the tenant submits that the landlady is comfortably living in her tarwad house. In this context, shall advert to a serious controversy as regards the nature of the right the landlady had in the tarwad house. The tenant would contend that she is the full owner of the house. The landlady would say that she has got only a right of residence. I shall quote the relevant clause in the partition deed:- "xxx xxx xxxx From what is provided in the partition deed it is difficult to hold that the landlady has got ownership of the house with all the incidents of ownership. The rent controller found that the landlady is residing happily in her tarwad house. The evidence in the case is contrary to this fact. It was found that the landlady's husband was not on good terms with the father of the landlady at least for a period prior to the institution of the proceedings and so that they can live happily there in the tarwad house seems to be not a reasonable conclusion on the facts proved in the case. 28. I think the order of the revisional court is perfectly valid and correct. The revisional court has examined the propriety and legality of the conclusions recorded by the lower authorities. If the revisional court thinks that the conclusions are improper on the legal inferences that can be drawn legitimately from the evidence and circumstances revealed in the case, it is the duty of the revisional court under S.20 of the Act to correct the orders of the lower authorities. The revisional court has only discharged its function properly. 29. This is the revision petition filed by the landlady. The revisional court has only discharged its function properly. 29. This is the revision petition filed by the landlady. The revisional court remitted the case after finding that landlady has established her bona fide need for examining the question of protection under the second proviso to S.11(3) of the Act. The lower authorities have not examined this question. The tenant thus raised this contention in his written objection. He has got a case that the whole building is used for commercial purpose. The counsel for the landlady relied on the decision reported in 1982 KLT 62 (Parvathy Ammal v. Sankara Menon). Relying on S.17 of the Act, Narendran, J. observed that the proviso is unconcerned about the residential accommodation of the tenant. Narendran, J held that the building contemplated by the proviso is a non residential building So the tenant of a residential building will not be entitled to the protection of the second proviso to S.11(3) of the Act, even though living there he carries on a trade or business also. The contention of the tenant that the building is exclusively used for commercial purposes is a matter which has to be considered by the lower authorities. The revisional court did not want to decide that question as an original authority and in that context, the revisional court remanded the case to the rent controller. I do not think that the revisional court has exercised its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity in remanding the case to the rent controller for considering the question of application of the second proviso to S.11(3) of the Act. I feel that in the circumstances, it is not proper for me to interfere with the order of the revisional court. The rent controller should consider this question uninfluenced by any of the observations made in this order as well as in the order of the District Judge. This C. R. P. is only to be dismissed. It is dismissed. 30. In the result, both the C.R.Ps. are dismissed. No order as to costs.