JUDGMENT Parmeshwar Dayal, J. - This is a tenant's writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India with a prayer for quashing the order dated 18183, passed by the Prescribed Authority, and the order dated 181185 passed by the IVth Additional District Judge, Lucknow, as contained in Annexures 11 and 13 respectively. 2. The dispute relates to a shop, situated in Narhi Bazar, Lucknow. and detailed by boundaries in the application under Section 21(1) (a) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. 3. The disputed shop belongs to the opposite parties No. 3 and 4, namely, Krishna Swarup Chaurasia and Rajendra Swarup Chaurasia who are real brothers. It was let out to one Munshi Lal whose eldest son was Durga Prasad. After the death of Munshi Lal, the receipts were issued by Krishna Swarup Chaurasia in favour of Durga Prasad Munshi Lal. Durga Prasad was the father of petitioner no. 1 Banarsi Das Agarwal. Durga Prasad had another son named Karori Mal whose son is Satya Narain. 4. The landlords moved an application under Section 21(1) (a) of Act No. 13 of 1972 on 16976, for release of the disputed portion of the shop, on grounds that the eldest son of Krishna Swarup Chaurasia completed his medical course and his second son started his practice as a lawyer and they needed the disputed portion of the shop for establishment. The landlord Rajendra Swarup Chaurasia has been taking up private tutions and he needed the accommodation to coach the students in the evening as he is quite old and is not in a position to go to the residence of his taughts. 5. The petitioner filed written statement alleging that Durga Prasad and Karori Mal carried on joint family business in the disputed shop upto the year 1965 under the fame and style of M/s. Munshi Lal Durga Prasad. There has been a family partition in the year 1965 wherein it was agreed that Karori Mal would carry on his business under the name and style of M/s Munshi Lal Karori Mal while Durga Prasad would carry on his business under the name and style of M/s Durga Prasad Banarsi Das in different portions of the shop. The rent was paid by both these brothers to Krishna Swarup Chaurasia who resided in the first floor of the building. The rent was paid by both these brothers to Krishna Swarup Chaurasia who resided in the first floor of the building. Intimation of the family partition was sent to the Sales Tax Officer. Satya Narain and his brother are carrying on their business in a portion of the disputed shop in their own right while the petitioners and their son and sister have been carrying on business in the disputed portion of the shop. 6. The case was first decided and dismissed on 151276 by the Prescribed Authority on the ground that the need of the landlord was not bona fide. They filed a revision and during the proceedings of revision an application for amendment was moved on behalf of the landlord which application was allowed and the case was remanded to the Prescribed Authority by means of an order dated 13580. After the remand of the case, the learned Prescribed Authority allowed the application of the landlords by means of the judgment and order dated 18183, contained in annexure11 to the writ petition. The tenants filed an appeal no. 7 of 1983, vide annexure12, against the order of the Prescribed Authority which appeal was dismissed on 181185 by means of judgment and order contained in annexure13 of the writ petition. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner Banarsi Das and his wife Smt. Kiran Agarwal filed the present writ petition. 7. The petitioners challenged the decisions of the Prescribed Authority and the appellate court on grounds that the Prescribed Authority did not follow the directions of the revisional court which remanded the case as the petitioners' application for crossexamining the witnesses was rejected in violation of the directions of the revisional court, both the courts did not consider the case of comparative hardship of the parties inspite of the pleadings of the petitioners in their written statement and compensation only was awarded and that the appellate court omitted to consider the written statement of the petitioners and affidavits which were on record. 8. While deciding the revision and remanding the case the revisional court passed orders on 13580, 20580 and 131280 and observed as follows: However the original case no. 276/76 shall be remanded back to the Prescribed Authority for giving an opportunity to the newly added parties to file their pleading and to lead evidence in support of their respective cases. 8. While deciding the revision and remanding the case the revisional court passed orders on 13580, 20580 and 131280 and observed as follows: However the original case no. 276/76 shall be remanded back to the Prescribed Authority for giving an opportunity to the newly added parties to file their pleading and to lead evidence in support of their respective cases. They will also have the right to crossexamine the witnesses of the other party already examined. The aforesaid observation followed because the application under section 21 was formerly filed against the petitioner no. 1 Banarsi Das alone and during the proceedings of revision an amendment for impleading other cotenants as party to the case was allowed. The revisional court, therefore, directed that the parties had a right to crossexamine the witnesses already examined. It implied that in case the parties led additional evidence after remand, they would be entitled to crossexamine the witnesses of each other who might be subsequently introduced apart from having a right to crossexamine the witnesses who were already examined. 9. The petitioners relied on the case of M/s Travancore Rayons Ltd. v. The Union of India and others ( AIR 1971 SC 862 ) in which case the case of Madhya Pradesh Industries Limited v. Union of India ( AIR 1966 SC 671 ) was also discussed and it was observed therein that the condition to give reasons introduces clarity and excludes or at any rate minimizes the arbitrariness. It was held in the case of Bhopal Sugar Mills v. Commissioner of Income Tax (1961) 1 SCR 474 ) that the directions which have been given by the superior court, if not carried out, would amount to denial of justice. This principle was not carried out in the case of Tobacco Manufactures (India) Ltd. v. The Commissioner of Sales Tax Bihar, Patna (1961 Vol. 2 SCR 106) because the Board of Revenue had not determined in fact its previous judgment and had not decided that every sale in which the goods were delivered outside the State of Bihar was exempted from liability to tax. But the principle that the subordinate Tribunal should follow the directions of the superior Tribunal and that in not following the directions of the superior Tribunal it can be very well inferred that the jurisdiction was not properly exercised remained as such. But the principle that the subordinate Tribunal should follow the directions of the superior Tribunal and that in not following the directions of the superior Tribunal it can be very well inferred that the jurisdiction was not properly exercised remained as such. The appellate court in its judgment dated 181185, contained in annexure13, observed that the remand order was confined only for the crossexamination of the witnesses already examined and that opposite parties 2 and 3 had not appeared and had not filed any written statement subsequent to the amendment of the application under section 21(1)(a) of the Act. This observation itself shows that the petitioners had raised this plea at the stage of appeal and their application for crossexamining the witnesses was rejected. The landlords in their counter affidavit have themselves admitted that there has been a mistake on the part of the appellate court but it was negligible, as it was averred in para 9(3) of the counter affidavit that probably on account of misreading of his notes the learned appellate court got confused in respect of opposite parties 2 and 3. It is established that after the remand of the case the petitioner no. 2 put in appearance and filed her written statement as well as her own affidavits. The petitioner no. 2 moved an application on 171181 for permission to crossexamine the witnesses of the landlords and her application was rejected. The appellate court held that any written statement of the petitioner no. 2 was not filed and this part of the judgment of the appellate court contained in annexure13 is against the material on record. Similarly the observations regarding affidavit of the petitioner no. 2 were wrongly made by the appellate court. It is thus evident that the learned Prescribed Authority did not exercise its jurisdiction properly by not following the remand order and the appellate court misread or omitted to read the evidence on record. 10. The landlords relied on the case of Pt. Similarly the observations regarding affidavit of the petitioner no. 2 were wrongly made by the appellate court. It is thus evident that the learned Prescribed Authority did not exercise its jurisdiction properly by not following the remand order and the appellate court misread or omitted to read the evidence on record. 10. The landlords relied on the case of Pt. Manni Lal Tnpathi v. Smt. Kamla Devi and others (1981 All LJ NOC 127) in which case the Prescribed Authority in a suit for ejectment rejected the prayer of tenant for opportunity to cross examine the landlady and her witnesses who had filed affidavits in support of her case and the order was held valid as both the parties were at an equal advantage or disadvantage in having their own and their witnesses' affidavits considered. But is was held in the cited case that in the exceptional cases it was always open to the Prescribed Authority to call a deponent for crossexamination, and also that if the rejection of prayer for opportunity to crossexamine was made without reasons the High Court should not interfere with such order merely on such a technical ground. But the cited case is not helpful to the landlords because in the instant case specific directions were given to the Prescribed Authority by the revisional court for giving opportunity to the parties to crossexamine the witnesses and the Prescribed Authority ignored those directions while the appellate court also did not take this factor into consideration. The landlords farther placed reliance on the case of Radha Kishan v. IVth Addl. District Judge, Jalaun (1985 (Vol. 1) ARC 427) in which case it was held that the evidence of affidavits is permissible by section itself and is necessary as well as primary objective of Act No. 13 of 1972 in expeditious disposal of the cases. It may be hindered if parties are permitted to lead oral evidence. But this cited case is also of no help to the landlords because in the instant case itself there were directions of the remanding revisional court that an opportunity to crossexamine the witnesses, already examined, should be given and the Prescribed Authority was required to follow the directions of the superior court. The petitioner no. But this cited case is also of no help to the landlords because in the instant case itself there were directions of the remanding revisional court that an opportunity to crossexamine the witnesses, already examined, should be given and the Prescribed Authority was required to follow the directions of the superior court. The petitioner no. 1 pleaded in his written statement, contained in annexure2 of the writ petition, in para 42, that in case the court released the accommodation in favour of the landlords then he was entitled to two years rent as compensation though he did not concede either to the alleged need of the landlords or of their brother for release. The petitioner no. 1, thus, challenged the bona fides of the need of the landlords and in that case the comparative hardship of the parties was also to be considered. The provision of payment of compensation is mandatory under section 21(1)(b) (second proviso) of the Act which lays down that : Provide, I further that if any application under clause (a) is made in respect of (any building let out exclusively for residential purpose) the Prescribed Authority while making the order of eviction shall, after considering all relevant facts of the case, award against the landlord to the tenant an amount not exceeding two years rent as compensation and may, subject to rules, impose such other conditions as he thinks fit. Therefore, the Prescribed Authority and the appellate court should have considered the case of the comparative hardship of the parties before deciding this case. The paragraphs 27, 42, 43 and 54 of the Prescribed Authority's judgment contained in annexure11 show that the need of the landlord was considered and discussed. But any reference was not made to the need of the tenants and this aspect of the case regarding the comparative hardship of the parties was not considered and analysed by the appellate court. The learned appellate court sidetracked this issue by observing that where the opposite parties claim an alternative relief then the relief which was suitable to the applicants should have been given to the opposite parties. The learned appellate court sidetracked this issue by observing that where the opposite parties claim an alternative relief then the relief which was suitable to the applicants should have been given to the opposite parties. The landlords relied on the case of Tej Bahadur and others v. Deputy Director of Consolidation and others (1985 All LJ 1244) in which case it was held that the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has the same powers as an authority against whose decision writ petition had been filed. But justice can be best done by the authority who is initially invested with the powers of deciding a particular case and prolonging the decision may not be obviated at the cost of justice. 11. The landlords relied on the case of Munna v. VIth Additional District Judge, Meerut, (1985 LRJ 62) in which case the findings of fact recorded by the appellate court were not found to have suffered from any patent error of law and the tenant did not try for any alternative accommodation even after five years' litigation, the petition was dismissed. But in the instant case, there is nothing on record to show that if he tried to find out any alternative accommodation or not and the judgments of the two courts below suffered from patent errors of law. The landlords further relied on the case of Sudarshan Singh v. Addl. District Judge (Anti Corruption) West Lucknow and two others (1986 LRJ 169) in which case also the tenant had not tried to find out an alternative accommodation and had not applied for allotment of a suitable accommodation and the landlords claim was allowed. This cited case is also not helpful to the landlords because they had not taken such a plea in the lower tribunals and there is nothing on record to show that if the tenant tried to or if he did not try to find out alternative accommodation. 12. Lastly, the landlords relied on the case of Kundan Kishan v. Board of Revenue, U.P. Allahabad (AIR 1972 Allahabad 184) in which case it was held that the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is discretionary and the court will be hesitant to grant a relief under the Article when if finds that substantial justice has been done between the parties. This cited case also is not helpful to the landlords because it is not established that substantial justice has or has not been done in this case in view of the fact that the directions of the superior tribunal were not followed by the Prescribed Authority and the appellate court misread or omitted to read the evidence on record. 13. In the result, this writ petition is allowed and the judgments and orders dated 18183 and 181185 passed by the Prescribed Authority and the appellate authority, contained in annexures11 and 13 respectively, of the writ petition, are quashed. The case is sent back to the Prescribed Authority concerned for deciding it afresh in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made above after giving an opportunity to the parties to substantiate further evidence in support of their respective contentions and after giving an opportunity to crossexamine the witness of each other party who have by now been examined in this case. 14. The costs which have been incurred are made easy.