JUDGMENT N.N. Mithal, J. - This is landlord's revision u/s 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 whose suit for adjustment has been thrown out by the VI Additional District Judge, Kanpur. 2. The building was admittedly constructed in the year 1964 and consisted of four independent portions in which different tenants were in occupation The Defendant became a -tenant of the disputed portion some time in 1967 when the owner was residing out side Kanpur, where her husband was serving. On his retirement, they occupied one of the four portions in the building in July 1982. 3. According to the Plaintiff, the tenant was liable to adjustment on two grounds i.e. for making constructions which damaged and disfigured the building and for committing default in the payment of rent along with taxes as required by law despite notice of demand and termination of tenancy dated 25th July 1983. 4. The Defendant denied the allegations. He pleaded an agreement to pay a fixed amount of Rs. 56.25 per month in addition to the monthly rent of Rs. 280/- inclusive of all taxes and future variations therein. According to him the burden of additional tax could not be recovered as rent from him. As for the alleged constructions, it was contended that the wall in the passage had already been demolished and no cause of action in that respect survived. The raising of the shed in the back-yard with corrugated asbestos sheet covering is admitted but since it had not been embedded in the main building, it was submitted that this did not amount to construction In any case, it was not such a construction as to fall within the mischief of Section 20 of U.P. Act 13 of 1972. 5. The court below has upheld the tenants' pleas of the oral agreement. It further held that house-tax could not form part of rent, and that the landlord was only entitled to add so much of the water-tax calculated on the rent payable under the agreement and not on the assessed rental value. Even though no written permission was obtained, the shed did not amount to construction as it was temporary in nature and could be removed without causing any damage to the main structure. It was also held that it did not offend against any provision of the Act. Even though no written permission was obtained, the shed did not amount to construction as it was temporary in nature and could be removed without causing any damage to the main structure. It was also held that it did not offend against any provision of the Act. The court also gave benefit of Section 20(4) to the tenant despite purchase of a residential building by him since the same had been demolished even before service of notice due to its dilapidated condition. On the strength of these findings the Court dismissed the Plaintiffs' suit. Aggrieved, the present revision has been filed. 6. All the findings recorded by the Court below have been assailed. Sri Tandon submits that these findings are based on total misreading and non consideration of material evidence. Several points have been assiduously canvassed before me which I propose to deal hereafter. 7. On the question of material alterations the revisionist has not very candidly, pressed any further her plea in respect of the wall raised in the passage since it had already been demolished. He mainly assailed the finding that the shed with a covering of corrugated asbestos sheet did not amount to ' construction ' within the meaning of Section 20(2)(c) of U.P. Act 13 of 1972. According to this section, a tenant, was liable to adjustment if, without landlords' written permission, he makes any ' such construction ' or ' structural alteration ' in the building as is likely to diminish its value or utility or to disfigure it. It is no body's case that any written permission had been obtained. The controversy raised lies in a narrow compass i.e. whether the structure admittedly raised amounts to ' construction ' or not? Admittedly the shed is supported on four poles embedded to the ground and is not fixed to the main structure of the building. It can easily be removed without causing any kind of damage to the property. 8. The revisionists' argument, however, is that for applying Section 20(2)(c) the conditions that must exist are: (i) the tenant has made some construction ; (ii) the construction has been made in the building ; (iii) this has been done without landlord's written permission, and (iv) the construction is such as is likely to diminish its value, or likely to diminish its utility, or to disfigure it. (a) likely to disminish its value or (b) likely to diminish its utility or (c) to disfigure it. 9. Thus to come within the mischief of Section 20(2)(c) the construction made in the building should be such as is likely to diminish its value or utility or to disfigure it. There is no dispute as to conditions (ii) and (iii) set out above. The main contention is about the remaining two requirements. The learned Judge Small Cause Court has recorded a finding that as the construction is of temporary nature removable without causing damage to the main building the same cannot be classed as ' construction '. It is this finding which JS most vehemently assailed before me. 10. In ordinary parlance, ' construction ' means some thing done to hold together the various constituents of a structure depending upon the nature or type of the construction. If it is made of masonry, then the masonry work of brick or stone may be done by mud or mortar or cement or in some other manner. If it is made of steel or fabricated and is held together by nuts and bolts it may still be some kind of construction latching the various constituents are Capable of being dismantled without causing any violence to its structure. The material used in the construction or the mode of joining together of Its constituent parts is thus not the deciding factor. It is also immaterial whether the structure raised is of a temporary or permanent nature, or whether it can be removed without causing any damage to the building. What is really material for the purpose of Sub-clause (c) is that some construction should have been made. One striking feature of a ' construction ' is the fact that it cannot be moved or displaced as it is from one place to another. When the structure is such which can be moved or shifted bodily from place to place without requiring its demolition or dismantling it cannot really be a ' construction ' in its true sense. A flower pot or a steel container can not normally be said to be ' construction ' but when the same flower pot is permanently fixed to the ground, it may become one. A flower pot or a steel container can not normally be said to be ' construction ' but when the same flower pot is permanently fixed to the ground, it may become one. Therefore, merely because the shed can be dismantled or removed without causing any damage to the main construction is not in itself a sufficient ground to hold that it is not ' construction ' of the nature referred to in Sub-clause (c) of Section 20(2). 11. Once the court finds that a particular structure tantamount to ' construction ' within the meaning of Section 20(2)(c), the court must then proceed to examine whether the construction is such as is likely to either diminish the value or utility of the building or to disfigure it. In the instant case we are not concerned with either diminution of the value of the building or of its utility due to rising of the shed. Revisionist rests his argument only on the question of resulting disfigurement. 12. In this case the parties are not at variance about the fact that the structure is supported on poles embedded to the ground with an asbestos covering even though no portion of it is embedded in the main structure of the building. Obviously it cannot be removed without being dismantled first and can not be bodily shifted to another place. The mere fact that no portion of the structure is embedded in the main structure of the building also cannot make any difference for it is quite possible to raise a construction in the open area of a demised premise?. It will not cease to be a construction merely for this reason. Thus the place where the construction had been made is also not decisive. The question depends upon the totality of circumstances including the kind and place of structure and the over all effect it has on the building. It is, therefore, difficult for me to agree with the findings of the court below that the structure being temporary, it did not amount to construction. 13. The court below also felt fortified in this view as no commission was got issued by the Plaintiff for local inspection. This could be of no consequence at all as all the necessary photographs of the shed in question had been filed and proved. 13. The court below also felt fortified in this view as no commission was got issued by the Plaintiff for local inspection. This could be of no consequence at all as all the necessary photographs of the shed in question had been filed and proved. The parties also did not challenge their correctness nor was there any dispute as to the place and nature of the structure. Disagreeing with the findings of the court below, therefore, I hold that the corrugated asbestos shed in question is a ' construction ' within the meaning of Section 20(2)(c) of U.P. Act 13 of 1972. 14. The question that next arises in this very connection is whether this Construction was such as was (i) likely to diminish the value of the building, or fir) its utility, or (Hi) had the effect of disfiguring it? Revisionist's learned Counsel has very rightly not pressed the first two aspects and has confined his submissions to the question of disfigurement only. According to him, the entire building has roads both towards its North and to its South. Both the roads are fairly wide and the disputed shed is clearly visible from the road. While the revisionist's learned Counsel urged that the shed caused disfigurement of the demised premises the same was refuted by the opposite party. According to him mere construction of a shed does not cause any disfigurement of the building. This leads us to the question as to what is ' disfigurement '. 15. Disfigurement ' has not been defined in the Act. However, according to the ordinary dictionary meaning, ' disfigurement ' means ' to spoil the figure ' to deform; to spoil the beauty ; to change to a worse form or to make it ugly." Thus if the existing shape and the beauty of the building is adversely affected consequent upon rising of the disputed construction either in or upon the building, it may amount to disfigurement. However, it is neither proper nor possible to lay down any hard and fast rule in this respect; each case must depend upon its own facts. Each case must, therefore, be judged in the light of its own facts and circumstances for determining whether the offending construction does cause any disfigurement or not. In some cases, even a so called work of improvement may result in disfigurement of the building. Each case must, therefore, be judged in the light of its own facts and circumstances for determining whether the offending construction does cause any disfigurement or not. In some cases, even a so called work of improvement may result in disfigurement of the building. Where, for example, a building is of old style having ornamental work on its front elevation but it is partly changed according to modern concept of architecture with plain plastered surface after the old worn out ornamented plaster has peeled of, it may in some cases result in disfigurement. Similarly, if a tenant puts up a cow-shed on the lawns of a bungalow or in the open land in front of the main building or in the area left as setback in the front side some walls are raised to form an enclosure or a part of it is converted into an open air toilet, these may certainly amount to disfigurement of the building. Thus, disfigurement has nothing to do with improvement or otherwise but must be seen in the light of the effect the offending construction has on the mind of an average person on seeing it. Disfigurement does not depend upon any single factor but is the cumulative effect of a variety of circumstances such as the place, nature, magnitude and its effect on the look of the existing construction and on the over all appearance of the building. 16. In the instant case the building is south facing having an open area towards the south and there is another road towards the north. There was some open place between the northern boundary and the main structure of the demised premises. It is over this place that the shed has been raised which is visible from the road towards the north. The court below has not at all applied itself to the task of finding out whether the shed in question would cause any disfigurement of the building or not if it was visible from the 30' wide road towards the north. It disposed of the matter only by recording a finding that the structure was not even a ' construction ' as it was of a temporary nature and could be removed without doing any violence to the main building. It disposed of the matter only by recording a finding that the structure was not even a ' construction ' as it was of a temporary nature and could be removed without doing any violence to the main building. This, I have already found to be wrong as the structure was in fact a ' construction ' for the purposes of Section 20. This aspect needs reconsideration before this Court can express any opinion on this question. Since there is no such finding, the case must be sent down to the court below to record a finding thereon in the light of my observations made earlier. 17. The second leg of the arguments concerns the finding on the question of default which has many facts. According to the revisionist, when U. P. Act 13 of 1972 was enforced, the Defendant was liable to pay Rs. 56.25 as the proportionate amount of house-tax and water-tax in respect of the property demised to him besides Rs. 280/- per month-total Rs. 336.25 per month as rent. It is contended that on the enforcement of the aid Act, whatever water-tax and house-tax amounts were enhanced, the Defendant came under a statutory liability to pay the entire enhanced amount of water-tax and 25% of the enhanced amount of house-tax. This submission is countered by the other side on the ground that prior to the enforcement of the Act, the parties had agreed to pay a fixed amount of Rs. 56.25 as the amount in respect of water-tax and house-tax and there was a further agreement that notwithstanding any increase in these taxes in future, the Defendants' liability will remain fixed at Rs. 56.25. The learned court below has accepted the Defendants' version although it has disbelieved the corroborative oral evidence. It is also submitted that since it is a finding of fact, in revision it cannot be varied. 18. I am conscious of the revisional courts' limited power to interfere in the findings of fact but it is not an inflexible rule and it is always open to the revisional Court to do so if the finding of fact recorded by the Court below is either not based on any evidence or where material evidence has been ignored. However, before doing that, it will be better to take stock of the legal position in the light of the admitted facts. However, before doing that, it will be better to take stock of the legal position in the light of the admitted facts. Of the whole building which consists of four parts, only one was in the tenancy of the opposite party at the rate of Rs 2b0/-(?) per month. House-tax and water-tax were also being paid by him. The point of conflict between the two is whether this amount of tax was being paid as part of the rent or it was being paid in addition to it. It is also in dispute whether an agreement had taken place between the parties that only a lived amount of Rs. 5(3.25 will be charged as house tax and water tax even though subsequently these taxes may be varied. In U. F. Act 13 of 1972 tenant' in relation to a building has been defined as a person by whom rent is paid. 'House-tax ' means the tax mentioned in Section 173(1)(a) of U.P. Act 2 of 1959. However, 'assessment' in relation to a building means the assessment or proportionate assessment of the letting value thereof by the local authority. Section 4(2) of the Act is relevant for our purpose and is extracted below ; (2) Except as provided in Sections 5, 6, 7, 8 and 10, the rent payable for any building shall be such as may be agreed upon between the landlord and the tenant and in the absence of any agreement, the standard rent. 19. From the above, it will be seen that the extent of tenants' liability for payment of rent is basically a matter of agreement between him and the landlord. If the amount of any lax is also agreed to be paid, two situations may arise (1) either the taxes are payable along with the rent as part thereof although such amount of tax may be subject to periodical variation, or (2) the tax amount may be payable along with and in a addition to the rent. However, the variable nature of the tax alone cannot be any reason to hold that such amount cannot form part of rent payable by the tenant. It must always depend upon the agreement between the parties. However, the variable nature of the tax alone cannot be any reason to hold that such amount cannot form part of rent payable by the tenant. It must always depend upon the agreement between the parties. It is always open to the parties to such an agreement to agree that house-tax and water-tax would be paid as part of the rent and in such an event, the agreed rent for the purposes of Section 4(2) would be the total of the amount of rent and the taxes. In the absence of such an agreement, however, the taxes would be payable not as part of the rent but as a separate entity. The liability to pay taxes in that case would be distinct and separate from the liability to pay the rent. For the purposes of default, non-payment of such taxes is not to be taken into consideration although the landlord may yet have the right to recover the same otherwise. This would be the legal position u/s 4 of the Act. A statutory liability has also been added to the agreed rent. This liability stands on a different footing. Even though House-tax and Water-tax or any other tax may not be payable as part of the rent by the tenant as per agreement existing at the time of the enforcement of U. P. Act 13 of 1972, yet from the aforesaid date, some liability to pay taxes has been created under the Act and u/s 7 it would be deemed to be part of the rent. The provision, to the extent it is relevant for our purpose, may be quoted below : Subject to any contract in writing to contrary the tenant shall be liable to pay to the landlord in addition to and as part of the rent, the following taxes or proportionate part thereof, it any, payable in respect of the building or part under his tenancy, namely - (a) the water-tax ; (b) twenty-five per cent of every such enhancement in house-tax made after the commencement of this Act, or such portion thereof, as is not occasioned on account of the increase in the assessment of building as a result of the enhancement of rent under the provisions of Section 5: provided.... 20. 20. According to this, in addition to the agreed rent liability to pay water-tax has also been statutorily placed on the tenant besides 25 percent of any increase in the house-tax that may take place subsequently. This would mean that apart from the amount which was payable as the agreed rent when the Act commenced, his rent liability would increase so as to include the entire water-tax plus 25 percent of the increase in house-tax. All these amounts added together would then become payable by the tenant as rent and will have to be accounted for towards rent for the purposes of default under the Act. However, this does not mean that even though the amount of these taxes which was already included in the rent would again be added to the agreed rent. That would be defying all reasons and common sense. This can only mean that the landlord would be entitled to claim only so much of additional amount of these taxes as had sot been already included in the agreed rent although any future increase in these taxes would also become payable by the tenant as part of the rent. However, the entire house-tax would not be payable- as part of rent unless the mutual agreement prior to 15-7-72 provided otherwise except to the extent of 25 percent of the enhanced liability in that regard after 15-7-72. Thus as a result of all future enhancement in water-tax and house-tax, the rent payable would go on varying in accordance with the changes that take place in the amount of water-tax and/or the proportionate amount of house-tax levied from time to time during the continuance of the tenancy. It may also be clarified here that if any enhancement in house-tax is occasioned in view of Section 5 of the At, the same shall be excluded for the purposes of Section 7. It may, however, be mentioned that in this case it is not disputed that no enhancement in house-tax has taken place by virtue of Section 5. 21. Viewing the controversy in the light of the above, it would be obvious that if the tenant had in fact agreed to pay Rs. It may, however, be mentioned that in this case it is not disputed that no enhancement in house-tax has taken place by virtue of Section 5. 21. Viewing the controversy in the light of the above, it would be obvious that if the tenant had in fact agreed to pay Rs. 56.25 as taxes i.e. water-tax and house-tax also as rent, his liability will go up as mentioned above i.e. in the case of water-tax the whole of the enhanced amount, and the house-tax to the limited extent of 25 percent of the enhancement made in that tax by the Local Body. 22. Having correctly come to the conclusion that the entire water-tax liability in respect of the demised premises was payable as rent, the court failed to record a similar finding in respect of liability to pay the house-tax. Although it is true that u/s 7 only 25 percent of the enhanced amount of house-tax would be included in the amount of rent payable yet in view of Section 4(2) the possibility can not be ruled out that the entire house-tax as payable on 15-7-72 may be the rent payable, of course, depending upon the mutual agreement. 23. The Petitioner's learned Counsel, however, submitted that the court below was wrong in holding that the fixed amount of Rs. 56.25 was payable towards taxes. His submission was that relevant documentary evidence has not been considered by the court in this behalf. It has not been disputed that certain taxes are payable as rent in the light of Section 7 of the Act. However, this cannot be read in isolation and must be harmonized with Section 4(2) of the Act. 24. In view of the above legal position, it becomes the duty of the Court to record a clear finding as to whether the rent agreed to be paid between the parties included any liability to pay the water-tax and house- tax or whether the parties had agreed to pay the said taxes in addition to the amount of rent. Two different consequences will flow. If the first kind of agreement exists between the parties, then both .water-tax and house-tax would merge in rent and would then be payable as part of rent which would be subject to such variations therein as may take place whenever assessment is made by the local authority. Two different consequences will flow. If the first kind of agreement exists between the parties, then both .water-tax and house-tax would merge in rent and would then be payable as part of rent which would be subject to such variations therein as may take place whenever assessment is made by the local authority. In the later case, however, water-tax would merge with rent to the extent of the water-tax payable for the premises on or after the enforcement of the Act together with 25 percent of any enhancement made in the house-tax which may take place after such date. Any other amount payable as tax under the agreement may give rise to a right to claim it but this will have to be done by the landlord independently of the claim for rent and can not be taken into account for the purposes of default u/s 20 of the Act. Relying upon the case of Anand Swaroop v. Ill Additional District Judge 1980 ARC 150 the court below has also rightly held that the water-tax amount formed part of rent and is payable by the tenant as such which must account for the purposes of default. Curiously, however, the court did not (went) deeper and further into the question as to what were the terms of agreement between the parties? This was necessary in order to see as to what was the nature of tenant's liability in respect of the taxes. The tenant had been inducted in 1960 and, therefore, so much depended on the nature of the agreement between them initially and to see with what subsequent modifications, if any, the agreement stood just prior to 15th July, 1972, when the Act was enforced. This the court below has failed to do. 25. The Court has recorded a finding that the parties had agreed that a fixed amount of Rs. 56.25 would be paid by way of taxes notwithstanding any variation in the same in future. While doing so, it has failed to take into account their contractual obligation as these existed just before 15th July 1972 onwards. It has also failed to look into the initial agreement between the parties. It has been pointed out that a large number of documents filed by the Petitioner have not been considered while arriving at the conclusion that a fixed tax of Rs. 56.25 was payable by the tenant. It has also failed to look into the initial agreement between the parties. It has been pointed out that a large number of documents filed by the Petitioner have not been considered while arriving at the conclusion that a fixed tax of Rs. 56.25 was payable by the tenant. The premise for this finding -is that at no point of time Rs. 56.25 only was payable as taxes Before me, documents have been referred which show that in 1968-69 and again in 1971-72 Rs. 56,25 was being paid as tax. Tax paid varied accordingly to the variations in assessment of taxes during the intervening period. These documents do not appear to have been considered by the court below while recording the above findings. 26. The court below has rejected the Plaintiff's case basically on the ground that at no time the sum of Rs. 56.25 was levied as house-tax and water-tax. This is obviously wrong and it is difficult for me to sustain the finding. Paper No. 85/4-C is the copy of house-tax assessment Register which shows that the portion occupied by the Defendant was assessed at a rental value of Rs. 250,- per month on which Rs. 40.265/- was payable as house-tax at the rate of 16 1/4 per cent and water-tax amounted to Rs. 15.265. This adds upto 56.25 per cent. The very foundation of the reasoning of the court below for taking this view, therefore, stands demolished. Even though in 1969-70 the rate of tax was reduced and tax liability came down to Rs. 43.75, but this was again restored to Rs. 56.25 in 1970-71. This was the position when the Act came into force. The court below has not recorded a finding whether this amount was payable as part of the rent or was only payable in addition to the rent. Even if it be assumed that the taxes were paid in addition to the rent of Rs. 280/- and not as part of the rent, at the time of commencement of the Act, the entire amount of water-tax would statutorily become tenant's liability to pay it as rent. Also 25 per cent of any subsequent enhancement in house-tax would also add to tenant's liability and these two amounts would also become rent in addition to Rs. 280/- and not as part of the rent, at the time of commencement of the Act, the entire amount of water-tax would statutorily become tenant's liability to pay it as rent. Also 25 per cent of any subsequent enhancement in house-tax would also add to tenant's liability and these two amounts would also become rent in addition to Rs. 280/- and the total amount would then become " rent " for the purposes of Section 20 of the Act. Since this aspect of the matter has not been considered in this light it will require reconsideration. 27. The agreement set up by the Defendant is alleged to have taken place prior to the commencement of the Act and it was urged that this would be binding on the parties. I cannot agree because even if the parties had agreed for a fixed amount of tax yet it cannot defeat or over-ride a contrary statutory provision which must prevail modifying the mutual agreement to that extent. Apart from this, such an agreement, being contrary to Section 7 can survive only if it was supported by any writing. Admittedly there is no writing in this behalf and, therefore, the tenant cannot escape from his statutory obligations in the absence of any written agreement relieving him from such liability. 28. Learned Counsel laid some trees on the words " but notwithstanding anything contained in Section 179 of U.P. Act 2 of 1959 " occurring in Section 7 of the Act and it was urged that the burden lay on the Plaintiff to establish a contract in writing to the contrary. I cannot persuade myself to accept the above submission. The above expression leads only to one conclusion that despite a contrary provision contained in the 1959 Act which places the primary liability to pay house-tax and water-tax in respect of a building on its owner, the said liability will stand shifted to the tenant's shoulders to the extent provided under Sub-clauses (a) and (b) of Section 7 of tie Act. This shifting of the statutory liability can be avoided only with the aid of a written agreement to the contrary, notwithstanding any oral agreement. The oral agreement to pay a fixed sum by way of taxes cannot stand or be allowed to over-ride the statutory liability fastened to the tenant. 29. This shifting of the statutory liability can be avoided only with the aid of a written agreement to the contrary, notwithstanding any oral agreement. The oral agreement to pay a fixed sum by way of taxes cannot stand or be allowed to over-ride the statutory liability fastened to the tenant. 29. Normally the liability to pay taxes is on the person owning the building. However, Section 7 specifically bars the applicability of those provisions and there is a sound public policy to support this. The entire benefit of the use of water is derived by the tenant. In fairness and equity, therefore, it is he who should pay for it. It is for this reason that the burden of this tax has been shifted on to the tenant. It is no doubt true that for the purposes of U. P. Act 2 of 1959, the owner may still remain liable for the payment of water-tax to the local authority and he cannot unlawfully enrich himself. He may recover the water-tax from the tenant and pay the same to the local body. Thus a proper balance has been struck by the legislature between the rights and liabilities of both the landlord and the tenant. The entire liability to pay water-tax must, therefore, be on the tenant as from 15-7-72, despite any oral agreement otherwise. This situation would vary where the landlord agrees in writing to bear the tax burden himself. 30. Coming to the liability in respect of house-tax, the learned court below was right in holding that whole of this amount cannot be treated to be part of the rent unless it was so agreed. However, in the case of house-tax also, if any enhancement takes place 25 percent of that burden will shift on to the tenant u/s 7. 31. In view of the above discussion, I have no hesitation in setting aside the findings of the court below on these questions. The question whether the parties ever agreed for payment of fixed sum of Rs. 56.25 only and its effect on the rights of the parties will have to be gone into again by the Court below in the light of the above discussion. The question whether default was committed or not will also have to be determined in the light of pigs. 32. 56.25 only and its effect on the rights of the parties will have to be gone into again by the Court below in the light of the above discussion. The question whether default was committed or not will also have to be determined in the light of pigs. 32. Petitioner has also assailed the finding of the court below holding for tax has to be calculated on the agreed rent and not on the letting value assessed by the local body. The definition of the word ' assessment ' in Section 3(f), has relation to the assessment of the letting value as levied by the local authority. It has nothing to do with rent actually paid by the tenant. Once the local authority enhances the letting value of the building during assessment the tax liability will also vary automatically. It is not; therefore, correct to say that despite any enhanced assessment of the letting value the tenant will continue to be liable for payment of house-tax and water-tax as calculated on the basis of the agreed rent. The finding of the trial court in this regard can not be sustained, 33. Lastly it was urged that the benefit of Section 20(4) was wrongly given to the tenant in spite of the fact that he had admittedly obtained another house in a vacant state and the mere fact that it has been demolished by the tenant after its purchase would be immaterial. The court below has held that the building had become dilapidated and was not fit for human habitation. The finding being one of fact based on relevant evidence cannot be interfered with. Nothing material has been pointed out which may induce me to reverse this finding. However, it is left open to the Petitioner, despite this finding, to show that the tenant could not be given benefit of Section 20(4). 34. Thus, the revision succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and decree under revision are set aside and the matter is sent down to the court below for decision in the light of the observations made in the body of the judgment. The costs of the suit and the revision will abide the ultimate result of the suit.