JUDGMENT 1. - This appeal has been filed by one of the defendants against the order of the learned Additional District Judge No. 2, Jodhpur dated November 19, 1984 granting temporary injunction against the defendants directing them not raise any construction over the property in dispute and to maintain the status quo and also not to transfer any part of the property. 2. The facts giving rise to this apneal may briefly be stated here. The plaintiff Shantimal filed a suit for per-emption in respect of the properties sold by defendant No. 1 Dr. Kan Mal on the ground that plaintiff Shantimal, Dr. Kantimal and Suraj Mal are sons of Gumanmal. Gumanmal had acquired the property described in para 1 of the plaint by foreclosure and also raised certain more construction after acquiring the property. The whole building, thus constructed is known as Bhansali Building. It is further alleged that Guman Mal gifted the suit property to his three sons in separate definite shares by registered gift-deed dated August 26, 1958. The pol of the property was kept joint and the passage through the pol was also joint. The three brothers took possession of their respective shares. The case of the plaintiff further was that defendant No. 1 Kanmal disposed of his share of the property to defendants No. 2 to 13 by different sale-deeds, which were got registered on September 1, 1982 without any notice to the plaintiff and keeping perfect secrecy about the negotiation of the same. The plaintiff further claimed that the sale-price has been exaggerated in the sale-deed although the real consideration received by defendant No. 1 was much less. The plaintiff further alleged that as the property sold by defendant No. 1 to defendant No. 2 to II and the property which is in possession of the plaintiff are parts of the same property, under Section 8 of the Rajasthan Pre-emptor Act, it was incumbent upon defendant No. 1 to have given a notice to the plaintiff offering him to sell the property in dispute, but this was not done nor the other defendants ever gave such notice to the plaintiff before they purchased the property. The plaintiff claimed the right of pie-emptor on the ground that he was a co-sharer in the property and also because the Pol and the passage through Pol was common between the three parts of the same building, which had been gifted by Shri Guman Mal to his three sons. He also alleged that he being the real brother of the seller, he is pre-emptor of the first class. He also claimed pre-emption on some other grounds, with which I am not very much concerned at present. He, thus, claimed the right of preemption on the properties sold by defendant No. 1 in favour of defendants Nos. 2 to 11. 3. The sales are dated Sept. 1, 1982. The suit was filed on Sept. 1, 1983 and, there after, an application under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2, Civil Procedure Code was filed by the plaintiff on July 17, 1984 praying for a temporary injunction against the defendants from making any addition or alteration or construction over the property sold by defendant No. 1 to defendants No 2 to 11 and also restraining them from further transferring the same. It was alleged that some of the defendants - purchasers had already started construction making addition and alterations in the parts purchased by them and if they were not restrained from doing so, complications will arise and the plaintiff will be put to irreparable injury. It was also alleged that some of them were trying to dispose of their parts of the property and if that is allowed to be done pending the suit, then also the plaintiff would be suffering irreparable injury and complications would arise in the suit. The application was supported by the affidavit of plaintiff Shantimal. Notices were issued on this application to the defendants Nos. 1 to 11 on August 10, 1984. An application was filed on behalf of defendant Jugal Kishore that he has not been supplied with the copy of the application and the affidavit and prayed that he maybe supplied with them so that he could file a proper reply to the application, and reserving his right to file a proper reply, he alleged that the application was not maintainable and the plaintiff had no right to file such an application. He was, thereupon, supplied with the requisite copies but no reply has been filed by him or any of the other defendants. He was, thereupon, supplied with the requisite copies but no reply has been filed by him or any of the other defendants. After hearing the learned Counsel for the parties, the learned Additional District Judge No. 2, granted a temporary injunction in favour of the plaintiff directing the defendants to maintain the status quo and restraining them from making any addition or alteration or construction on it or transferring it in any manner, by his order dated November 19, 1984. It is against this order that the present appeal has been filed by defendant Jugal Kishore. 4. I have heard learned Counsel for the appellants and respondent No. 1. The other respondents have not appeared despite service. 5. Learned Counsel for the appellant has raised three contentions before me. The first contention is that the learned Additional District Judge has not at all applied his mind to the facts and circumstances of the case and has not even cared to specify as to under which of the clauses of Section 6 of the Preemption Act, the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for pre-emption. He has observed that the plaintiff is the co-sharer in the property in dispute, which is not the plaintiff's case and it could not be because no part of the properties sold was ever joint between the plaintiff and the defendant No. 1, His second contention was that the learned Additional District Judge also did not take into account the fact that the plaintiff himself had not pressed his application for temporary injunction against defendants Nos. 1 and 11 and still, temporary injunction has been granted against them also and that goes to show that the order has been passed in a very casual manner. The last contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant was that the plaintiff does not acquire any right in the property till a decree for pre-emption is passed in his favour and he deposits the sale-price and, therefore, at present he has no right to the property and he could not have asked for the temporary injunction in respect of that property. Learned Counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, supported the order of the court-below. 6. Learned Counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, supported the order of the court-below. 6. The first two contentions of the learned Counsel for the appellant should not detain me for long in as much as the plaintiff had averred that he is co-sharer in the property and it is also urged that the Pol is joint and the passage through the Pol to three different shares of the three sons of Guman Mal is common. Whether on this ground, the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for pre-emption or not will be a question to be considered at the time, the matter is finally disposed of by the trial court, but at this stage, it cannot be said that the learned Additional District Judge has made observation which was not even alleged by the plaintiff. Apart from the fact that the plaintiff had claimed the co-ownership, the plaintiff had claimed that joint-ness of the passage of the Poland that also prima facie shows his right of pre-emption and in these circumstances, the learned Additional District Judge cannot be said to have committed any error of jurisdiction in arriving at the conclusion that the plaintiff had a prima facie case for grant of a decree for pre-emption. 7. So far as the fact that the injunction has been granted even against defendants No. 1 and 11 despite the fact that the plaintiff did not want the injunction against them is concerned. I am sorry to say that this is not so. On the application of the plaintiff for the grant of temporary injunction, the notices had been issued to all the defendants and the Court had not granted any interim order. The defendants were raising construction and, therefore, the plaintiff felt urgency in the matter and, therefore, on October 10, 1984, he moved an application that all the other defendants except defendants No. 1 and 11, have been served and therefore, the Court should proceed to grant temporary injunction against the defendants, who have already been served and so far as defendants No. 1 and 11 are concerned, the plaintiff would not press his application at this stage. However, the Court did not accept this prayer and adjourned the case for the consideration of the application for temporary injunction till defendants No. 1 and 11 were also served. However, the Court did not accept this prayer and adjourned the case for the consideration of the application for temporary injunction till defendants No. 1 and 11 were also served. It therefore, cannot be said that the plaintiff had withdrawn his application against defendants No. 1 and II. In these circumstances, if the Court granted injunction against the defendants, it cannot be said to have granted injunction against chose defendants also against whom the plaintiff did not pray for injunction. 8. This brings me to the last but the most important contention. Learned Counsel for the appellant, placing reliance op Section 20 of the Rajasthan Pre-emption Act and Order 20, Rule 18, Civil Procedure Code and citing Ganga Ram v. Chhirkanda Ram AIR 1964 Pub 260 & Hukum Singh v. Hukumat Raj, AIR 1968 Pub 110 , urged that the plaintiff would get a right to the property only after decree is passed in his favour and he deposits the sum of money required to be paid in accordance with the pre-emption decree and before that, he has no right to the property. In these circumstances, he is not entitled to the grant of temporary injunction in respect of that property and the defendants who have purchased the property bonafide and after paying consideration, should not be deprived from the use of the property. It is true that the plaintiff would get the right to the property in dispute only after the decree for pre-emption is passed in his favour and he deposits the amount required to be paid under the decree, but for the grant of temporary injunction, it is not always necessary that the plaintiff should have a title to the property in dispute. The right of pre-emption is a right vested in the plaintiff to follow the property which has been sold to some body else but which the plaintiff has right to purchase in preference to the person to whom it has been sold, in this connection, reference may be made to Bishan Singh v. Khazan Singh, AIR 1958 SC 838 , wherein it has been observed by their Lordships as under: "The right of pre-emption is not a right to the thing sold but a right to the offer of a thing about to be sold. This right is called the primary or inherent right. This right is called the primary or inherent right. The pre-emptor has a secondary right or a remedial right to follow the thing sold. It is a right of substitution but not of re-purchase i.e., the pre-emptor takes the entire bargain and steps into the shoes of the original vendee. It is a right to acquire the whole of the property sold and not a share of the property sold.... This, therefore, goes to show that even though the plaintiff may not have acquired a right to the property as such, he has certainly aright to follow the property if he has a right of pre-emption and that, as already stated above, has prima facie been found in his favour. The plaintiff has only to establish that he has fair question to raise in the suit and need not necessarily establish his title in order to obtain a temporary injunction as has been observed in Brajendra Nath v. Kashi Bai AIR 1946 Pat. 177 . 9. Learned Counsel for the appellant, further, urged that the right of pre-emption is a very weak right and even the theory of lis pendente has not been applied to it, as has been held in Mohammed Saddiq v. Ghasi Ram AIR 1946 Lah. 322 . But, as already stated above, the plaintiff has a right to follow the property which has been sold. The question whether the doctrine of lis pendente is applied in cases for preemption or not, would not, in my opinion, debar the court from granting temporary injunction in suitable cases. Section 20 of the Rajasthan pre-emption Act does not lay down that the theory of lis pendente will not be applicable at all for pre-emption. All that it says is that the person, who has obtained the decree for pre-emption in respect of any property shall acquire no title to that property until he pays to the court, the sum of money required to be paid in accordance with the pre-emption decree, but upon such payment having been made, any alienation of the property made by the original transferee or by any person claiming through him, shall be voidable at the option of the decree-holder with effect from the date of such payment. Therefore, clearly the right of pre-emption comes into effect after the decree is passed and the payment is made in accordance with the decree, but it has retrospective effect and the alienation made by the original transferee shall be rendered avoidable at the option of the pre-emptor after he has acquired a right to the property under Section 20 of the Rajasthan Preemption Act. In this view of the matter also, if in the meantime, the property changes hands or it is altered in such a manner that it may be rendered useless for the pre-emptor, the very purpose of his filing the suit for pre-emption would be jeopardised. I have already stated above, that the plaintiff's is a suit for pre-emption of course does not have the present interest or title to the property, but at the same time, he has the right to follow the property, as held by the Supreme Court in Bishan Singh's case (supra). This right to follow the property envisages that the property should remain in the same situation till the suit is decided and a decree is passed in favour of the plaintiff so that he may be able to reap the full fruits of such a decree and not that he may get only a paper decree without the real advantage he wants to obtain from the pre-emption. 10. Learned Counsel for the appellant, then, urged that although he has not been able to cite any authority in support of his contention that in a suit for pre-emption the temporary injunction restraining the original purchaser from raising construction over the property or alienating that property cannot be passed an inference to that effect can be drawn from the authorities in relation to the suits for specific performance of agreement, as according to him, a case of suit for specific performance of agreement is very near to or similar to a suit for pre-emption and in this connection he has placed reliance upon Krishnamoorthy v. Paramasiva and Jeewan Das v. Narain Dass AIR 1981 Delhi 291 . I have given my thoughtful consideration to this contenion also, but find myself unable to accept the same. The view adopted by Madras and Delhi High Courts has not been accepted by our Court, as would be clear from a decision of this Court reported in Mahesh Chand Heda v. Mahesh Prasad 1980 WLN (UC) 401. I have given my thoughtful consideration to this contenion also, but find myself unable to accept the same. The view adopted by Madras and Delhi High Courts has not been accepted by our Court, as would be clear from a decision of this Court reported in Mahesh Chand Heda v. Mahesh Prasad 1980 WLN (UC) 401. In that case, in a suit for specific performance of an agreement, a temporary injunction was granted. In that case, this Court observed as under: "In my opinion, therefore, the Additional District Judge was right in holding that a prima facie case for grant of specific performance of the contract of sale of the plot of land had been established in the present case. Having arrived at the aforesaid findings, the Addl. District Judge in my view, was not right in refusing to grant an injunction restraining the respondent from alienating the plot of land to a third person during the pendency of the suit on the ground that the appellant would not suffer any irreparable loss and that the balance of convenience was not in favour of the appellant. If the respondent is permitted to sell the plot of land in question to a third party during the pendency of the suit, the effect would be that the purchaser may make constructions over the land in dispute which may land to further complication as well as litigation causing delay in appellants securing possession of the land in dispute. It cannot, therefore, be said that the appellant would not suffer irreparable loss if the injunction prayed for is not granted in their favour. On the other hand the respondent would not suffer any loss if he is restrained from alienating the land during the pendency of the suit. The balance of convenience also lies in favour of the appellants. The order passed by the Additional District Judge rejecting the application for grant of temporary injunction cannot therefore, be upheld in the facts and circumstances of the present case. I am, therefore, in respectful agreement with this view and according to me it equally applies to a suit for preemption. The order passed by the Additional District Judge rejecting the application for grant of temporary injunction cannot therefore, be upheld in the facts and circumstances of the present case. I am, therefore, in respectful agreement with this view and according to me it equally applies to a suit for preemption. When the plaintiff is shown to be a person who can claim pre-emption under any of the clauses of Section 6 of the Rajasthan Pre-emption Act, he has a prima facie case in his favour for grant of temporary injunction and the question of balance of convenience and irreparable injury are also in his favour as observed in the Rajasthan case referred to here in above. 11. I, am, therefore, clearly of the opinion that the discretion exercised by the learned Additional District Judge No. 2, Jodhpur in granting temporary injunction in favour of the plaintiff-respondent No. 1 and against the defendants, cannot be said to be improper, and no interference is called for with that order. It may be added that although the injunction has been granted against all the defendants, but only one of the defendants has come up in appeal. The other defendants have not joined him in filing the appeal nor they been cared to appear despite service of notice. In these circumstances also, I have not been able to pursuade myself to interfere with the order under appeal. 12. The result, therefore, is that the appeal fails and is, hereby dismissed, However, looking to all the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.Appeal dismissed. *******