JUDGMENT A.N. Dikshita, J. - By means of this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the petitioner has prayed for issue of a writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing the award dated 5-11-1980 given by the respondent No. 1 in Adjudication Case No. 75 of 1977. 2. Material facts giving rise to the controversy is that the petitioner has for the purposes of generation of electricity various projects including Panki Thermal Power Station at Panki, Kanpur. Respondent No. 2 represents a section of the workmen employed at the said power house. The workmen employed in the said power-house get the wages and various allowances admissible to workmen as fixed by the petitioner from time to time. City Compensatory Allowance had been sanctioned by the petitioner to its workmen living in KAVAL towns within the corporation limits having regard to the dearness allowance. Panki Power Station being situate at Kanpur, its workmen were entitled to the benefits of City Compensatory Allowance and it was sanctioned on 4-6-1974 by the petitioner at the rate of 5% of basic pay subject to maximum of Rs. 25/- per month. Vide letter dated 2-11-1977 of the Secretary of the petitioner it was to continue. The petitioner with the passage of time had undertaken various projects at far off places where facilities of schools, medicines, conveyance market etc. were scarcely available and mindful of the hardship to the employees serving at such sites the petitioner vide order dated 10-4-1973 sanctioned Site Compensatory Allowance to such employees who were residing in the houses provided by the petitioner at the project sites. The Site Compensatory Allowance was much higher than the City Compensatory Allowance. Another order dated 12-9-1973 was issued clarifying that City Compensatory Allowance and the Site Compensatory Allowance should not be paid simultaneously to such officers and staff as two allowances were mutually exclusive to each other and only one of them was payable, and this order amounted to withdrawal of the City Compensatory Allowance. 3. In view of the order of the petitioner dated 10-4-1973 a dispute arose regarding the entitlement to the employees serving at Panki Power Station in regard to payment of Site Compensatory Allowance as well as City Compensatory Allowance between the employees and the petitioner. The dispute was referred to adjudication under Section 4-K of (J. P. Industrial Disputes Act (Adjudication Case No. 75 of 1977). The dispute was referred to adjudication under Section 4-K of (J. P. Industrial Disputes Act (Adjudication Case No. 75 of 1977). After necessary evidence the Presiding Officer Industrial Tribunal U.P. Lucknow, respondent No. 1, vide its award dated 29-9-1980 held that the petitioner was not entitled to withhold the benefit of City Compensatory Allowance in respect of those employees who were on deputation from the Electricity Department and from K E.S.A. on the formation of the Board in 1959. Respondent No. 1 thus held that such employees were not affected by the order dated 12-9-1973. Further the respondent No. 1 held that the workmen who were working at the Panki Power Station on 12th September, 1973 were entitled to receive City Compensatory Allowance at the sanctioned rate and the decision of the petitioner depriving them of the City Compensatory Allowance was illegal and unjustified. Hence, this petition. 4. Counter affidavit and rejoinder-affidavit have been exchanged. 5. Learned counsel for the parties have been heard at length. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the award given by respondent No. 1 is patently illegal inasmuch as the respondent No. 1 committed a manifest error of law in disregarding the provisions of Section 79 (c) of Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 (hereinafter called the Act) which empower the Board to frame regulations for laying conditions of service of its workmen. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that all the orders issued in respect of salaries, allowances and Other conditions of service would be deemed to be regulations as they are made or passed under the regulation making power of the petitioner as provided under section 79(c) of the Act. For better appreciation of this contention sub-clause (c) of Section 79 of the Act is reproduced below : "79. Power to make regulations. - The Board may make regulations not inconsistent with this Act and the rules made thereunder to provide for all or any of the following matters, namely- * * * * * (C) the duties of officers and other employees of the Board, and their salaries, allowances and other conditions of service;" 7. Power to make regulations. - The Board may make regulations not inconsistent with this Act and the rules made thereunder to provide for all or any of the following matters, namely- * * * * * (C) the duties of officers and other employees of the Board, and their salaries, allowances and other conditions of service;" 7. A bare reading of this provision clearly indicates that the Board had the power to make regulations in respect of salaries, allowances and other conditions of service of its employees, but the contention that every order issue by the Board in respect of salaries, allowances and other conditions of service would be deemed to be a regulation does not appear to be convincing unless it is shown that such order would amount in letter or spirit a regulation as provided under Section 79(c) of the Act. On a perusal of the award (Annexure 10 to the writ petition) it is nowhere emerging that the petitioner ever satisfied that the order passed by it in respect of the site compensatory allowance and city compensatory allowance would come within the ambit of Section 79(c) of the Act. It has to be proved that in view of the disregard of the orders which would be deemed to be a regulation under section 79(c) of the Act, respondent No. 1 erred in law. However, the petitioner has nowhere even whispered before respondent No. 1 that the regulations as framed under Section 79(c) were in respect of site compensatory allowance or city compensatory allowance and have statutory force. Further such a plea was never raised that the orders issued by the petitioner from time to time would have statutory force and binding upon respondent No. 2. The plea is being raised for the first time before this Court. This plea which was not raised before respondent No. 1 cannot be permitted to be raised for the first time before this Court as it requires investigation into facts and the material available before respondent No. 1. The plea is being raised for the first time before this Court. This plea which was not raised before respondent No. 1 cannot be permitted to be raised for the first time before this Court as it requires investigation into facts and the material available before respondent No. 1. Unless such a plea was raised and proved by the petitioner before respondent No. it would be difficult at this late stage to permit the petitioner to raise it for the first time warranting interference under Article 226 of the Constitution a Division Bench of this Court in a dispute between Niranjan Lal Bhargava and Company and Deputy Labour Commissioner and Others, (1979) 39 FLR 11 took a similar view that such a plea cannot be raised for the first time in this Court N.D. Ojha, J. (as he then was) speaking for the Bench observed that questions which are not pure questions of law and require investigation into facts cannot be raised for the first time when such facts were not pleaded or raised before the concerned authority. In view of this and in the absence of any material having been placed even before this Court it cannot be found that the petitioner was justified in denying respondent No. 2 the fruits of the site compensatory allowance. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner then urged that another aspect very material to the instant controversy has not been considered by respondent No. 1 as regards the withdrawal of an allowance so as to contradict or infringe the Government Order dated 1-2-1972 causing prejudice to the employees by such withdrawal. It has been submitted that such non-consideration of the prejudice detrimental to the terms and conditions of the employees invites adjudication in the totality of the circumstances and which has not been done and this alone would render the award a nullity. I find no merit in this submission. It was incumbent for the petitioner to have satisfied respondent No. 1 that the withdrawal of the allowance was not in contradiction or in infringement of the Government Order dated 1-2-1972. This was a pure question of fact. While exercising the power to pierce the veil of an order passed by the Labour Court/Tribunal and to have a close look at all the circumstances it is not necessary to come to a decision as regards the findings of fact. This was a pure question of fact. While exercising the power to pierce the veil of an order passed by the Labour Court/Tribunal and to have a close look at all the circumstances it is not necessary to come to a decision as regards the findings of fact. A finding of fact cannot be interfered with under Article 226 of the Constitution unless the conclusion is perverse as has been held by the Supreme Court in the dispute between Mahendra Singh Dandwal and Hindustan Motors Ltd., 1976 (II) LLJ 259 . It is no doubt true that unless the findings recorded by respondent No. 1 are perverse or contrary to law resulting in miscarriage of justice this Court would not interfere with such findings in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Such a view was taken by the Supreme Court in the case of Swadcsh Industries Ltd. v. Its workmen, (1960 (II) LKJ 78 (SC). 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner then submitted that the withdrawal of the allowance was not in contradiction of the Government Order dated 1-2-1972 nor it infringed it and as such it was not necessary for the petitioner to have resorted to the provisions of Section 4-1 of the Industrial Disputes Act as has been erroneously held by respondent No. 1. It has been submitted that the attraction of such provision would be necessary where such a withdrawal of any benefit has pre-judicially affected the workmen. Respondent No. 1 has found as a finding of fact that such a withdrawal of the allowance has caused prejudice to the employees. It would have been open to the petitioner to have invoked the provisions of Section 4-1 of the Industrial Disputes Act instead of asserting that the withdrawal has not detrimentally prejudiced the employees when respondent No. 1 found it as a fact that by such withdrawal the employees of the petitioner had been adversely affected. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner then submitted that a compromise had been arrived at between the petitioner and some union and the legal non-consideration of such a compromise by respondent No. 1 would render the award a nullity. This submission again has no force. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner then submitted that a compromise had been arrived at between the petitioner and some union and the legal non-consideration of such a compromise by respondent No. 1 would render the award a nullity. This submission again has no force. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that a significant fact has thus been lost sight of that when such compromise or settlement was arrived at between the petitioner and some other union providing for some higher benefits to the members then it cannot be said that the agreement or compromise was in any case a got up document on the face of it unless found to be dubious or having been arrived at in clandestine manner. The submission is of no avail to the petitioner and has no merit. The multiplicity of the unions in a body corporate often creates such a situation that it may be difficult for the authorities or the employers themselves to find out or uphold the validity of such an agreement and comply with its terms and conditions. The impact of such an agreement/settlement has to be considered for the larger interest of the workmen. No doubt to preserve peace and amity between the employees and employers recourse to settle down disputes are often resorted to by the representatives of the two sections to arrive at an amicable solution. Such an agreement or settlement if it was ever arrived at was not pleaded by the petitioner before respondent No. 1. Unless a fact has been pleaded any evidence in support of that plea would be of no avail as it denies an opportunity to the other side to meet it. However, the petitioner has failed to show as to how such, an agreement was binding on respondent No. 2 who was not a party to such agreement or settlement. 11. It was then urged on behalf of the petitioner that the award is a nullity inasmuch as the findings recorded are wholly perverse and contrary to law resulting in miscarriage of justice. I find it difficult to agree with such submission. An attempt was made to persuade me to go through the findings and examine its reasons or justifications in arriving at such finding. I find it difficult to agree with such submission. An attempt was made to persuade me to go through the findings and examine its reasons or justifications in arriving at such finding. Respondent No. 1 on the basis of the material produced as well as taking into account the evidence which was adduced by the parties found that the withdrawal of the allowance was detrimental to the employees. It is very difficult for this Court to reappraise the evidence or to re-adjudicate the dispute. In the case of Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha, 1980 (40) FLR 152 .the Supreme Court has held that an error ora wrong order cannot be corrected merely because it is wrong while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. The order sought to be challenged can be quashed if it is vitiated by error of law on the face of the order, jurisdictional incompetence, perverse, misreading of facts or absence of legal evidence. Respondent No. 1 after adjudicating into the dispute has come to the conclusion that the withdrawal of the allowance has detrimentally prejudiced the employees of the petitioner and such findings of fact having been arrived at on the basis of legal evidence do not empower the High Court in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent findings on such evidence Respondent No. 1 who was seized of the matter was the sole judge of facts and if on the basis of legal evidence he has arrived at some conclusion the adequacy or reliability of the evidence before him is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. No doubt the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is too wide but at the same time it has to be exercised with great circumspection. The Court while exercising the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot constitute itself into an appellate court over the order passed by the Tribunal and re-adjudicate the issue or the question of fact decided by the Tribunal. The Court while exercising the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot constitute itself into an appellate court over the order passed by the Tribunal and re-adjudicate the issue or the question of fact decided by the Tribunal. In a matter of dispute between Sadhu Ram and Delhi Transport Corporation, 1983 (11) LLJ 383 (SC) the Supreme Court held that the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution has to be exercised with caution and not as an appellate forum. Indeed the findings arrived at by respondent No. 1 can be interfered with only if they are based upon no evidence or based upon extraneous or irrelevant evidence or otherwise perverse but not otherwise as has been held by the Supreme Court in the case of Afs Khushiram Behari Lal & Co. v. Assessing Authority, Sangrur and another, AIR 1976 SC 2372 . However, it is not found that respondent No. 1 based his findings on no evidence or upon any extraneous or irrelevant evidence. The plea of perversity as has been canvassed before me on behalf of the petitioner as regards the findings arrived at by respondent No. 1 is without any substance. Any reasonable man would have arrived at the same finding which respondent No. 1 has arrived at on the evidence before it. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon Tamil Nadu Electricity Workers' Federation and another v. Madras State Electricity Board, 1962 (2) LLJ and Sone Valley Portland Cement Company v. The Workmen, (1972) 3 SCC 727 . These cases are of no avail to the petitioner. 13. Section 9-A of the Industrial Disputes Act which is a kin to Section 4-1 of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act provide for the change of service conditions but after resorting to the provisions of Section 9-A Admittedly no effort was made to comply with the requirement of section 4-1 of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act in the instant case and as such the submission as well as the cases cited do not help the petitioner. 14. Learned counsel for the respondent Sri U. K. Misra strongly placed reliance upon The Management of Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. Its Workmen, (1976) 1 SCC 63 . 14. Learned counsel for the respondent Sri U. K. Misra strongly placed reliance upon The Management of Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. Its Workmen, (1976) 1 SCC 63 . In this case the Supreme Court has held that Section 9-A of the Industrial Disputes Act comes into operation the moment an employer proposes to change any condition of services of its workmen. The provisions of Section 9-A have been held to be mandatory. The withdrawal of compensatory allowance as has been held could not be unilateral. 15. Respondent No. 1 having held that the withdrawal of City Compensatory Allowance amounts to change in the conditions of service of the employees of Panki Power House the action of the petitioner is violative of the provisions of Section 4-1 of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act. 16. Pursuant to what has been said above the petition is wholly misconceived and without merit and deserves to be dismissed. The award dated 5th November, 1980 (Annexure 10 to the petition) docs not require any interference. 17. In the result the petition fails and is hereby dismissed with costs.