JUDGMENT : G.B. Pattnaik, J. - The decree-holder is the petitioner impugning the order of the Subordinate judge dated 19. 10. 1982. By the impugned order, the learned Subordinate Judge has allowed the application filed by the judgment-debtor u/s 47 of the CPC and has held that the decree in question has become inexecutable in view of Section 10-B of the Orissa (Scheduled Areas) Money-Lenders' Regulation, 1967 (hereinafter referred to as the "Regulation") as introduced by Orissa Regulation 2 of 1976. 2. The plaintiff filed a suit on the allegation that the defendant had taken some loan from him on executing a mortgage deed and by delivering the mortgaged property in his favour. But after the plaintiff remained in possession of the land for one year, the defendant forcibly rook over possession of the land and also did not pay the amount which he had taken on loan and, therefore, the plaintiff filed the suit for recovery of the amount in question. This suit was decreed ex parte on a finding that the plaintiff remained in possession of the mortgaged land for one year from the date of execution of the mortgage and thereafter the defendant forcibly dispossessed him and consequently the defendant is liable to pay the amount taken by him on loan. When the plaintiff levied execution of the said decree, the defendant filed an application u/s 47 of the CPC contending inter alia that the mortgage in question stood redeemed by operation of law after expiry of seven years from the date of the execution of the mortgage deed under Regulation 10-B and, therefore, the decree in question obtained by the plaintiff is a nullity and has become inexecutable. The plaintiff-decree-holder filed objection to the said petition contending that the executing Court cannot go behind the decree and, at any rate, in view of the finding of the Subordinate judge that the plaintiff was in possession of the land only for a period of one year from the date of mortgage whereafter the defendant has forcibly taken over possession, the provision of Regulation 10-B has no application and consequently, the decree remains executable. The learned Subordinate judge relying on the evidence of P. W. 2 came to the conclusion that in fact the decree-holder had remained in possession of the land for seven years and, therefore, according to him the provision of Regulation 10-B would apply in full force. 3. Mr. Ray, the learned counsel for the petitioner contends that in view of the specific finding of the Subordinate Judge in the suit to the effect that the plaintiff was in possession of the mortgaged land for a period of one year whereafter he Was forcibly dispossessed by the defendant, it was not open for the executing Court to come to a different finding on the basis of evidence adduced in the execution proceeding and the executing Court committed gross error of jurisdiction in interfering with the said finding. In other words, according to Mr. Ray, the executing Court has gone behind the decree to find out the legality of the same which is not permissible. Mr. S. Misra 2, the learned Counsel for the opposite party, on the other hand, contends that the executing Court has merely applied the provision of law which it is entitled to do and, therefore, this is not a case where the executing Court has gone behind the decree. 4. After perusing the impugned order, I am of the opinion that the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is well-founded. The executing Court has indeed gone behind the decree to find cut the legality of the same on an ancillary finding as to the period of possession by the plaintiff over the mortgaged property. In the suit itself, there is a specific finding that the plaintiff was in possession of the land for a period of one year from the date of the execution of the mortgage deed. In that view of the matter, it was not open for the executing Court to alter that finding on the basis of some evidence adduced in the execution case. Consequently, the order of the executing Court must be held to be in excess of the jurisdiction and, therefore, cannot be sustained in law. 5. In that view of the matter, it was not open for the executing Court to alter that finding on the basis of some evidence adduced in the execution case. Consequently, the order of the executing Court must be held to be in excess of the jurisdiction and, therefore, cannot be sustained in law. 5. That apart, the provision of Regulation 10-B cannot be held to be applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case, since it applies when any possessory mortgage is executed by the debtor in favour of a money-lender "Money-lender" has been defined in the Regulation to mean, a person whose business is that of advancing and realising loans and shall include a mandi merchant and a trader but does not include a bank or co-operative society and the expression 'money- lending' shall be construed accordingly. There is no material on the basis of which it can be held that the plaintiff was a money-lender within the meaning of Clause (x) of Regulation 2 of the Regulation. In that view of of the matter, the provision of the said Regulation cannot have any application and consequently, the impugned order passed by the Subordinate judge cannot be sustained. In either view, therefore, the order of the Subordinate Judge dated 19. 10. 1982 passed in M. J.C No. 93 of 1981 must be held to be illegal. I would, therefore, set aside the said order of the learned Subordinate Judge. 6. This Civil Revision is accordingly allowed, but in the circumstances without any order as to costs. Final Result : Allowed