JUDGMENT - C.S. DHARMADHIKARI, J.:---In this writ petition the petitioner Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay-B.E.S.T. has challenged the order passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal overruling the preliminary objection raised to the very maintainability of the application. 2. It appears from the record that the deceased Lawarance was knocked down by the BEST bus on 17th February, 1982 and he died in the said accident. The applicant Smt. Santan Marshall Fernandes, who is the maternal, aunt of the deceased Lawarance, therefore, filed an application under section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act. It was contended by the maternal aunt Smt. Santan that the deceased was the son of the sister of her husband and was residing with her since childhood. The deceased had no other relation either nearer or remote and she is the only surviving heir of the deceased. She, therefore, preferred a claim of Rs. 97,000/- by way of compensation. This application was stoutly opposed by the Corporation on the ground that the applicant is not a legal representative of the deceased within the meaning of the said expression as used in section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act and, therefore, the application filed by her is not maintainable. 3. The learned member of the Tribunal after making a detailed reference to the various decisions, in the field, ultimately came to the conclusion that at this preliminary stage it may not be proper to consider and distinguish between the claim for loss of estate and claim for compensation on the ground of dependency. The Tribunal further held that all the heirs who can show dependency on the deceased and also who can represent the estate of the deceased are entitled to maintain the action. Hence the application filed by the applicant, the maternal aunt of the deceased is maintainable. As already observed it is this order of the Tribunal which is challenged in the present writ petition. 4. Since the question involved in this writ petition was of considerable importance and at the initial stage none appeared for the respondent, we requested Shri D.R. Dhanuka, Advocate to assist this Court as Amicus Curie to which he readily agreed. We are very much thankful to him. 5. 4. Since the question involved in this writ petition was of considerable importance and at the initial stage none appeared for the respondent, we requested Shri D.R. Dhanuka, Advocate to assist this Court as Amicus Curie to which he readily agreed. We are very much thankful to him. 5. Shri Raja Bhonsale, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners-B.E.S.T. Municipal Corporation, contended before us that the only persons who are entitled to file claim petition under section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act are those who are referred to in section 1-A of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act does not confer any additional right upon anybody to claim compensation. Sections 110-A to 110-F of the Motor Vehicles Act are merely adjectival or procedural in nature. Therefore, the said provisions will have to be read with the provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act and that too harmoniously. So read a claim for compensation could be made only for the benefit of the wife, husband, parent and child of the person who had died in such accident. Since admittedly the applicant in the present case is the maternal aunt she is not entitled to claim any compensation under the provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act and so also under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act. In support of this contention he has placed strong reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in (New Indian Insurance Co. v. Smt. Shanti Mehra)1 , A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 237, as well as the latest decisions of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in (Prakash Chand and another v. Pal Singh othrers)2, A.I.R. 1985 Punj. 329. He has also placed reliance upon various other decisions of different High Courts namely (Northern India Transport Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Amra Wali)3, A.I.R. 1966 Punjab 288. (Kamladevi others v. Kishanchand others)4, A.I.R. 1970 M.P 168. (P.B. Kader v. Thatchamma others)5, A.I.R. 1970 Kerala 241. (Budh v. Union of India)6, A.I.R. 1981 M.P. 151. (Diwan Hari Chand others v. Municipal Committee of Delhi others)7, A.I.R. 1981 Delhi 71. (Perumal and others v. G. Ellusamy Reddiar anther)8, 1974 A.C.J. 182 (Madras). 6. On the other hand Shri D.R. Dhanuka, learned Counsel appearing as Amicus Curie contended before us that the provisions of section 110-A to 110-F of the Motor Vehicles Act are partly procedural and partly substantive. (Perumal and others v. G. Ellusamy Reddiar anther)8, 1974 A.C.J. 182 (Madras). 6. On the other hand Shri D.R. Dhanuka, learned Counsel appearing as Amicus Curie contended before us that the provisions of section 110-A to 110-F of the Motor Vehicles Act are partly procedural and partly substantive. The said provisions are procedural in so far as they provide for a different forum, mode and form of application for claim as also limitation, but they are substantive in so far as they enlarge the list of persons who can claim compensation including the legal representatives of the deceased. In terms they provide that an application for compensation may be made where the death has resulted from the accident, by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased. Section 1-A of the Fatal Accidents Act restricts the right to executor or administrator for the benefit of the wife, husband, parent and child. Thus by section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, the right to make an application for compensation is enlarged, and therefore, it cannot be termed as mere procedural. It is well settled that the special law should override the general law. The expression "legal representatives" is not Motor Vehicles Act. The definition of the said expression as contained in section 2(11) of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be automatically applied for the purpose of determining the category of persons who could be described as legal representatives under section 110-A of the Motor. The said expression as used in the Motor Vehicles Act means and includes any heir of the deceased according to law of succession by which the deceased was governed. In support of this contention Shri Dhanuka has placed strong reliance upon the decisions of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in (Chairman A.P.S.R.T.C. Hyderabad v. Smt. Shafiya Khatoon others)9, A.I.R. 1985 A.P. 83. (General Manager K.S.R.T.C. Bangalore v. Peerappa Parasamma Sangblli others)10, A.I.R. 1979 Karnatak 154. (Megjibhai Khimji Vira another v . Chaturbhai Taljibhai others)11, A.I.R. 1977 Gujarat 195. (Mohamad Habibullah others v. V.K. Seathammal)12, A.I.R. 1967 Madras 123. (State of Himachal Pradesh v. Dole Ram)13, A.I.R. 1981 Himachal Pradesh 87. (Bhagat Singh Sohan Singh v. Smt. Om Sharma others)14, A.I.R. 1983 P.H. 94. Shri Kapadia, learned Counsel appearing for the said Smt. Santan adopted the arguments advanced by Shri Dhanuka. Chaturbhai Taljibhai others)11, A.I.R. 1977 Gujarat 195. (Mohamad Habibullah others v. V.K. Seathammal)12, A.I.R. 1967 Madras 123. (State of Himachal Pradesh v. Dole Ram)13, A.I.R. 1981 Himachal Pradesh 87. (Bhagat Singh Sohan Singh v. Smt. Om Sharma others)14, A.I.R. 1983 P.H. 94. Shri Kapadia, learned Counsel appearing for the said Smt. Santan adopted the arguments advanced by Shri Dhanuka. From these decisions it appears that there is a difference of opinion between the different High Courts so far as the true scope of section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act is concerned. Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act reads as under: "110-A(l). An application for compensation arising out of an accident of the nature specified in the sub-sections (1) of section 110 may be made ... a) by the person who has sustained the injury; or aa) by the owner of the property; or b) where death has resulted from the accident, (by all or any of the legal representatives) of the deceased; or c) by any agent duly authorised by the person injured (or all or any of the legal representatives) of the deceased, as the case may be; "(Provided that where all the legal representatives of the deceased have not joined in any such application for compensation, the application shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all the legal representatives of the deceased and the legal representatives who have not so joined, shall be impleaded as respondents to the application)." These provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act are supplementary to the provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act. Such a view is taken by this Court in (Jaikumar Chhaganlal Patni and other v. Mery Jeroms D'Souza and others)15, A.I.R. 1978 Bom. 239, where this Court observed as under : "5. The provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act provide for compensation even for injuries that do not prove to the fatal and differ from those of the Fatal Accidents Act on certain other minor points. Section 110-B of the Motor Vehicles Act requires the Tribunal to award such amount by way of damages as it thinks just. Opinion is divided on whether 'just' compensation conceived under section 110-B, requires application of any different principle by the Claims Tribunal from the one implicit in the Fatal Accidents Act and evolved in English and Indian cases decided thereunder. Opinion is divided on whether 'just' compensation conceived under section 110-B, requires application of any different principle by the Claims Tribunal from the one implicit in the Fatal Accidents Act and evolved in English and Indian cases decided thereunder. The Supreme Court has adverted to this in the case of (M/s. Sheikhupura Transport Co. Ltd. v. N.I.T. Ins. Co.)16, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1624, arising directly under the said section 110-B of the Motor Vehicles Act, and merely observed that, that section 110-B is wider in scope, without indicating the extent of such width. The Supreme Court however, has still reiterated the general principle indicated in the case of Gobald Motor Services, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1 (supra) by citing the above quoted passage, though the Gobald case was tried by the Civil Court by reference to Fatal Accidents Act and not to the Motor Vehicles Act. In other words, essential principles of the decided cases under the Fatal Accidents Act still hold the field and pecuniary benefits coming to the claimants by reason of the death of the deceased are still liable to be balanced against the claimants' pecuniary losses." This Position is also clear from the decision of the Supreme Court in 3.7 (Minu B. Mehta v. Balkrishna Nayan)17, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1248. Section 1-A of the Fatal Accidents Act reads as under : "l-A. Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default, and the act, neglect or default is such as would (if death had not ensured) have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, the party who would have been liable if death had not ensured, shall be liable to an action or suit for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured, and although the death shall have been caused under such circumstances as amount in law to felony or other crime. "Every such action or suit shall be for the benefit of the wife, husband, parent and child, if any, of the person whose death shall have been so caused, and shall be brought by and in the name of the executor, administrator or representative of the person deceased". "Every such action or suit shall be for the benefit of the wife, husband, parent and child, if any, of the person whose death shall have been so caused, and shall be brought by and in the name of the executor, administrator or representative of the person deceased". "and in every such action, the Court may give such damages as it may think proportioned to the loss resulting from such death to the parties respectively, for whom and for whose benefit such action shall be brought, and the amount so recovered, after deducting all costs and expenses, including the costs not recovered from the defendant, shall be divided amongst the before-mentioned parties, or any of them, in such shares as the Court by its judgment or decree shall direct". Then comes section 2 which reads as under :--- "2. Provided always that not more than one action or suit shall be brought for, and in respect of the same subject matter of complaint:" "Provided that in any such action or suit the executor, administrator or representative of the deceased may insert a claim for and recover any pecuniary loss to the estate of the deceased occasioned by such wrongful act, neglect or default, which sum, when recovered, shall be deemed part of the assets of the estate of the deceased." Thus these provisions contemplate two types of claims. The cause of action under section 1 and that of under section 2 are different. (Gobald Motor Services Ltd. another v. R.M.K. Veluswami others)18, See A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1 (C.K. Subramonia Iyer others v. V.T. Kunhikuttan Nair others)19, and A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 376. 7. However it is not possible for us to accept the contention of Shri Raja Bhonsale that the provisions of sections 110-A to 110-F of the Motor Vehicles Act are merely adjective or procedural in nature. In support of this contention he has placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in New India Insurance's case, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 273. It cannot be forgotten that in that case the Supreme Court was concerned with the question as to the forum and the period of limitation only. In support of this contention he has placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in New India Insurance's case, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 273. It cannot be forgotten that in that case the Supreme Court was concerned with the question as to the forum and the period of limitation only. The wider question as to whether the relevant provision of Motor Vehicles Act, which authorised certain persons to file claim petition, or the persons for whose benefit the claim application could be filed, and whether they are in the nature of substantive provisions did not fall for consideration of Their Lordships of the Supreme Court. Hence the said decisions is distinguishable. In our view the said provisions are partly procedural and partly substantive ; in nature. They are substantive in nature so far as they enlarge the list of persons who can file claim application which includes legal representatives of the deceased, it is true that definition of 'Legal Representative' as given in Code of Civil Procedure cannot be bodily imported in the Motor Vehicles Act. Having regard to the context in which said expression is used in the Motor Vehicles Act, it will include legal heirs of the deceased according to law of succession by which deceased was governed. 8. By section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act it is laid down that an application for compensation arising out of an accident where death has resulted from it, could be filed by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased. By proviso it is clarified that where all the legal representatives of the deceased have not joined in any such application for compensation, the application shall be made on behalf of and for the benefit of all the legal representatives of the deceased and the legal representatives who have not so joined shall be impleaded as respondents to the application. It only means that an application is to be filed for and on behalf of the whole body of the legal representatives, To that extent there is departure from the provisions of section 1-A of the Fatal Accidents Act. However, the question still remains as to whether apart from the persons referred to under section 1-A of the Fatal Accidents Act any other remote heirs can also claim compensation and on what count ? However, the question still remains as to whether apart from the persons referred to under section 1-A of the Fatal Accidents Act any other remote heirs can also claim compensation and on what count ? It is contended by Shri Dhanuka that if a person has a right to inherit property as per the personal law of the deceased, then he could be considered as legal representative within the meaning of the said expression of section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act. For claiming any such compensation dependency is not relevant though it may be relevant for the apportionment of the quantum of compensation. The right of compensation is not restricted to the persons named in section 1-A of the Fatal Accidents Act. If it is established that the applicant is an heir of the deceased then he is entitled to file an application and claim compensation on all counts. 9. On the other hand it is contended by Shri Bhonsale that though the legal representative i.e. heir of the deceased may have a locus standi to file an application for compensation, it must be for the benefit of the persons named under section 1-A of the Fatal Accidents Act. If such persons are not available then, in a given case, an heir or legal representative can claim compensation for the loss to estate only as provided by section 2 of Fatal Accident Act. As already observed the learned Counsel appearing for both sides have placed strong reliance upon the various decisions in the field. 10. With the assistance of the learned Counsel appearing on both sides we have gone through the relevant decisions. In our view it is not necessary to make a detailed reference to the various decisions cited at the bar since we generally agree with the view taken by the Full Bench of the Punjab Haryana High Court in Prakash Chand's case. After making a detailed reference to the provisions of the two enactments, as well as other laws in the field, this is what the Full Bench has observed in para 25 of its judgment : "25. Since we have identified legal representatives of the deceased under section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, subject to the proviso thereof, so the question that arises for consideration is; does the proviso restricts the choice of legal representatives of the deceased who could file claim application ? Since we have identified legal representatives of the deceased under section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, subject to the proviso thereof, so the question that arises for consideration is; does the proviso restricts the choice of legal representatives of the deceased who could file claim application ? In my opinion, it does. As already observed, whereas the Fatal Accidents Act envisages two sets of beneficiaries of the damages (l) the dependants and (2) the estate of the deceased. Sub-section (1) of section 110-A, read with the proviso, envisages all the legal representatives of the person deceased to be the beneficiaries of the award. The proviso goes to the extent that it envisages a mandate to the Tribunal to implead as respondent any such legal representative if he had not joined the legal representative who had filed the application as an applicant. In my opinion, section 110-A envisages filing of an application for compensation by any or all such legal representatives as are entitled to ; hare the damages that may be awarded by the Tribunal which damages, as already observed may be referable to the pecuniary loss suffered by the dependants or the pecuniary loss suffered by the estate of the person deceased or both." Then without being exhaustive, the Full Bench made a reference to six situations which one can envisage under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, and held that the question as to whether the person who has made an application "has locus standi to do so", would be judged in each case in accordance with the criteria that a person making application must also be entitled to enjoy the damages either in whole or in part. Ultimately this is what the Full Bench held in para 27 of its judgment : "27. In the case in hand, the person deceased Dharam Pal has left behind no dependent. The deceased, as his name suggests, is a Hindu by religion and so his estate would be inheritable in accordance with the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act. Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 deals with the intestate succession to a male. According to the said section, brothers fall in category (b). By virtue of the said section, person failing in a given category succeeds equally and persons falling in (a) category excludes the persons mentioned in category (b) and so forth. Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 deals with the intestate succession to a male. According to the said section, brothers fall in category (b). By virtue of the said section, person failing in a given category succeeds equally and persons falling in (a) category excludes the persons mentioned in category (b) and so forth. It is nobody's case that deceased had left behind any of the persons falling in category (a). It is also nobody's case that the deceased had left behind any person other that applicant-appellant falling in category (b). In view of this, the applicant-appellant would fall in such category of legal representatives as would be entitled to enjoy the damages that may be awarded by the Tribunal. The damages in this regard would be referable to the loss to the estate of the deceased which would be equal to the lost earnings for the lost years of the deceased's life. In other words, the possible saving of the deceased after accounting for his personnel expenditure multiplied by a suitable multiplier having regard to the years by which the working life of the deceased had been cut short by the accident. See in this regard (Pickett v. British Rail Engineering Ltd.)20, 1980 Acc. C.J. 261 (House of Lords, England); and (Cammoli v. Wilson)21, 1982 Acc. C.J. 409, (House of Lords, England). Thus the Full Bench came to the conclusion that there are two types of legal representatives who are entitled to file application, (1) who can claim compensation for their own benefit and (2) heirs who can claim compensation as damages referable to the loss to the estate. Thereafter the Full Bench made a detailed reference to the various decisions in the field including that of the Gujarat High Court, Karnataka High Court, Madhya Pradesh High Court, and rightly came to the conclusion that the persons who are not referred to in section 1-A of the Fatal Accidents Act can claim compensation to the loss of estate of the deceased and while doing so it is not necessary to establish the dependency of the deceased. However, we would like to make it clear that as to what could be termed as "just compensation" for loss to the estate must ultimately depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case, and no general rule can be laid down in that behalf. 11. However, we would like to make it clear that as to what could be termed as "just compensation" for loss to the estate must ultimately depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case, and no general rule can be laid down in that behalf. 11. The decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Chairman, A.P.S.R.T.C., Hyderabad v. Safiya Khatoon, is of little assistance in deciding the controversy raised before us. In the said decision the Andhra Pradesh High Court was mainly concerned with the principle of apportionment. We are not concerned with such controversy in this case. Therefore, we will prefer to keep said question open. 12. Therefore, so far as the question of locus standi to file claim-application is concerned, it could safely be said that the heirs of the deceased who are legal representatives can maintain an application for compensation. However, if the heir is a person who is not named under section 1-A of the Fatal Accidents Act, then the compensation claimable could be for the loss of estate only. In the present case the petitioner is the maternal aunt of the deceased and has claimed compensation under section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, in her capacity as heir of the deceased. Therefore, her application for claiming compensation for loss of estate is maintainable. To that extent the order passed by the lower Court stands modified. In the result, therefore, Rule is partly made absolute with no orders as to costs. Rule made partly absolute. -----