JUDGMENT 1. - This revision is directed against the order dated July 23, 1983 passed by the learned District Judge, Udaipur in Civil Execution Case No. 7 of 1981. 2. The respondent-decree-holder Jialal Kapoor had obtained a decree in Civil Suit No. 13 of 1977 on May 24, 1940 and he submitted an application for execution under section XXI, Rule U, CPC. The plaintiff-decree-holder's services were terminated on 6-2-1974. He was holding the post of Chief Mining Engineer/Superintendent of Mines/Chief of Planning and Development (Mines). The plaintiff's suit was decreed in the following terms: (1) The order of termination passed by the defendant No. 2 on 6-2-1974 was illegal and void and as such it was ineffective as against the plaintiff; (2) That the plaintiff will be deemed to have continued in service of the defendant No. 2 and as such he shall be immediately reinstated on the same post on which he was working on 6-2-1974 and he shall be entitled to claim all salaries and other benefits from that particular date till he joins back his duties; (3) The plaintiff has filed the suit for grant of damages amounting to Rs. 1,00,000/- also but since his termination has been held to be void and his reinstatement has been ordered as such he shall be entitled to claim his salary and all other benefits and as such if they happen to be more than Rs. 1,00,000/- then he shall pay proportionate court-fees on the excess amount received by him. 3. After passing of the decree, the plaintiff was reinstated on the post on which he was working on 6-2-1974 but certain benefits, which he would have otherwise received, had his services not been terminated, were not allowed, to, in execution of the decree, he claimed these benefits The claims related to (it promotion and continuance of seniority; (ii) amount of provident fund; (iii) Conveyance allowance; (iv) benefit of Leave Travel Concession; (v) damages on account of payment of interest amounting to Rs. 1310/-for not depositing the premium in time on service policy of Life Insurance; and (vi) court-fee. The learned District Judge allowed these claims in execution of the decree. 1310/-for not depositing the premium in time on service policy of Life Insurance; and (vi) court-fee. The learned District Judge allowed these claims in execution of the decree. With regard to the claim of promotion, he directed that the plaintiff-decree-holder is entitled to be considered for notional promotion during the period of termination and his reinstatement and it was further directed that this consideration shall be made within a period of six months from the date of the order. As regards the leave travel concession, the learned District Judge directed that the plaintiff-decree-holder would be entitled to claim leave travel concession, in case he under takes the journey to his home town of in India within a period of one year from the date of the order. Dissatisfied with the order of the learned District Judge, this revision has been filed by the judgment-debtor challenging the grant of reliefs in respect of promotion, provident fund, leave travel concession and damages on account of non-payment of premiums 4. I have heard Mr. H.M. Parekh, learned Counsel for the judgment-debtor petitioner and Mr. M. Mridul, learned Counsel for the plaintiff-decree-holder respondent. 5. Mr. H.M. Parekh, learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that under the decree, the plaintiff is only entitled to reinstatement on the same post on which he was working on 6-2-74 and further he is entitled to claim all salaries and other benefits of that post from the date of termination upto the date of his reinstatement. The plaintiff is not entitled to claim any promotion or benefits of promotion post under the terms of the decree. The decree no where provides that the plaintiff shall be considered for notional promotion from the date of the termination till the date of reinstatement and that, be would be entitled to the benefits of the promotion post, in case, he is promoted to that post. Mr. Parekh also submitted that the learned District Judge, at page 14 of the judgment clearly recorded his finding that the decree holder is not entitled to such a claim regarding the normal promotion. Having recorded such a finding, the learned District Judge was not justified to hold that the decree-holder is entitled to such a relief and he was wrong in directing the judgment debtor to consider the decree-holder's case for notional promotion within a period of six months. Having recorded such a finding, the learned District Judge was not justified to hold that the decree-holder is entitled to such a relief and he was wrong in directing the judgment debtor to consider the decree-holder's case for notional promotion within a period of six months. He submitted that under the words "other benefits" the promotion is not covered as promotion, is not the benefit of the post on which the decree holder was to be reinstated. 6. Mr. M. Mridul, on the other, supported the order of the learned District Judge and submitted that the executing court can construe the decree in order to find out as to what the intent of the court in passing the decree was. He urged that the order of termination has been declared to be void, inoperative and in effective. The resultant effect of it is, as if the order of termination was never passed and was nonest. That being so, all natural consequences would follow which includes the consideration of the incumbent for promotion and that is, the other benefits to which the incumbent is entitled during the period of termination and reinstatement. He submitted that the combined effect of paras 1, 2 and 3 of the decree, if read along with the averments of the plaint, the document submitted and proved by the plaintiff and the consideration made by the court in the judgment is that the terms of the decree so include the decree-holder's right for consideration of his promotion during the relevant period and so, the executing court was justified in directing the judgment-debtor to consider the decree-holder's case for notional promotion during the said period. He submitted that the plaintiff has led evidence that the post of Deputy General Manager was a promotion post and during the relevant period Shri R.V. Paliwal, SDM and Shri M. Dutta, S.W.M. were promoted on the posts of Dy. General Manager w.e.f. 1-5-74 vide order dated 9-5-74. The post of Deputy General Manager was, no doubt, selection post and was not a direct recruitment post. It has come in the evidence that the departmental promotion committee considered their cases for promotion, although according to the plaintiff decree-holders both of them were not eligible for promotion. 7. I have considered the rival submissions of the learned Counsel for the parties. It has come in the evidence that the departmental promotion committee considered their cases for promotion, although according to the plaintiff decree-holders both of them were not eligible for promotion. 7. I have considered the rival submissions of the learned Counsel for the parties. Before the executing court, there was a controversy with regard to the nature of 2 promotion posts, but the learned executing court proceeded to examine the question in the light of the statement of Shri Nand Kumar. It is now not in dispute that the post of Deputy General Manager was a selection post and the posts were filled in after consideration of the cases of Shri Paliwal and Shri M. Dutta by the departmental promotion Committee. DW 1 Nand Kumar was examined by the judgment-debtor, who has made the statement to that effect. 8. The main controversy between the parties is as to whether the words "other benefit cover the consideration of the decree-holder's case for promotion. I may first consider as to how the executing court has dealt with the matter. In my opinion, there does not appear to be any basis in the argument of Mr. Parekh that the executing court, at page 14 of the order found that the plaintiff is not entitled to claim the relief in respect of promotion. What the learned executing court has done is that it has recorded that straight off the decree-holder is not entitled to promotions. The executing court clearly recorded that the decree-holder is only entitled to claim that he may be considered for notional promotion. At page 14 of the order, after passing the question as to whether the decree-holder is entitled for promotion the executing court opined that the decree-holder is not entitled to notional promotion and immediately thereafter the executing court recorded, that the decree-holder can only claim that he should be considered for notional promotion. So, in my opinion, the executing court has not recorded any contradictory finding. The executing court has made a distinction between the claim of notional promotion and claim' of consideration for notional promotion and to be it appears that the executing court has been consistent white dealing with the controversy relating to the claim of promotion. 9. Coming to the question as to how the decree is to be construed i.e. whether the words "other benefits" include the consideration for promotion or not. 9. Coming to the question as to how the decree is to be construed i.e. whether the words "other benefits" include the consideration for promotion or not. I may state that the words "other benefits" can be construed in the light as to how the matter has been considered by both the parties during the pendency of the suit and in the light of the judgment passed by the court-below. It may be stated that the learned executing court has referred to the relevant paragraphs of the plaint, the documents proved by the plaintiff and the opinion expressed by the court in the judgment. In para 22 of the plaint, the plaintiff categorically mentioned about the promotion which he would have got, had his services been not terminated. He produced the relevant orders of promotion Ex. 45 and Ex. 46 and service Rule 48. The seniority list was got exhibited. It is in this contest, the court expressed that the order of termination was void and in operative and the plaintiff is entitled to his immediate reinstatement and he shall be deemed to be in continuous service from 6-2-1974 itself. He will, therefore, be further entitled to the claim of entire salaries and all other benefits, which he would have otherwise earned, had he remained in service and the learned Judge expressed that in his opinion, the suit should be decreed. From this expression that the suit is fit to be decreed, it can be taken that the words "other benefits" would also include the benefit of promotion. In Bhawan Baja v. Solanki Hanuji AIR 1972 Supreme Court 1371 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed as under: It is true that an executing court cannot go behind the decree under execution. But that does not mean that it has no duty to find out the true effect of that decree. For construing a decree, it can and in appropriate cases, it ought to take into consideration the pleadings as well as the proceedings leading upto the decree. In order to find out the meaning of the words employed in a decree the Court, often has to ascertain the circumstances under which these words came to be used. For construing a decree, it can and in appropriate cases, it ought to take into consideration the pleadings as well as the proceedings leading upto the decree. In order to find out the meaning of the words employed in a decree the Court, often has to ascertain the circumstances under which these words came to be used. That is the plain duty of the execution Court and if that Court fails to discharge that duty it has plainly failed to exercise the jurisdiction began and ended with merely looking at the decree on it was finally drafted. Despite the fact that the pleadings as well as the earlier judgments rendered by the Board as well as by the appellate Court had been placed before it, the execution Court does not appear to have considered these documents. 10. It may be stated that it could not be the intention of the court to pass the decree that the decree-holder would not be entitled to for consideration of his promotion. When the order of termination is declared void, the necessary consequence would be that if the plaintiff is otherwise eligible for consideration of promotion, then he should be so considered. The executing court clearly recorded that the plaintiff is entitled to all other benefits which he would have earned, had he remained in service. The decree-holder has certainly earned the right for consideration of promotion. This right of consideration, in my opinion is undoubtedly a benefit to which in terms of the decree, the decree-holder is entitled. 11. Even otherwise, the words "other benefits" are of wide impart. In the Dictionary sense, the word "benefit" would mean; any advantage, profit or gain. In Black's Law Dictionary (IV Edition), the word 'benefit is considered to mean as under: Advantage; profit; fruit: privilege; Advantage. Fitch v. Bates, 11 Bates, 11 Barb (NY) 473; Feerigine v. Reachev, 93 Cons 445, 106 A. 445, 447; In re Krawse Estate 173 Wash. 1, 21 P. 20 268; a pecuniary advantage or profit; gain; account interest the whole benefit and entire beneficial interest. Birm v. New comb, 170, Vs 208, 196 SE 605, 608. 12. The word "benefit" according in Sub-section (2) of Section 33C of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 came up for consideration before their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Punjab National Bank Ltd. v. K.L. Kharbanda, AIR 1963 Supreme Court 487 . Birm v. New comb, 170, Vs 208, 196 SE 605, 608. 12. The word "benefit" according in Sub-section (2) of Section 33C of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 came up for consideration before their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Punjab National Bank Ltd. v. K.L. Kharbanda, AIR 1963 Supreme Court 487 . Their Lordships observed as under: The "benefit" is of vide import, and the dictionary meaning thereof is "advantage, profit." This would naturally include monetary advantage or monetary profit. There is no reason therefore for excluding "monetary benefits" from the word "benefit" read in this sub-section, unless it is clear from the words used that monetary benefits were not intended to be included in the word "benefit" used therein. Looking therefore to the words of the sub-section and the previous decision with respect to them we are of opinion that the word "benefit" used in Sub-section (2) is not confined merely to non-monetary benefit which could be converted in terms of money but is concerned with all kinds of benefits whether monetary or non-monetary to which workman may be entitled, say, for example, under an Award and that the sub-section comes into play when the benefits have to be computed or calculated & there is a dispute as to the calculation or computation after the benefits have been so computed the workman can apply under Sub-section (1) for recovery of the amount in the case manner as arrears of land-revenue. As in this case, the Sastry Award had conferred a benefit on the respondent and those like him by providing for Fixation of pay in the new scale, even though that benefit may be monetary and there was a dispute between the parties as to the amount of that benefit, it was open to the respondent to apply to the labour court for computation of that benefit in terms of money, and the labour Court would have jurisdiction to entertain the application and compute the amount due on the basis of the benefit conferred by the award. 13. Thus, viewed from any angle, in my opinion, the terms of the decree do include the benefit of consideration of the decree holder for notional promotion during the period of termination and reinstatement therefore, find no substance in the contention of Mr. Parekh that the decree holder is not entitled to the benefit under the aforesaid terms. 14. 13. Thus, viewed from any angle, in my opinion, the terms of the decree do include the benefit of consideration of the decree holder for notional promotion during the period of termination and reinstatement therefore, find no substance in the contention of Mr. Parekh that the decree holder is not entitled to the benefit under the aforesaid terms. 14. It is next contended by Mr. Parekh that the decree holder is not entitled to any Leave Travel Concession as has been allowed by the executing court. He urged that this Concession is available only when he avails the Leave Travel Concession. The decree holder did not avail any Leave Travel Concession, so he is not entitled to the grant of LTC without undertaking, the travel concession is not admissible. It is actually reimbursement and the reimbursement implies that certain facility has been availed at the cost of the employer and having availed the facility, the employee is to be reimbursed for the expenses incurred by him to the limited extent. Mr. Parekh referred to a decision of the Bombay High Court in The Bombay Gas Co. Ltd. v. R.S. Kulkarni AIR 1965 Supreme Court 172. Mr. Parekh submitted that, that was a case of privilege leave and the P.L. was granted to the employees, as a sort of benefit. Similarly the Leave Travel Concession is also granted to the employees by the petitioner company for recuperation. In the aforesaid decision, it has been held that the privilege leave is not a benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money within the reading of Section 33C(2). Mr. Parekh submitted that unless he undertakes travel, no employee is entitled to claim any amount, for LTC. Suffice it to say that the Bombay decision is based on the provision of Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act and in that light the question has been examined as to whether the privilege leave is a benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money. Suffice it to say that the Bombay decision is based on the provision of Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act and in that light the question has been examined as to whether the privilege leave is a benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money. The view of the labour court did not find favour with the learned Judges of the Bombay High Court and it was observed as under: It is well-known that privilege leave is a sort of benefit granted to an employee so that he may recoup health after along period of work and return to work refreshed, In short, it is a benefit which would have little meaning if it were not to be actively enjoyed by the worker and instead the workers were to be given a monetary privilege. It seems that this is the fundamental basis for the grant of this benefit of privilege leave and if so, it is implicit in the nature of that benefit and the purpose for which it is granted that it ought not to be allowed to be converted into money, except perhaps, when ultimately the worker retires with privilege leave to his credit. But normally privilege leave, is by its very nature and purpose a benefit meant to be enjoyed, and not be encashed. 15. It may be stated that it is true that without undertaking the travel, the leave travel concession cannot be encashed. The rules permit concession only when the travel is under taken. The employee is entitled to leave concession as of right as the same is provided under the Rules. The decree-holder could not avail this facility as his services were terminated. Had he remained in service, he was entitled to this facility. What the executing court has done in the present case is that the decree-holder is entitled to it only when he under takes travel within a period of 1 year. The decree-holder claimed a sum of Rs. 20,000/-. This amount has not been allowed rightly by the executing court and the executing court was right and just to hold that if within a period of 1 year, the decree-holder undertakes the travel in respect of the relevant period, he would be entitled to claim the benefit of leave travel concession. In my opinion, this claim has been rightly allowed with the aforesaid direction. 16. Mr. In my opinion, this claim has been rightly allowed with the aforesaid direction. 16. Mr. Parekh further submitted that the executing court has wrongly allowed the claim in the sum of Rs. 1318/-. I entirely agree with the submission of Mr. Parekh. It was the personal policy of the decree-holder-judgment-debtor. The employer had taken an additional responsibility to deduct the premium out of the salary of the respondent and remit the same to the Life Insurance Corporation. When the decree-holder's services were terminated, the decree-holders knew it that there would be no deduction of premiums after the date of termination, so he ought to have continued to make payments of the premiums and if any default is committed by him, the employer cannot be saddled with any liability. The policy bond is an agreement between the insurer and the insured and a facility was provided in the service policy for making payment of premiums, but on that account, on termination of service liability of interest cannot be fastened on the employer. The claim in this regard is disallowed. 17. The last item is with regard to non-transfer of same amount of Provident Fund to the Provident Fund Trust. The decree-holder's case is that a sum of Rs. 25,989.90 has not been transferred by the employer in the Provident Fund Trust. This amount has wrongly been adjusted against the dues of the employer. Admittedly, there, were some dues outstanding against the decree-holder. As stated by the decree-holder, and his counsel, that car loan was taken, which was to be repaid in instalments so there were outstandings against him on that account when there were out-standings, these sums were adjustable. The judgment-debtor-petitioner it entitled to make adjustment of the same out of the salary or even out of the Provident Fund. The learned executing court has referred to the relevant provision of Hindustan Zinc Limited's Employees Contribution Provident Fund Rules and said that no adjustment can be made of this nature against the provident fund of the employees. It may be stated that the loss caused by the employee is adjustable against the Provident Fund and non-payment of any outstanding will be a loss to the employer so any such loss, in my opinion, is adjustable against the Provident Fund under the Rules. It may be stated that the loss caused by the employee is adjustable against the Provident Fund and non-payment of any outstanding will be a loss to the employer so any such loss, in my opinion, is adjustable against the Provident Fund under the Rules. The petitioner-company even can adjust the outstanding against the salary of the respondent or against any other amount that may be payable to the respondent-decree-holder. Thus, I do not agree with the view of the executing court. Adjustment can only be made upto extent of the dues outstanding against the decree-holder and not beyond that. The revision petition-deserves to be partly allowed. 18. Accordingly, the revision petition is partly allowed. The relief granted to the decree-holder by the executing court in respect of consideration for notional promotion and LTC are maintained. So far as the claim of damages stated above is concerned, the same is disallowed, and with regard to the relief of Provident Fund the claim is disallowed and it is ordered that the petitioner-company would be entitled to adjust its dues from the salary or other amount payable to the decree-holder including the Provident Fund. 19. In respect of the reliefs, some period was specified by the executing court and as there was a stay granted by this Court, it is necessary how to further specify the time. The petitioner-company is directed to consider the respondent's case for notional promotion within a period of 3 months from the date of this judgment, and the respondent would be entitled to leave travel concession if he avails the same within three months from today. 20. This parties shall bear their own costs of this revision petition.Revision Partly Allowed. *******