G. C. GUPTA, J. ( 1 ) THE appellant, a Nazul Inspector in the employment of the respondent- State, has been found guilty of offences punishable under section 161 of the Indian Penal Code and section 5 (1) (d) read with section 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (hereinafter referred to as the TActt) and sentenced to one year's R. I. with a fine of Rs. 500/- and in default of payment of fine, to a further R. I. for three months, by judgment dated 18. 5. 1982, passed by the Special Judge, Balaghat, in Special Criminal Case No. 2 of 1982. He feels aggrieved by his aforesaid conviction and sentence and challenges the same in this appeal filed under section 374 (2), Cr. P. C. ( 2 ) THE appellant, while working as a public servant, was alleged to have demanded and accepted an illegal gratification of Rs. 100/- from the complainant Vakilchand (P. W. 1) on 30. 3. 1981 as a consideration for giving a no objection certificate to him, to enable him to construct his house. Since he had earlier taken an illegal bribe of Rs. 150/- from the said Vakilchand, his acceptance of Rs. 100/- bribe on 30. 3. 1981, was also considered breach of section 5 (1) (d) of the Act. It was alleged that the appellant was, at the relevant time, employed as a Nazul Inspector at Balaghat and was, therefore, a public servant within the meaning of the term defined in the Indian Penal Code. It is alleged that complainant Vakilchand presented an application on 17. 2. 1981 before the Nazul Officer, seeking a no objection certificate from him for construction of a house on a Nazul plot. The appellant is alleged to have gone to the spot for spot inspection and report. On 30. 3. 1981 the appellant is alleged to have gone to the shop of complainant Vakilchand and went with him to see the plot in question. After inspection of plot the appellant is alleged to have told the complainant Vakilchand that there could be several objections to the grant of no objection certificate, but this can be avoided on payment of Rs. 150/ -. Vakilchand is alleged to have paid this illegal gratification of Rs. 150/- and the appellant promised to get the no objection certificate issued within a week. 150/ -. Vakilchand is alleged to have paid this illegal gratification of Rs. 150/- and the appellant promised to get the no objection certificate issued within a week. After some time, he demanded further sum of Rs. 100/- from the complainant. The complainant felt annoyed and reported the matter to his Advocate Shri R. S. Shukla (P. W. 6 ). Shri Shukla reported the matter to the Collector, Balaghat, who, in turn, directed Shri Trivedi, S. D. O. (P. W. 2) to look into the matter. Shri Trivedi contacted Deputy Superintendent of Police Shri U. S. Verma (P. W. 8) and laid a trap. Eight currency notes of Rs. 10/- each and one currency note of Rs. 20/- were initialed by Shri Trivedi and given to the complainant for handing over the same to the appellant. Thereafter, the complainant Vakilchand went to Nazul Office and offered to pay him the bribe. The appellant, however, told the complainant Vakilchand that he will come to his shop after office hours and obtain the money. This was reported to Shri R. S. Shukla, who, in turn, reported it to the Deputy Superintendent of Police Shri Verma and the S D. O. Shri Trivedi. The appellant reached the complainant's shop at about 5-20 p. m. and was taken inside and given the currency notes, in question. After receiving those currency notes, he kept them in his pocket and assured complainant Vakilchand that his work will be done. At this point of time, the raiding party apprehended the appellant and interrogated him. In the beginning, the appellant avoided answering, but, ultimately, produced the money from his pocket. Shri Trivedi compared the numbers of these notes and also his initials and seized the same. Thereafter, an offence under section 161, I. P. C. and section 5 (1) of the Act was registered against the appellant. The Commissioner of Land Records and Settlement, Madhya Pradesh, Gwalior, by his communication dated 13. 8. 1981 (Ex. P. 8), granted permission to prosecute the appellant. That is how the appellant had been put on trial on the aforesaid allegations. ( 3 ) DURING the trial, the appellant denied having taken any bribe. His defence was that he had given his watches for repair to Vakilchand and had gone to the shop at the time of incident to receive those repaired watches. That is how the appellant had been put on trial on the aforesaid allegations. ( 3 ) DURING the trial, the appellant denied having taken any bribe. His defence was that he had given his watches for repair to Vakilchand and had gone to the shop at the time of incident to receive those repaired watches. He denied having taken any money or seizure of money from him as alleged. The learned Special Judge, relying upon the evidence of Vakilchand (P. W. 1), Hiralal (P. W. 2), Amirchand (P. W. 3), R. S, Shukla (P. W. 6) and Deputy Superintendent of Police Shri Verma (P. W. 8), held that Panchnama (Ex. P. 1) was prepared in the house of Shri Trivedi and currency notes were initialed. Relying further on this evidence, the learned Judge held that those currency notes were later on handed over to the appellant as illegal gratification. Relying on the aforesaid evidence, the learned Judge also held that the complainant had filed an application before the Nazul Officer for obtaining no objection certificate and in consequence thereof, the appellant had gone for spot inspection. The learned Judge did not believe the defence that there was no seizure or that the appellant was falsely implicated. Dealing with the sanction given by the Commissioner of Land Records and Settlement (Ex. p. 8), the learned Judge rejected the submission that it does not satisfy the requirement of section 6 (1) of the Act. That is how the appellant has been convicted and sentenced as aforesaid. ( 4 ) THE learned counsel for the appellant submitted that sanction (Ex. P-8) does not satisfy the requirement of section 6 (1) of the Act and, therefore, the conviction and sentence is wholly without jurisdiction. According to the learned counsel, the evidence on record does not disclose that the sanctioning authority applied its mind to the facts and circumstances of the case and then granted the sanction. It is also not clear if the sanction was for this particular offence. Relying on Ex. P-8, it is further submitted that the sanction is not by the Commissioner, but by the Deputy Commissioner who was not the authority competent to remove the appellant. After hearing the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant, on the point of sanction, this Court thought it proper to hear the learned Government Advocate about, it. Relying on Ex. P-8, it is further submitted that the sanction is not by the Commissioner, but by the Deputy Commissioner who was not the authority competent to remove the appellant. After hearing the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant, on the point of sanction, this Court thought it proper to hear the learned Government Advocate about, it. This Court, therefore, assured the learned counsel for the appellants that he will be heard further on merits in case this Court rejects his submission on the point of sanction. Since this Court felt that this appeal has to be allowed on the ground that sanction necessary to prosecute the appellant was missing, it is not considered necessary to further hear the appellants learned counsel on merits of the case. ( 5 ) SECTION 6 of the Act, which requires previous sanction for prosecuting a public servant for offence punishable under section 161, I. P. C. or under section 5 (2) of the Act, reads as under: ( 6 ) PREVIOUS sanction necessary for prosecution.- (1) No Court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under section 161 (or section 161) or section 165 of the Indian Penal Code or under sub-section (2) (or sub-section (3-A)) of section 5 of this Act, alleged to have been committed by a public servant except with the previous sanction,- (a) in the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affairs of the (Union) and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Central Government (of the) Central Government; (b) in the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affairs of (a State) and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the State Government, (of the) State Government; (c) in the case of any other person, of the authority competent to remove him from his office. (2) Where for any reason whatsoever any doubt arises whether the previous sanction as required under sub-section (1) should be given by the Central or State Government or any other authority, such sanction shall be given by that Government or authority which would have been competent to remove public servant from his office at the time when the offence was alleged to have been TI A bare reading of this provision would indicate that it aims at preventing harassment and vexatious prosecution of a public servant. It assumes that an honest public servant would not be in a position to oblige everyone and may therefore, incur displeasure of many of them. This displeasure may even result in his vexatious and malicious prosecution for offence relating to discharge of his official duties. The Legislature, therefore thought of providing a reasonable protection to public servants in the discharge of their official functions so that they continue performing their duties and obligations undeterred by vexatious and unnecessary prosecution. Inspite of it, the intention is to safeguard the innocent and not to provide a shield for the guilty. That sufficiently explains the reason for inserting the aforesaid provision in the Act. The said provision was analysed by the Supreme Court in Jaswant Singh v. State of Punjab, to hold that the object of the provision for sanction was that the authority giving the sanction should be able to consider for itself the evidence before it and come to a conclusion that the prosecution in the circumstances be sanctioned or forbidden. It should, therefore, be clear from the form of the sanction that the sanctioning authority considered the evidence before it and after a consideration of all the circumstances of the case, sanctioned the prosecution, and therefore unless the matter can be proved by other evidence in the sanction itself the fact should be referred to indicate that the sanctioning authority had applied its mind to the facts and circumstances of the case. This clearly indicated that the sanction was not an empty or automatic formality but was intended to be a serious exercise with a view to provide necessary protection. In this connection, the following passage from the decision being important, may be quoted for ready reference: ( 7 ) 4. This clearly indicated that the sanction was not an empty or automatic formality but was intended to be a serious exercise with a view to provide necessary protection. In this connection, the following passage from the decision being important, may be quoted for ready reference: ( 7 ) 4. The sanction under the Act is not intended to be nor is an automatic formality and it is essential that the provisions in regard to sanction should be observed with complete strictness; (Basdeo Agarwala v. Emperor 1945 F. C. R. 93 at p. 98,: (A. I. R. 1945 F. C. 16 at p. 18) (A ). The object of the provision for sanctions is that the authority giving the sanction should be able to consider for itself the evidence before it comes to a conclusion that the prosecution in the circumstances be sanctioned or forbidden. In Gokulchand Dwarkadas Morarka v. The King, 75 md. App. 30 at p. 37: (A. I. R. 1948 P. C. 82 at p. 84) (B), the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council also took a similar view when it observed: In their Lordshipst view, to comply with the provision of Cl. 23 it must be proved that the sanction was given in respect of the facts constituting the offence charged. It is plainly desirable that the facts should be referred to on the face of the sanction, but this is not essential, since Cl. 23 does not require the sanction to be in any particular form, nor even to be in writing. But if the facts constituting the offence charged are not shown on the face of the sanction, the prosecution must prove by extraneous evidence that those facts were placed before the sanctioning authority. The sanction to prosecute is an important matter; it constitutes a condition precedent to the institution of the prosecution and the government have an absolute discretion to grant or withhold their sanction, It should be clear from the form of the sanction that the sanctioning authority considered the evidence before it and after a consideration of all the circumstances of the case sanctioned the prosecution, and therefore, unless the matter can be proved by other evidence, in the sanction itself the facts should be referred to indicate that the sanctioning authority had applied its mind to the facts and circumstances of the case. In Yusofalli Mulla v. The King 76 md. In Yusofalli Mulla v. The King 76 md. App. 158: (A. I. R. 1949 P. C. 264) (C) it was held that a valid sanction on separate charges of hoarding and profiteering was essential to give the Court jurisdiction to try the charge. Without such sanction the prosecution would be a nullity and the trial without jurisdiction. Applying the aforesaid law in Indu Bhusan v. State of West Bengal2, the Supreme Court examined the sanction order and found it satisfying the basic requirement of application of mind by the sanctioning authority. In Shiv Raj v. Delhi Administrations3, the Supreme Court once again considered the subject and re-affirmed the guidelines given by it in Jaswant Singh case (Supra ). In this case, the sanction order not only stated the facts necessary to constitute the offence but also the name of the complainant, date and the amount involved with the further recital that on consideration thereof, the authority decided to sanction prosecution. The same was held to be satisfying all esset ntial requirements of the sanction. In Som Nath v. Union of India4, the Supreme Court again considered the matter and observed that, For a sanction to be valid it must be established that the sanction was given in respect of the facts constituting the offence with which the accused is proposed to be charged. Though it is desirable that the facts should be referred to in the sanction itself, nonetheless if they do not appear on the face of it the prosecution must establish aliunde by evidence that those facts were placed before the sanctioning authorities. The aforesaid observations were made in the context of the decision in Jaswant Singh's case (supra) which had been relied upon by the Supreme Court. Subsequent decision in Mohd. Iqbal Ahmed v. State of A. P. 5, re-states the said law as under 37 It is incumbent on the prosecution to prove that a valid sanction has been granted by the Sanctioning Authority after it was satisfied that a case for sanction has been made out constituting the offence. This should be done in two ways; either (1) by producing the original sanction which itself contains the facts constituting the offence and the grounds of satisfaction and (2) by adducing evidence aliunde to show that the facts placed before the Sanctioning Authority and the satisfactionarrived at by it. This should be done in two ways; either (1) by producing the original sanction which itself contains the facts constituting the offence and the grounds of satisfaction and (2) by adducing evidence aliunde to show that the facts placed before the Sanctioning Authority and the satisfactionarrived at by it. It is well settled that any case instituted without a proper sanction must fail because this being a manifest difficult (sic-defect) in the prosecution, the entire proceedings are rendered void ab initio In this very case, the Supreme Court observed as under: what the Court has to see is whether or not the Sanctioning Authority at the time of giving sanction was aware of the facts constituting the offence and applied its mind for the same and any subsequent fact which may come into existence after the resolution granting sanction has been passed, is wholly irrelevant. The grant of sanction is not an idle formality or an acrimonious exercise but a solemn and sacrosanct act which affords protection to government servants against frivolous prosecutions and must therefore be strictly complied wit h before any prosecution can be launched against the public servant concerned. Similarly, in Raghubir Singh v. State of Haryana6, it was held that prosecution must fail for an infirmity in the sanction order. Applying the principles stated above, this Court in Madhusudan Prasad v. State of M. P. 7 held that mere illusory satisfaction recorded mechanically is not sufficient to meet the requirement of law. Under the circumstances, it is clear that nexus between the sanction granted by the sanctioning authority and facts constituting the offence must be clear either from the sanction order or from the evidence on record. It is equally clear that if the sanctioning authority had not applied its mind to the facts and circumstances of the case and had accorded the sanction mechanically, the same would not satisfy the law. It is also clear that the sanction must be in relation to the offence for which the Court is supposed to take cognizance. Facts of the case may, therefore, be examined if these legal requirements remain satisfied in the instant case. Sanction order (Ex. P-8) has been issued by the Deputy Commissioner acting for the Commissioner on 13 8. 1981. It is also clear that the sanction must be in relation to the offence for which the Court is supposed to take cognizance. Facts of the case may, therefore, be examined if these legal requirements remain satisfied in the instant case. Sanction order (Ex. P-8) has been issued by the Deputy Commissioner acting for the Commissioner on 13 8. 1981. Even if it was to be assumed that it was issued by the Commissioner, who was the authority competent to remove the appellant from the employment, the order does not satisfy the other two basic requirements of law, viz. , (i) application of mind to the facts and circumstances of the case by the sanctioning authority and. (ii) the sanction to prosecute the appellant for the offence in question. In order to properly appreciate the aforesaid, the relevant portion of the order is reproduced as under: Jh ,e- vkj- dqjskh] uty lalkkj. k vkijh{kd ckyk?kkv dks ?kwl ysus ds vijk!k esa fizosuku vkq djlku ,dv 1947 dh /kkjk 6 ds vurxzr U;k;ky; esa vfflk;ksftr djus gsrq vuqefr nh tkrh gs A 2v2 Jh dqjskh dh isok iqflrdk rhu Hkkxksa esa ,oa O;fdrxr ulrh ewyr% layxu gs A dik;k izkflr dh vfl-lklohdfr kh?kz Hkstsa A (2) Jh dqjskh dh isok iqflrdk rhu Hkkxksa esa ,oa O;fdrxr ulrh ewyr% layxu gs A dik;k izkflr dh vfl-lklohdfr kh?kz Hkstsa A The aforesaid is the total content of the order and would sufficiently indicate that it does not disclose the allegations made against the appellant or the application of mind by the sanctioning authority, nor does it explain the manner in which the authority was satisfied before granting the sanction. The sanction is granted not with reference to any particular offence, but is granted for an offence consisting of taking bribe. Literally and strictly read, this may at the most, be a sanction for offence under section 161, I. P. C. and not under section 5 (1) (d) of the Act. Then, the sanction does not indicate the name of the complainant, the date on which the bribe had been taken and the amount involved. Under the circumstances, the sanction does not satisfy the basic requirement of application of mind by the sanctioning authority to the facts and circumstances of the case and suffers from infirmity in that regard. Then, the sanction does not indicate the name of the complainant, the date on which the bribe had been taken and the amount involved. Under the circumstances, the sanction does not satisfy the basic requirement of application of mind by the sanctioning authority to the facts and circumstances of the case and suffers from infirmity in that regard. It is, however, true that absence of facts constituting the offence and ground of satisfaction from the sanction order would not, by itself, render the prosecution invalid and the prosecution would be entitled to adduce evidence to show the facts placed before the sanctioning authority and the satisfaction arrived at by it. It may, therefore, be examined if it has been done in the instant case. ( 8 ) 6. Sanction order (Ex. P-8) has been proved by Shard a Prasad (P. W. 5), who is a clerk working in the Collector ate at Balaghat. He has only stated that sanction order dated 13. 8. 1981 (Ex. P-8) was brought by him. Apparently this witness was not in a position to state anything happening in the Office of Commissioner of Land Records and Settlement at Gwalior. No one from the Office of the Commissioner of Land Records and Settlement was examined in the Court. There is no document, i. e. , note-sheet etc. , to indicate how the matter was pursued in the Office of the Commissioner. On the contrary, para. 2 of the sanction order leads one to hold that the Commissioner had considered service-book and the persona-file of the appellant while granting the sanction. Service-book and personal-file of the appellant are wholly irrelevant in the matter. What the Commissioner is required to consider is the fact constituting offence and the desirability or otherwise of according sanction for prosecution. It is true that in letter (Exs. P-12, P-13 and P-14) the Collector, Balaghat, had requested the Commissioner to accord sanction in relation to the offence in question, but there is nothing on record to indicate that the Commissioner read these matters or considered facts stated thereupon. As has been brought out earlier, grant of sanction is not a mechanical exercise or an automatic formality. P-12, P-13 and P-14) the Collector, Balaghat, had requested the Commissioner to accord sanction in relation to the offence in question, but there is nothing on record to indicate that the Commissioner read these matters or considered facts stated thereupon. As has been brought out earlier, grant of sanction is not a mechanical exercise or an automatic formality. In fact, the material on record sufficiently leads to the conclusion that the sanctioning authority or the prosecutor was not aware of the aforesaid legal requirement and has acted in a manner as to reduce the seriousness or sanctity of the aforesaid provision. Such a sanction cannot be accepted as satisfying the legal requirements of section 6 of the Act and, hence, it must be held that the prosecution of the appellant was without jurisdiction. ( 9 ) THE appeal succeeds and is allowed. The conviction and sentence of the appellant is quashed. Bail-bonds, if any, furnished by him, shall stand cancelled. C. .