JUDGMENT 1. The plaintiff/non-petitioners filed a suit for perpetual injunction, mense profits as damages for use and occupation as well as for possession. They also moved an application for grant of temporary injunction to restrain the defendants from interfering with the performance of Seva-puja in a temple. This application was rejected by the trial court, namely, Additional District Judge No. 2, Jaipur City. The plaintiffs perferred an appeal before this Court. During the pendency of the appeal the proceedings before the court below continued but later on the record was called. Then on 2nd December, 1980 the sole-defendant in the case Shri Narain died. The appeal before this Court was held to be abated vide this court's order dated 25th November, 1933. Even the application for condonation of delay for setting-aside the abatement was dismissed. It was only on 25th Nov., 1983, that the plaintiff moved the trial court for setting aside the abatement of the suit and also submitted an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. This application was seriously contested by the petitioners, who are the legal-representatives of the deceased Shrinarain. The argument of the petitioners was that the plaintiff knew about the death of Shrinarain and had taken proceedings for substitution of legal representatives before the Assistant Commissioner, Devasthan, on 3rd January, 1981 and the counsel in those proceedings was the same who was the counsel in the Civil Suit, but these circumstances did not find favour with the learned trial court and he allowed the application for substitution of legal representatives, by his order dated 8th Feb., 1986. This order has been challenged by the petitioners in this revision. 2. The ground for delay in moving the application for substitution of legal representatives as given by the plaintiff was that the appeal was pending before this court, which had summoned the file of the original suit and in absence of the file before the lower court, the application could not be submitted within the statutory period of 90 days. The learned lower court considered the pleas advanced on behalf of both the sides and observed that much before the death of the defendant. the file had been sent in the year 1974, to the High Court at Jodhpur, and was not returned until 24th March, 1984. The learned lower court considered the pleas advanced on behalf of both the sides and observed that much before the death of the defendant. the file had been sent in the year 1974, to the High Court at Jodhpur, and was not returned until 24th March, 1984. He relied upon the principles laid down in Bhagwan Swaroop and others v. Moolchand and others, AIR 1983 S.C. 355 and held that the plaintiff was able to make out sufficient cause for not moving the application for substitution of legal representatives within 90-days of the death of the original defendant. According to him the intention of the law is grant substantial justice to the parties and not prevent them from getting the same on account of technical reasons. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that in this case delay is of over three years in moving the application for substitution, which cannot be condoned as the reason given is not sufficient. According to him substitution in the proceedings before the Assistant Commissioner, Devasthan, were taken in time and there is no reason why the plaintiff could not have done the same in the suit. According to him even when the application for substitution was moved before the trial court, then too the file had not been received back and when the plaintiff could move the application for substitution without the file being before the court at that time, he could have done so, much before within the time permissible by law. In support of his contention, he has placed reliance on State of Gujarat V. Sayad Mohd. Baquir El Edross AIR 1981 S.C. 1921 , in which it has been held that where no cause has been shown for condonation of delay for setting aside abatement, then the application for bringing legal representatives on record cannot be allowed. The plea that the case of the plaintiff is very strong on merits is not a ground for condonation of delay. 4. On the other hand the learned counsel for the non-petitioners has drawn my attention to the order passed by this Court in appeal against the refusal to grant temporary injunction, in which observations have been made about the procedure which the plaintiff may take in the suit for purposes of substituting the legal representatives. 4. On the other hand the learned counsel for the non-petitioners has drawn my attention to the order passed by this Court in appeal against the refusal to grant temporary injunction, in which observations have been made about the procedure which the plaintiff may take in the suit for purposes of substituting the legal representatives. The Court was inclined to take a liberal view in the matter of substitution of legal representatives on basis of principles of substantial justice. But as the appeal before this Court at that time was against the interlocutory order, this court did not condone the delay. It was also observed that the order would not create a bar against the plaintiff for moving an application before the tower court where the suit is pending and while deciding that application the lower court would keep in view the undisputed fact that the appeal was pending and the record was also before this Court. In the end, it was also observed -therefore the appellants were justified in not moving application in the trial court for substitution in time." 5. In Bhagwant Swaroop and others V. Moolchand and others (supra), a preliminary decree for partition was passed and during the appeal the respondent died and his legal representatives were not brought on record for more than three years, the High Court rejected the application and held the appeal abated as a whole. On appeal to the Supreme Court, it was observed as under:- Held that the order of High Court disclosed a hypertechnical approach which if carried to end may result in miscarriage of justice. If the trend is to encourage fair play in action in administrative law, it must all the more inhere in judicial approach. Such applications have to be approached with this view whether substantial justice is done between the parties or technical rules of procedure are given procedence over doing substantial justice in Court. Undoubtedly, justice according to law; law to be administered to advance justice. The application of appellant as well as that of legal representatives was allowable. 6. In Mahindra Land and Building Corporation Ltd. V. Bhutnath Banerjee. Undoubtedly, justice according to law; law to be administered to advance justice. The application of appellant as well as that of legal representatives was allowable. 6. In Mahindra Land and Building Corporation Ltd. V. Bhutnath Banerjee. and other AIR 1964 S.C. 1336 , it has been held that where sufficient cause is shown to condone the delay and the subordinate court has exercised discretion in favour of the applicant and the decision did not involve question regarding irregular exercise or non-exercise of jurisdiction then the High Court's interference in revision is a error is law. 7. In the present case, it is an admitted position that the file of the suit was before the High Court and the lower court was merely giving dates while waiting for the return of the record. The plaintiff in this case was under the bonafide impression that without the file, nothing would be done in the suit. His bonafides is also establishes by the fact that he did not fail to take substitution proceedings in the case which was pending before the Assistant Commissioner, Devasthan. If he had not been in a bonafide impression that he could not move the substitution application without the record, there was no reason why he could not move a substitution application in the suit itself. The learned lower court while exercising its discretion has taken principles of substantial justice in view and it cannot be said that it has committed any error of justice in the exercise of his direction. This court in its earlier order dated 25th Nov 1983, had made it amply clear as to what can be a good cause for condoning delay in moving an application for substitution of legal representatives. Order 22 Rule 9 (2) Civil Procedure Code allows a party to move the Court to set-aside the abatement by showing that he was prevented by any sufficient cause from continuing the suit and the Court has the power to set-aside the abatement. In accordance with this provision the learned lower court has exercised its discretion and there being no error of jurisdiction, no interference is called for in this revision. 8. The revision is accordingly dismissed.Revision dismissed. *******