This revision petition arises out of the order dated 24.3.1986 passed by the learned Assistant District Judge, Dibrugarh, in Misc. Appeal No.22 of 1985. 2. The facts of the case may briefly be stated. The petitioner presented the appeal in the Court of the Assistant District Judge after the expiry of the period of limitation for the appeal without accompanying an application for not pre­ferring the appeal within the period prescribed in violation of the provisions under O. 41, R. 3A(1) CPC. The appeal was however, registered by mentioning that the appeal was barred by Afterwards, the appellant filed an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay. The learned Judge rejected the petition for condonation of delay on the ground that the petition ought to have been filed at the time of presentation of the appeal without discu­ssing the merits of the petition. In consequence of it, the learned Judge dismissed the appeal as barred by limitation and vacated the interim order of stay; hence this revision petition. 3. Mr. D. N. Barua, learned counsel for the petitioner, has submitted that the learned Assistant District Judge ought to have allowed the petition, and has referred me to the decisi­ons as reported in Miss. Nirmala v. Bisheshar, AIR 1979 Delhi 26 and State of Bihar vs. Ray Chandi Nath Sahay, AIR 1983 Pat 189 . Mr. S. Birmiwal, the learned counsel for the opposite party, has contended that the learned Assistant District Judge rightly rejected the petition as there was non-compliance with the provision under O. 41, R. 3A(1), CPC, and has cited a deci­sion reported in Padmavathi vs. Kalu, AIR 1980 Ker.173 to support his contention. 4. In Nirmala (Supra), the Delhi High Court has head : "The newly added provision of R. 3A of O. 41 in the Civil P. C. gives an additional right to a litigant to claim condonation at the time of presenting the appeal. The provision of R. 3A of O. 41 of the Code cannot be read in such a way as to repeal the power conferred on a court by the substantive provisions for condona­tion of delay referred to in the aforesaid two provisions." 5. The provision of R. 3A of O. 41 of the Code cannot be read in such a way as to repeal the power conferred on a court by the substantive provisions for condona­tion of delay referred to in the aforesaid two provisions." 5. In Padmavathi (Supra), the Kerala High Court has held : "It is mandatory for a person presenting an appeal after the expiry of the period of limitation specified there for to file an application supported by an affidavit to satisfy the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within such period." 6. In State of Bihar vs. Ray Chaidi Nath Sahay (Supra) a Division Bench of the Patna High Court has held : "R. 3A of the Code does not lay down that if the appeal, filed beyond time, is not accompanied by an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act the Court shall reject it. In fiat view of the matter, I have not the least hesitation in holding that the provisions of R. 3A of the Code are not mandatory." 7. The only question which arises for consideration is what will be effect of the presentation of an appeal in non-compli­ance with the provisions under O. 41. R. 3A (I), CPC. 8. O. 41,R.3A(1), CPC runs as follows: "When an appeal is presented after the expiry of the period of limitation specified there for, it shall be accompanied by an application supported by affidavit getting forth the facts on which the appellant relies co satisfy the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within such period." (Emphasis added) In O. 41, R. 3A(1), CPC, the word 'shall' has been used. Therefore, the next question which arises for consideration is whether O.41, R. 3A(1) CPC is directory or mandatory. 9. The Supreme Court, in Raza Buland Sugar Vs. Muildpal Board, AIR 1965 SC 895 has held : "The question whether a particular provision of a statute which on the face of it appears mandatory-inasmuch as it uses the word "shall" as in the present case-or is merely directory cannot be resolved by laying down any general rule and depends upon the facts of each case and for that purpose the object of the statute in making the provision is the determining factor. The purpose for which the provision has been made and its nature, the intention of the legislature in making the provision, the serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons resulting from whether the provision is read one way or the other, the relation of the particular provision to other provisions dealing with the same subject and other considerations which may arise on the facts of a particular case in­cluding the language of the provision, have all to betaken into account in arriving at the conclusion whether a parti­cular provision is mandatory or directory." 10. Let me now examine the provisions in O.41, R. 3A(i), CPC in the light of the above principles. The Objects and reasons for inserting O.41, R. 3A, CPC as published in the Gazette of India, dated 8.4.1974 are : Where an appeal is filed after the expiry of the period of limitation, it is the practice to admit the appeal sub­ject to the provisions as to limitation being raised at the time of hearing. This practice has been disapproved by the Privy Council which has stressed the expediency of adopting a procedure for securing the final determination of the question as to limitation even at the stage of admission of the appeal. New Rule 3A is being inser­ted to give effect to the said recommendation." 11. The object of making of the provisions of O.41, R. 34, CPC, is to provide a procedure for final determination as to the question of limitation. The intention of the legislature in making the provisions is to fix a point in time for deciding the question as to limitation. It is 10 be decided before the Court proceeds to deal with the appeal under R. 12 or R. 13 of O. 41, CPC. For the purpose of the final determination as to the question of limitation as early as possible even at the stage of admission, an application for condonation of delay is required to be filed along with the appeal. 12. the expiration of the period of limitation for an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of the decree-holder to treat the decree as binding and beyond challenge as between the parties, However, in view of the section 5 of the Limitation Act, if sufficient cause for excusing the delay is shown, the right may be disturbed. 12. the expiration of the period of limitation for an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of the decree-holder to treat the decree as binding and beyond challenge as between the parties, However, in view of the section 5 of the Limitation Act, if sufficient cause for excusing the delay is shown, the right may be disturbed. The result is that section 5 of the limitation Act, create a right in favour of the appellant to claim condonation of delay for not preferring the appeal within the period prescribed. The right may not be an absolute right. Therefore, if the memorandum of appeal is rejected for non-compliance with the provision of O.41, R. 3A (1) CPC, a serious injustice will be caused to the appellant. At the same time, section 5 of the Limitation Act also does not provide at what stage the claim is to be made. A reading of section 5 of the Limita­tion Act together with O.41, R. 3A shows that the claim for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is to be disposed of in the manner provided under O.41, R. 3A, CPC. In such a situation, if the application for condonation of delay is filed before the Court proceeds to deal with the appeal under R. 11 or R. 13, of O. 41, CPC although it was not filed at the time of the presentation of the appeal, the object of O.41, R. 3A CPC and the intention of the Legislature will not be defeated by holding the same as directory as the Court can dispose of the matter of condonation as early as possible as intended and required by it. 13. Let me also examine O. 41, R. 3A(1), CPC in the con­text of the provisions under R. 1 and R 2 of O, 41, CPC. O.41, R.I CPC provides, inter alia, that every appeal shall be preferred in the form of a memorandum signed by the appe­llant or his pleader and presented to the Court or to such officer as it appoints in this behalf; and that the memorandum shall be accompanied by a copy of the decree or of the judg­ment as provided there under. Under O. 41, R. 3, CPC where the memorandum of appeal is not drawn up in the manner prescribed in O. 41, R. 1, CPC, it may be rejected or it may be returned to the appellant for the purpose of being amended within a time to be fixed by the Court or to be amended then and there. Rr. 1,3 and 3A of O. 41, CPC deal with the same sub­ject matter relating to the presentation of a memorandum of appeal. However, consequence for not presenting the appeal accompanied by an application for condonation under O. 41, R. 3A(1), CPC has not been provided. 14. For the forgoing reasons, I am of the view that O. 41, R. 3A (1), CPC is directory. I with great respect find difficult to agree with the decision of the Kerala High Court, and I respectfully agree with the conclusions arrived at by the High Courts of Delhi and Patna. 15. In the result, the petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 24.3.1986 is set aside and the case is remanded to the Assistant District Judge, Dibrugarh to disposed of the appli­cation for condonation of delay in accordance with law. No costs.