VENKATESH, J. ( 1 ) THE first two writ petitions are public interest petitions, in which the petitioners have challenged the legality of an order of the State Government under which contract for bottling Arrack was granted to respondents 3 to 10 on the ground that a largess involving a total turnover of Rs. 50 crores had been granted to them, in flagrant violation of law and on collateral consideration. In the other petitions the petitioners therein have questioned the legality of the same Government order. ( 2 ) THE background and history of the cases are as follow : (1) Pursuant to the decision of the Government that arrack should be supplied to the consumers in sealed bottles or sachets, to avoid the possibiliy of adulteration, on 11th April, 1984, the Excise Commissoner invited applications from persons interested in undertaking the bottling of arrack at 18 places in the State most of which are district head quarters. The applicants were required to furnish their names and addresses and the previous experience and were required to send a Demand Draft of rs. 10,000/- in favour of the Excise commmissioner, The successful applicants were required to deposit a sum of rs. 50,000/- including Rs. 10,000/- already sent along with the application. According to the notification, the successful applicant would be issued bottling licence as per rules on payment of the prescribed licence fee. The last date for receipt of the application was 21st April, 1984. Pursuant to the said notification, as many as 131 persons submitted their applications. By order dated 29th September 1984 the state Government selected respondents 3 to 10 for entrustment of bottling contract. The name, place of bottling and areas to be covered by respondents 3 to 10 are set out in the following statement : ( 21 ) AFTER giving our careful thought and consideration to the points urged for both the parties in the light of the ratio of the judgments of the Supreme Court, we are of the view that as the allegation in the petition is that in conferring the largess or privilege consisting of a business turnover of over 50 crores of Rs. to respondents 3 to 10 which enable them to earn huge profits, the Government had acted in flagrant violatian of law, arbitra rily, capriciously and mala fide, every citizen/resident of this State has sufficient interest to approach the High Court seeking nullification of such decision. ( 22 ) THE Supreme Court has, in clearest terms laid down that if a challenge to arbitrary or mala fide administrative action which seriously affects rule of law is disallowed, disrespect for law would be the consequence, which would strike a severe blow to rule of law and force the people to fight. out the matter in the streets. Therefore, citizens must be allowed to resort to a legal remedy in the courts and should not be forced to go to the streets to resort to unconstitutional methods to express their protest against such governmental decisions. Any such situation created by taking a narrow, pedantic view about locus standi, even in situations in which arbitrary or capricious or mala fide exercise of power is alleged and the extent and gravity of such unlawful action is such as would make a mockery of Rule of law, the consequence would be disastrous in that it might mark the beginning of the end of the faith of the people in the rule of law. These are the weighty reasons which have persuaded us to hold that the petitioners have the locus standi to prosecute the petitions and we hold accordingly. ( 23 ) ON this question, learned counsel for the respondents submitted as follows : as far as the liquor trade is concerned, the power and privilege of the State is absolute. No citizen can claim a fundamental right to do business in liquor. The government has absolute discretion to select any individual for conferment of privilege in respect of any matter connected with liquor trade. It is extra commercium. Even a competitor for the grant of privilege in liquor trade has no right to secure relief form the Court. This being the settled position in law. the petitioners have no right to challenge the validity of the impugned order. In support of the submission, the counsel has relied upon the following decisions of the supreme Court: (1) State of Orissa v Harinarayan (5) Air 1972 SC 1816 . Paragraph 18, on which the learned counsel relied, reads:"18. This being the settled position in law. the petitioners have no right to challenge the validity of the impugned order. In support of the submission, the counsel has relied upon the following decisions of the supreme Court: (1) State of Orissa v Harinarayan (5) Air 1972 SC 1816 . Paragraph 18, on which the learned counsel relied, reads:"18. The High Court erroneously thought that the Government was bound to satisfy the Court that there was collusion between the bidders. The High court was not sitting on appeal against the order made by the Government. The inference of the Government that there was a collusion among the bidders may be right or wrong. But that was not open to judicial review so long as it is not proved that it was a make-believe one. The real opinion formed by the government was that the price fetched was not adequate. That conclusion is taken on the basis of Government's expectations. The conclusion reached by the Government does not affect any one's right. . . . . . . . . . . . " (2) Nashirwarv/s State of Madhya pradesh. (6) AIR 1915 S, C. 360. The relevant portions of the judgment read :-"15. The observations in Crowley's case (1890; 34 Law Ed 620 (supra) which were laid down as a ruling of this court in Bharucha's case 1954 SCR 873 - ( AIR 1954 SC 220 ) are these. "there is no inherent right in a citizen to sell intoxicating liquors by retail; it is not a privilege of a citizen of the State or of a citizen of the United states. As it is a business attended with danger to the community, it may, as already said, be entirely prohibited, or be permitted under such conditions as will limit to the utmost its evil. The manner and extent of regulation rest in the discretion of the governing authority. "bharucha's case negatived the contention of inherent right of citizen to carry on trade in intoxicating liquors,,"22. . . . . . . . . . . . . This trade or business is treated as a class by itself and cannot be treated on the same basis as other trades while considering Article 14. . . . . ""35. Trade in liquor has historically stood on a different footing from other trades. . . . . . . . . . . . . This trade or business is treated as a class by itself and cannot be treated on the same basis as other trades while considering Article 14. . . . . ""35. Trade in liquor has historically stood on a different footing from other trades. Restrictions which are not permissible in other trades are lawful and reasonable so far as the trade in liquor is concerned. That is why even prohibition of the trade in liquor is not only permissible but is also reasonable. The reasons are public -morality, public interest and harmful and dangerous character of the liquor. The State possesses the right of complete control over all aspects of intoxicants, viz. , manufacture, collection, sale and consumption. The State has exclusive right to manufacture and sell liquor and to sell the said right in order to raise revenue. That is the view of this Court in Bharucha's case 1954 SCR 873 . . . . . . . . and Jaiswal's case (1972) 3 scr 784 . . . . . . . . The nature of the trade is such that the State confers the right to vend liquor by farming out either in auction or on private treaty. Rental is the consideration for the privilege granted by the Govenment for manufacturing or vending liquor. Rental is neither a tax nor an excise duty. Rental is the consideration for the agreement for grant of privilege by the Government". (3) Har Shankar V/s The Deputy excise and Taxation Commissioner: air 1975 S. C. 1121. Paragraphs 47 and 55 of the Judgment which reads :-''47. These unanimous decisions of five Constitution Benches uniformly emphasized after a careful consideration of the problem involved that the State has the power to prohibit trades which are injurious to the health and welfare of the public, that elimination and exclusion from business is inherent in the nature of liquor business, that no person has an absolute right to deal in liquor and that all forms of dealings in liquor have, from their inherent nature, been treated as a class by themselves by all civilized communities. The contention that the citizen had either a natural or a fundamental right to carry on trade or business in liquor thus stood rejected". The contention that the citizen had either a natural or a fundamental right to carry on trade or business in liquor thus stood rejected". ''55, Since rights in regard to intoxicants belong to the State, it is open to the Government to part with those rights for a consideration. By article 298 of the Constitution, the executive power of the State extends to the carrying on of any trade or business and to the making of contracts for any purpose. As observed in Harinarayan jaiswal's case, ''if the Government is the exclusive owner of those privileges, reliance on Article 19 (1) (g) or Article 14 becomes irrelevant. Citizens cannot have any fundamental right to trade or carry on business in the properties or rights belonging to the Government, nor can there be any infringement of Article 14, if the Government tries to get the best available price for its valuable rights". Section 27 of the Act recognises the right of the Government to grant a lease of its right to manufacture, supply or sell intoxicants. Section 34 of the Act read with Section 59 (d) empowers the Financial Commissioner to direct that a licence, permit or pass be granted under the Act on payment of such fees and subject to such restrictions and. on such conditions as he may prescribe. In such a scheme, it is not of the essence Whether the amount charged to the licensees is pre-deter- mined as in the appeals of Northern india Caterers and of Green Hotel or whether it is left to be determined by bids offered in auctions held for granting 'those rights to licensees. The power of the Government to charge a price for parting with its rights and not the mode of fixing that price is what constitutes the essence of the matter. Nor indeed does the label affixed to the price determine either the true nature of the charge levied by the Government or its right