ORDER S. Nainar Sundaram, J. 1. The judgment in the Second Appeal was delivered on 4.12.1985 and 1 find that the judgment is reported in Katha Pillai v. Tamil Nadu State Wakf Board, Madras represented by its Secretary . The respondent in the Second Appeal, the Tamil Nadu State Wakf Board, the plaintiff in the suit, asked for possession amongst other reliefs. The appellant, the second-defendant in the suit, raised a plea of limitation. Reliance was placed by the plaintiff on Article 96 of the Limitation Act, 1963, to state that the plaintiff will have a period of twelve years from the date of its establishment when t be plaintiff must be deemed to have been appointed as the Manager of the Wakf. While repelling this reliance as a total misconception, I have observed and opined as follows: It would be a misnomer to equate the constitution or reconstitution of any Wakf Board to an appointment as Manager of an endowment. Under the Wakf Act, 1954, there could be assumption of a direct management by the Wakf Board under Section 43~A thereof. The other powers of the Wakf Board under the Act are supervisory in character and certainly they cannot be equated to direct management so as to bring the matter within the ambit of the set of expressions "appointment of the plaintiff as manager of the endowment" occurring in this Article. Though the management contemplated under this Article need not necessarily be a de Jure one, and it could be a de facto one, the supervisory powers of the Wakf Board under the statute are not synonymous with the powers of a person put in charge of management of the endowment. There must be assumption of a direct management by the Wakf Board by any manner known to law. In expressing the above view, I have also taken note of a pronouncement of Varadarajan, J. as he then was, in Kader Batcha Sahib v. Tamil Nadu State Wakf Board S.A. Nos. 19, 534, 626, 1661 and 1662 of 1973, judgment dated 12.1.1976) concisely reported in (1976) 89 Law Weekly (Summary of Cases) 55, and which I find has also been fully reported in I.L.R. (1976)2 Madras 343. 2. 19, 534, 626, 1661 and 1662 of 1973, judgment dated 12.1.1976) concisely reported in (1976) 89 Law Weekly (Summary of Cases) 55, and which I find has also been fully reported in I.L.R. (1976)2 Madras 343. 2. It is now brought to my notice that there is a pronouncement of a Bench of this Court in Tamil Nadu Wakf Board represented by its Secretary Abdul Aziz v. Kaveri Ammal and 5 others A.S. No. 382 of 1973, judgment dated 22.2.1978, to which have been a party and which does not appear to have been reported in any law journal, which has categorically opined that the Wakf Board constituted under the Wakf Act must be deemed to be a manager appointed within the meaning of the third column to Article 96 of the Limitation Act and the period of twelve years must run from the date of the constitution of the Wakf Board. This pronouncement was not brought to my notice at the time when the judgment in the second appeal was delivered. But the abovesaid Bench pronouncement being categories must govern. Obviously a mistake has crept in inadvertently in the reasonings expressed in the judgment in the second appeal delivered earlier. Hence, I was obliged to post the matter for being spoken to, to rectify this mistake. 3. Ismail, J. as he then was, speaking for the Bench adverted to two pronouncements of Natarajan, J. one in Somathammal and Ors. v. The Tamil Nadu State Wakf Board S.A.No. 400 of 1972, judgment dated 11.7.1975 and the other in Thangiah Velar and Anr. v. Tamil Nadu State Wakf Board and Anr. S.A. No. 456 of 1972, judgment dated 29.7.1975. In S.A. No. 400 of 1972, Natarajan, j. observed as follows: The last contention on which considerable stress is placed by the learned Counsel for the appellants is that in any event the suit had become barred by limitation on the date when the wakf Board instituted the suit and consequently the suit must have been dismissed. In support of this contention it is pointed out that the Wakf Board had lost possession of the property even in the year 1929 when Ex.B-3 was executed and as no suit has been filed within the statutory period to set aside the alienation, the present suit for declaration and possession was not maintainable. This contention unfortunately overlooks many factors. In support of this contention it is pointed out that the Wakf Board had lost possession of the property even in the year 1929 when Ex.B-3 was executed and as no suit has been filed within the statutory period to set aside the alienation, the present suit for declaration and possession was not maintainable. This contention unfortunately overlooks many factors. As already stated, the Wakf Board itself was constituted in the year 1958 and the Wakf Act empowers the Board constituted under the Act to institute proceedings for recovery of the properties of a Wakf which had been lost to the trust by inadvertent action of the Muthavalli, Section 15 of the Act which specifies the functions of the Wakf Board inter alia provides under Sub-clause 2(h) that the Wakf Board was empowered to take measures for the recovery of lost properties of any Wakf. Having been constituted only in the year 1958 the Board had a 12 year period to institute an action of the kind in hand for recovery of property lost to the Wakf and when admittedly the suit had been instituted in the year 1967 itself, the Board was well within time in filing the suit. Even otherwise it is to be noted that Article 96 of the Limitation Act, 1963 has made a significant change in the period of limitation in respect of suits which are to be instituted by the Manager of a Hindu, Muslim or Buddhist religious or charitable endowment to recover possession of movable or immovable property comprised in the endowment which had been transferred by the previous Manager for a valuable consideration. While the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 under Article 134(c) had stated that the starting point of limitation for a suit of the kind referred to above would be the date of death or resignation or removal from office of the huq, Article 96 of the present Limitation Act has further added that the date of appointment of the plaintiff as manager of the endowment would also be starting point of limitation and that the later event, viz., the date of death, resignation or removal of the transferor or the date of appointment of the plaintiff would govern the situation. Though the Wakf Board cannot be deemed to be the manager, of the endowment in question, nevertheless--by reason of the power given to it under Section 15(2)(h) of the Wakf Act, the Board is empowered to step into the shoes of the manager and institute a suit as contemplated under Article 96. It is therefore futile for the appellants to contend that the suit was patently barred by limitation on the date it was filed. Ismail, J. as he then was, also referred to an earlier pronouncement of his in The State Wakf Board, Madras v. Subramanyam where the learned Judge has observed as follows: The argument of the learned Counsel now is that only when the Wakf Board assumes direct management of the Wakf, it can be said to be a manager as contemplated by the third column in Article 96 of the new Act and that so long as there is no assumption of direct management the Wakf Board cannot be said to be a manager. I am unable to accept this argument, from one point of view. Neither Section 42 nor Section 43-A of the Wakfs Act on which reliance has been placed uses the word, "Manager". The word "Manager" in relation to a religious or charitable endowment is not a term of art. The said word denotes the person who is in charge of the administration of the endowment or manages the property or supervises the performance of the charity and the word is one of very wide and general import. As a matter of fact, the judgment of Natarajan, J. has referred to the provisions contained in Section 15(2) of the Wakf Act. Section 15(1) of the Wakfs Act provides that subject to any rules that may be made under the said Act, the general superintendence of all wakfs in a State shall vest in the Board established for the State; and it shall be the duty of the Board so to exercise its powers under the Act as to ensure that the wakfs under its superintendence are properly maintained, controlled and administered and the income thereof is duly applied to the objects and for the purposes for which such wakfs were created or intended. Sub-section (2) of Section 15, without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by Sub-section (1), by way of illustration, enumerates certain specified powers also. Sub-section (2) of Section 15, without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by Sub-section (1), by way of illustration, enumerates certain specified powers also. One such specified power so enumerated is contained in "section 15(2)(h), which enables the Wakf Board to take measures for the recovery of lost properties of any wakf. Section 15(2)(i) also enables the Wakf Board to institute and defend suits and proceedings in a Court of law relating to wakfs. The combined effect of Sections 15(1) and 15(2) of the Wakfs Act will certainly be sufficient to designate the Wakf Board as a manager for the purpose of recovery of possession of wakf property and consequently it can certainly be termed as "Manager" contemplated by the third column to Article 96 of the new Limitation Act and if so construed, the constitution of the Wakf Board under the statute can certainly be construed to be the appointment of the Wakf Board as Manager of the Wakf in question, because even the word "appointment" just like the word "Manager" is not a term of art and therefore has to receive its ordinary, natural and normal meaning. 4. In fact, there is a judgment of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh dealing with the same question in L. Machi Reddy v. Wakf Board of Andhra Pradesh . In that judgment, the Andhra Pradesh High Court pointed out: In so far as the capacity of the Board to institute the present suit as Manager is concerned, Section 15 of the Wakfs Act makes it abundantly plain that subject to any rules that may be made under the said Act, the general superintendence of all Wakfs in a State shall vest in the Board established for the State; and it shall be the duty of the Board so to exercise its powers under the said Act as to ensure that the Wakfs under its superintendence are properly maintained, controlled and administered and the income thereof is duly applied to the objects and for the purposes for which such wakfs were created or intended. Thus, a very wide power is given to the Board not only to supervise the functioning of these wakfs but to see that they are properly maintained, controlled and administered. Thus, a very wide power is given to the Board not only to supervise the functioning of these wakfs but to see that they are properly maintained, controlled and administered. The Board is specially charged with the duty to see that the income of the Wakfs is duly applied to the objects and for the purposes for which the wakfs were created or intended. Apart from this general power which Section 15(1) confers on the Board, Clauses (h) and (i) of Sub-section (2) of that section specifically, empower the Board to take measures for the recovery of lost properties of any wakf and to institute and defend suits and proceedings in a Court of law relating to wakfs. What must necessarily follow therefore is that the Wakf Board having supervisory powers and having special duties to perform is not only entitled to file the suit for recovery of the property lost to the Wakf but also can manage and administer the property or see that the properties are properly managed and administered and its income applied to the objects and for the purposes for which the wakfs were created or intended. Keeping in view these statutory functions and the powers of supervision of the Wakf Board over the Wakfs, I do not experience any difficulty in holding that the Wakf Board is a manager within the meaning of Article 96 of the Limitation Act. For the reasons already indicated by me, I am in entire agreement with the above reasoning and conclusion of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh. The result of this will be that the Wakf Board is a manager as contemplated by Article 96 of the new Act and the constitution of the Wakf Board under the Wakfs Act will constitute the appointment of the Wakf Board as manager of the Wakfs in question. If so, the Wakf Board having come into existence in 1958 and the suits having been instituted in 1967, the suits are well within time according to Article 96 of the new Limitation Act and there-fore the suits cannot be said to have been barred by limitation. The view of Varadarajan, J. as he then was, in Kader Batcha Sahib and Ors. v. Tamil Nadu Wakf Board I.L.R. (1976) 2 Mad. The view of Varadarajan, J. as he then was, in Kader Batcha Sahib and Ors. v. Tamil Nadu Wakf Board I.L.R. (1976) 2 Mad. 343 was adverted to and the Bench expressed its inability to accept the said view and the reasons therefor have been expressed by the Bench in the following terms: From the above extract, it would appear that Varadarajan, J. took the view that Article 96 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 does not apply to such a case for the reasons that the Wakf Act makes a distinction between the Wakf Board assuming direct management of wakfs and the Wakf Board exercising general superintendence over the wakfs in the State and Article 96 would apply only to a case where the Wakf Board has assumed direct management of the Wakfs. We are unable to share the view taken by Varadarajan, J. It is true that Section 15(1) of the Wakf Act provides for the Wakf Board exercising general superintendence over alt the wakfs in the State and Section 43-A provides for the Wakf Board making temporary arrangements for the management of a particular wakf. However, the very section, viz., Section 15 by Sub-section (1) thereof provides for the Wakf Board having a general power of superintendence over all the wakfs in the State, and by Sub-section (2) thereof, expressly enables the Wakf Board to take measures for recovery of lost properties of a wakf and to institute and defend suits and proceedings in a court of law relating to wakfs. The combined effect of Section 15(1) and 15(2)(h) and (i) will clearly be that the Wakf Board can file a suit for recovery of the lost properties of a wakf and therefore, there is no such clear-cut demarcation with regard to suits for possession of wakf properties as observed by Varadarajan, J. as between Section 15 on the one hand and Section 43-A on the other. There is yet another distinction that has to be borne in mind. As we pointed out already, and as Varadarajan, J. himself has recognised the power of assumption of direct management under Section 43-A can be only for a period of five years at the most, while there is no such period of restriction in relation to the power of the Wakf Board under Section 15 of the Act. As we pointed out already, and as Varadarajan, J. himself has recognised the power of assumption of direct management under Section 43-A can be only for a period of five years at the most, while there is no such period of restriction in relation to the power of the Wakf Board under Section 15 of the Act. Under such circumstances, we are unable to appreciate the distinction sought to be made by the learned Judge with regard to a suit of this nature, basing himself on the two sets of provisions, viz., those contained in Section 15 and those contained in Section 43-A of the Wakf Act, 1954. In fact, the third column in Article 96 would also provide an answer to the distinction sought to be made by Varadarajan, J. between Section 15 and Section 43-A of the Wakf Act. As the learned Judge him seif has pointed out, the period of direct management under Section 43-A(1) can be only a period of five years as the maximum and if this is so, it cannot be contended that Article 96 of the Limitation Act was intended to apply only to such a case, because in such a case, a period of twelve years from the date of the Wakf Board assuming direct management will never be available since in every case of assumption of direct management the maximum period allowed by law is only five years. Having regard to these features, we are unable to agree with the view taken by Varadaraja J. in the decision referred to above, and we hold that the view taken by Nata rajan J. in S.A. Nos. 400 and 456 of 1972 and by one of us in State Wakf Board v. Subramanyam represented the correct position of law in his behalf. 5. In view of the pronouncement of the Bench, the reasonings expressed by me in the Second Appeal earlier as per extract made above and my conclusion that Article 96 of the Limitation Act, 1963, could not be relied on, cannot hold good and will have to be deleted and accordingly they stand deleted. 6. 5. In view of the pronouncement of the Bench, the reasonings expressed by me in the Second Appeal earlier as per extract made above and my conclusion that Article 96 of the Limitation Act, 1963, could not be relied on, cannot hold good and will have to be deleted and accordingly they stand deleted. 6. Then the question is, even if we take the date of the establishment of the Wakf Board as equated to the date of the appointment of the Manager of the Wakf in question, under Article 96, can it be stated that the suit laid on 2.1.1973 for recovery of possession was with in time. It is found, and there is not dispute before me, that the Wakf Board was established under the Wakf Act in the year 1958. The twelve year period, in any event, would have lapsed by the end of 1970. Hence, even applying the ratio of the Bench of this Court, the suit as laid on 2.1.1973 was clearly out of time. Apart from rectifying the mistake in the reasonings expressed by me in the earlier judgment there is no warrant for disturbing the result of the judgment. 7. Mr. F.A. Rasheed, learned Counsel for the respondent in the Second Appeal the plaintiff in the suit, wanted to recanvass the question of possession, obviously to avail of the extension of limitation under Section 3 of the Public Wakf (Extension of Limitation) Act 29 of 1959, to state that the possession of the second-defendant-appellant herein should have become adverse, on and after the sale as per Ex.B-1 dated 6.10.1949. This is not permissible, because it has been found as a finding of fact, that the property was not delivered to the Wakf as such, and possession of the predecessors in title of the second--defendant could never be characterized as for and on behalf of the Wakf, and such possession had been throughout adverse to the Wakf.