JUDGMENT 1. - This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 29th April, 1971, passed by the learned Addl District Judge, Gangapur in Civil Regular Appeal No. 16 of 1971, confirming the judgment and decree dated 10th December, 1970 passed by the learnei Addl. Civil Judge No. 2, Bharatpur, in Civil Original Suit No. 45 of 1967 (20 of 1910). 2. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that the plaintiff firm M/s Ridhichand Jagannath. Gangapur City filed a civil suit against the defendant firm M/s Rati Lai Ram Lal in the Court of Senior Civil Judge, Gangapur on 4th September 1967, with the allegations that the parties are commission agent and deal in sale and purchase of ground-nuts etc. at Gangapur and Calcutta respectively. It was pleaded by the plaintiff firm that it was agreed b.tween the parties at Gangapur that they will dispatch the goods for sale on commission to The firm Shah Rati Lai Ram Lal, Calcutta and, the defendant firm shall sell the goods according to the instructions of the plaintiff firm. It is further alleged that in pursuance of this agreement two consignments of ground-nuts of 343 bags weighing 120 quintals 5 kilos and, 341 bags weighing 19 quintals 35 kilos were sent to the defendant on 9th November, 1965 and 16th November, 1965 respectively. These two consignments were sent with the instructions to the defendant to sell the goods on profit and to give accounts of the sale-proceeds to the plaintiff at Gangapur. The defendant firm made a payment of Rs. 23,000/- to the plaintiff firon as advance through hundis and the plaintiff firm paid Rs. 2,000/- to the defendant through hundi on demand. It was alleged that without instructions the goods ware sold by the defendant and after selling the goods remitted the sale proceeds amounting to Rs. 23,894.50, including expenses. It was further contended by the plaintiff firm that the market price at the relevant time was Rs. 50/- per mound and that two consignments had been sold at this rate it would have fetched Rs. 30,172.76 and, after crediting a sum of Rs. 21,100/- received from the defendant and expenses incurred by him the plaintiff claimed a sum of Rs. 6,380.91 due from the defendant, which included a sum of Rs. 102 65 on account of previous outstanding dues. Thus, a suit for recovery of Rs. 30,172.76 and, after crediting a sum of Rs. 21,100/- received from the defendant and expenses incurred by him the plaintiff claimed a sum of Rs. 6,380.91 due from the defendant, which included a sum of Rs. 102 65 on account of previous outstanding dues. Thus, a suit for recovery of Rs. 6,380.91 was filed against the defendant. 3. The defendant in the written statement admitted that the aforesaid two consignments were sent by the plaintiff to the defendant at Calcutta and that it was sold by them at the market rate in a proper manner and that the defendant filed a suit against the plaintiff in the Small Causes Court at Calcutta for recovery of a sum of Rs. 1.047.12, for this very transaction acid the same was decreed Thus. the question of paying the amount to the plaintiff does not arise at all. The defendant contended that the Court at Gangapur had no jurisdiction to hear the suit it was also contended by the defendant that the decree passed by the Court of Small Causes at Calcutta against the plaintiff operates as res judicata. With regard to the jurisdiction the plaintiff specifically pleaded that the contract was entered into at Gangapur and that the payment was to be made by the defendant to the plaintiff at Gangapur It was also pleaded that the cause of action also accrued within the jurisd ction of the Court at Gangapur. 4. The learned trial Court decreed the suit for a sum of Rs. 6,278.26 in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant. An appeal was preferred against the judgment and decree passed by the learned Addl. Civil Jude No. 2, Bharatpur dated 10th December. 1970. The first appellate Court vide its judgment and decree dated 29th April, 1971, maintained the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 29th April, 1971, passed by the learned Addl. District Judge, Gangapur, this appeal has been preferred by the defendant-appellant. 5. The learned counsel for the defendant-appellant has raised the following questions in the appeal : "1 That the trial Court had no jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. "2. That it was not proved by the plaintiff that the rate prevailing at the time when the goods were sold by the defendant at Calcutta was Rs. 5. The learned counsel for the defendant-appellant has raised the following questions in the appeal : "1 That the trial Court had no jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. "2. That it was not proved by the plaintiff that the rate prevailing at the time when the goods were sold by the defendant at Calcutta was Rs. 50/- per mound and, thus, the loss was wrongly calculated by the Courts below. "3. That the judgment and decree passed by the Court of Small Causes at Calcutta in favour of the defendant-appellant against the plaintiff-respondent operates as res judicata. 6. As regards the plea of lack of jurisdication, Shri Loonia, learned counsel for the defendant-appellant. submitted that finding given by the first appellate Court is that the plaintiff has completely failed to prove that the contract was entered into at Gangapur and that there was no stipulati n regarding the payment to be made by the defendant to the plaintiff at Gangapur and that no cause of action accrued to the plaintiff for tiling the suit at Gangapur. His submission is that the case was considered by the learned first appellate Court on the principle of common law in England, the general rule is that debtor should seek creditor and, it was on the basis of this principle that the first appellate Court held that the payment was to be made at Gangapur and, as such the Court at Gangapur had jurisdiction to try the suit. Shri Loonia submitted that in the' suit for transaction which was entered into between the plaintiff and the defendant, this common law principle of debtor should seek creditor is not applicable. He alto submitted that in view of the fact that there are statutory provisions made in the Code of Civil Procedure for giving jurisdiction to the Court. the common law principle cannot be engrafted in the statutory enactment. Shri Loonia further submitted that in view of the fact that the defendant's suit was decreed against the plaintiff at Calcutta, as such, it should h, '.e been considered that it was the defendant who was the creditor vis-a-vis the plaintiff. In these circumstances also the common law principle was wrongly apnli d by the learned lower Court. Shri Loonia further submitted that in view of the fact that the defendant's suit was decreed against the plaintiff at Calcutta, as such, it should h, '.e been considered that it was the defendant who was the creditor vis-a-vis the plaintiff. In these circumstances also the common law principle was wrongly apnli d by the learned lower Court. It was also submitted by ,hri l oonia that in a suit for rendition of accounts, or in a suit where the relations between the parties -.rc that of commission agent, this principle cannot be made applicable even for a specific amount. 7. In order to substantiate his contention, Shri Loonia relied on Prem Nath v. M/s Kaudoomal Rikhiram : AIR 1958 Punj. 361 , in which the following observations were made by Justice Tek Chand of the Punjab High Court "The common-law rule of England that the respondent as debtor must seek his creditor does not apply for the purposes of determining the forum where the suit is to be instituted." 8. There is also another relevant observation made by the Said Court: "A commission agent, from the very nature of his work, transacts business on behalf of his principals scattered all over the country. A suit for the recovery of a specific amount, or for accounts by a principal, against his agent, should be filed at the place where the latter was. Cause of action against a commission agent therefore, arises where he does his business." 9. In (2) firm Hira Lai v. Baij Nath, AIR 1950 Punj. 450 (F.B.) , which is a Full Bench Judgment of the Punjab High Court and on which wrong reliance is placed by Shri Loonia, the following principles were laid down "The English Common Law rule that where there is no express agreement that payment is to be made at a particular place, a debtor must seek his creditor is not applicable in India, as a matter of law, to determine the forum where the suit is to be instituted. The creditor's place of residence or business is only one of the circumstances attending the contract which may be taken into consideration in finding as a fact the place where the money was agreed to be paid." The Full Court also made a very pertinent observation, which is as follows "(15) The first contention, in my opinion is based on misconception, of the scope of the rule variously described in English as "Ordinary Rule" "general rule" or "a common law rule '. This description to my mind excludes it from being considered as an abstract and rigid rule of law. If the learned counsel's contention be correct, then by fiction of law this rule must be deemed to have been incorporated in the agreement arrived at between the parties although the parties had never applied their mind and had never fixed a place of payment even impliedly of the money due. Such an introduction of a term in the agreement of parties by fiction of law, in my opinion, can be done only by statute and not by application of a rule which has been described as an ordinary or general rule. There is no such statutory provision in the Indian Contract Act or in the Evidence Act. Moreover, this contention, if correct, has the consequence of allowing a suit by a creditor in all cases to be filed at the plaintiff's place of residence or business and this is contrary to the provisions of section 20 of the Civil Procedure Code and to the policy underlying it. Moreover this conclusion will negative the possibility of proof of an implied agreement fixing a place for payment elsewhere as the incorporation of this rule in the agreement between the parties amount to an express agreement which would necessarily exclude the existence of' an implied agreement." 10. In Hira Lal's case (supra), there is also another observation, which also requires consideration -if the Court, however. is unable to come to a definite conclusion as to whether the parties in the circumstances intended to have agreed to fix a place for payment at the time that the contract was entered into then it must be held that the plaintiff has failed to prove any express or implied agreement fixing a place for payment. is unable to come to a definite conclusion as to whether the parties in the circumstances intended to have agreed to fix a place for payment at the time that the contract was entered into then it must be held that the plaintiff has failed to prove any express or implied agreement fixing a place for payment. In that case the plaintiff would have failed to move that part of the cause of action so far as it depended on the place fixed for payment has not been proved to have arisen where the suit has been filed. In that case the plaint must be returned to the plaintiff for presentation to proper Court." 11. Shri Loonia, learned counsel for the defendant-appellant, submitted that in a number of cases this court has taken the view that in the absence of specific term in the contract, the general law will apply in deciding the place where the profits and losses were to be paid and, according to the general law the debtor must seek his creditor. The first case of this Court is (3) Kishan Lal v. Bhanwar Lal, AIR 1952 Raj, 81 , which is a Division Bench judgment. In that case, the following observations were made "The payment of profits to defendant or losses to plaintiffs must be deemed to be part of the contract of agency. As no specific terms have been alleged to have been settled between the parties, the general law will apply in deciding the place where these profits or posses were to be paid." 12. The next case of this Court is (4) Balloram & Anr. v. Firm Seth Uttamchand Bishandas : ILR (1960) 10 Raj. 1123 in which Hon'ble Chhangani J., after reviewing the various cases, laid down the following principles : "1. The technical rule that the creditor's residence at the commencement of the suit should determine the forum in the absence of a contract to the contrary should not be applied in India. India is a vast country and it is hardly fair to impose a burden upon the debtor to seek the creditor wherever he happens to go in this vast country. The Privy Council case is consistent with this proposition. The contrary authorities in cases (11) and (12) do not in my judmgment state the correct laws. "2. India is a vast country and it is hardly fair to impose a burden upon the debtor to seek the creditor wherever he happens to go in this vast country. The Privy Council case is consistent with this proposition. The contrary authorities in cases (11) and (12) do not in my judmgment state the correct laws. "2. If the place of performance of contract or for that matter, the place of payment of debt can be shown to be fixed expressly or impliedly and irrespective of or despite the inteifcrcnees arising from the obligation of the detor to seek the creditor involved in the obligation to pay him. the applicability of the rules dots not arise. "3. Even though the place has not been fixed at the time of agreement expressly or impliedly, but if it has been sub equently fixed under S. 49 of the Contract Act on an application of the promisor and with the consent of the promisee, the rule should not be applied. "4. If it is not possible to establish an agreement respecting the place of performance or payment, express or implied, the court should apply the rule and should presumed that the place of the creditor's residence at the time of the agreement was implied to be the place of performance or payment" (AIR 1927 PC 155 Soniram Jeetmul v. Tata & Co.) (11) AIR 1936 Cal. 37 : Tulsiram Bibi v. Abdul Lafif (12) AIR 1956 Bom. 111 : Mammal v. Sakhawatmal ) 13. After examining the facts in case of Balooram & Anr. v. Firm Seth Uttamchand Bishandas : AIR 1960 Raj. 247 (4), this Court observed that if there was no agreement between the parties, express or implied, determining the place of payment, the rule will apply. If such an agreement is not proved, then also the rule should be applied. In (5) Haridas v. Shankarlal : ILR (1960) 10 Raj. 187 , Hon'ble Jagat Narain as he then was, made the following observations : "It may be mentioned here that there is no express contract to the contrary in the present case. As I have pointed out above the implied intention of the plaintiffs was that the payment should be made at Jaisalmer and if an application had been made in accordance with section 49 by the debtor. As I have pointed out above the implied intention of the plaintiffs was that the payment should be made at Jaisalmer and if an application had been made in accordance with section 49 by the debtor. Jaisalmer would have been named as the place for the repayment of the debt. 14. In that case, the attention of the Court was drawn to the Privy Council's case in Soniram's case ( AIR 1927 PC 156 ) and, it was contended that their Lordships of the Privy Council did not lay down as a rule of law that the principle that a debtor is bound to seek out his creditor and pay his debt is applicable in this country even for the purpose of determining the local jurisdiction of a particular court. It appears that this case was merely decided on the basis of the provisions of Se 49 of the Contract Act, on the presumption that had an application been made in accordance with Section 49 by the debtor, then the creditor would have named the place of his residence as the place for payment of the debt. 15. There is yet another authority of this Court laid down by Hon'ble Jagat Narain J., as he then was, in (6) Firm Bilasrai Mannalal v. Firm Purushottam Das Sanwaldas : AIR 1960 Raj. 247 , in which this Court held that in the absence of any agreement as to where the amount was payable the principle that the debtor must seek the creditor becomes applicable. 16. The submission of Shri Loonia, learned counsel for the defendant-appellant, is that on the following grounds the proposition laid down by this Court is not a sound proposition which requires reconsideration: "1. That when the statutory provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure are there with regard to the place of suing in terms of Section 15 to 20, there is no scope for considering the common law principle for determining the place of suing He submits that this would be contrary to the provisions of Section 2 , Civil Procedure Code and the policy underlying it, "2. That in Soniram's case (supra), their Lordship's of the Privy Council did not lay down as a rule of law that the principle that the debtor is bound to seek out his creditor and pay his debt is applicable in this country even for the purpose of determining the local jurisdiction of a particular court and this fact has been noticed by this Court in Hari Das's case (supra). "3. That even in Balooram's case (supra) this Court while laying down the principles. clearly observed that the technical rule that the creditor's residence at the commencement of the suit should determine the forum and in the absence of a contract it should not be applied in India. "4. That it would create hardship in a suit where the relation between the parties are that of a commission agent, as a Commission Agent may be having dealings all over India and, if this rule is made applicable. it will create great hardship in case suits are filed against such commission agent. 17. In order to substantiate his contentions, Shri Loonia submitted that in none of the cases decided by this Court, the full bench decision of the Punjab High Court was considered. He adopted the same arguments which were dealt with by 'he Full Bench of the Punjab High Court and, the Full Bench made the observations which have been referred to above. He also placed reliance on (7) Sanghvi Jeevral Chewar Chand & ors. v. Madras Chillies, Grains and Kirana Merchants Workers' Union & Ors. 1969-I LLJ 719 . It was a case under the Payment of Bonus Act. Prier to the enactment of the Payment of Bonus Act, employees were getting bonus under the adjudication provided by the Industrial Disputes Act and other similar Acts. But the Payment of Bonus Act was made applicable to all factories and establishments in which 20 or more persons are employed. It was, thus, contended before the Supreme Court that the establishments or the factories where less than 20 persons are employed will continue to get bonus under the full bench formula made under the adjudication, and other factories and establishments will be governed by the Payment of Bonus Act. It was, thus, contended before the Supreme Court that the establishments or the factories where less than 20 persons are employed will continue to get bonus under the full bench formula made under the adjudication, and other factories and establishments will be governed by the Payment of Bonus Act. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court, in that case, held that bonus could not be claimed do hors the Act and, it was further held that it was not possible to accept the construction suggested on behalf of the respondents that the Act is not an exhaustive Act dealing with the subject-matter comprehensively, in all its aspect or that Parliament still left it open to make the Act which is not applicable by reason of its provisions either as to exclusion or exception to raise a dispute with regard to bonus through industrial adjudication under the Industrial Disputes Act, or other corresponding law. 18. Mrs. Kamla Jain. appearing on behalf of the plaintiff-respondent, submitted that the proposition laid down by our High Court in the above referred judgment has taken into consideration all aspects of the matter and did not agree with the view of the Punjab High Court, specially the case of t8) Niranjan Singh v. Jagjit Singh: AIR 1955 Punj. 128 , was considered, but was not followed. She submitted that the judgment of the Full Bench is more or less based on the proposition of law laid down by the Punjab High Court in Niranjan's case (supra). 19. 1 have carefully gone through all the authorities and given my anxious consideration to the respective submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties. In my opinion. there appears to be some force in the submissions Tirade by Shri Loonia, learned counsel for the defendant-appellant. But I would not like to refer this case to a Larger Bench for decision. as I am of the opinion that this appeal can be disposed of on other grounds. But I would like to observe that the decisions of this Court require reconsideration by a Large Bench of this Court as and when the occasion may arise. 20. Mrs. Kamla Jain, learned counsel for respondents, submitted that in view of the principles laid down in Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the appellant is precluded from raising any objection as to the place of suing. 20. Mrs. Kamla Jain, learned counsel for respondents, submitted that in view of the principles laid down in Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the appellant is precluded from raising any objection as to the place of suing. It would not be allowed to be raised by any appellate or revisional court unless such objection was taken in the Court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity and unless there has been a consequent of justice. She submitted that it is true that an objection as to the place of suing was taken by the defendant in the written statement in the Court of first instance. But, in the memo of appeal filed in the first appellate Court it was not pointed out as to in what manner there had been a failure of justice on account of trial of the case by the court of first instance. She also pointed out that the defendant examined Ram Narain as a witness and produced no other witnesses on 28th August, 1970 and closed his evidence. No application was moved for examining more witnesses. The learned counsel for the defendant placed reliance on (9) Permanand v. Anandi Bai: AIR 1974 Raj. 65 , where the objection as to the lack of territorial jurisdiction was not maintained at the stage of second appeal, in the absence of miscarriage of justice. 21. It is true that Section 21, C.P.C. lays down two conditions. The first condition is that an objection about the place of suing should be raised in the Court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity, and the second condition is that there should arise a consequent failure of justice. In this case, the first condition is fulfilled; but the second condition is not satisfied. The learned counsel for the defendant has failed to convince that in what manner there has been a consequent failure of justice even if the case was tried by the Court at Gangapur. Shri Loonia's main submission in this regard is that had the suit ben filed by plaintiff at Calcutta, he would have been in a better position to defend his case. He would have examined the witnesses with regard to the rate of the commodity prevailing on the date when the defendant had sold the goods and, the relevant document could have been proved by the defendant or his witnesses. He would have examined the witnesses with regard to the rate of the commodity prevailing on the date when the defendant had sold the goods and, the relevant document could have been proved by the defendant or his witnesses. In my opinion, there is nothing on the record to substantiate his contention. The defendant without any murmuring or complaint of any nature examined his witness and did not apply, at any time, for the production of further evidence, or other documents. in this view of the matter, I am of the opinion that since there has been no consequential failure of justice on account of the trial of the case at Gangapur City, the appellant cannot be allowed to raise an objection as to the jursidiction of the Court. 22. The next submission made by Shri Loonia, learned counsel for the defendant-appellant, is that a decree was passed by the Court of Small Causes at Calcutta in favour of the defendant-appellant against the plaintiff f-respondent prior to the decision of the suit against which this second appeal arises and subject matter of dispute between the parties in the previous suit was the breach of same contract between the parties, wherein the defendant-appellant in the suit claimed a sum of Rs. 1,047 12 as loss suffered by him in the transaction. The suit was decreed by the Small Causes Court, Calcutta on 20th January, 1957. This decree became final as no appeal/revision was preferred and the decretal amount was also realised by the appellant from the respondents, which is an admitted fact. He. thus, submitted that the judgment between the parties operated as res judicata and the plaintiff was precluded from filing the suit on the basis of the saint contract between the parties. He further submitted that had the plaintiff of this suit resisted the cast, he could have raised all the pleas therein and, having failed to do so, the principles laid down in Explanation No. 4 and 8 of Sec. I I of the Code of Civil Procedure would be attracted. 23. To controvert the argument regarding res judicata advanced by the teamed counsel for the appellant, Mrs. Jain the learned counsel for the respondents, submitted that the principle of res judicata laid down under Section 11. Civil Procedure Code are not attracted. 23. To controvert the argument regarding res judicata advanced by the teamed counsel for the appellant, Mrs. Jain the learned counsel for the respondents, submitted that the principle of res judicata laid down under Section 11. Civil Procedure Code are not attracted. She contended that in order to attract the principal of re, judicata, the two courts should be competent to try the suits. She submitted that the former suit was decided by the Court of Small Causes of limited jurisdiction and the present suit was decided by the Civil Judge, Gangapur who had different pecuniary jurisdiction. which is not equal to that of Small Causes Court at Calcutta. She placed reliace on (10) Premchand v. Danmal : 1953 RLW 429 wherein this court observed that the principle of res judicata should not be applicable if the two courts are having different pecuniary jurisdiction. In that case the defendant filed at a suit against the plaintiff in Munsiff s Court at Kurnool. the plaintiff filed the suit of higher valuation in civil Judge's Court at Sirohi and thus. it was held that the plaintiff's suit was not barred, as the second suit was outside the scope of Munsiff's Cour.. Thus, the learned counsel submitted that similar position arises in this case. Shri Loonia. controverting the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the respondent. submitted that in view of the Explanation 8, newly added by the Code of Civil Procedure Amendment Act No. 10 of 1976, the position has been made clear. Even if an issue heard and decided by a Court of limited jurisdiction, competent to decide such issue the decision shall operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit, notwithstanding that such Court of limited jurisdiction was not competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which issue has been subsequently raised. The learned counsel also submitted that in view of Explanation IV in any matter which might, or ought to have been made a ground of defence or attack in such former suit shall be deemed to have been matter directly or substantially in issue in such suit. 24. It is true that the suit was decided prior to the insertion of Explanation VIII to Section 11, CPC. 24. It is true that the suit was decided prior to the insertion of Explanation VIII to Section 11, CPC. The question arises for consideration is whether this explanation has retrospective effect, Shri Loonia submitted that the purpose of an explanation is to explain the meaning and effect of the main provision to which it is appended and to clear up any doubt or ambiguity in it. Shri Loonia further submitted that on the basis of language of section, including Explanation, it can be held that the New Explanation has widened the scope of the main section and effect must be given to the Legislative intent, notwithstanding the fact that the Legislature named that provision as an Explanation. The explanation is in no way inconsistent with the main section. His further submission is that Explanation more or less explains what is already there. Thus, whenever an explanation is added to a section. it is always with retrospective effect. To substantiate his argument, he has referred to Hari Singh v. Smt Sringar Kanwar where a Division Bench was considering a situation which was identical to the situation which has arisen in the present appeal. In that case, the suit out of which second appeal arose was tried and decided by the learned Munsiff, Jaipur. The valuation of the suit did not exceed Rs. 2.000/., whereas the valuation of the suit, out of which the appeal was under consideration before the Division Bench. was Rs. 1,37.782/-. The learned Division Bench after considering the object and purpose of introducing Explanation VIII to Sec. H. Civil Procedure Code was pleased to obeserve as follows: "In our opinion the expression "a court of limited jurisdiction" is wide enough to include a Court whose jurisdiction is subject to a limited pecuniary jurisdiction and it will not be right to interpret the said expression as connoting only as Court other than Civil Courts". 25. The learned Division Bench also considered the scope of Explanation and observed that the Explanation must be read so as to harmonise with and clear up the ambiguity in the main section. It should not be so construed as to widen the scope of the main section It was also observed that the correct mode of interpretation is to read the section in combination and harmonise with the Explanation. It should not be so construed as to widen the scope of the main section It was also observed that the correct mode of interpretation is to read the section in combination and harmonise with the Explanation. The relevant observations made by the learned Division Bench of this Court, which are of importance in deciding the present appeal are as follows:- "On the basis of the language of the section including Explanations Vll and VIII it can be held that if on a true reading of an Explanation it appears that it had widened the scope of the main section effect must be given to the legislative intent notwithstanding the fact that the legislature named that provision as an explanation." It is true that Explanations are keys to the sections to which they are appended, as they explain the heart of the maker with the purpose. An explanation explains or clarifies the purpose of the section. Explanation VIII in Sec. I t, Civil Procedure Code was inserted by Amendment Act. No 104 of 1976, and the object and purpose was to indicate that the principle of res judicata should become fully effective so that the issues heard and finally decided between the parties by any Court competent to decide such issue should not be allowed to be re-agitated by the patties and the litigation comes to an end and to provide that a decision on an issue heard and finally decided by a court of limited jurisdiction, which explanation will include a court of limited pecuniary jurisdiction will operate as res judicata in subsequent suit notwithstanding that such court of limited jurisdiction was not competent to try such subsequent suit. In this view of the matter, even if the pecuniary jurisdication of the two Courts, i.e. Court of Small Causes at Calcutta and Civil Judge at Gangapur were different, it will not make any difference in attracting the principle of res judicata as per the Explanation added to Section 11, Civil Procedure Code and the decision given by the Court of Small Causes at Calcutta would operate as res judicata in subsequent case filed by the plaintiff. I therefore, hold that there is force in the submission made by Shri Loonia, learned counsel for the appellant, in raising point No. 3 referred to above and, consequently, it is held that the judgment and decree passed by the Small Causes Court at Calcutta in favour of the defendant-appellant and against the plaintiff-respondent operated as res judicata. Consequently, the plaintiff was not entitled to maintain his suit. 26. On merits also, I have examined the evidence and I find that there is no evidence worth the name to prove what were the rates prevailing, of the commodity of 341 bags sold by the defendant at Calcutta. It is true that unless the plaintiff is able to prove as to what were the rates prevailing when the breach had taken place, he is not entitled to any compensation. 27. Thus, it is held that the Court of Ci' it Judge, Gangapur City had jurisdiction to try the case; but in view of the fact that the defendant filed a suit on the same contract in the Small Causes Court at Calcutta and obtained a decree and the plaintiff even after proper service about the suit did not contest the same when he had an opportunity to raise all defences available to him. In such circumstances, Explanation 1V and Explanation VIII are attracted and in view of the observations made above, the decision given by the Court of Small Causes at Calcutta operates as res judicata and the subsequent suit of the plaintiff was barred by the principles laid down in Section 11, CPC. 28. Consequently. the appeal is allowed; the judgment and decree dated 29th April. 1971, passed by the learned Addl. District Judge, Gangapur, in Appeal No. 16/1971 and the judgment and decree passed by the learned Addl. Civil Judge No. 2, Bharatpur in Civil Original Suit No. 45 of 1967, are set aside The suit of the plaintiff is accordingly dismissed. 29. The bank guarantee given by the appellant in view of the stay order dated 16th September, 1971, is discharged. There shall be no order as to costs.Appeal allowed. *******