Judgment :- This is a revision petition filed by a tenant in a proceeding under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, hereinafter referred to as the Act. The matter arises in execution. 2. The landlord filed an application R.C.O.P.20 of 1976 for eviction of the tenant on the ground of arrears of rent. This petition was ended in compromise. The court passed an order accepting the compromise. It is dated 11-11-1977. The terms of the compromise are important for deciding the question involved in this revision. So I quote the relevant terms of the compromise order. Even though this compromise order was passed on 11-11-1977, the tenant did not deposit the arrears of rent or paid any future rent. The landlord filed E.P.No.8 of 1982 for delivery of the shop room and also for recovery of arrears of rent. 3. The tenant resisted the execution stating that the compromise order is not executable. This contention was negatived by the execution court. The execution court ordered delivery of the building. The tenant filed a revision under S.14 of the Act. The Addl District Judge confirmed the order of the execution court. Hence the tenant files this revision petition. Pending this revision petition, the tenant died and his legal representatives were impleaded. 4. The root question that has to be considered in this case is whether the contention raised by the tenant that the order is not executable is correct or not. True, there is no explicit provision enabling the landlord to file an execution petition for recovery of the building in default of the terms contained in the compromise order. This position is spot lighted by the learned counsel for the tenant and he submits, relying on two decisions, viz. A.I.R.1966J&K. 13 and A.I.R.1982 Bombay 532, that the compromise order is not executable. 5. The learned counsel for the respondents wanted to offset the argument of the counsel for the petitioner by highlighting the general principle that the courts should not insist for their power to execute the decree that a decree or an order should contain explicitly a clause that in default of the terms of the order or decree, there should be a clear direction to enforce the terms of the decree by a particular mode of execution of the decree or order. The learned counsel cited the following decisions o support of his argument. The learned counsel cited the following decisions o support of his argument. A.I.R.1977 Cal.388, A.I.R.1978 Cal.495, I.L.R.(1979)2 Madras 218,1972(2. RCR 353, A.I.R.1976 Delhi 181,1978 K.L.T. 495 & A.I.R.1973 S.C. 2065) 6. I feel that I need consider this question in the light of the decision reported in A. I. R. 1973 S.C. 2065 (Prakash Chand v. Hamam Singh). Chandrachud, J. as he then was, observed thus: "A clause in a decree passed in terms of an arbitration award providing that on the happening of certain events the vendor shall be entitled to take back possession of the property does not make the award declaratory so as to make it incapable of execution. The intendment of the award is that on the happening of stipulated events the vendor would be entitled to apply for execution of the award and obtain possession of the property. The mere fact that the award fails to mention filing of an execution application does not make it declaratory. It is never a pre-condition of the excitability of a decree that it must provide expressly that the party entitled to a relief under it must file an execution application for obtaining that relief." 7. It has to be noted that the Supreme Court in unmistakable terms has observed that the intendment of the award or decree has to be looked into for deciding the question whether a decree or award is declaratory or otherwise. I have to examine here also the intendment of the compromise order. I feel no doubt that the intendment of the compromise order is, on the happening of the stipulated event of the tenant defaulting payment of arrears of rent, the landlord should have the entitlement to get the tenant evicted by the process of court. The tenant has unequivocally agreed that he will surrender the building if he commits default in the matter of payment of rent or arrears of rent. This unequivocal undertaking which has become part of the order of the court, makes the order, in my opinion, executable. 8. It is difficult for me to hold that the effect of the compromise is only to declare that the landlord will have a right to institute the normal eviction proceedings under the Act when the tenant defaults payment of arrears of rent and that is all what is provided in the compromise order. 8. It is difficult for me to hold that the effect of the compromise is only to declare that the landlord will have a right to institute the normal eviction proceedings under the Act when the tenant defaults payment of arrears of rent and that is all what is provided in the compromise order. To hold that there was no intendment to execute the order for obtaining surrender of possession of the building by the tenant on default of payment of arrears of rent, in my judgment, will be ignoring the realities and taking an artificial and a snide view of the situation. It will be unnatural and euphuistic, ingenuine and unreal. I cannot think for a moment that the parties merely for the sake of re-iterating their rights envisaged in law of resorting to usual proceedings provided in the Act, would enter into a compromise. The plain and clear intendment of the compromise order is that in case of default of payment of arrears of rent by the tenant, the tenant is liable to be evicted by ihs process of court in execution of the compromise order. The contention that the compromise order provided nothing to be executed and the execution of the compromise order was only an exercise in futility, will be so specious and illogic considering the situation involved in the case, that I should repel such a contention. 9. In decrees for specific performance of contract for the sale of property, where there is no specific direction to put the plaintiff in possession of the property, courts have taken the view that the execution court can in executing such decree deliver possession of the property also. Concord of judicial opinion seems to be in favour of the competency of the executing court to grant delivery of possession of property even where no such relief is explicitly granted by a decree for specific performance in a contract of sale. Of course, this has been done on the principle that directing delivery of the property is an incidental and ancillary relief granted in the decree for specific performance. This principle also impliedly supports the view I take in this case. 10. The learned counsel for the petitioner referred me to A. I. R. 1966 J & K.13 (Thapar v. Sudhir Kumar). This principle also impliedly supports the view I take in this case. 10. The learned counsel for the petitioner referred me to A. I. R. 1966 J & K.13 (Thapar v. Sudhir Kumar). The facts of this case are quite different and I need not say that in relying on precedents, I must always remember that the ratio of the decision depends upon the peculiarities of the facts presented in the case. I feel clause 2 in the compromise decree which was considered in the case reported in A.I.R. 1966 J. & K.13 makes a vital distinction with the crucial facts of the case now I am considering. Clause 2 of the compromise decree in the J. & K. decision provided that "the defendants shall be liable to ejectment and shall vacates the premises on 1st January, 1963 on the terms and conditions as stated above" and the tenant was given an option to renew the lease. It has to be noted that the decree mainly provides for a declaration of the liability of the defendant that the will be ejected under certain conditions. When it is only in the stage of liability, though I am not very certain, I think it is possible to discern a declaratory character predominant in the decree. Further the date mentioned for surrender is 1-1-1963. But even on 1-1-1963, it was open to the lessee to have claimed a renewal of that lease with the consent of the. landlord. These peculiar features distinguish the Jammu & Kashmir Case from the instant case. 11. In K. At. Shah v. S. M. Kankaria (A.I.R.1982 Bombay 532) three points were raised and the decision was rendered on the 3rd point raised by the counsel for the petitioner Shri N. A. Kapasi. The point was that on the plaintiff's own showing the defendant was at least a statutory tenant with effect from 10-8-1970, if not a contractual tenant and so the decree is not executable. Even though the counsel for the defendant raised the question of excitability of the decree, the court decided the case holding that at the times when the decree was sought to be executed, the defendant got himself transformed as a statutory tenant. I do not think that this decision will ba of any assistance to the revision petitioners. 12. Even though the counsel for the defendant raised the question of excitability of the decree, the court decided the case holding that at the times when the decree was sought to be executed, the defendant got himself transformed as a statutory tenant. I do not think that this decision will ba of any assistance to the revision petitioners. 12. I need not refer to all the decisions cited by the counsel for the respondent. In 1978 K.L.T. 495 (Balakrishna Reddiar v. Madhavan Filial), this court has held thus: "If going by the compromise order for eviction the tenant has agreed for vacating the premises, the mere fact that tenant was given some breathing time to vacate and to continue in possession till then on payment of rent, will not in any way help the tenant to cling on to the premises and raise a contention that he can be dispossessed only in fresh proceedings under S.11 of the Act." In fact, I asked the counsel for the petitioners what is the effect of the compromise order, if the compromise order cannot be executed through the process of court. The counsel submitted that it only grants the landlord the right to take appropriate steps on default of payment of arrears of rent for eviction. I feel certain that it will be wrong on my part to hold that that is the intendment of the compromise order. Now both the courts have found that the plea of the tenant is not sustainable. 13. This court should not take a very narrow technical view to say a compromise order is not executable and of no effect at all in revision when both the lower authorities have found that the order is capable of execution. I feel certain that there will not be any failure of justice if I confirm the order passed by the Addl. District Judge on this aspect of the matter. I say so because as early as 1977, the tenant has agreed that in case he defaults payment of arrears of rent he will surrender the building to the landlord and he made a partial payment of arrears of rent only in 1982. 14. The counsel for the petitioners submitted that the arrears of rent have been paid by the revision petitioners. 14. The counsel for the petitioners submitted that the arrears of rent have been paid by the revision petitioners. The respondent's counsel submits that only a portion of the amount due as arrears of rent, has been deposited and that too only on 22-8-1985. Of course, the counsel for the petitioners submits that they had deposited an amount of Rs.1,000/- in 1982. Whatever it be, the indifferent attitude of the tenant is clear from the fact that he did not make payment of rent from 11-11-1977 to 1982. 15. The counsel for the petitioners submitted that I should take note of certain subsequent events that took place after the filing of the revision petition. He has produced a notice issued by the landlords through their counsel. The revision petitioners are relying on this notice to say that a fresh tenancy has commenced from 1978 April. The question is whether I have got the power to consider this notice as a subsequent event to mould the relief that I should give in this C.R.P. The counsel for the respondents submits that he is not even aware of such a notice and that I should at rely on that notice. Counsel submits that he is cot certain about the genuineness of the notice. These are the facts on this aspect. Now the law. 16. The counsel for the petitioners referred me to two decisions of the Supreme Court, A.I.R.1975 S.C.1409 and A.I.R. 1981 S. C. 1711. These decisions tell me clearly that in appropriate cases, this court has got the power to consider subsequent events before passing a final order. Of course, this aspect has been very clearly stated as early as in 1941 by the Federal Court in A.I.R.1941 FC 5 (Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul v. Kashwar Lai Chaudhuri). Gwyer C. J. in the above case referred to the rule adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States in Patterson v. State of Albamma (1934) 294 US 600 at p.607. The dictum laid down in that decision reads thus: "We have frequently held that in the exercise of our appellate jurisdiction we have power not only to correct in the judgment under review but to make such disposition of the case as justice requires. The dictum laid down in that decision reads thus: "We have frequently held that in the exercise of our appellate jurisdiction we have power not only to correct in the judgment under review but to make such disposition of the case as justice requires. And in determining what justice doe require, the Court is bound to consider any change, either in fact or in law, which has supervened since the judgement was entered." The dictum in this case has been followed in P. Venkateswarlu v. Motor & General Traders (A.I.R.1975 S.C.1409). 17. In Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad (A.I.R.1981 S.C.1711), Desai, J., followed the decision reported in A.I.R.1975 S.C.1409. In this decision, I see a limit that has been imposed on the power of the court in the matter of giving effect to subsequent events. It is said that the subsequent events affecting the right of the landlord can be taken into account till the decree is made final by the final appellate or revisional court. This is because the appellate jurisdiction envisages a power not only to correct judgment under review but to make such disposition of the case as justice demands. This power, in my judgment, stems from the fact that the hearing of an appeal is under the processual law of our country and is in the nature of a re-hearing. Further the principle is rooted oa the theory that an appeal being in the rature of a re-hearing, the court should have power to mould the relief to be granted and that the court of appeal should have power to take into account even facts and events which have come into existence after the decree appealed against. But it should stop when a final decree is made by the final appellate court. I do not think that the execution court can take into account facts and events which have come into existence after the decree has become final, unless it is sanctioned explicitly by a law providing for the same. The execution court may not have the same freedom in the matter of considering subsequent events as that of a court of appeal or revisional court. In these circumstances, I think it may not be proper for me to take into account the notice relied on by the counsel for the petitioner. 18. In the result, I think the C.R.P. has to be dismissed. In these circumstances, I think it may not be proper for me to take into account the notice relied on by the counsel for the petitioner. 18. In the result, I think the C.R.P. has to be dismissed. I do so. 19. The counsel for the petitioners now submits that the revision petitioners should be given a little time to surrender the building in question. Considering the fact that the original revision petitioner died pending this revision and taking into account all the other relevant circumstances, I think I should grant 4 months' time from today to surrender the building to the landlords. This is made conditional on the revision petitioners filing an undertaking in the form of an affidavit before the execution court that they will surrender the building within the said period, viz. 4 months from today. This undertaking has to be filed within three weeks from today. If no such undertaking is filed as stipulated above, the direction granting time will stand automatically cancelled. I may make it clear that the revision petitioners have to pay an amount of Rs. 60/-per month as compensation for use and occupation of the building when they continue in occupation of the building. Issue carbon copies of the order to both sides on usual terms.