G. C. GUPTA, J. ( 1 ) THE appellant Bhishma Kinger, a practicing Advocate at Raipur Bar, bas been found guilty of offence punishable under section 323, Indian Penal Code and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 1. 000/- and in default three months R. I. by judgment dated 15. 4. 1982, passed by Shri L. D. Deoras, Second Additional Sessions Judge. Raipur, in Sessions Trial No. 144 of 1980 and has preferred this appeal under section 374 (2 ). Criminal Procedure Code, challenging his aforesaid conviction and sentence. ( 2 ) THE appellant was put on trial for having voluntarily causing hurt with an intention to kill Shri Dhirajlal Pandya (P. W. 1), another Advocate, on 25. 8. 1980 within the premises of District Court at Raipur, punishable under section 323/307, Indian Penal Code. Appellant and the complainant are practicing Advocates at Raipur. At the relevant time, Shri Nag, Civil Judge (Class II), had his Court on the first floor of the Court Building. On 25. 8. 1980, in the afternoon, an execution case was fixed in the Court of Shri Nag, in which the decree-holder was represented by the appellant and the judgment-debtor by Shri M. L. Yadu. The appellant is alleged to have appeared on behalf of one Shri Bhatia and filed an application under Order 21, Rule 16, Criminal Procedure Code to the effect that the decree in question has been transferred in favour of Shri Bhatia. The complainant-Dhirajlal Pandya appeared in the Court and opposed the said application on behalf of the decree-holder. Shri Pandya filed an application in this behalf. Shri M. L. Yadu, the Advocate of judgment-debtor, prayed for time for filing reply to the said application, which was granted by the Court. The case file was, thereafter, sent to the Execution-Clerk for giving a date. At this point of time, the appellant addressed the complainant Shri Pandya as rw in a very impolite language. Shri Pandya objected to this mode of address, on which the appellant abused him by saying Ikys rw ,sls ugh ekusxk and slapped Shri Pandya. Thereafter, the appellant dragged Shri Pandya out of the Court room into the verandah and dashed his head against the wall-causing bleeding injury. It is also alleged that the appellant tried to throw Shri Pandya from the first floor of the building. Thereafter, the appellant dragged Shri Pandya out of the Court room into the verandah and dashed his head against the wall-causing bleeding injury. It is also alleged that the appellant tried to throw Shri Pandya from the first floor of the building. Report of the incident was lodged at the police station vide Ex. P. 1 and a case under section 307, Indian Penal Code registered. A complaint purporting to be for offence under section 228, Indian Penal Code was also filed before the Civil Judge, Shri Pandya was sent for medical examination and was examined by Dr. Yadava (P. W. 7) who found an injury on the left parietal region. After investigation the appellant was tried as aforesaid. ( 3 ) THE learned Sessions Judge, relying on the evidence of Shri Pandya (P. W. 1) and Shri M. L. Yadu (P. W. 2) and the medical evidence of Dr. Yadava (P. W. 7), held that it was the appellant who had caused the injury on the person of Shri Pandya. The learned Judge, however, did not find any intention on the part of the appellant to kill Shri Pandya. That is how the appellant has been found not guilty of offence under section 307, Indian Penal Code and convicted for offence under section 323, I. P. C. only. ( 4 ) SUBMISSION of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the prosecution case against the appellant is based on the testimony of Advocates, who cannot be treated as independent witnesses. According to the learned counsel, Shri M. L. Yadu (P. W. 2), Shri P. K. Soni (P. W. 3), Shri Manoj Kumar Dubey (P. W. 4) and Shri J. N. Sharma (P. W. 6) are Advocates and, therefore, professionally related to Shri Pandya (P. W. 1 ). Their evidence cannot, therefore, provide corroboration to the evidence of Shri Pandya. A corroboration, according to the learned counsel, would have been provided by the evidence of Shri Ramautar Sharma, the Execution Clerk, before whom the incident had taken place and who was not examined. It is also submitted that F. I. R. had been lodged with considerable delay and is not sufficient to sustain the conviction of the appellant. It is also submitted that evidence of witnesses is conflicting and, therefore, unreliable. It is also submitted that F. I. R. had been lodged with considerable delay and is not sufficient to sustain the conviction of the appellant. It is also submitted that evidence of witnesses is conflicting and, therefore, unreliable. It is as well submitted that the present case was not maintainable, as the complainant had filed an application under section 228, Indian Penal Code (Ex. D-2), requesting the Court to take cognizance of the matter. The learned Government Advocate, however, submitted that the Advocates are officers of the Court and their evidence by itself, is sufficient to accept without any further corroboration. ( 5 ) AS far as delay in lodging the F. I. R. is concerned, it was lodged at 8. 30 p. m. at the City Kotwali, Raipur situated at a distance of about four furlongs from the place of incident. The incident had taken place at about 3 15 p. m. Clearly, therefore, there had been a delay of about five hours in lodging the report. The report has been proved by Shri Pandya (P. W. 1), who has stated that after the incident, he was given some water and milk by some one in the Court premises. Thereafter, he filed an application in the Court for taking action against the appellant and the Court sent him to the hospital for treatment. According to this witness, he returned from the hospital to the Bar Association at about 7. 15 p. m. and went to the Police Station with some Advocates to lodge the report. The fact that an application was filed by this witness immediately after the incident, is not in dispute. In fact, a certified copy of the application has been filed as Ex D-2. In cross- examination, he has admitted that he was sent to the hospital for medical examination by the Court and several Advocates had gone with him. He denied that these Advocates conspired to concoct a false case against the appellant. There is nothing in his cross-examination which may discredit his explanation about lodging the F. I. R. after the medical examination. It is, therefore, clear that his evidence fully states the reason for not lodging the report immediately. In the context of this explanation, the decision of Supreme Court in Thulia Kali v. State of Tamil Nadu cannot help the appellant. It is, therefore, clear that his evidence fully states the reason for not lodging the report immediately. In the context of this explanation, the decision of Supreme Court in Thulia Kali v. State of Tamil Nadu cannot help the appellant. The delay in the instant case was neither unusual nor unexplained and, therefore, it must be held that it has no effect whatsoever on the prosecution case. ( 6 ) THE submission that corroboration by Advocates is not a good corroboration in the eye of law, does not deserve any serious consideration. Evidence of Shri Pandya (P. W. 1) is corroborated by Shri M. L. Yadu (P. W. 2), Shri P. K. Soni (P. W. 3) and Shri J. N. Sharma (P. W. 6 ). These witnesses are practicing Advocates and were present on the spot. The fact that they are practicing Advocates is, by itself, not sufficient to make them interested witnesses. Their evidence has to be appreciated in the context of the fact that the appellant is also a practising Advocate. These witnesses have admitted that they have nothing against the appellant. If, inspite of it, they have deposed against the appellant and in favour of Shri Pandya, their evidence cannot be lightly brushed aside. An advocate is really an officer of the court and by the nature of the office held by him, is bound to state the truth. This Court is, therefore, not able to accept these witnesses as interested witnesses. In the opinion of this court, they are independent witnesses and their evidence is sufficient to provide necessary corroboration to the evidence of the complainant. ( 7 ) SHRI Pandya (P. W. 1) has stated that while he was initialling the copy of the application to be given to the appellant, he was told by the appellant, ;s rw D;k dj jgk gs and he objected to the use of the word rw by the appellant. On this, the appellant slapped him on his right cheek. The appellant, thereafter, caught hold of his hair and collar and dragged him outside into the verandah. While in the verandah, he dashed his head on a pillar-causing bleeding-injury. Though this witness has further stated that the appellant tried to throw him from the first floor and had lifted him upto his waist, all other Advocates came and caught hold of him. While in the verandah, he dashed his head on a pillar-causing bleeding-injury. Though this witness has further stated that the appellant tried to throw him from the first floor and had lifted him upto his waist, all other Advocates came and caught hold of him. The witness remained firm in cross- examination on the point of slap, being dragged outside, being dashed against the wall and being thrown from the first floor. He was confronted with his application (Ex. D-2), in which there is an omission regarding dashing of his head on the pillar and causing bleeding injury. There is also an omission regarding catching hold of his hair. According to him, he was in a state of shock and, therefore, could not give the details of the incident. Shr. M. L. Yadu (P. W. 2) was the Advocate for judgment-debtor in the case and was admittedly present on the spot. He has corroborated the version of Shri Pandya by stating that the appellant had given a slap to Shri Pandya and, thereafter, dragged him outside the room into the verandah and again given him slaps. This witness also stated that the appellant gave push to Shri Pandya, as a result of which his head dashed against the wall causing the bleeding injury. He had, however, not seen the appellant trying to throw Shri Pandya from the first floor. There is nothing in his cross-examination to discredit the version of this witness. He is apparently a very Senior Advocate practicing since 1936. He had no complaint against the appellant, who had been practicing since last about 10 years. The learned Sessions Judge has placed reliance on the evidence of this witness and has convicted the appellant. P. K. Soni (P. W. 3) is an Advocate practicing since 1973 and has provided further corroboration. His police-case diary statement (Ex. D-l) did not contain the fact that the appellant had caught hold of Shri Pandya by his hair. Except for this omission, there is nothing in his statement to discredit the version of this witness. J. N. Sharma (P. W. 6) is yet another Advocate who has corroborated the evidence of the complainant. Not only this, even the appellants defence corroborates the complainants version. According to the appellant, there had been some exchange of words-resulting in some scuffle. He, however, denied that either he slapped or dashed the complainant outside the Court-room. J. N. Sharma (P. W. 6) is yet another Advocate who has corroborated the evidence of the complainant. Not only this, even the appellants defence corroborates the complainants version. According to the appellant, there had been some exchange of words-resulting in some scuffle. He, however, denied that either he slapped or dashed the complainant outside the Court-room. According to him, the complainant had used a fro user on the date of incident and had fallen down because of it. His defence is prima facie unbelievable. No one who uses a bale-bottom pant can fall down in the manner suggested. His evidence does not in any way take out the substance of prosecution case. V. S. Gupta (D. W. 1) tries to support the story of accidental fall of Shri Pandya, but his evidence is so untenable that it cannot be believed. The witness admits that the incident had started because the appellant wed the word rw for Shri Pandya. He also admits that the appellant accidentally slapped Shri Pandya. He further admits that Shri Pandya fell down and suffered injury. As stated earlier, the story of fall because of the bale- bottom pant, is unnatural and proves that this witness is intentionally giving false evidence with a view to protect the appellant. The fact that he himself is a lawyer, makes his false version and the more regrettable. Under the circumstances, the inevitable conclusion is that there is good and reliable evidence in the instant case to hold that the appellant had slapped Shri Pandya, dragged him outside the Court room by using criminal force against him and has caused bleeding injury on his head. This conclusion is by itself, sufficient to uphold the appellant's conviction for offence punishable under section 323, I. P. C. ( 8 ) LEGAL submission that the learned Sessions Judge could not have taken cognizance of the matter in the context of pending complaint under section 228, I. P. C. , need not be taken very seriously. Section 345, Cr. P. C. gives only a limited jurisdiction to the Court. Section 228, I. P. C. deals with interruption to public servant sitting in judicial proceedings. Cognizance of this offence can be taken by the Court concerned under section 345, Cr. P. C. Section 345, Cr. Section 345, Cr. P. C. gives only a limited jurisdiction to the Court. Section 228, I. P. C. deals with interruption to public servant sitting in judicial proceedings. Cognizance of this offence can be taken by the Court concerned under section 345, Cr. P. C. Section 345, Cr. P. C. , however, does not authorise the said Court to take cognizance of offence punishable under any other section of the Indian Penal Code than mentioned therein. Section 210, Cr P. C. , on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the appellant, has no relevance in the instant case as offences covered by this case and the complaint (Ex. D-2) are entirely different. ( 9 ) IN view of the discussion aforesaid, the appeal fails and is dismissed. This Court, however, expresses its deep concern and anguish over the incident-more so because it has taken place within the Court premises and between the two Advocates. The incident, according to this Court, without anything more, is sufficient to lower the prestige of the profession and the judiciary of which the profession is an integral part. It would expect all concerned to see that these incidents do not happen in future. ( 10 ) THE appeal fails and is dismissed. Appeal dismissed .