Union of India v. II Additional District Judge, Meerut
1986-09-10
B.L.YADAV
body1986
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment B.L. Yadav, J. 1. THE Union of India has filed the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against the order dated 15-12-1976 passed by the IInd Additional District Judge, Meerut in an appeal under Section 9 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1958, (for short the Central Act), allowing the appeal filed by respondent no. 2 against the notice dated 12th January, 1971. 2. THE facts of the case are few and simple. Respondent no. 2 Smt. Sanno Devi was the daughter of late Sri Bishambhar Swaroop. She was grantee of the land in Bungalow ho. 9, R. A. Lines, Meerut Cantt. in view of the provisions of Clause 6 of the Bengal Army Regulations, Governor General Order by the Governor General in Council, No. 179 dated 12-9-1836, (for short the Order) (vide Annexure C. A. ' 3 to the counter affidavit). That was the order to have the effect from the date of its promulgation at different stations of the Bengal Army. THE Meerut City and its Cantonment area came within area specified in this Order and was all included within different stations of Bengal Army. There was a provision providing that the Government retains power of resumption at any time on giving one month's notice and paying the value of such buildings as may have been authorised to be rooted. Further it was made clear that the land belongs to the Govt. and the same cannot be sold by the grantee. The petitioner no. 2 issued a notice dated 30-7-68, (hereinafter called as the first notice), to Smt. Sanno Devi, respondent no. 2 under Clause 6 of the Order along with a Cheque for Rs. 5,827/- being value of the buildings standing on the land. This notice dated 30th July, 1968 was to the effect that she held Cantonment tenure as a grantee, the President of India being the owner, wants to resume the said land and the construction, the value of the construction, the Cheque for rupees 5,827/- was being sent. This notice was given to quit and deliver possession of the aforesaid building side (i. e. Survey No. 172, Bungalow No. 9, R. A.) to the Military Estate Officer, Meerut, at 10.00 A. M. on 2nd September, 1968. 3. THIS first notice was not contested by respondent no. 2 nor it was challenged by filing any appeal etc.
This notice was given to quit and deliver possession of the aforesaid building side (i. e. Survey No. 172, Bungalow No. 9, R. A.) to the Military Estate Officer, Meerut, at 10.00 A. M. on 2nd September, 1968. 3. THIS first notice was not contested by respondent no. 2 nor it was challenged by filing any appeal etc. or by any other process available to her under law. A copy of the first notice has been filed as Annexure ' 1 to the writ petition. As the first notice was not challenged, hence the legal consequences indicated in that notice followed. The Military Estate Officer, or the Government became entitled to take and resume possession, at the same time the right of respondent no. 2 to occupy the said land and the building ceased as indicated in the last but one paragraph, of the said notice. In other words, in pursuance of the said notice the right to retain the land and the building came to an end and respondent no. 2 was only entitled to claim damages, for which a cheque for Rs. 5,827/- was sent to her. In pursuance of the first notice respondent no. 2 must have handed over possession to the petitioners, but she did not do so. Thereafter, a second notice dated 19-8-1970, under section 7 (2) of the Central Act, after a lapse of about two years, was sent by the petitioners to the respondent no. 2, indicating that the cantonment tenure along with the building held by her has been resumed with effect from 2-9-1978 (i. e. on which possession was required to be delivered in view of first notice) and she was required to pay damages, for unauthorised occupation. To the second notice, respondent no. 2 submitted a reply dated 7-9-70 (Annexure-3). The said objection was considered by the Estate Officer, Meerut Circle, and it was held that respondent no. 2 was liable to pay damages amounting to Rs. 8,061.45 for the period 2-9-68 to 19-8-1970 and further she was liable to pay damages at the rate of Rs. 4,096.80 per annum from 20-8-70 till the date of handing over possession. Thereafter, a third notice dated 12-1-71 under section 7 (2) of the Central Act was issued, wherein respondent no. 2 was directed to pay damages as aforesaid (Annexure ' 4 ). Respondent no.
4,096.80 per annum from 20-8-70 till the date of handing over possession. Thereafter, a third notice dated 12-1-71 under section 7 (2) of the Central Act was issued, wherein respondent no. 2 was directed to pay damages as aforesaid (Annexure ' 4 ). Respondent no. 2 filed an appeal and the same was allowed by the impugned order 4. LEARNED counsel for the petitioners urged that as the first notice, under Clause 6 of the Order was not challenged, which was to the effect that the possession of land and building was resumed and the rights of respondent no. 2, who remained in possession after service of first notice, came to an end, the appellate court erred in entering into the questions covered by the first notice, i. e. resumption of land and building. Only second and third notices were challenged and not the first notice. Consequently, the first notice issued under Clause 6 of the Order about resumption of land and buildings and delivery of possession on 2-9-68 cannot be quashed by the appellate court. It was admitted that contesting respondent no. 2 did not deny this fact, that she did not contest the first notice, hence it was not open on her behalf to argue anything in appeal against the contents of the first notice nor the appellate court had any authority or jurisdiction to allow the appeal and quash the first notice. At the best the appeal could have been decided only in respect of quantum of damages payable by respondent no. 2, which was the subject matter of second and third notice served on respondent no. 2. Learned counsel for the contesting respondent supported the impugned order and urged that the impugned order was perfectly correct and legal and there was no merit in the writ petition. 5. HAVING heard the learned counsel for the parties, I am of the view that the writ petition cannot be said to be without substance. The first point for determination is as to what was the legal effect of not contesting the first notice issued under Clause 6 of the Order. In para 4 of the writ petition it has been stated that the notice dated 30-7-68 (first notice) was not challenged by respondent no. 2, hence the notice became final and the land would be resumed as provided under Clause 6 of the Order.
In para 4 of the writ petition it has been stated that the notice dated 30-7-68 (first notice) was not challenged by respondent no. 2, hence the notice became final and the land would be resumed as provided under Clause 6 of the Order. In counter affidavit this paragraph has been replied in para 4 and it was only stated that except receipt of the notice other facts were denied. It was further averred that the notice was illegal and confiscatory in nature and that the Order no. 1/79, particularly its clause was not applicable. It is accordingly evident that non-contest of the first notice issued under Clause 6 of the Order was not denied rather it was admitted. Consequently, the legal effect of the notice, i. e. resumption of the land and building occupied by respondent no. 2 became final and she lost all her rights in the land and building and she was only entitled to damages. It was, however, open to her to challenge the receipt of notice or she could have challenged the notice in an appropriate court of law. But she did not do so. Now it is not open to her to challenge the validity of the first notice in appeal. 6. THE next point for determination is as to whether the appeal could be disposed of considering the legal effect of the first notice which was not challenged by respondent no. 2. It is clear from the averments made in para 4 of the counter affidavit that she did not deny the receipt of the first notice rather she only stated that the same was illegal. In case, that was so, she must have challenged the same by preferring an objection before the appropriate authority or the court. But she did not do so. Respondent no. 2 placed reliance on a Division Bench Case in Smt. Bhagwati Devi v. President of India, 1973 AWR 483. I am in complete agreement with the view taken in that case. But that was different case where the first notice for resumption of land and building was challenged and it was held that opportunity must have been given to the person concerned to contest the notice and as no opportunity was given, consequently, it was held in that case that principles of natural justice were violated. But in the instant case the facts are entirely different.
But in the instant case the facts are entirely different. Here the first notice for resumption in accordance with Clause 6 of the Order was not challenged. In para 4 of the counter affidavit it was also not stated that she did not have any opportunity to contest the first notice, rather she only stated that the notice was illegal. Now it is too late on her part to challenge the first notice on the ground that it was illegal. Accordingly I am of the view that the Division Bench Case of Smt. Bhagwati Devi (supra) was besides the point. The next point for determination is that the petitioner did not file an appeal under Section 9 of the Act against the first notice, which was for resumption of the land and building and delivery of possession by the petitioner on 2-9-68, rather the appeal was filed under Section 9 of the Central Act against the second and third notices issued under Section 7 (2) of the Central Act. By the notice dated 10-8-70 the respondent no. 2 was directed as to why not she should pay damages amounting to Rs. 8,061.45 at the rate of Rs. 4,096.80 per annum (Annexure-2), and thereupon respondent no. 2 filed an objection dated 7-9-70 (Annexure-3), which appears to have been decided by order dated 12-1-71 (Annexure-4) and her objection was rejected and she was directed to pay a sum of Rs. 8,061.45 as damages on account of her unauthorised occupation of the said premises within five months in equal instalments of Rs. 1612.29 and to pay further damages at the rate of Rs. 4096.80 per annum from 20-8-70 onwards till the date of handing over possession of Bungalow No. 9, R. A. Lines, Meerut Canti., to the petitioners. 7. AGAINST the notice to pay damages (Annexure-2) and the order disposing of the objection of respondent no. 2 in respect thereof, (Annexure-4), an appeal was filed under Section 9 of the Central Act by respondent no. 2. But she did not file an appeal against the first notice directing her to deliver possession as the land and building has been resumed in pursuance of the Order. It is also clear from the first paragraph of the appellate judgment dated 15-3-76 that the appeal was filed against the notice dated 12-1-71 and in respect of the payment to be made for damages as indicated above.
It is also clear from the first paragraph of the appellate judgment dated 15-3-76 that the appeal was filed against the notice dated 12-1-71 and in respect of the payment to be made for damages as indicated above. As stated earlier, no appeal was filed by respondent no. 2 against the first notice and hence that became final and the direction for resumption of the land and construction thereon and for delivery of possession cannot now be challenged by her. The appellate court has further decided the legality or otherwise of the first notice for resumption of the land and construction thereon and delivery of possession, which was not the subject matter of appeal. Consequently, the appellate court has decided the appeal treating that as to be the subject matter, which was not actually subject matter of the appeal. In this view of the matter, I am of the view that the impugned judgment in appeal is manifestly erroneous and the same cannot be sustained. 8. IN view of the facts stated above, the impugned order cannot be sustained and deserves to be quashed. In the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated 15-12-76 is hereby quashed and the case is remanded back to the appellate court for decision afresh in accordance with law and in the light of observations made above. Under the circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.