JUDGMENT B.D. Agrawal, J. - The identical question of law which this group of petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution gives rise is short but interesting. 2. The petitioners are employees of the U.P. State Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the Corporation). In Writ Petition No. 8363 of 1986 (which has been argued as the leading case) the petitioner was a Conductor appointed by the Assistant Regional Manager, Varanasi under order dated June 1, 1978. Upon certain complaint against him a charge-sheet was served under the order of the Assistant Regional Manager on July 1, 1985 in response to which the petitioner submitted his explanation dated July 29, 1985. Enquiry followed whereafter notice to show cause dated February 4, 1986 was given to the petitioner. The petitioner submitted his reply. Under the impugned order passed on February 27, 1986 the Assistant Regional Manager removed the petitioner from service vide Annexure 6 to the supplementary affidavit. It is not necessary for us to dilate on the facts of other petitions and suffice it may to note that the orders impugned are of dismissal, removal, reduction in rank or suspension passed as part of disciplinary proceedings by the Regional Manager, Assistant Regional Manager or in some cases the Station Superintendent. These are of recent months passed long after November 13, 1982 when the Road Transport Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1982 (Central Act 62 of 1982) came into force. 3. The contention raised for the petitioners is that the Regional Manager, Assistant Regional Manager or Station Superintendent for that matter is incompetent to make the orders impugned. In view of the U.P. State Road Transport Corporation Employees (other than officers) Service Regulations, 1981 (for short, the Regulations) issued by the Corporation in exercise of powers under Section 45(2)(c) of the Road Transport Corporation Act 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), with effect from June 19, 1981, it is argued, the Board of Directors was constituted as the appointing authority. The Board could exercise the powers as appointing authority itself or through an officer authorised by the Board to make appointment. The Board could exercise the powers as appointing authority itself or through an officer authorised by the Board to make appointment. The submission further is that the Road Transport Corporation (Amendment) Act 1982 which came into force as mentioned above on November 13, 1982 created the Board of Directors as an agency distinct from the Corporation for purposes of superintendence, direction and management of affairs and business of the Corporation and in view of Section 12 of the Act (as amended) the Board could act in the matter either itself or through the medium of some officer authorised by the Board in this behalf. No such authorisation has taken place till date. 4. Sri S.K. Sharma, learned counsel for the Corporation urged in reply that there was delegation/authorisation made by the Corporation on February 16, 1974 under Section 12 of the Act (as it then was) which is Annexure 5 to the counter affidavit filed in Writ Petition No. 3363 of 1986 and thereunder the powers of the appointing authority are conferred upon the Assistant Regional Manager. That authorisation, it is argued, is operative still despite the Regulations 1981 or the Central (Amendment) Act, 1982 coming into force. 5. The U.P. Government Roadways was originally Departmental Undertaking to provide passengers transport Service in various parts of the State. The employees serving in Roadways were Government employees. Subsequently in exercise of the powers conferred by the Road Transport Corporation Act the Government of Uttar Pradesh constituted U.P. State Road Transport Corporation with effect from June 1, 1972 vide Notification issued on May 31, 1972. On the creation of the Corporation the employees serving in the Roadways as Government employees were sent on deputation to the Corporation. For the Corporation it is maintained that by gradual process the employees have been absorbed in the service of the Corporation. Some of the petitioners before us have maintained that they continued on deputation with the Corporation still and the absorption has not taken place. But this is not material for the purposes of the case because even if it is assumed that absorption has taken place as the Corporation asserts, the dispute remains whether the authority to terminate the service vests in the Regional Manager or the Assistant Regional Manager as the case may be. 6. But this is not material for the purposes of the case because even if it is assumed that absorption has taken place as the Corporation asserts, the dispute remains whether the authority to terminate the service vests in the Regional Manager or the Assistant Regional Manager as the case may be. 6. The question is whether the delegation or authorisation made by the Corporation under Section 12 of the Act by resolution dated 16.2.1974 is operative still despite the enforcement of the Regulations under Section 45(1)(c) on June 19, 1981 and the amendment made in the Act by the Road Transport Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1982 with effect from November 13, 1982. 7. In regulation 9(ii) the expression "Appointing Authority" is defined as meaning the Board or an officer authorised by the Board to make appointment. 'Board' according to clause (iii) means the Board of Directors of the Corporation and the 'Chairman' means the Chairman of the Board vide clause (iv). Regulations 61 to 69 contained in Part X (Conduct, Punishment and Appeal) denote that the entire disciplinary control (including suspension) is vested in the appointing authority, that is, the Board or an officer authorised by the Board to make appointment. 8. The Act, as stated above, was amended by the Road Transport Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1982 (Central Act 63 of 1982) with effect from November 13, 1982. The amendment, as will presently appear, brings about certain material changes in the texture of the Act. This amounts in essence to repeal of the provisions amended and enactment of the provisions in the amended form. An Act may be repealed not merely by a statute, the only provision of which is that the Act is repealed, but also by a statute which besides repealing the Act enacts provisions to be substituted. If the amendment of the existing Law is small, the Act professes to amend it, if it is extensive, it repeals the Law and re-enacts it. New Singhal Dal Mill v. Firm Sheo Prasad Jainti Prasad A.I.R. 1953 All. 404 (D.B.) and Shamshul Hasan v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1956 All. 413. 9. The rules of construction governing the effect to be given to a repealing statute are well settled. New Singhal Dal Mill v. Firm Sheo Prasad Jainti Prasad A.I.R. 1953 All. 404 (D.B.) and Shamshul Hasan v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1956 All. 413. 9. The rules of construction governing the effect to be given to a repealing statute are well settled. The normal effect of repealing a statute is to obliterate it from the statute book as completely as if is has never been passed; it must be considered as a law that never existed; the source of power is dried up: the power to create new law under the repealed provisions is abolished with the result that no further law thereunder in exercise of that power can be made Deep Chand and others v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 648 and Mohan Agrawal v. Union of India etc., A.I.R. 1979 All. 170. But to this rule there is exception engrafted in Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. The principle underlying Section 6 is that every later enactment which supersedes an earlier one or puts an end to an earlier state of the law is presumed to intend the continuance of rights accrued and liabilities incurred under the superseded enactment unless there were sufficient implications express or implied in the later enactment designed to completely obliterate the earlier state of the law. State of Orissa and another v. M/s. M.A. Tullooh and Co., A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1264 The Court has to look to the provisions of the new Act for the purpose of determining whether they exhibit a different intention. The question is not whether the new Act expressly keeps alive the old rights and liabilities, but whether it manifests an intention, expressly or by necessary implication, to destroy them. The incompatibility, if any, would need be ascertained from a consideration of all the relevant provisions of the new statute and the mere absence of a saving clause is by itself not material. In T.S. Baliah v. T.S. Rangachari, A.I.R. 1969 (S.C.) 701 we find it laid down at page 705: "The principle of this section is that unless a different intention appears in the repealing Act, any legal proceeding can be instituted and continued in respect of any matter pending under the repealed Act as it that Act was in force at the time of repeal. In other words, whenever there is a repeal of an enactment the consequences laid down in Section 6 of the General Clauses Act will follow unless, as the section itself says a different intention appears in the repealing statute. In the case of a simple repeal there is scarcely any room for expression of a contrary opinion. But when the repeal is followed by fresh legislation on the same subject the Court would undoubtedly have to look to the provisions of the new Act, but only for the purpose of determining whether they indicate a different intention. The question is not whether the new Act expressly keeps alive old rights and liabilities but whether it manifests an intention to destroy them. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act therefore will be applicable unless the new legislation manifests an intention incompatible with or contrary to the provisions of the section. Such incompatibility would have to be ascertained from a consideration of all the relevant provisions of the new statute and the mere absence of a saving clause is by itself not material. In other words, the provisions of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act will apply to a case of repeal even if there is a simultaneous re-enactment unless a contrary intention can be gathered from the new statute." 10. If a contrary intention appears from the repealing statute, that prevails. Qudrat Ullah v. Municipal Board Bareilly, 1974 1 S.C.C. 202 at 213. In case as in the present a repeal is accompanied with simultaneous re-enactment on the subject, the Court has to look to the provisions of the new Act to see whether they indicate a different intention. 11. The relevant part of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act reads as follows: "Where this Act, or any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to the made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not. 11. The relevant part of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act reads as follows: "Where this Act, or any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to the made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not. (a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect; or (b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder; or (c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed; Clause (b) is attracted if there be anything done or suffered under the repealed enactment so as to leave unaffected the previous operation thereof (See for example, Om Prakash and another v. Motilal and others, A.I.R. 1958 All. 409 (F.B.) in which under the unamended provisions of Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act the Court had already summoned the record in exercise of the revisory powers before the amendment took place. In none of the cases we are concerned with the order impugned made or even the proceedings leading thereto initiated prior to June 19, 1981 when the Regulations came into force; the Central (Amendment) Act, 1982 came even long afterwards. Therefore, clause (b) of Section 6 is of no assistance to the Corporation. Did the Assistant Regional Manager acquire any 'right' under the authorisation made in his favour by the resolution of the Corporation dated 16.2.1974 within the contemplation of Section 6(c) is the question to be next considered. In its true import the said resolution confers a power upon the officer; minus the resolution under the law then in force he could not be the appointing authority; the power in this behalf was of the Corporation; due to the authorisation given, the Asstt. Regional Manager acquired competency in this respect. But even assuming, as urged for the respondent, that clause (c) applies, it would need still be adjudged whether a different intention appears. In case there be a different intention, none of the clauses of Section 6 may save the situation. This, therefore, requires a careful comparison of the position existing originally in the Act and as brought about by the Amendment Act, 1982 or as reflected in the Regulations. 12. In case there be a different intention, none of the clauses of Section 6 may save the situation. This, therefore, requires a careful comparison of the position existing originally in the Act and as brought about by the Amendment Act, 1982 or as reflected in the Regulations. 12. Taking up the Regulations first, the preamble thereto states: "In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 45(2)(c) of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950 (Central Act 64 of 1950) and in supersession of all existing Regulations or orders on the subject, the Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, with the previous sanction of the State Government, makes and the State Government is pleased to publish in the official Gazette, the following Regulations regulating the recruitment and the conditions of service of the persons appointed to the Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation Employees (other than Officers) Service." (Emphasis supplied). 13. This thus in express terms supersedes the then existing Regulations or orders on the subject. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the resolution dated 16.2.1974 of the Corporation passed in exercise of the statutory powers under Section 12 of the Act falls within the purview of being an order on the subject relevant and, therefore, this stands superseded as well. The Regulations, moreover, in their text and operation exhibit a different intention. They create an Appointing Authority meaning thereby the Board or an officer authorised by the Board to make appointment. The entire powers in the matter of disciplinary control are conferred on the Appointing Authority. Upon the Regulations coming into force consequently the orders as impugned in these cases could be passed either by the Board or its delegate. The authority conferred under the resolution dated 16.2.1974 would be ineffective even since 19th June 1981 being incompatible with the provisions of the Regulations framed by the Corporation itself. 14. Coming now to the Amendment Act, 1982, the Statement of Object and Reasons contained in the Bill clearly enunciates the purpose intended to be achieved by the amendment made in this respect, as follows: "(b) The organizational set up of the Road Transport Corporations under the Act is being modified to provide for each Corporation a Board of Directors consisting of a Chairman and other Directors in place of the Chairman and members of the Corporation. This approach would help in keeping the agency through which a Corporation has to function distinct from the Corporation itself. It is also proposed to provide that in addition to the Chairman, each Board may consist "of not less than five and not more than seventeen other Directors (vide clause 3). (Emphasis supplied). Paras (e) and (f) of the Statement are relevant also: (e) At present, a Road Transport Corporation cannot raise any share capital where Loan capital has been provided to it by the Central Government and the State Government, with a view to augmenting the resources of the Corporation and to enable the Corporations to undertake developmental scheme. Section 23 of the principal Act is being amended to enable a Corporation which has received a loan capital from the Central Government and the State Government to raise share capital. Opportunity is also being taken to enable the Central Government or the State Government to convert the whole or any part of the loan capital provided by it under the said Section 23 into share capital. (vide clause 12). (f) Section 26 of the principal Act relating to borrowing powers of Road Transport Corporation is being substituted by a new section to enable a Corporation; with the approval of the State Government, to borrow money not only in the open market, but also from the nationalised banks, State Financial Corporations, the Industrial Finance Corporation of India, the Industrial Development Bank of India, the Life Insurance Corporation of India, or any other financial institution providing credit which is subject to the Control of the Reserve Bank of India. Such borrowing may be either for the purpose of raising working capital or for meeting any expenditure of a capital nature (vide clause 13). 15. Shri Sharma urged that the Bill may have aimed to set up an agency distinct from the Corporation itself but the text of the Act does not carry out that purpose. We find no merit in this submission which is not borne out on a comparison made of the relevant provisions. The Corporation initially was and remains still a body corporate having perpetual succession and a common seal and entitled to sue and be sued in its name (Section 4). Section 5 of the unamended Act laid down the constitution of the Corporation as under: "5. The Corporation initially was and remains still a body corporate having perpetual succession and a common seal and entitled to sue and be sued in its name (Section 4). Section 5 of the unamended Act laid down the constitution of the Corporation as under: "5. Constitution of Road Transportation - (1) Subject to rules made under this Act, a Corporation shall consist of a Chairman and such number of other members as the State Government may think fit to appoint. 16. The Amendment Act has substituted the following in place of Section 5 as it earlier existed: "5. Management of Corporation and Board of Directors. (1) The general superintendence, direction and management of the affairs and business of a Corporation shall vest in a Board of Directors which, with the assistance of its committees and Managing Director, may exercise all such powers and do all such acts and things as may be exercised or done by the Corporation. (2) The Board shall consist of a Chairman and such other Directors, being not less than five and not more than seventeen, as the State Government may think fit to appoint. (3) The State Government may, if it so thinks fit appoint one of the other Directors as the Vice-Chairman of the Board. (4) Rules made under this Act shall provide for the representation; both of the Central Government and of the State Government concerned, on the Board in such proportion as may be agreed to by both the Government and of appointment by each Government of its own representatives thereto and where the capital of a Corporation is raised by the issue of shares to other parties under sub-section (3) of Section 23, provision shall also be made for the representation of such shareholders on the Board and the manner in which the representatives shall be elected by shareholders. (5) The term of office and the manner of casual vacancies among the Directors shall be such as may be prescribed." 17. Subsequent to the amendment, we do not have anything in the statute specifying the constitution of the Corporation. The composition laid is of the Board which, however, is not a juristic person though the Corporation is. The general superintendence, direction and management of the affairs and business of the Corporation now 'vest' in the Board. Subsequent to the amendment, we do not have anything in the statute specifying the constitution of the Corporation. The composition laid is of the Board which, however, is not a juristic person though the Corporation is. The general superintendence, direction and management of the affairs and business of the Corporation now 'vest' in the Board. This vesting is done not by the Corporation in favour of its agency by delegation or authorisation, but by the specific terms of the statute itself. The vesting is statutory not being made dependent upon any resolution or notification of the Corporation. The expression 'vesting' it has been said is a word of slippery import and has many meanings. The context controls the text and the purpose and scheme project the particular romantic shade or nuance of meaning. Mahraj Singh v. State of U.P., 1977 (3) A.L.R. 12 (S.C.) (Summary) Black's Law Dictionary (5th Edition) page 1401, gives us the sense of 'vested' as 'Fixed'; accrued; settled; absolute. Webster's Third International Dictionary gives the meaning as "to give to a person a legally fixed immediate right of present or future enjoyment." The powers normally exercised by an appointing authority as such would undoubtedly fall within the compass of general superintendence, direction and management of the affairs and business of the Corporation; and the power to appoint carries with it the power also to take disciplinary action or to terminate employment. U.P. State Electricity Board v. Abdul Shakoor Hasmi and others, (1980) 3 S.C.C. 278 . The Board is to consist of Chairman and a specified number of Directors ranging between 5 to 17 appointed by the State Government. The Act (as amended) does not lay down that the Board shall act subject to supervisory or other control of the Corporation. The Board shall function with the assistance of its committees which it may appoint (vide Section 12(1)(a) and the Managing Director, who is an appointee of the State Government, and not the Corporation (vide Section 14(1). 18. Consequential amendment has been made in Sections 6 to 10 of the Act in relation to disqualifications of Directors, resignation of office by the Chairman or a Director, removal of Chairman or any other Director, vacancies in the Board and their effect, temporary association of persons with the Board for particular purposes. The meetings now envisaged in Section 11 are of the Board. The meetings now envisaged in Section 11 are of the Board. Section 12(1) which again is material lays down in the following words the power vested in the Board to delegate its powers and duties: "(1) A Board may, from time to time, by resolution passed at a meeting-- (a) appoint committees consisting of Directors for performing such functions as may be specified in the resolution; (b) delegate to any such committee or to the Chairman or Vice-Chairman, subject to such conditions and limitations, if any, as may be specified in the resolution, such of its powers and duties as it may think fit; (c) authorise the Managing Director or any other officer of the Corporation subject to such conditions and limitations, if any, as may be specified in the resolution to exercise such powers and perform such duties as it may deem necessary for the efficient day-to-day administration of its business." 19. A conspicuous feature that must also be taken note of is that the Corporation remains a legal entity and is as such assigned or specified area of powers and duties enumerated in Sections 18 to 21 composed in Chapter III (Powers and Duties of Corporation). In matters of Finance. Accounts and Audit (Chapter IV), the powers and duties of the Corporation which include powers in regard to the raising of capital and the borrowing powers. The State Government may in consultation with the Corporation give general instructions to the Corporation including in relation to the recruitment, conditions of service and training of its employees (Section 33). The power to make regulations remains in the Corporation and is to be exercised with the previous sanction of the State Government (Section 45). 20. Upon a comprehensive review thus of the Act (as amended) it is undeniable, in our opinion, that the Amendment Act does create, as it professes also, a Board of Directors consisting of a Chairman and other Directors in place of the Chairman and members of the Corporation and this agency (Board) through which the Corporation has to function is kept distinct from the Corporation itself. The Board ever since its creation takes up the functions of the appointing authority with all its adjuncts. The Board ever since its creation takes up the functions of the appointing authority with all its adjuncts. An order in matters of disciplinary proceedings or emanating basically in the course of day-to-day management or supervision over the staff has to originate from the Board which is empowered no doubt to delegate its powers in this respect to an officer. The intention behind the amending provisions is self-evident; these leave the Corporation to concentrate on methods to provide efficient, adequate, economical and properly coordinated systems of road transport service and to lay down matters of policy while the managerial aspect is assigned by the statute to the Board of Directors created by the Act. In face of this set up it is difficult to maintain in our view that the delegation/authorisation which the Corporation made under Section 12 (as it then existed) and in the making whereof the Board had no say nor has the Board adopted or ratified it subsequent to its creation may serve to negative the authority of the Board. It is not in dispute that there is no delegation or authorisation by the Board in favour of any officer. The intention being differently expressed in the Amendment Act, Section 6(c) of the General Clauses Act is of little assistance. The resolution of the Corporation dated 16.2.1974 no longer survives as efficacious. 21. Nor does Section 24 of the General Clauses Act vary the position in this respect. The continuation safeguarded thereunder is in respect of "any appointment, notification, order, scheme, rule, form or bye law made or issued under the repealed Act." The 'order' is denotive of a statutory instrument or form. Assuming that the resolution dated 16.2.1974 possessed this character being made in exercise of statutory powers under Section 12, the overriding condition would remain yet to be satisfied because subsequent to the repeal this resolution may have efficacy only if that be not inconsistent with the provisions re enacted. The inconsistency has arisen since the powers of the appointing authority now vest under the Act in the Board of Directors which is a distinct agency. In the Regulations dated 19.6.1981 created by Corporation the supersession of the order such as contained in the resolution dated 16.2.1974 is express; the Amendment Act by implication negatives the orders which did not emanate from the Board; see also State of Assam v. Assam Tea Co. In the Regulations dated 19.6.1981 created by Corporation the supersession of the order such as contained in the resolution dated 16.2.1974 is express; the Amendment Act by implication negatives the orders which did not emanate from the Board; see also State of Assam v. Assam Tea Co. Ltd., A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1358. 22. Sri Sharma placed reliance on certain observations in Krishna Kumar v. Divisional Assistant Electrical Engineer and others, (1979) 4 S.C.C. 289 . Appointment of the appellant in that case was made under an order passed by the Chief Electrical Engineer. Later the appellant was removed from service by the Divisional Assistant Engineer. The question for determination was whether as alleged by the appellant he was removed from service by an authority subordinate to that which had appointed him. The Supreme Court found that the removal of the appellant from service was by an authority which was subordinate in rank to that by which he was appointed. The argument for the respondent that since the Divisional Assistant Electrical Engineer had been given the power to make appointment to the post concerned, he would have the power to remove any person from that post, was repelled pointing out that whether or not an authority is subordinate in rank to another has to be determined with reference to the state of affairs existing on the date of appointment. The subsequent authorisation made in favour of respondent No. 1 in regard to making appointments to the post held by the appellant could not confer upon the respondent the power to remove him. The question we are faced with in the present, is different namely, whether the power conferred on the Assistant Regional Manager on February 16, 1974 in the form of a resolution of the Corporation survives despite the supersession brought about by the Regulations referred to above and the provisions of the Central (Amendment) Act 1982 which reflect unmistakably a different intention. On account of those intervening factors which have superimposed the power created under the resolution stands eroded. 23. There was a feeble attempt for the respondent--the Corporation to justify the impugned orders on the basis of de facto doctrine. The submission is misplaced. On account of those intervening factors which have superimposed the power created under the resolution stands eroded. 23. There was a feeble attempt for the respondent--the Corporation to justify the impugned orders on the basis of de facto doctrine. The submission is misplaced. In Pulin Behari v. King Emperor, 16 I.C. 257 Sir Asutosh Mookerjee, J. traced the origin of this doctrine and observed thus as to its content:-- "The substance of the matter is that the de facto doctrine was introduced into the law as a matter of policy and necessity, to prospect the interest of the public and the individual where these interests were involved in the official acts of persons exercising the duties of an office without being lawful officers. The doctrine in fact is necessary to maintain the supremacy of the law and to preserve peace and order in the community at large. Indeed, if any individual or body of individuals were permitted, at his or their pleasure, to collaterally challenge the authority of and to refuse obedience to the Government of the State and the numerous functionaries through whom it exercised its various powers on the ground of irregular existence or defective title, insubordination and disorder of the worst kind would be encouraged. For the good order and peace of society, their authority must be upheld until in some regular mode their title is directly investigated and determined." 24. The Supreme Court cited this and other authorities with approval in Gokaraju Rangaraju v. State of A.P., 1968 All. L.J. 877 (F.B.) and came to the conclusion-- "A Judge, de facto, therefore, is one who is not a mere intruder or usurper but one who holds office, under colour of lawful authority, though his appointment is defective and may later be found to be defective. Whatever be the defect of his title to the office, judgments pronounced by him and acts done by him when he was clothed with the powers and functions of the office, albeit unlawfully, have the same efficacy as judgments pronounced and acts done by a judge de jure. Such is the de facto doctrine, born of necessity and public policy to prevent needless confusion and endless mischief. There is yet another rule also based on public policy. Such is the de facto doctrine, born of necessity and public policy to prevent needless confusion and endless mischief. There is yet another rule also based on public policy. The defective appointment of a de facto judge may be questioned directly in a proceeding to which he be a party but it cannot be permitted to be questioned in a litigation between two private litigants, a litigation which is of no concern or consequence to the Judge except as a judge. Two litigants, litigating their private titles cannot be permitted to bring in issue and litigate upon the title of a judge to his office. Otherwise so soon as a judge pronounces a judgment a litigation may be commenced for a declaration that the judgment is void because the judge is no judge. A judge's title to his office cannot be brought into jeopardy in that fashion. Hence the rule against collateral attack on validity of judicial appointments. To question judge's appointment in an appeal against his judgment is, of course, such a collateral attack." 25 The distinction is noticed also by Dwivedi J., speaking for the majority in Jai Kumar v. State, W.P. No. 18556 of 1985 dated 20.5.86 in these words:-- "The connecting of the appointment of a person as a Judge with the jurisdiction of a judge has a plausible appearance but is fallacious." A is a Judge" and "A" as a Judge, has jurisdiction over suits for money"--these two sentences refer to two distinct legal concepts in jurisprudence. The first refers to the status or legal character of a person; the second refers to the legal authority or power of a judge to entertain a petition or other proceeding." 26. In the instant case the challenge is not to the appointment of Regional Manager, Asstt. Regional Manager or Station Superintendent. The petitioners do not contend that these officers were not duly appointed or that they did not hold the office assigned to them. The attack is directed instead against the orders which they have made in exercise of their professed authority. This pertains to the scope of their powers exercisable in respective capacity. The individuals concerned held their office both de facto and de jure. No question of colour of authority arises in such a case. 27. The attack is directed instead against the orders which they have made in exercise of their professed authority. This pertains to the scope of their powers exercisable in respective capacity. The individuals concerned held their office both de facto and de jure. No question of colour of authority arises in such a case. 27. Learned counsel for the petitioners also invited our attention to the decision of a learned Single Judge in Rashid Ahmad v. U.P. State Road Transport Corporation etc., Writ Petition No. 18556 of 1985. D/d. 20.5.1986 in which the order of removal passed by Regional Manager was quashed on ground inter alia that there is no delegation made by the Board and their resolution of the Corporation dated 16.2.1974 is of no avail. 28. For reasons given by us we are in respectful agreement with the conclusion reached on the point by the learned Judge. The submission for the respondent that on the footing of that judgment such orders only be nullified as are made after 20th May 1986 has only to be stated to be rejected. The Court does not legislate; the judgment merely declares the law as it has been during the relevant period. The law existing has only been interpreted; this has indeed been the position to our mind since 19th June 1981 when the Regulations were enforced, and, in any case since 13th November 1982 when the Central (Amendment) Act, 1982 became operative. 29. For the discussions in the above, the petitions succeed and are allowed. The impugned orders are quashed. The authority competent in this behalf shall be at liberty to proceed in the matter afresh according to law. We leave the parties to bear their own costs.