Judgment Ramnandan Prasad, J. 1. This appeal is directed against the order passed by the learned single judge dated 9-1-1985 dismissing C.W.J.C. No. 1692 of 1983, which was filed by the appellant. In that writ application the appellant had prayed for the issuance of a mandamus on respondent No. 2, the Bihar Public Service Commission (hereinafter referred to as the commission) to recommend his name for appointment to any post on the basis of the result of the 29th combined competitive examination held by the Commission, and on respondent No. 1, the State of Bihar, for appointing him to the said post. There was also a request to quash the appointment of respondent No. 3 Binod Singh as Block Employment Officer, as he had secured less marks than the appellant at the said examination. 2. The short question, which arises for decision in this appeal, is as to whether a candidate, who had applied for all the services/posts, but had subsequently shown preference for only seven of the services/posts, could be refused appointment to the services/post which he had not included in his preference list, on the ground that he will be deemed to have withdrawn his candidature for the services/posts not included in his preference list. 3. In response to an advertisement issued by the Commission the appellant filed an application for various services/posts for which a combined competitive examination, to wit, the 29th combined competitive examination was going to be held. The candidates were instructed not to indicate their preference for the various services in the application form, as they were to be given an opportunity to indicate their preference at the time of viva-voce test, in case they qualified at the written examination. In due course the result of the written test was declared by the Commission and the appellant was declared successful in the category which was reserve for economically most backward class and he was asked to appear at the viva-voce test on 27-11-1981. When the appellant went for appearing at the said test, he was given a statement showing the number of vacancies in the different services/posts in different departments with their pay scales and he was asked to indicate his preference for the services/posts in order of preference on a blank sheet of paper. When the appellant went for appearing at the said test, he was given a statement showing the number of vacancies in the different services/posts in different departments with their pay scales and he was asked to indicate his preference for the services/posts in order of preference on a blank sheet of paper. Accordingly he mentioned the names of seven services/posts in order of preference on a blank sheet of paper and tendered the same to the commission. He, however, did not write anything about the remaining services posts. When the final results were published the petitioner did not find his name amongst the successful candidates and, on an enquiry in the commission office, he learnt that although he had secured a total of 461 marks (443 in written examination and 18 viva-voce), he was not declared successful whereas respondent No. 3 Binod Singh was declared successful in the same category i.e. economically most backward, although he had obtained only 459 marks in the aggregate. Eventually respondent No. 3 was appointed as Block Employment Officer. The appellant represented his case to the Secretary of the commission, but to no effect. Thereafter he filed a writ application in this Court-vide C.W.J.C. No. 3944 of 1982 which was disposed of on 1940-1982 with a direction to the Chairman of the commission to dispose of the representation of the petitioner. Subsequently, the representation of the petitioner was rejected and, being aggrieved thereby, he filed C.W.J.C. No, 1692 of 1983 which was disposed of by a learned single judge of this Court on 9-1-85 declining to grant any relief to the appellant excepting the opportunity to file a representation before the State Government. It is this decision of the learned single judge which has given rise to this appeal. 4. The State Government and the Commission (respondent Nos. 1 and 2) have filed a counter-affidavit in which their case is that before appearing at the viva-voce test the candidates were given a printed proforma to indicate their preference for different services/posts for which they wanted to be considered on a plain sheet of paper and the appellant mentioned the names of only seven services/posts in order of preference on that proforma. He did not indicate his preference for the post of Block Employment Officer and hence he was not considered for that post by the Commission and that is why his name was not recommended for that post and instead the name of respondent No. 3 Binod Singh was recommended for that post, although he had obtained lesser marks than the appellant. This Binod Singh was later appointed to that post and since then he is working on that post. 5. In this case the facts are by and large admitted. It is the admitted position that the appellant had filed an application for all the services/posts for which the 29th combined competitive examination was to be held, it is also admitted that he had obtained higher marks than respondent No. 3 Binod Singh, who was appointed as Block Employment Officer on the basis of the result of the said examination. It is further admitted that the appellant as well as respondent No. 3 came in the same category of economically most backward for which certain posts were reserved. It is also admitted that the appellant had not mentioned the post of Block Employment Officer in the preference list submitted by him to the commission. 6. The commission has annexed the preference list given by the appellant before the viva-voce test, which is Annexure--A to the counter-affidavit filed by the respondents. As stated above, the candidates were given proforma by the commission for filling up the same before the viva-voce test. This proforma shows that the candidates were asked to give their preference in respect of different services/posts and the appellant gave a list of only 7 services/posts in order of preference in that proforma. There is, however, nothing in this proforma to indicate that the candidate would not be considered for appointment to any service/post for which he had not shown any preference in this proforma. It has also been conceded that there was no rule framed by the commission to the effect that a candidate would not be appointed to any service or post which was not mentioned in his preference list. No instruction to this effect was also issued to the candidates of the said 29th competitive examination. It has also been conceded that there was no rule framed by the commission to the effect that a candidate would not be appointed to any service or post which was not mentioned in his preference list. No instruction to this effect was also issued to the candidates of the said 29th competitive examination. It was stated at the Bar that such a rule has been framed after the said examination, but it would not be necessary to deal with this rule in this appeal. 7. So, the position is the candidates were simply asked to state their preference for various services/posts in order of preference without being told that they will not be appointed to any service or post which was not included in their preference list. The stand of the commission and the Government was that even in the absence of such instruction or rule, as stated above, a candidate should be deemed to have withdrawn his candidature for the service or post, which he had not included in his preference list. The learned single judge seems to have accepted this stand of the respondents and observed as follows: ...but once the petitioner had mentioned only 7 services against which he was prepared to be considered, the respondent commission cannot be held responsible for not recommending his name for any other service. With great respect to the learned single judge, the view expressed by him goes too far. Merely because the appellant had shown preference for seven services/posts only in his preference list, it cannot be presumed in the absence of any rule or instruction to that effect that he had abandoned his claim in respect of other services for which he had not shown any preference. 8. As stated above, there was no rule or instruction given to the candidate at the relevant time that the candidate would not be considered for those services which they did not include in their preference list. In the proforma the appellant was required only to state his order of preference for the various services/posts and nothing more. 8. As stated above, there was no rule or instruction given to the candidate at the relevant time that the candidate would not be considered for those services which they did not include in their preference list. In the proforma the appellant was required only to state his order of preference for the various services/posts and nothing more. The appellant had given a list of seven services/posts in order of preference, in his proforma and had not mentioned the post of Block Employment Officer therein, so, the position is that he showed his preference for only seven services/posts and did not say anything regarding the rest of the services/posts in respect of which also the said combined competitive examination was held. It is the undisputed position that the appellant was a candidate for all those services/posts, when he had submitted his application form and had appeared at the written examination. The submission of the appellant is that in that proforma he had shown his preference for only seven posts as he had equal preference for the remaining services/posts, and he could not be deprived of the services/posts for which he had not shown preference, only on the basis of the said preference list when, on the face of it, it does not show that he had abandoned his claim for the other services/posts. In support of this submission, learned Counsel referred to column Nos. 22 & 11 of the Instruction to the candidates of the Civil Services (Main) Examinations conducted by the Union Public Commission. It has been stated therein as follows: 22. State in order of preference the services and posts for which you would like to be considered for appointment. 11. In case you do not include certain services and posts in answer to col. 22 it will be assumed that you have equal preference for those services/posts. According to this instruction, the candidate was to be considered even for those services/posts which were not included in his preference list, on the assumption that he had equal preference for those services/posts. This instruction is in consonance with the principle of natural justice and fair play. On the other hand, the stand of the respondents that the candidate would be deemed to have withdrawn his candidature for the services/posts which were not included in the preference list does not appear to be reasonable. This instruction is in consonance with the principle of natural justice and fair play. On the other hand, the stand of the respondents that the candidate would be deemed to have withdrawn his candidature for the services/posts which were not included in the preference list does not appear to be reasonable. The submission of the learned Counsel is that in view of the said instruction issued by the Union Public Service Commission and there being nothing contrary in the instructions issued by the commission, the appellant was always under the impression that the same principle would be applied by the Commission also. It was submitted that it was under this impression that he had given a list of only seven services/ posts in his preference list and had not mentioned the rest, as the commission would assure that he had equal preference for the remaining services/posts. This submission also appears to be quite reasonable. 9 In any event, the result of this appeal would depend upon the true meaning of the word "Preference", when there is no rule or instruction regarding abandonment of the claim in respect of services/posts, which are not included in the preference list. The Oxford English Dictionary (Volume VIII) gives the meaning of the term as the action of preferring or the fact of being preferred, liking for or estimation of one thing before or above another, prior favor or choice. The Chambers 20th Century Dictionary gives the meaning of the term as the act of choosing, favoring, or liking one above another; estimation above another: the state of being preferred: priority. 10. So, the ordinary meaning of preference is to give priority to one over another. It would mean that by giving preference to one the person shows his liking for it over the others. This does not mean that by giving preference or priority to one, he shows his dislike for others and opts against them. So, if the appellant gave preference to some services/posts. It cannot be said that he has withdrawn his candidature for the rest of the services/posts Any contrary inference drawn on the basis of preference list would be opposed to the principle of natural justice. So, if the appellant gave preference to some services/posts. It cannot be said that he has withdrawn his candidature for the rest of the services/posts Any contrary inference drawn on the basis of preference list would be opposed to the principle of natural justice. If one says that he prefers a five roomed house, it cannot be interpreted to mean that he would not accept a four roomed house, if no five roomed house is made available to him. The term preference always indicates that the person has a choice to make. It cannot be interpreted to mean that if he is not offered the thing for which he has shown his preference, he will not accept the other things offered to him for which also he was otherwise eligible and for which also he was a candidate from the very beginning. If the applicant had no choice left with him, as he was not found suitable for those services/posts for which he had shown preference, it cannot be said that he has abandoned his claim for the rest of the services, as it cannot be presumed that he would prefer to remain unemployed, if he did not get the services/posts of his choice. 11. For the reasons given above, with great respect to the learned judge, I am unable to agree with the view expressed in the impugned judgment and I have no hesitation in holding that the appellant did not withdraw his candidature for the posts and services which he did not include in his preference list. In such a situation, the commission and the Government should have assumed that the appellant had equal preference for those services and posts which were not included in his preference list as is done by the Union Public Service Commission. It would have been a different matter had there been a rule or instruction to the contrary. But, in the absence of any such rule or instruction issued in respect of the examination in question, the above assumption of the commission appears to be unreasonable and opposed to the principle of natural justice. It is, accordingly, held that the appellant by including only seven services/posts in his preference list, did not withdraw his candidature for the other services for which also he had sat at the said examination. It is, accordingly, held that the appellant by including only seven services/posts in his preference list, did not withdraw his candidature for the other services for which also he had sat at the said examination. In this view of the matter, the commission and the Government were not justified in not considering him for the post of Block Employment Officer or for other services/posts for which he would have been found suitable on the basis of the result of the said examination. The commission was, therefore, whole unjustified in recommending the name of respondent No. 3 Binod Singh in preference to the appellant for the post of Block Employment Officer, when the appellant had admittedly secured higher total marks than him, for the reserved quota of most economically backward candidates. Similarly, the Government was not justified in appointing respondent No. 3 in preference to the appellant to the post of Block Employment Officer in the said category. 12. By recommending the name of respondent No. 3 for the post of Block Employment Officer and not recommending the name of the appellant for that post, when the appellant had admittedly secured higher marks than respondent No. 3, the commission has violated the principle of natural justice and also Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Similarly, the Government is also guilty of these violations by accepting the recommendation of the commission. In such a situation, the appointment of respondent No. 3 is fit to be quashed. But, we have been informed at the Bar by the learned Counsel for the appellant that a number of vacancies for the posts of Block Employment Officers are still vacant and the Government has made a request to the commission to send recommendation for the same on the basis of the result of the 29th combined competitive examination, which is also evident from Annexure 6 & 7. That being so, it does not appear necessary to quash the appointment of respondent No. 3 if the appellant can be appointed to the said post without quashing the appointment of respondent No. 3. But, in case it be not possible to appoint the appellant to the said post without quashing the appointment of respondent No. 3, the State Government shall do so for doing justice to the appellant. 13. But, in case it be not possible to appoint the appellant to the said post without quashing the appointment of respondent No. 3, the State Government shall do so for doing justice to the appellant. 13. The commission is, therefore, directed to recommend the name of the appellant for appointment to the post of Block Employment Officer and the State Government is directed to consider his case for appointment to the said post, as if his name had been shown above respondent No. 3 in the category of most economically backward. On his appointment, the appellant shall be placed above respondent No. 3 in the seniority list (in case the appellant is appointed without quashing the appointment of respondent No. 3) and the appellant shall be given all increments, as if he had been appointed on the date on which respondent No. 3 was appointed. 14. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed, Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 are directed to comply with the above directions within two months of the communication of this order. The appellant is entitled to cost of this appeal as well as the original writ application, which is quantified at Rs. 1000.00 only.