P. Chennakesav Reddi, C.J. - The resolving of the issue raised in this case revolves round the question as to the correct interpretation of sub-section (4) of section 3 of the Income-tax Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and the extent of limitation on the power of the Income-tax Officer under the said sub-section to withhold consent to vary the meaning of the expression "previous year” by an assessee. The material facts may be made plain at the outset for a proper appreciation of the issue involved in the case. The petitioner (hereinafter referred to as the assessee-company) grows tea by agricultural process in the tea estates situated in the State of Assam. At all material times, the assessee-company carried on and now also carries on business in growing green tea leaves and manufacturing black tea there from. The assessee-company is a regular income-tax assessee under the Act. The assessments under the Act have been completed up to this assess­ment year "1982-83. The assessee-company has also filed all returns up to the assessment year 1984-85. The assessee-company used to maintain accounts from 1st July of each year to 30th June of the next year the assessee-company, however, had to change under certain compelling circums­tances the accounting period to the financial year with effect from 1983. Therefore, the assessee-company sought permission of the Income-tax authorities to vary the-meaning of the expre­ssion "previous year" under section 3 (4) of the Act and the assessee-company was allowed to change Its "previous year” from 30th June to 31st March effective from the assessment year 1983-84. The assessee-company then submitted an application on 28th June, 1985 seeking permission for change of "previous year'' under section 3(4) of the Act from 31st March to 30th June. It was stated in the application that tea being a seasonal pro­duct, the closing stock had to be valued at the subsequently realised price and that on 31st March a substantial quantity of the old season's tea remained unsold even at the time of finalising the accounts and as such the unsold tea had to be -valued at an estimated realisable value. On the other hand, it was pleaded that if the accounts were closed on 30th June, by the time of accounts finalisation the sale value of almost the entire old season stock would be known and the profit and loss account could be correctly drawn up without any estima­tion being required. It was further asserted in the application that almost all the big tea companies in Assam had made 30tb June their accounting year end and if the assessee-company also has the same year end, it will greatly facilitate comparative studies and help better planning and results. It was also however affirmed that the variation of the change in the previous year will not in any way affect the revenue. The Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax by his order dated 4. 7.85 rejected the application observing as follows : "However, after going through the records of the case as well as considering all the reasons stated in the assessee's petition, I find no justification to entertain the assessee's claim. I, therefore, reject the assessee's petition dated 28. 6. 85. Sd/-C. Rokhama Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Assessment Range- I, Gauhati.'' Against the said order, the assessee-company preferred revi­sion petition under section 264 of the Act on 27.9.85 before the Commissioner of Income-tax It was pleaded in the revision petition that the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner failed to give any reasons for rejecting the assessee's application and 4id not grant even an opportunity to the assessee-company of being heard before withholding consent for the variation. The Commissioner of Income tax by his order dated 23rd August, 1985 also rejected the application observing that "permitting the assessee to change its previous year from the financial year to the period ended 30th June will adversely affect the revenue." Aggrieved against the said order of the Commissioner, the assessee-company has filed this writ petition. It is firstly submitted on behalf of the assessee company that the power conferred on the Income-tax Officer under sub­section (4) of section 3 of the Act to withhold consent is not absolute but circumscribed by limitations and that no power is conferred to refuse consent outright. However, argues the learned counsel, consent could be given subject to conditions to safegu­ard losses of revenue, if any, attendant on the consent for ch­ange in the previous year. However, argues the learned counsel, consent could be given subject to conditions to safegu­ard losses of revenue, if any, attendant on the consent for ch­ange in the previous year. The second submission is this: The rejection of the application without giving any reasons and wi­thout affording an opportunity of being heard even to the assessee-company is opposed to the principles of natural justice. The discretion conferred under section 3 (4) of the Act is coupled with a duty to exercise judicially and, therefore, failure to have taken into consideration the objective factors placed before him has resulted in grave injustice to the assessee. The learned Standing Counsel for the revenue, on the other hand, submits that consent under section 3 (4) of the Act is an administrative action, that it is not necessary to record reasons or afford an opportunity of being heard to the assessee for the exercise of the discretion under section 3 (4) of the Act, that the change if allowed would occasion loss to the revenue and that the request for change was, therefore, rightly rejected. The first question is whether the Income-tax officer has ab­solute power to refuse consent and reject an application of the assessee for change of the "previous year'' under section 3 (4) of the Act. "Previous year" is defined in section 3(1) of the Act and in so far as is material for the purpose of this case, it may be read : "3. "Previous year'' defined. (1) For the purposes of this Act, "previous year'' means- (a) the financial year immediately preceding the assess­ment year; or (b) if the accounts of the assessee have been made up to a date within the said financial year, then, at the op­tion of the assessee, the twelve' months ending on such date; or (c) in the case of any person or business or class of per­sons or business not failing within clauses (a) or clause (b), such period as may be determined by the Board or by any authority authorised by the Board in this behalf or (d)...... (e).... (f).... (g)-.--" Now, sub-section (4) of section 3 may be noticed. (e).... (f).... (g)-.--" Now, sub-section (4) of section 3 may be noticed. "(4) Where in respect of a particular source of income or in respect of business or profession newly set up, an assessee has once exercised the option under clause (b) or sub-clause (ii) of clause (d) or sub-clause (i) of clause (e) of sub-section (1) or has once been assessed, then, he shall not, in respect of that source, or, as the case may be, business or profession, been titled to vary the meaning of the expression "previous year'' as then applicable to him, except with the consent of the Income-tax Officer and upon such conditions as the Income-tax Officer may think fit to impose." Generally "Previous year" as defined in the section is the financial year immediately preceding the assessment year. But the assessee has an option if the accounts of the asse­ssee have been made up to a date within the said finan­cial year on the basis of the Hind, Christian or other calendar year, or the assessee has made up his accounts on the basis of a twelve-month period starting from any odd date of the year, to have as his "Previous year'' either the immedia­tely preceding financial year or the period ending within such year for which to has made up his accounts. Sub-section (4) cl­early says that if an assessee has once exercised his option under clause (b) or other appropriate clause in respect of a busi­ness,/ profession, or vocation, then the assessee cannot in respect of that source, business, profession, or vocation change the "previous year'' except with the consent of the Income-tax Offi­cer and the Income tax Officer is entitled to impose such conditions as he may deem fit in permitting the assessee to change the "previous year''. The expression employed in the section is that the assessee shall not "be entitled to vary the meaning of the expression "previous year" except with the consent of the Income-tax Officer. Therefore, if the consent is not given- to change the "previous year'', the assessee cannot change the "previous year". But the sub-section empowers the authority to impose such conditions as he thinks fit to impose having regard to the circumstances in giving his consent for the change of the "pre­vious year". Therefore, if the consent is not given- to change the "previous year'', the assessee cannot change the "previous year". But the sub-section empowers the authority to impose such conditions as he thinks fit to impose having regard to the circumstances in giving his consent for the change of the "pre­vious year". The legislative intent Or policy underlying the pro­vision appears to be clearly to give consent save in exceptional cases with or without conditions. The sub-section no doubt vests with the authority discretion to withhold consent. But that di­scretion must be exercised in conformity with the policy or le­gislative intent to effectuate which discretionary power is vested. But the more important question is, should the order pissed by the Income-tax officer be a speaking order ? In other words, should be given reasons if consent is not given ? The discretion ves­ted in him is judicial in nature and is coupled with a duty to exercise the discretion judicially. The exercise of discretion should not be arbitrary, Arbitrariness and discrimination are tw­ins. No doubt, discretionary power is not necessarily discrimin­atory, but the discretionary power must be exercised in a judicial manner. Orders unsupported by reasons are logically incomplete and are bound to breed discrimination. The absence of any such reasons deprives the assessee to successfully assail the order before the appellate or revisional court. Therefore, arbitrary re­fusal to change the ''previous year" offends Article 14 of the constitution. To strike down exercise of arbitrary power is not merely to sustain the rule of law but to exalt it. Bhagwati, J. (as he then was), speaking for the court in the Siemens Engineering & Manufacturing Co. of India Ltd. vs. The Union of India and anr., (1976) 2 SCC 981 , observed. "Before we part with this appeal, we must express our regret at the manner in which the Assistant Collector, the Collector and the Government of India disposed of the proceedings before them. It is incontrovertible that the proceedings before the Assistant Collector arising from the notices demanding differential duty were quasi-judicial proceedings and so also were the proceedings in revision before the Collector and the Government of India. Indeed, this was not disputed by the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents. It is incontrovertible that the proceedings before the Assistant Collector arising from the notices demanding differential duty were quasi-judicial proceedings and so also were the proceedings in revision before the Collector and the Government of India. Indeed, this was not disputed by the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents. It is now settled law that where an authority makes an order in exercise of a quasi-judicial function, it must record its reasons in support of the order it makes. Every quasi-judicial order must be supported by reasons. That has been laid down by a long line of decisions of this Court ending with N.M. Desai vs. Testeels Ltd. (C.A. No. 245 of 1970, decided on December 17, 1975). But, unfortunately, the Assistant Collector did not choose to give any reason in support of the order made by him confirming the demand for differen­tial duty. This was in plain disregard of the requirement of law." Learned Counsel for the revenue, however, submits that the order passed by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income tax is administrative in nature and there is no need to record reasons for the exercise of the discretion under sub-sect­ion (4) of section 3 of the Act. Reliance is placed by the lea­rned counsel on the decision of the Delhi High Court in Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Ltd. vs. Income-tax officer, Central Circle VII New Delhi, (1973) 88 ITR 21 , in which Rajindar Sachar, J. (as be then was) held that while exercising the discretion under section 3(4) of the Act, it was not obligatory on the part of the Income-tax Officer to record reasons for refusing to accord his appro­val for the change in the "previous year" of the assessee. However, we find it difficult to agree with the opinion expressed by the learned single Judge for the reasons already recorded above. The next submission of learned counsel for the revenue is that the assessee had preferred a revision before the Commissioner of Income tax, North Eastern Region and the Commissi­oner had passed a speaking order giving reason for rejecting the prayer of the assessee for change of the "previous year" and so no prejudice is caused to the assessee. The next submission of learned counsel for the revenue is that the assessee had preferred a revision before the Commissioner of Income tax, North Eastern Region and the Commissi­oner had passed a speaking order giving reason for rejecting the prayer of the assessee for change of the "previous year" and so no prejudice is caused to the assessee. A look at the order discloses that the Commissioner was somewhat prejudiced against the assessee by the fact that in case of change in the "previous year" from the financial year to the period ended 30th June, 1985, the previous year of the assessee would be for a period of 15 months from 1st April, 1984 to 30th June, 1985 and that there would be no "previous year'' for the assessment year 1985-86 and since there had been a reduction in the rate of tax for the assessment year 1986-87, the change would adversely affect the revenue. The Commissioner totally failed to take into con­sideration factors germane for the purpose of decision of the issue; namely, that there was considerable practical inconvenience in finalising the accounts by the assessee company since at the end of 31st March, a substantial quantity of tea remained unsold and as such the unsold tea has to be valued at an estimated realisable price for the purpose of accounting and that the incon­venience of fixing an estimated price for the unsold tea could be avoided only by changing the "previous year” from 31st March to 30th of June. Learned counsel for the petitioner sta­tes from the Bar that if any loss of revenue is to be occasio­ned, then appropriate conditions could be imposed to safeguard any such loss in allowing the change in the "previous year." It is also stated that almost all the big tea companies in Assam ob­serve 30th day of June as their accounting year end and that it would also greatly help the assessee company in making compa­rative studies and making better planning if the assessee-company is permitted to change the accounting year. The learned counsel had also furnished a list of 13 leading tea companies in Assam which observe 30th June as their accounting year end. Therefore, it cannot but be said that the order is vitiated by taking into consideration factors not germane for the decision of the issue. The learned counsel had also furnished a list of 13 leading tea companies in Assam which observe 30th June as their accounting year end. Therefore, it cannot but be said that the order is vitiated by taking into consideration factors not germane for the decision of the issue. We are unable to see how the decision of the Supreme Court in Shankar Ramchandra Abhyankar vs. Krishnaji Dattatraya Bapat ( AIR 1970 SC 1 ) cited for the revenue is applicable to the facts of this case. That was a case where after the revision petition against the appellate order was dismissed by the High Court after hearing both the parties the appellate order was once again cha­llenged in the High Court by another set of proceedings under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court therein observed : "The right of appeal is one of entering a superior Court and invoking its aid and interposition to redress the error of the Court below. Two things which are required to con­stitute appellate jurisdiction are the existence of the rela­tion of superior and inferior Court and the power on the part of Jibe former to review decisions of the latter. When the a id of the High Court is invoked on the revisional side, it is done because it is a superior Court and it can interfere for the purpose of rectifying the error of the Court below. Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cir­cumscribes the limits of that jurisdiction but the jurisdic­tion which is being exercised is a part of the general appellate jurisdiction of the High Court as a superior Court. It is only one of the modes of exercising power confe­rred by the Statute; basically and fundamentally it is the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court which is be­ing invoked and exercised in a wider, and larger sense.” * * * * * * "If there are two modes of invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court and one of those modes has been chosen and exhausted it would not be a proper and sound exer­cise of discretion to grant relief in the other set of pro­ceedings in respect of the same order of the subordinate Court. The refusal to grant relief in such circumstances would be in consonance with the anxiety of the Court to prevent abuse of process as also to respect and accord fina­lity to its own decisions.” On the other hand, the decisions referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioner are more apposite. In Annamunthodo vs. Oil fields Workers Trade Union, (1961)3 All E. R. 621, Lord Denning, speaking for the Court, said "If the original order was invalid, for want of observance of the rules of natural justice, he can still complain of it, notwithstanding his appeal.'' Again in Leary vs. National Union of Vehicle Builders, (1970) 2 All E.R. 713, Megarry, J., said "If a man has never had a fair trial by the appropriate trial body, is it open to an appellate body to discard its appellate functions and itself give the man the fair trial that he has never had ? I very much doubt the existence of any such doctrine. Central bodies and local bodies often differ much in their views and approach; and the evidence before me certainly does not suggest that this is a union free from any such differences. Suppose the case of a member whose activities have pleased some of his fellow members in the locality but have displeased headquarters and other branches. Su­ppose further that in his absences and so without hearing his explanations, a local committee is persuaded to expel him. Is it answer to his complaint that he has not rece­ived the benefit of natural justice to say 'Never mind, one of the central bodies will treat your appeal as if it were an initial trial' ? Can he not say "I want to be tried pro­perly and fairly by the only body with power under the rules to try me in the first place, namely, the local co­mmittee'? Can he not say "I want to be tried pro­perly and fairly by the only body with power under the rules to try me in the first place, namely, the local co­mmittee'? I appreciate that the appeals council is compo­sed of members elected from each of the union's 12 divi­sions, and is not an emanation of the NEC or other central body; but I do not think that this affects the point." The Supreme Court in Mohinder Singh Gill vs. The Chief Election Commissioner ( AIR 1978 SC 851 ) observed : “When a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh rea­sons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to Court on account of a challenge, get validated by addi­tional grounds later brought out." Therefore, even if some reasons are given or found in the revisional order passed by the Commissioner, it cannot cure the defect in the original order passed by the Inspecting Assistant Com­missioner, which is undoubtedly arbitrary and unsupported by any reasons. The learned counsel for the revenue. Dr. Saraf, invi­ted our attention to the decision of the House of Lords in Calvin vs. Carr and ors. (1979) 2 All E. R. 440. The House of Lo­rds, dealing with the decision of Megarry, J., in Leary vs. Na­tional Union of Vehicle Builders, (1970) 2 All E. R. 713, said : "In their Lordships' opinion this is too broadly stated. It affirms principle which may be found correct in a cate­gory of cases.” The Court said that there can be no absolute rule that de­fects in natural justice appearing at an original hearing, whether administrative or quasi judicial, cannot be cured through appeal proceedings which had been correctly and fairly conducted. The task of the court was to decide whether at the end of the pro­ceedings there is a fair result reached by fair methods. We have already stated that in this case there had been no such fair result reached by fair methods. The task of the court was to decide whether at the end of the pro­ceedings there is a fair result reached by fair methods. We have already stated that in this case there had been no such fair result reached by fair methods. The question that still plagues the case is whether under section 3 (4) of the Act an assessee is entitled to a personal hea­ring before an order prejudicial to the assessee or refusing to allow the assessee a change in the "previous year” is passed. Is any order passed without affording a personal hearing to the assessee a nullity on the ground of infraction of the principles of natural justice ? Sub-section (4) of section 3 does not expressly say that the assessee shall be heard before an order is passed. The learned counsel for the revenue invited our attention to the se­veral provisions in the Act, namely, section 127 (power to trans­fer cases), section 144A (power of Inspecting Assistant Commissio­ner in cataia cases), sub-section (4) of section 144B (reference to In­specting Assistant Commissioner in certain oases), section 148 (issue of notice where income has escaped assessment), section 154 (rectifi­cation of mistake) and section 186 (cancellation of registration) and submitted that wherever the legislature intended an opportunity of being heard to the assessee being afforded a specific provision has been made in that regard in the statute itself and the absence of any such specific provision providing an opportunity of being heard in sub-section (4) of section 3 must be construed to exclude impliedly such an opportunity of being heard to the assessee. On the other hand learned counsel for the petitioner submits that whenever the Parliament considered it necessary 10 exclude the applicability of the principles of natural justice Parliament expressly provided so in no uncertain terms. He pointed out to us the provisions of section 185 (1) (b) (procedure for registration of a firm), section 245(D) (procedure for settlement of cases.) We only fold in section 245(D) that an application for Settlement Commissioner shall not be rejected unless an opportunity has been given to the applicant of being heard. Section 245 (D) deals with settle­ment of the cases of the assessee on an application made by him for settlement of his cases by the Income-tax settlement Commi­ssion. Section 245 (D) deals with settle­ment of the cases of the assessee on an application made by him for settlement of his cases by the Income-tax settlement Commi­ssion. No other provision has been pointed out to us by the learned counsel for the petitioners which expressly provides an opportunity of being heard. Therefore, having regard to the other provisions of the Act referred to by the learned counsel for the revenue, we have no option but to conclude that Parliament whenever it considered necessary to provide an opportunity of being heard, made specific provision in that behalf. In the absence of any such express provision in section 3 (4) of the Act, the assessee cannot claim as of right an opportunity of being heard before any adverse order is passed by the Income-tax Officer. Rights cannot be conferred by mere implication. There must be clear and unequivocal enactment. Whether or not the rules of natural justice had been contravened should be decided not under any pre-conceived notions but in the light of the statuto­ry provisions and the rules. (See Nagendra Nath Bora vs. Commissioner, Hills Division, AIR 1958 SC 300 ). The last submission that requires to be considered is whether loss of revenue, or that the previous year will consist of more than twelve months if the change was allowed are valid grounds for rejection of the prayer for change in the "previous year" by the assessee. The learned counsel for the revenue placed re­liance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Esthuri Aswathaiah vs. Commissioner of Income-tax, Mysore, 60 ITR 114. In that case, for the assessment year 1952-53 the assessee filed a return for 21 months commencing on July 1, 1950 and ending on March 31, 1952. The Income-tax Officer accorded his sanct­ion for the change in the "previous year" and assessed the total income for the period of 21 months at the rate applicable to that total income. The Supreme Court held that the Income-tax Officer had power to treat the period of 21 months as the pre­vious year for the assessment year 1952-53 and that the total income for the period of 21 months had to be assessed at the rate specified in the relevant Finance Act for that total income and the Income-tax Officer could not apply the rate applicable to the income of the last period of 12 months. Therefore, it can no longer be contended that the length of a previous year should be only 12 calendar months. The length of a previous year may be more or less than 12 months under section 3(1)(c) of the Act as may be determined by the Central Board of Di­rect Taxes, or such authority as the Board may authorise in that behalf. The Supreme Court held that once the length of the previous year is determined, that income must be charged at the rate specified in the Finance Act and at no other rate. Now, there is a change in the language of the charging section contained in section 3 of the Indian Income tax Act, 1922 and section 4(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Section 3 of the Act of 1922 reads as follows : "3. Charge of income-tax.-Where any Central Act en­acts that income-tax shall be charged for any year at any rate or rates tax at that rate or those rates shall be charged for that year in accordance with, and subject to the provisions of, this Act in respect of the total income of the previous year of every individual Hindu undivided family, company and local authority, and of very firm and other association of persons or the partners of the firm or the members of the association individually.'' Section 4(1) of the Act of 1961 reads : "4. Charge of income-tax -(1) Where any Central Act enacts that income tax shall be charged for any assessment year at any rate or rates, income-tax at that rate or those rates shall be charged for that year in accordance with, and subject to the provisions of, this Act in respect of the total income of the previous year or previous years, as the case may be, of every person : Provided that where by virtue of any provision of this Act income-tax is to be charged in respect of the income of a period other than the previous year, income-tax shall be charged accordingly.'' The Supreme Court in the aforesaid case arising under the Act of 1922 held that once the length of the previous year is de­termined, the total income of the previous year relevant to the assessment year must be assessed at the rate specified in the relevant Finance Act and at no other rate. It is contended by the learned counsel that there is a difference in the languages employed in the charging sections of the Acts of 1922 and 1961. We are unable to find any difference so far as the main ingredient of the charging sec­tion is concerned. The subject of charge is the total income of the previous year and not the income of the assessment year. In other words, the tax is assessed and paid in the next succeeding year on the total income of the previous year at the rate fixed by the Finance Act of the relevant year of assess­ment. But, should the change in the previous year be allowed even though such permission results in loss of revenue ? It is not disputed that there is loss of revenue if the change in the previous year as prayed for by the assessee is permitted. The counter affidavit filed by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, Assessment Range I, Gauhati on behalf of the respondents shows that in view of the reduction in the rate of tax applicable for the assessment year 1986-87 to 50% from 55% which was the rate of tax applicable for the assessment year 1985-86, the revenue will suffer a loss of Rs. 16,04,441.00 and therefore the permission sought for was not allowed. It is pleaded by the revenue that the change in the previous year from 31.3.85 to 30.6.85 has been made only as a device to avoid tax keeping in view the reduction in the rates of the tax announced in the budget presented on 16.3.86 for the assess­ment year 1986-87. In the reply affidavit filed by the assessee, the assessee has categorically admitted no doubt that there will be a loss of revenue, but the loss of revenue may be about Rs. 9,62,665.00 and not Rs. 16,04,441.00 as stated in the affi­davit-in-opposition. But it is stated in the affidavit which it filed in support of the Civil Rule that the change in the pre­vious year could have been granted by imposing a condition protecting the loss of revenue. Indeed, it has also been stated from the Bar that the assessee is agreeable to any condition being imposed so that there is no loss of revenue occasioned by giving consent to the assessee for a change in the previous year. Indeed, it has also been stated from the Bar that the assessee is agreeable to any condition being imposed so that there is no loss of revenue occasioned by giving consent to the assessee for a change in the previous year. It is true that consent, no doubt, could be refused when the variation sought for is mala fide or rooted in oblique motives. In Additional Commissioner of Income-tax vs. Mumtaz Silk Central 101 ITR 355, a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court observed that while giving consent for the change in the pre­vious years the Income-tax Officer can impose reasonable condi­tions with a view to safeguarding the interest of the revenue. The same High Court in J. K. Synthetics Ltd. vs. D. S. Bajpai, Income-tax Officer, Central Circle vs. Kanpur, 105 ITR 864, observed that, “…... the conditions which the Income-tax officer can impose must be valid and legal besides being reasonable. He cannot impose conditions which are contrary to the provisions of the Income-tax Act.'' In Medowell and Co. Ltd. vs. Commercial Tax officer, 145 JTR 148, Chinnappa Reddy, J., observed : "----We must recognise that there is behind taxation laws as much moral sanction as behind any other wel­fare legislation and it is a pretence to say that avoi­dance of taxation is not unethical and that it stands on no less a moral plane than honest payment of taxa­tion. In our view, the proper way to construe a taxing statute, while considering a device to avoid tax, is not to ask whether the provisions should be construed literally or liberally nor whether the transaction is not unreal and not prohibited by the statute, but whether the transaction is a device to avoid tax, and whether the transaction is such that the judicial process may accord its appro­val to it." But in this case it is stated in the affidavit and also stated by learned counsel from the Bar that in order to protect the loss of revenue occasioned by the change in the previous year, a condition to that effect could be imposed by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner. Therefore, in view of the express sta­tement contained in the affidavit as well as made from the Bar by the learned counsel, we are unable to hold that the appli­cation for a change in the previous year is rooted in oblique motives of tax avoidance. Therefore, in view of the express sta­tement contained in the affidavit as well as made from the Bar by the learned counsel, we are unable to hold that the appli­cation for a change in the previous year is rooted in oblique motives of tax avoidance. The principles that can be discerned from the above discu­ssion and decisions are : (1) Sub-section (4) of Section 3 of the Act undoubtedly vests with the Income-Tax Officer discretion to give or withhold his consent for the change in the "previous year''. But that dis­cretion must be exercised in conformity with the policy or legis­lative intent to effectuate which discretionary power is vested. The legislative intent and policy underlying the provision appears to be clearly to give consent save in exceptional cases with or without conditions. (2) The exercise of discretionary power should not be arbi­trary. It should be exercised in a judicial manner. Arbitrary orders unsupported by reasons are logically incomplete and are bound to breed discrimination. Therefore, arbitrary refusal to change the "previous year'' is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. To strike down exercise of arbitrary power is not me­rely to sustain the rule of law but to exalt it. (3) The defect in the original order passed by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner which is found to be arbitrary and un­supported by any reasons cannot be cured by some reasons given in the revisional order passed by the Commissioner of Income-Tax. (5) An assessee cannot claim as of right an opportunity of being heard before any order withholding consent for the change in the "previous year" is passed by the Income-Tax Officer. Ri­ghts cannot be conferred by mere implication; there must be clear and un-equivocal enactment. In the absence of any such express provision for personal bearing in section 3(4) of the Act, the assessee cannot claim such a right. (5) The length of the "previous year" may be more or less than twelve months under Section 3(1)(c) of the Act as may be determined by the Central Board of Direct Taxes or such an authority as the Board may authorise in that behalf. (6) The Income-Tax Officer has power under Section 3(4) of the Act to withhold consent for a change in the "previous year" if the request of the assessee is rooted in oblique motives of tax avoidance. (6) The Income-Tax Officer has power under Section 3(4) of the Act to withhold consent for a change in the "previous year" if the request of the assessee is rooted in oblique motives of tax avoidance. For the reasons recorded above, the Civil Rule is allowed and the order of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, dated 5.7.85, and the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax, North Eastern Region, dated 23.8.85, are quashed. The Ins­pecting Assistant Commissioner shall now consider afresh the application of the assessee-company for a change in the "pre­vious year'' in the light of the observations made above and the undertaking given by the assessee-company that the assessee-com­pany shall be bound by any condition imposed by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner in allowing the change in the ''previous year" so that no loss of revenue is occasioned. No costs.