JUDGMENT K.N. Misra, J. - This revision is directed against the judgment and order dated 21-7-84 passed by Sri Hari Singh, Civil Judge, Gonda by which application has been rejected which was moved by the Defendant applicant seeking extension of time for depositing costs awarded, vide order dated 7-7-84 while setting aside exporter decree dated 5-3-84. 2. Plaintiff opposite party Sardar Arjun Singh had filed a suit for specific performance of contract. This suit was decreed exparte on 5-3-84. An application was moved by del endant-applicant for setting aside the exparte decree on 4-4-84. This application was allowed by the learned Civil Judge Sri Hari Singh; vide order dated 7-7-84. Tne exparte decree was set aside on the condition that the Defendant-applicant should deposit a sum of Rs. 100/- as costs and further a sum of Rs. 3000/- as costs of the suit in the court's account within two weeks from the date of said order i.e. 7-7-84. The period of two weeks allowed by the said order was to expire on 21st July, 1984 but on that date an application was moved by the Defendant-applicant, a copy of which has been annexed as annexure 6 to the counter affidavit wherein a prayer was made for extension of time to make deposit of the amount in compliance of order dated 7-7-84 by which exparte decree was set aside on aforesaid conditions. This application purported to be one moved u/s 148 of the CPC for short ' the Code '. It was rejected by the Civil Judge, Gonda, vide order date 21-7-84 by a short order which reads as under : Application did not comply with the order dated 7-7-84. Order dated 7-7-84 itself is very clear that this order will be of no avail and exparte decree will prevail in case it is Dot complied with. Hence application 9/D is not maintainable. Hence it is rejected. Sd/-Hari Singh. 27-7-1984 3. Defendant-applicant aggrieved by the above order preferred revision before the District Judge, Gonda, which was held to be not entertain able by the Court vide order dated 29-9-84. It appears that the Plaintiff opposite party had raised an objection to the effect that the revision was not maintainable in the court of the District Judge as the valuation of the suit was Rs. 25,000/-. It appears that the Plaintiff opposite party had raised an objection to the effect that the revision was not maintainable in the court of the District Judge as the valuation of the suit was Rs. 25,000/-. The revisionist was thus directed to file revision in this Court as it was found to be not maintainable in the court of the District Judge vide order dated 29-9-84. The Defendant-applicant thereupon presented this revision within limitation on 11-12-84 and notice was directed to be issued to the opposite parties to show cause why the revision application be not admitted. It was also indicated that the matter was likely to be disposed of finally on that date. This revision has thus been listed today for orders/ hearing. 4. I have heard learned Counsel for the Defendant-applicant Sri Shafiq Mirza and learned Counsel for the opposite party Smt. H.S. Suhai and have perused the impugned order dated 21-7-84 very caretally. Learned Counsel for the Appellant has urged that the application seeking extension of time was maintainable u/s 148 of the Code and the learned court below legally erred in rejecting the application as not maintainable, in reply learned Counsel for the opposite party has urged that the conduct of the Defendant-applicant did not entitle her to move application seeking extension of time as she had not deposited the amount which was required to be deposited within the period provided in the order dated 7-7-84. It was further urged that even the costs of Rs 100 - was not deposited by the Defendant-applicant while moving the application seeking extension of time. It was thus submitted that the learned court below has committed no error in rejecting the application as not maintainable. 5. Having heard learned Counsel for the parties and on a consideration of the relevant provision of the Code and decided case laws on the point, I find that the learned Civil Judge acted illegally and exhibited his gross-ignorance of the provisions of law while rejecting the application for extension of time as not maintainable. It is not disputed that the defen dant applicant had moved application within the period by which she was granted time to deposit the aforesaid amount mentioned in the order dated 7-7-84. It is not disputed that the defen dant applicant had moved application within the period by which she was granted time to deposit the aforesaid amount mentioned in the order dated 7-7-84. This application was moved on 21-7-84 and was rejected by the learned Civil Judge on the same day by the above quoted order which exhibits ignorance of the learned Civil Judge about the provision contained in Section 148 of the Code, which reads as under: 148 Enlargement of Time: Where any period is fixed or granted by the court for doing of any act prescribed or allowed by this code, the court may, in its discretion, from time to time, enlarge such period even though the period originally fixed or granted may have expired. 6. Had the learned Civil Judge taken care to go through the aforesaid provision, he would not have rejected the application for extension of time as not maintainable. This was the first application moved by the Defendant- applicant and it was also not moved after the expiry of the period fixed by the said order but it was presented on the last date when the time fixed was to expire, praying that time for making the deposit of the said amount be extended. This application, therefore, could not be rejected merely on the ground that it was not maintainable. In Gobardhan Singh v. Barsati, 1972 AWR 1 (FB), it was held '. Even in cases where an order is made by the court for doing a thing within a particular time and the order further provides that the application, suit or appeal shall stand dismissed if the thing is not done within the time fixed, the court had jurisdiction, if sufficient cause is made out, to extend the time even when the application for extension of time is made after the expiry of time fixed. It is not the application for grant of further time, whether made before or after the expiry of the time granted, which confers jurisdiction on the court. The court possesses the jurisdiction u/s 148, CPC to enlarge the time and the application merely invokes that jurisdiction. 7. In Lakshmi Bala Chanak Vs. Brojendra Nath Pain and Others, AIR 1971 Cal 243 , it has been observed that a court has power to extend time u/s 148 even after the time fixed by decree or order has expired. 8. 7. In Lakshmi Bala Chanak Vs. Brojendra Nath Pain and Others, AIR 1971 Cal 243 , it has been observed that a court has power to extend time u/s 148 even after the time fixed by decree or order has expired. 8. In Budhulal Kasturchand v. Chhotelal 1977 M P 1, it was observed : Even if in the initial order the court may have said that if costs are not paid before a certain date fixed for it, the suit shall stand dismissed, the court does not lose season of the case after the expiry of such period' notwithstanding a default. Such directions are in terror so that dilatory litigants put themselves in order. The court does not cease to have jurisdiction on the happening of the default. There are no words in Section 148 to confine it to cases in which extension is sought before the period fixed by the court, expires. The court does not cease to have jurisdiction until it makes an order finally disposing of the proceeding before it. The power being there, it is for the court to exercise its discretion one way or the other. If the court is of opinion that a party has been grossly negligent or has been deliberator disobeying the order of the court or the default is capricious, it has the undoubted power to reject the application for extension of time. But rejecting an application in exercise of the discretion is one thing and it is quite another to say that the court ceases to have jurisdiction over the matter just because the period originally fixed has expired. 9. In Mahanth Ram Das Vs. Ganga Das, AIR 1961 SC 882 , a similar question cropped up for consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and it was noticed on the facts that the case is unfortunate and unusual one. The application for extension of time was made before the time fixed by the High Court for the payment of deficit court-fee had actually run-out. That application appears not to have been considered at all in view of the peremptory order which had been passed earlier by the Division Bench, hearing the appeal, mainly because on the date of the hearing of the petition for extension of time, the period had expired. That application appears not to have been considered at all in view of the peremptory order which had been passed earlier by the Division Bench, hearing the appeal, mainly because on the date of the hearing of the petition for extension of time, the period had expired. The short question which cropped up for consideration was as to whether the High Court, in the circumstances of the case, was powerless to enlarge the time even though it had peremptorily fixed the period for payment. 10. The Hon'ble Supreme Court on these facts was pleased to observe: If the court had Considered the application and rejected it on merits other considerations might have arisen, but the High Court in the order quoted, went by the letter of the original order under which time for payment had been fixed. Section 148 of the Code, in terms, allow extension of time, even if the original period fixed has expired, and Section 149 is equally liberal, and the order extending time for payment, though passed after expiry of the time fixed by the original judgment, would have operated from the date on which the time fixed expired. The procedural orders though peremptory (conditional decree apart), are, in essence, in terrorism, so that dilatory litigants might put themselves in order and avoid delay. They do not however, completely stop a court from taking note of events and circumstances which happen within the time fixed, 11. Thus in view of the above, it is quite apparent that the learned Civil Judge had acted illegally and with material irregularity in exercise of jurisdiction in rejecting the application moved by the Defendant-applicant for enlargement of time as not maintainable. The impugned order on the face of it is illegal and has resulted in grave miscarriage of justice putting the Defendant-applicant to bear the burden of filing revision against the said order. It appears that the learned Civil Judge was not aware of the said provision contained in Section 148 of the code and he has exhibited his gross-ignorance of law and depletes legal knowledge. It appears that he hurriedly proceeded to reject the application as not maintainable on the date it was presented without caring to look to the said specific provision. It appears that he hurriedly proceeded to reject the application as not maintainable on the date it was presented without caring to look to the said specific provision. The Defendant-applicant had sought extension of time by moving the said application on the last date when the time fixed for making compliance of order dated 7-7-84 was to expire. She had indicated in the application that she could not make management of the money and prayed for extension of time. The application, therefore, deserved to be allowed and it cannot be rejected as not maintainable. 12. Learned Counsel for the opposite party had urged that the application mode by the Defendant-applicant was not bona fide as she had not deposited even the costs of Rs. 100/- which was directed to be deposited within two weeks from the date of the order setting aside the exparte decree. I am unable to agree with this contention. It was mentioned in the application by the Defendant-applicant that she could not make arrangement for the money and so the amount could not be deposited in compliance of the order dated 7-7-84. She had, therefore, prayed for extension of time and it was moved on the date when the time fixed by the said order was due to expire. It, therefore, Cannot be said that the Defendant-applicant was guilty of deliberate and willful default. The application moved by the Defendant-applicant, as already observed above, could not be rejected being not maintainable. The impugned order, therefore, cannot be sustained and it deserves to be quashed. 13. In the result the revision succeeds and is allowed and the order dated 21-7-84 passed by the Civil Judge, Gonda is hereby set aside and the Defendant-applicant is allowed to make deposits of the amount mentioned in the order dated 7-7-84 within a period of three weeks from today, failing which the revision shall stand dismissed. No order as to costs. The parties are directed to appear before the court below on 1-10-86.