G. C. GUPTA, J. ( 1 ) THE appellants, having been found guilty of offences under sections 147, 323i 149 and 458, I. P. C. and sentenced to 3 months and one years R. I. , respectively, on each count by judgment dated 27-5-1982, passed by the Special Judge. Damoh, in Special Criminal Case No. 43 of 1981, have preferred this appeal challenging their aforesaid conviction and sentence. ( 2 ) THE prosecution case against the appellants was that on 2-10-1981 they trespassed into the house of complainant Jagdish (P. W. 1) and used force against him and his mother Indrani. It was also alleged that they threatened Indrani to kill and on that threat, took out a box containing ornaments and Rs. 1. 000/. The report of the incident was lodged on 4-10-1981 (Ex. P-i), on the basis of which F. I. R. (Ex. P-2) was recorded at 8-30 p m. on that date. The learned Judge did not find any evidence of dacoity and acquitted them of offences relating to the same. The learned Judge, however, found that the appellants were guilty of entering into the house, breaking open the doors and causing injuries. That is how the appellants have been convicted and sentenced. ( 3 ) THE complainant and the appellants have filed an application under section 320 (5), Cr. P. C. seeking permission of the court to compound the offences. This application i. e. I A. No. 311/85, was take n on record on 8-2-1985 and directed to be considered at the time of final hearing of the appeal. Offences punishable under sections 147 and 458, I. P. C. are not compoundable and, therefore, this application cannot be allowed in respect of these offences. Offence under section 323, I P. C. is, however, compoundable and, therefore, this application may be allowed in respect of this offence. The learned counsel, however, submitted that the prosecution case in relation to sections 147 and 458. I. P. C. is prima facie not maintainable and, therefore, the compromise application may be considered only after considering their appeal in relation to these offences. The learned counsel, however, submitted that the prosecution case in relation to sections 147 and 458. I. P. C. is prima facie not maintainable and, therefore, the compromise application may be considered only after considering their appeal in relation to these offences. ( 4 ) SUBMISSION of the learned counsel is that in the context of evidence of P. W. 1 Jagdish that the appellants entered into the house not stealthily but boldly by breaking open the three doors, no offence under section 458, I P. C. can be said to have been committed. It is further submitted that evidence of P. W. 1 Jagdish does not inspire confidence in the context of evidence of P. W. 2 Narayan, who is neighbour and denies having seen any incident. It is further submitted that the evidence of interested witnesses is not sufficient to justify conviction of the appellants. Further submission is the F. I. R. has been lodged with undue delay, which remains unexplained and, therefore, causing doubt about the entire story. ( 5 ) AS far as offence under section 458, I. P. C. is concerned, the same consists of lurking house trespass or house breaking by night after preparation for hurt etc. The incident had taken place in the night and injuries have been caused on Jagdish and Indrani. Under the circumstances, only question for consideration is: whether lurking house-trespass was committed by the appellants so as to bring their act within the purview of section 458, I. P. C. ? Lurking house-trespass is a trespass with precautions to conceal the same from some person who has a right to exclude or eject the trespasser from the house (see section 443, I. P. C. ). In the context of the facts of the present case, it will have to be established that the appellants had made preparation or had taken some precautions to conceal their house-trespass from Jagdish (P. W. 1) who is the owner of the house. The essence of lurking house-trespass apparently is the precaution to conceal the act. Evidence of Jagdish, when considered in this context, clearly indicate that this necessary ingredient is missing. Jagdish, in para 2 of his statement in the Court, has deposed that the appellants came to his house abusing him and entered into the same by breaking open three doors one after another. Evidence of Jagdish, when considered in this context, clearly indicate that this necessary ingredient is missing. Jagdish, in para 2 of his statement in the Court, has deposed that the appellants came to his house abusing him and entered into the same by breaking open three doors one after another. According to this witness, the appellants even assaulted him and his mother even when they had not resisted their entry. There in nothing in his statement to indicate that they had stealthily entered into the house. Evidence of Narayan (P. W. 2), the next door neighbour only indicates that even he heard the abuses. Laxmi (P. W. 3) also does not allege any precaution being taken by these appellants, nor does Indrani (P. W. 4) the mother of the complainant, makes any such statement. Under the circumstances, there is nothing on record to indicate that the appellants had taken precaution to conceal the house-trespass from Jagdish, and, hence, the appellants cannot not be held guilty of offence punishable under section 458, I. P. C. Inspite of it, the evidence clearly indicates that they entered into the house which amounts to a house-trespass punishable under section 442, I. P. C. Their conviction under section 458, I. P. C. is, therefore set aside and they are, instead, convicted for offence under section 448, I. P. C. Section 320, Cr. P. C. permits composition of this offence at the instance of the person in possession of the house trespassed into, i. e. , Jagdish. Since Jagdish has signed the compromise application, it will have to be allowed in respect of this offence also. ( 6 ) IT may now be examined if there is material on record to find the appellants guilty offence under section 147, I. P. C. which consists of rioting, i. e. , use of force or violence by the unlawful assembly or any member thereof in prosecution of the common objects of such assembly. Evidence on record clearly indicates that the appellants trespassed into the house of Jagdish and used force against him and Indrani (P. W. 4) and, thereby, caused simple hurt on their person. The question, however, is: whether this, by itself, is sufficient to establish an unlawful assembly necessary for conviction under this section. Jagdish is known to the appellants. In his report (Ex. The question, however, is: whether this, by itself, is sufficient to establish an unlawful assembly necessary for conviction under this section. Jagdish is known to the appellants. In his report (Ex. P-I), he has alleged that these persons entered into the house after breaking open the doors and hit his mother. He has also stated that appellant Shanker was armed with gun while others were armed with lathi. In his statement in the Court, Shanker is said to have hit him and his mother with a Genda or a bamboo stick (para 2.) No other appellant had used anything to came the injury. In cross-examination, he was confronted with his earlier report and he stated that portion marked A- to-A was not reported by him. This portion relates to appellant Shanker being armed with a gun and others being armed with lathi. If his Court statement that this part was not his version is to be accepted, it would appear that no one was armed with gun and lathi as alleged. The story that the complainant has been looted of his property, has not been found proved by the trial Court. Then, there is delay in recording F. I. R. and the previous enmity betweenHarinarayan who has written the report and the appellants. In this context, it would appear that the story that the appellants were armed with lathi, is an improvement. Now, if the appellants had not gone to the house of the complainant having made any preparation and had not committed any dacoity, it would not be possible to infer they had any other common intention. The intention to cause house-trespass or assault, does not appear to be common. Under the circumstances, it is not possible to hold that the appellants constituted the unlawful assembly within the meaning of section 141, I. P. C. It is true that to constitute an unlawful assembly, previous concert is not necessary and the assembly may subsequently become unlawful, but even this has to be established by leading cogent evidence, which is missing in the instant case. If the evidence relating to appellants being armed with lathi is disbelieved, it would not be possible to hold that they made any preparation. Under the circumstances, conviction of the appellants under section 147, I. P. C. cannot be sustained. If the evidence relating to appellants being armed with lathi is disbelieved, it would not be possible to hold that they made any preparation. Under the circumstances, conviction of the appellants under section 147, I. P. C. cannot be sustained. ( 7 ) IN view of the discussion aforesaid, the appellants are held not guilty of offence punishable under sections 147 and 458, I. P. C. and are acquitted of the same. They are, however, guilty of offence under section 448, I. P. C. which is compoundable. Similarly, in the absence of any common object, the appellant Shanker alone would be guilty of offence punishable under section 323, I. P. C. and other persons would not be guilty under this section. Since both these offences are compoundable with the permission of the Court under section 320 Cr. P. C. , the appellants with have to be acquitted in case their request is accepted. Policy of law as contained in section 320 Cr. P. C. is to promote friendliness between the parties so that peace between them is restored. There is no reason why this policy should not be given effect to. Under the circumstances, permission necessary for composition of offences is granted. ( 8 ) AS a necessary consequence, the appellants are acquitted of these offences. The appeal, therefore, succeeds and is allowed. The bailbonds, if any, furnished by the appellants, are hereby cancelled. Appeal allowed. .