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1986 DIGILAW 72 (MAD)

Moulvi Abun Naser Khuthubuddin Syed Shah Mohammed Rakher Khadiri v. The Special Tahsildar For Land Acquisition (N. H. Scheme), Sathuvachari

1986-02-11

M.A.SATHAR SAYEED, V.RATNAM

body1986
Judgment :- This is an appeal at the instance of the Claimant against the judgment and decree in L.A.O.P. No.10 of 1974, Sub-Court, Vellore, on a reference made under S.18 of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). An extent of 5.98 acres comprised in Survey Nos. 541/2, 549/3A, 560/2A and 560/2C in Sathuvacheri Village and belonging to the claimant/appellant herein was acquired under the provisions of the Act on behalf of the Housing Board for Neighbourhood Scheme near Vellore. The notification under S.4(1) of the Act was on 27-12-1967. Before the Land Acquisition Officer, the claimant prayed that the compensation in respect of the lands acquired should be fixed at the rate of Rs.1,000/- per cent. However, the Land Acquisition Officer, on a consideration of the sales statistics of similar lands in the village fixed the market value of the acquired lands at Rs.24.40 per cent. Estimating the value of the standing trees and allowing solatium at 15%, the claimant was awarded a sum of Rs.17,170.50 as compensation. Dissatisfied with this, the appellant prayed for referring the question of compensation to court and on a consideration of the oral as well as documentary evidence, the court fixed Rs.75/- per cent as market value of the land acquired with solatium of 15% and interest at 4 1/2 per cent per annum from the date of possession till the date of payment. It is against this, the claimant has preferred the appeal praying that the compensation should be fixed at Rs.365/- per cent instead of Rs.75/- as done by the court below. 2. The learned counsel for the appellant first contended that the court below ought to have proceeded to determine the market value of the lands acquired on the basis of Exs.A1 to A.3 and that its failure to do so vitiated the fixation of market value in the manner done. On the other hand, the learned Government Pleader submitted that these documents cannot provide the real basis for ascertaining the market value of the acquired lands as they relate to very small extents or include superstructures and that, therefore, no case for enhanced fixation of the market value at all is made out. 3. Chronologically, the three sale deeds upon which the appellant has relied are Ex.A.3-dated 27-3-1967, Ex.A.1 dated 9-7-1970 and Ex. A.2 dated 7-10-1977. 3. Chronologically, the three sale deeds upon which the appellant has relied are Ex.A.3-dated 27-3-1967, Ex.A.1 dated 9-7-1970 and Ex. A.2 dated 7-10-1977. Ex.A3 relates to Survey No. 428 which is not anywhere near the vicinity of the lands acquired from the claimant, as could be seen from Ex.B.6. Besides, the sale under Ex.A.3 is a composite one in that it takes in the trees, fencing as well as a superstructure. There is no evidence on record indicating the value of the superstructure or the trees and in the absence of evidence on those subjects, it is difficult to accept Ex.A.3 as affording a just or reasonable basis for fixing the compensation in respect of the lands acquired from the appellant. Apart from this the land dealt with under Ex.A.3 is nearer Vellore town and closer to the Highway and the tharam of the land is also different. Considering these aspects, Ex.A. 3 cannot be accepted as affording a just or reasonable basis for fixing the compensation for the lands in question. Ex.A.1 relates to Survey No. 495 which abuts the Highway and which is located far away from the lands acquired in this case. That sale is in respect of a developed house plot. The sale includes a superstructure and other movables. Here again, there is nothing to indicate the value of the superstructure and movables. The extent of the property dealt with under Ex.A.1 is very small, when compared to the extent of the lands under acquisition. The composite nature of the sale and the absence of evidence indicating the value of the superstructure and other movables and the smallness of the extent render Ex. A.1 unacceptable. Ex.A2 relates to Survey No.497 which again abuts the Highway. That sale is in respect of a very small extent of 2-/-cents inclusive of several trees. From the description of the property, the sale appears to be of a developed plot south of the Trunk Road. That bears no comparison at all to Survey Nos.541/2, 549/3A, 560/2A and 560/2C with which we are concerned in this appeal. Therefore, none of the documents relied on by the appellant supports or justifies the enhancement and fixation of the compensation at the rates claimed by the appellant. No reliance can, therefore, be placed upon the documents Exs.A1 to A. 3. 4. Therefore, none of the documents relied on by the appellant supports or justifies the enhancement and fixation of the compensation at the rates claimed by the appellant. No reliance can, therefore, be placed upon the documents Exs.A1 to A. 3. 4. The oral evidence in support of the claim for enhanced compensation is also not satisfactory. All that appears from the evidence of C.Ws.1 and 3 is that the lands acquired are situate at the foot of the hill and that there is a plague shed nearby. C.W. 1 has not given any useful evidence regarding the market value of the lands under acquisition. C.W. 3 practically confessed that there is no evidence to show that the market value of the acquired lands is Rs.700/- a cent. Thus, the oral evidence on behalf of the claimant also does not establish that any enhancement of the compensation as fixed, is called for. 5. Realising this, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the fixation of market value, in respect of lands adjacent to the lands in question, for the very same purpose, came to be considered in A.S. Nos. 1017 to 1029 of 1979 (the Special Tahsildar for Land Acquisition Neighbourhood Scheme, Sathuvachari, Vellore v. TMT. Logammal and others), Appeal No. 362 of 1980 (the Special Tahsildar (L.A.) Neighbourhood Scheme, Sathuvachari, Vellore v. Ganesha Mudaliar), Appeal Nos. 880 and 1180 of 1980 (Murugesa Mudaliar and others v. The Special Tahsildar (L.A.) Neighbourhood Scheme, Sathuvachari, Vellore) and Appeals Nos. 265 and 893 of 1981 (The Special Tahsildar Land Acquisition, Neighbourhood, Scheme, Sathuvachari, Vellore v. P. K. Ponnuswamy) and that the compensation may be fixed at least on the basis indicated in those decisions. The learned Government Pleader, however, maintained that these decisions related to totally different survey numbers and cannot afford a just or fair basis for the fixation of the market value of the lands acquired in this case. 6. In A.S. Nos. 1017 to 1020 (the Special Tahsildar for Land Acquisition Neighbourhood Scheme, Sathuvachari Vellore v. TMT. Logammal and others), the acquisition was for the purpose of Neighbourhood Scheme and related to Sathuvachari Village, Vellore. The concerned Survey numbers were 427/3/4 and 8,427/5/9,424/1, 427/1/6,427/2 and 427/7 and some wells and the date of notification under S.4(1) of the Act was 13-10-1971. 1017 to 1020 (the Special Tahsildar for Land Acquisition Neighbourhood Scheme, Sathuvachari Vellore v. TMT. Logammal and others), the acquisition was for the purpose of Neighbourhood Scheme and related to Sathuvachari Village, Vellore. The concerned Survey numbers were 427/3/4 and 8,427/5/9,424/1, 427/1/6,427/2 and 427/7 and some wells and the date of notification under S.4(1) of the Act was 13-10-1971. On a consideration of the evidence and taking into account the situation of the acquired lands in a developed area possessing potential value for being sold as building sites, this court fixed the compensation at the rate of Rs.325/- per cent. However it is seen from Ex.B 6 that the lands covered by the acquisition under the notification dated 10-10-1971 which formed the subject matter of the appeals in A.S. Nos.1017 1020 of 1979, are not situated anywhere near the lands under acquisition in this appeal. Besides, there is almost a gap of nearly 4 years between the date of the notification under S.4(1) of the Act in those cases and in this appeal. Therefore the market value as fixed in A.S. Nos. 1017 to 1020 of 1979 cannot be adopted as the basis in this appeal. In A.S. No.362 of 1980 (The Special Tahsildar (LA.) Neighbourhood Scheme, Sathuvachari, Vellore v. Ganesa Mudaliar), I had occasion to consider the question of fixation of the market value in respect of an extent of 47 cents in Survey No.632/2 in Sathuvachari village for the purpose of the Housing Board for Neighbourhood Scheme. The notification under S.4(1) of the Act in that case was on 21-3-1971. It is seen from Ex. B.6 that Survey No. 632 is situate to the south of Survey No. 560, in which a portion of the land acquired in this case is situate. In considering at the instance of the State, the question whether the fixation of the market value at the rate of Rs.75/- per cent is in order, it was held that such fixation is reasonable and cannot be taken exception to by the State. That decision also cannot, therefore be pressed into service to support the claim for enhanced compensation put forth by the appellant. 7. In A. S. Nos. That decision also cannot, therefore be pressed into service to support the claim for enhanced compensation put forth by the appellant. 7. In A. S. Nos. 880 and 1180 of 1980 (Murugesa Mudaliar and others v. The Special Tahsildar (L.A.), Neighbourhood Scheme, Sathuvachari, Vellore), I had occasion in sitting in a Division Bench to consider the propriety of the fixation of the market value of an extent of 5.86 cents/acres acquired in Survey No. 531 in Sathuvachari Village, Vellore Taluk, for the purpose of the Neighbourhood Scheme under a notification under Sec.4(1) of the Act dated 13-10-1971. On a consideration of the evidence, the market value was fixed at Rs.250/- per cent as on the date of the notification under S.4(1) of the Act i.e on 13-10-1971. Ex, B. 6 shows that Survey No. 531 dealt with in A.S. Nos. 880 of 1980 and 1180 of 1981 is removed from the lands under acquisition in Survey No. 551 and Survey No. 549 by just two blocks of lands on the west. It is also further seen that they are equally remote from the Highway on the north. Survey No. 549 is situate adjacent east to survey No. 541, though Survey No. 560 is removed from Survey No. 549 on the east by about 3 blocks. In A.S. Nos. 265 and 893 of 1981 (the Special Tahsildar Land Acquisition, Neighbourhood Scheme, Sathuvachari Vellore v. P. K. Ponnuswamy) to which I was a party, the question of the market value in respect of an extent of 2.76 acres in Survey No. 529 in Sathuvachari Village came to be considered with reference to a notification under S.4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act dated 13-10-1971. There also, following the decision in A.S. Nos. 880 and 1180 of 1980, the market value of the acquired lands was fixed at Rs.250/-per cent. It has to be remembered that Survey No. 529 which was dealt with in A.S. Nos.265 and 893 of 1981 abuts the Highway, while the lands under acquisition in this appeal, are far away from that. Taking into account the market value as fixed by this Court in Survey Nos. It has to be remembered that Survey No. 529 which was dealt with in A.S. Nos.265 and 893 of 1981 abuts the Highway, while the lands under acquisition in this appeal, are far away from that. Taking into account the market value as fixed by this Court in Survey Nos. 531 and 529 and making an allowance for a difference of almost about four years in the date of the notification under Sec.4(1) of the Act and the location of the acquired lands in the interior without their enjoying any access from the Highway or other facilities, it appears to us that it would be fair and just, if the market value of the lands acquired in this case, is fixed at Rs.175/- per cent, instead of Rs.75/- per cent, as done by the court below. 8. The learned counsel for the appellant next contended that the appellant would be entitled to the benefit of solatium at 30% as per amended Sec. 23(2) of the Act and interest at 9% instead of 6 per cent, as per the amended Sec.28 of the Act. Reliance in this connection was placed by the learned counsel for the appellant upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Bhag Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh 1985 AIR(SC) 1576, 1986 (1) CCC 91, 1985 (2) Scale 246 , 1985 (3) SCC 737 , 1985 (S2) SCR 949, 1985 UJ 910 ). On the other hand, the learned Government Pleader, disputed the entitlement of the appellant for the benefits of the amended provisions. 9. The scope and amplitude of the amendments to Secs. 23 and 28 of the Act came to be considered by the Supreme Court in Bhag Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh 1985 AIR(SC) 1576, 1986 (1) CCC 91, 1985 (2) Scale 246 , 1985 (3) SCC 737 , 1985 (S2) SCR 949, 1985 UJ 910 . Referring to Sec.30(2) of tbe Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act 1984 (Act No. 68 of 1984), the Supreme Court pointed out that an appeal against the award would be a continuation of the proceedings initiated before the court by way of reference and when the High Court hears the appeal, in effect and substance, it would be hearing the reference and while determining the amount of compensation, effect has to be given to Secs.23 and 28, as found on the date of the decision in the appeal. It was also further pointed out that the provisions of the amended Sec.23 (2) and Sec.28 of the Act are made applicable to all proceedings, relating to compensation pending on 30-4-1982 or filed subsequent to the date, whether before the Collector or before the Court or the High Court or Supreme Court, even if they have finally terminated before the enactment of the Amending Act and that it would not be correct to say that the amended provisions would apply in relation to an order passed by the High Court or Supreme Court, only if the order is passed by in an appeal against an award made by the Collector or court between 30-4-1982 and the commencement of the Amending Act. That the amended provisions would apply to an award made by the Collector or court on or before 30-4-1982, if an appeal against the award was pending before the High Court or Supreme Court on 30-4-1982 or is filed subsequent to the date, was reiterated. In this case, the award is dated 17-12-1973 and the appeal before this court, was presented on 19-1-1979 and was pending on 30-4-1982. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court, it follows that the appellant would be entitled to claim the benefit of enhanced solatium at 30% under Sec.23(2) and interest at 9%per annum on the enhanced compensation from the date of taking possession of the land till the date of payment, under Sec.28 of the Act. We accordingly hold that the appellant will be entitled to enhanced solatium as well as interest as per the amended provisions of the Act. 10. However, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that though the decision of the Supreme Court referred to earlier directed the payment of deficit court-fees, it would be unnecessary to pay any court-fees on interest, as well as solatium. Regarding payment of court-fee on interest, the learned counsel placed reliance upon the Full Bench decision of this court reported in J. Pattammal v. The Collector of Madras, 84 Mad LW 803 : 1972 AIR(Mad) 158) to contend that it need not be paid. Regarding payment of court-fee on interest, the learned counsel placed reliance upon the Full Bench decision of this court reported in J. Pattammal v. The Collector of Madras, 84 Mad LW 803 : 1972 AIR(Mad) 158) to contend that it need not be paid. The learned counsel also submitted that no claim as such for payment of solatium need be made by a claimant, but that it is a duty cast on the court under Sec. 23(2) of the Act to award solatium at a certain percentage on the market value as determined on a claim made in that regard and therefore, the award of solatium cannot be put on par with a claim made and adjudicated upon, as to justify the payment of court-fees, even on solatium on the difference between the amount awarded and the amount claimed, under the provisions of the Court-fees Act. Reference in this connection was made to the decisions in Kesireddy Appalaswamy v. Special Tahsildar, Land Acquisition Officer, Central Rly. Vijayawada 1970 AIR(SC) 139) (FB), D. M. Jawarilal v. Spl. A.Q. CITB, Bangalore 1975 AIR(Kant) 129) (FB), Abdul Sultan Hussainbhai Velji v. Collector of Ahmednagar 1968 AIR(Bom) 390), State of Bihar v. Bindeswar Singh 1974 AIR(Pat) 71) and Manjeri Kovilkath Manavallabhan Karnnamulpad Manjeri v. Sub-Collector and Land Acquisition Officer, Malapuram 1971 AIR(Ker) 257). Per contra, the learned Government Pleader invited attention to the decision in J. Pattammal v. Collector of Madras 84 Mad LW 803 : 1972 AIR(Madras) 158 (FB) to contend that the court-fees is payable in an appeal even on solatium. Reference was also made in this connection to the decision of this court in Koppakka Brahmanandam v. The Secretary of State for India In Council (57 Mad L. J. 357 : 1930 AIR(Mad) 45 : ILR 53 Mad 48). 11. Unfettered by authority, we propose to advert to certain general considerations and examine the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act and the act to ascertain the precise nature of solatium and whether a claimant is obliged to make a claim on that account and pay court-fee thereon. The word 'solatium' ordinarily, connotes compensation for disappointment, inconvenience or wounded feelings. It is not compensation for the acquired interest in land, but a consolatory additional payment, intended to wipe out the disappointment or inconvenience arising out of and caused by the acquisition. The word 'solatium' ordinarily, connotes compensation for disappointment, inconvenience or wounded feelings. It is not compensation for the acquired interest in land, but a consolatory additional payment, intended to wipe out the disappointment or inconvenience arising out of and caused by the acquisition. The quantum of such consolatory compensation is no doubt fixed at a certain percentage on the market value of the acquired land, as adjudicated upon or determined, on a consideration of the claim made in that regard. Thus, it will at once be apparent that the determination of the quantum of solatium is not the same as the determination of the market value of the acquired land, though it is one of the components of compensation. Further, the awarding of solatium is a duty imposed by statute and there is no choice in the matter at all. The awarding of solatium as forming part of compensation is thus not traceable to the agitation, assertion or adjudication of rights in that regard, but is dependent upon a decision on a disputed claim relating to the market value of the property acquired. In other words, there is no question of any adjudication regarding solatium on assertion of rights in that regard; but the quantum thereof is fixed by statute, as compulsorily awardable based on a percentage of the market value of the property acquired, with reference to which, the claim is made by the owner of the interest in the acquired property. It follows that only if there is a claim and an adjudication thereon, the question of the difference between what was claimed and what was awarded, would arise. When the obligation to award solatium at a fixed percentage, on the market value of the property, as may be determined, after investigating the claim put forth by the owner of the acquired interest in land, as part of the compensation, is statutory, there is no question of the consideration of any claim relating to solatium by the claimant and the arising of some difference between the claim and the adjudication, which can appropriately form the subject matter of further proceedings. 12. 12. Bearing the aforesaid aspects in mind, we proceed to a consideration of the provisions of the Court-fees Act first, under Sec.8 of the Court-fees Act (VII of 1870), the court-fee on a memorandum of appeal against an order relating to compensation under any Act for the time being in force for the acquisition of land for public purposes, shall be computed according to the difference between the amount awarded and the amount claimed by the appellant. Sec.51 of the Tamil Nadu Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1955 providing for payment of court-fee on a memorandum of appeal against an order relating to compensation couched in almost identical terms, as Sec.8, referred to above. Under S.52 of the Tamil Nadu Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1955, a general provision is made for the payment of court-fee on appeals from suits. In view of the special provision under Sec.51, Sec.52 can have no application whatever to the court-fee payable on the memorandum of appeal against an order relating to compensation, as it is difficult to attribute to the legislature tautology and error of repetition. Thus, the computation of the court-fee under Sec.51 of the Tamil Nadu Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act 1955, for purposes of an appeal relating to land acquisition, has to be on the difference between the amount awarded and the amount claimed by the appellant. There is however no indication under Sec.51 whether solatium is excluded from the scope of that section. We have now to turn to the provisions of the Act to find out that what is meant by "amount claimed". Under Sec.3(1) of the Act, 'land' is defined to include benefits to arise out of land and things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth. The expression 'person interested' occurring in Sec.3(b) includes all persons claiming an interest in the compensation to be made on account of the acquisition of land. Sec.9(2) of the Act provides for the issue of a notice requiring persons interested in the land to appear personally or by agent before the Collector at a time and place therein mentioned and to state the nature of their respective interest in the land and the amount and particulars of their claims to compensation for such interest. Sec.9(2) of the Act provides for the issue of a notice requiring persons interested in the land to appear personally or by agent before the Collector at a time and place therein mentioned and to state the nature of their respective interest in the land and the amount and particulars of their claims to compensation for such interest. It is significant that Sec.9(2) omits any reference to solatium as such, but contemplates only the amount and particulars of claims relating to compensation for interest in land. Sec.11 empowers the Collector to conduct an enquiry into the objections, into the value of the land and also into the respective interests of the persons claiming compensation and to make an award with reference to the area of the land, the compensation, which in his opinion, should be allowed, and the appointment of the said compensation among the persons known or believed to be interested in the land etc., The enquiry, amongst others, relates to the value of the land at the date of the notification under Sec.4(1) of the Act and the interest of the person claiming the compensation. Likewise, the award contemplates an adjudication regarding the area of the land, the compensation allowable for the land and the apportionment of the compensation among persons known or believed to be interested, in the land. Here again, there is no mention of solatium. Sec.15 provides for the matters to be taken into account and neglected, while determining the amount of compensation. Under Sec. 23 of the Act, several matters, which have to be considered or taken into account in determining the compensation, have been set out. In determining compensation to be awarded for land acquired, Sec. 23(1) obliges the court to consider those factors and aspects enumerated therein. The first and foremost is the market value of the land as on the date of publication of the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act. There are also other matters to be taken into account like damages sustained by a person by the deprivation of standing crops or severance or injurious affection of other property or change of residence or place of business compelled by the acquisition or the dimunition of profits between the time of publication of the declaration under S. 6 and the time of taking of possession by the Collector etc. Sec.23(2) of the Act provides that in addition to the market value of the land as provided in Sec.23(1), the court shall, in every case, award a sum of thirty per cent on such market value, in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition. A conjoint reading of Sec, 23(1) and (2) of the Act makes it clear that though solatium is a component part of compensation, it is not awarded on an adjudication of a claim asserted, but is made available in every case at a fixed percentage on the market value of the land arrived at on a claim made in that regard by the person interested in the land acquired. Indeed, in Union of India v. Ram Mehar 1973 AIR(SC) 305, 1973 (1) SCC 109 , 1973 (2) SCR 720 ), the term "market value" has been held to have acquired a definite connotation by judicial decisions and that any addition to the value of the land, unrelated to the open market, cannot be regarded as part of its market value, that the market value is only one of the components in the determination of the amount of compensation and further that the compensation under Sec. 23(1) of the Act comprises of the market value of the land and a sum of fifteen (now) thirty per cent on such market value which is the consideration for the compulsory nature of the acquisition. This also emphasises the consolatory nature of the sum awarded, which is not attributable to any assertion of a right or a claim for the same. Thus, under the provisions of the Act, though a person interested in the acquired land need make a claim only with reference to the fixation of the market value of the land acquired and other matters referred to in Sec.23(1) of the Act and no more, the amount ultimately awarded as compensation includes solatium at thirty per cent of the market value in every case without any adjudication or a claim even in that regard put in by the person interested. We may now refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Mishrilal Tarachand Lodha 1964 AIR(SC) 457, 1964 (5) SCR 230 , 1964 KerLT 115, 66 BomLR 254, 1964 (1) KerLR 163, 1964 MahLJ 120, 1964 MhLJ 120). We may now refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Mishrilal Tarachand Lodha 1964 AIR(SC) 457, 1964 (5) SCR 230 , 1964 KerLT 115, 66 BomLR 254, 1964 (1) KerLR 163, 1964 MahLJ 120, 1964 MhLJ 120). There the question arose whether it would be necessary for a defendant to include pendente lite interest decreed by the trial court, while valuing the subject matter of the appeal, under Sec.7(1) of the Bombay Court-Fees Act. Raghubar Dayal J., speaking for the court observed thus at page 460 : ".........Claims not based on any asserted right but dependent on the decision of the disputed right (underlining ours) and reliefs in regard to which are in the discretion of the Court do not come within the purview of the expression subject matter in dispute in plaint or memo of appeal" * . Thus, the award of solatium is not on the basis of any right, asserted in that regard, but depends upon the decision with reference to the market value arrived at on the basis of a claim made by the person interested in the acquired land and there is no discretion even left in the court to decline to award solatium. Cases of express waiver of solatium apart, which are indeed extremely rare, the court is obliged in every case to award thirty per cent of the market value of the acquired lands as solatium, whether asked for by the claimant or not. In cases where it is asked for, it is only a reminder to the court. Even if not asked for, the court is bound to grant it unless it is expressly waived. Sec.24 of the Act catalogues matters, which have to be ignored in determining the compensation. Sec.26 sets out the contents of the award and the effect of the same. The award should be in writing signed by the Judge and should specify the amount awarded under the first clause of sub-sec. (1) of Sec.23 i.e. the market value of the land on the date of the publication of the notification under Sec.4(1) of the Act. It should also specify the amount awarded under each of the other clauses of the same sub-section together with the grounds for awarding each of the said amounts. Sec.26(1) of the Act does not expressly take in the solatium awarded under Sec.23(2) of the Act. It should also specify the amount awarded under each of the other clauses of the same sub-section together with the grounds for awarding each of the said amounts. Sec.26(1) of the Act does not expressly take in the solatium awarded under Sec.23(2) of the Act. That may be interpreted as indicating that solatium, though forming part of the totality of the compensation awarded in respect of the land acquired, is really not part of the award. However, it is rather difficult to subscribe to this interpretation. The expression "award" is not defined in the Act. It seems to us that the award comprises of twin components an adjudicatory one and a statutory one the former arising out of a claim made and adjudicated upon under Sec.23(1) of the Act and the latter statutorily fixed under Sec.23(2) of the Act at 30 per cent depending upon the market value as determined under clause one of Sec.23(1) of the Act. In other words, solatium statutorily forms part of the award and that perhaps is the reason why there is no reference to Sec.23(2) in Sec.26(1) of the Act. This also stands to reason. We can conceive of a case of enhancement of the market value of the acquired lands. If solatium is not part of the award, then the court will be helpless to award the solatium under Sec. 23(2) of the Act on the enhanced market value at 30% thereof, for, it cannot deal with something which is not part of the award appealed against. Thus, even in a case where a case for enhancement of the market value of the lands acquired under Sec.23(1) of the Act is made out, the court cannot grant the solatium on the enhanced market value under Sec.23(2) of the Act. Further, under Sec. 26(2) of the Act, every award is deemed to be a decree and the statement of the grounds of every such award a judgment. Inasmuch as the solatium is awardable in every case as part of the compensation for the acquired lands and the reason for awarding solatium is the duty cast on court under Sec.23(2) of the Act, that part of the award referable to Sec.23(2) of the Act for the award of solatium is also a judgment under Sec.26(2) of the Act and the award including, among others the solatium has to be deemed to be a decree. Again, if solatium is not to be considered as part of the award serious difficulties would arise. That part of the award relating to solatium cannot be deemed to be a decree under Sec.26(2) of the Act. That in turn would lead to the position where, compensation under the different heads mentioned under Sec.23(1) of the Act alone can be recovered as forming the subject matter of the award and deemed a decree, but not solatium forming part of the compensation under Sec.23(2) of the Act. We are therefore inclined to take the view that statutorily, under Sec.23(2) of the Act solatium is also part of the award and therefore, under Sec.26(2) of the Act, the whole award should be deemed to be a decree within the meaning of Sec.2(2) C.P.C. the only other component of the award is costs under Sec.27 of the Act and fixation of liability for the payment of the same. Under Sec.54 of the Act, an appeal lies from the award or any part of the award to the High Court. The court-fee payable under Sec.51 of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act on such an appeal, as noticed earlier, shall be computed on the difference between the amount awarded and the amount claimed by the appellant. It is seen on a consideration of the provisions of the Act that there is no obligation on the part of the person interested in the lands acquired to claim solatium, as it is the statutory duty of the authorities to award it and include it in the award. There is, therefore, no question of including the solatium as an amount claimed, but not awarded for purposes of appeal and payment of court-fee thereon. We are therefore clearly of the opinion that the award of solatium is purely a statutory duty to be performed under Sec. 23(2) of the Act in respect of which no claim need be made by a person interested in the lands acquired and it follows that if there is no need to claim, then there is no need to include it as the subject matter of an appeal and pay court-fee thereon, as even at the stage of the Appeal, the court is obliged to discharge the duty cast on it under Sec.23(2) of the Act whether the appellant has asked for the same or not. 13. 13. Since we have earlier at length dealt with the question of payment of court-fees on a consideration of the provisions of the Act and the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1955, it would suffice if we make a brief reference now to the decisions cited at the Bar. Kasireddi Appala Swamy v. Special Tahsildar, Land Acquisition Officer, Central Rly. Vijayawada 1970 AIR(SC) 139) (FB), ruled that solatium is not part of the award and therefore, in an appeal under Sec.54 of the Land Acquiisition Act, no court-fee, under Sec.48 of the Andhra Pradesh Court Fees Act, need be paid on the difference of the solatium, to which the appellant is entitled, as a result of the increase in compensation awarded by the court and that awarded by the collector, D. M. Jawarilal v. Special L.A.O. CITB, Bangalore 1975 AIR(Kant) 129) dealt with Secs.48 and 49 of the Karnataka Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act in relation to appeals under Sec.54 of the Act and the Full Bench followed the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court referred to earlier. The Bombay High Court in Abdulsultan Hussain Bhai Velji v. Collector of Ahmednagar 1968 AIR(Bom) 390) has taken the view that solatium being a statutory amount of compensation in addition to the market value, the court has no power to deprive a claimant of that amount and that the expression "amount claimed" has reference to the amount of compensation i.e. the market value under Sec.23(1) of the Act and the court-fee will have to be paid only on that amount and not on the solatium. The Kerala High Court in Manjeri Kovilkath Manavallabhan Karanamulpad Manjeri v. The Sub-Collector and Land Acquisition Officer, Malapuram 1971 AIR(Ker) 257) took the view that the award of solatium under Sec.25(2) of the Kerala Land Acquisition Act was not a matter of judicial discretion, but a statutory duty and solatium had to be granted, whether the party asked for it or not and when the court must necessarily grant the relief, it is unnecessary for the party to claim the same. It was further held that even if a formal claim is made, it is only a reminder to court to do its duty and not a prayer for adjudication of any controversy and that solatium would not form part of the amount claimed and therefore, it is unnecessary to include solatium as part of the subject matter of the appeal and pay court-fee thereon. A similar view has also been expressed by Patna High Court in State of Bihar v. Bindeswar Singh 1974 AIR(Pat) 71) following Smt. Siawati Kuer v. The State of Bihar 1972 AIR(Pat) 294) which in turn merely followed the Full Bench decision in Kasireddi Appala Swami v. Spl. Tahsildar, Land Acquisition Officer, Central Rly. Vijayawada 1970 AIR(SC) 139). We may point out that all these decisions have expressed views which generally accord with what has been stated hereinbefore. 14. However it is necessary to refer in some detail the decisions in J. Pattammal v. the Collector of Madras (84 Mad LW 803) : 1972 AIR(Mad) 158 (FB) and Koppaka Brahmanandam v. The Secretary of State for India in Council, 57 Mad LJ 357 : 1930 AIR(Mad) 45), as considerable reliance was placed on them by the learned Government pleader. The question referred for decision by the Full Bench was whether court-fee is payable on interest under Sec. 28 of the Act. It was argued on the strength of Koppaka Brahmanandam v. The Secretary of State for India in Council, (57 Mad LJ 357) : 1930 AIR(Mad) 45) that if solatium could be regarded as part of compensation, there was no reason why interest under Sec.34 of the Act, should not be regarded the same way. This argument was not accepted on the ground that the Full Bench was not called upon to decide, whether the solatium is part of compensation. Even so the Full Bench observed that Sec.23 (2) of the Act indicates that the character of solatium in identical with that of compensation and that solatium is in no way distinguishable from compensation for land and the cases relating to solatium are distinguishable. Even so the Full Bench observed that Sec.23 (2) of the Act indicates that the character of solatium in identical with that of compensation and that solatium is in no way distinguishable from compensation for land and the cases relating to solatium are distinguishable. Referring to Kopakka Brahmanandam v. The Secretary of State for India in Council (57 Mad LJ 357) : 1930 AIR(Mad) 45), the Full Bench stated that under Sec.51 of the Tamil Nadu Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act, a memorandum of appeal against an order relating to compensation is not required to include interest. Considering the question that arose for decision before the Full Bench, we are unable to read and understand that decision as requiring the inclusion of solatium, as part of the subject matter of the appeal, within the meaning of Sec.51 of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1955, and the payment of court-fee thereon. That question had not been dealt with at all or decided by the Full Bench and therefore, the learned Government Pleader cannot seek to derive any support. In so far as Koppaka Brahmanandam v. The Secretary of State for India in Council 57 MLJ 357 : 1930 AIR(Mad) 45 is concerned, we have to state that the learned Judge has proceeded on the basis that compensation claimed in the appeal would include solatium, which as we have earlier pointed out need not be claimed, but statutorily awardable, in every case, as a consolatory payment under Sec.23(2) of the Act. There is no reference to Sec.9 or Sec.26 of the Act or to the other aspects to which we have made reference earlier. The provision regarding tender of compensation under S.31 of the Act by the Collector and his being required to deposit the same into Court, have largely influenced the inclusion that solatium is part of compensation, which is claimed. We fail to see how these aspects would be relevant for a decision on the question whether court-fee should be paid on solatium under Sec.8 of the Court-fees Act 1870 or Sec.51 of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1955. Even on the footing that solatium is part of the compensation, the question of payment of court-fees on solatium would depend upon the intepretation to be put upon the provisions of the Act already referred to. Even on the footing that solatium is part of the compensation, the question of payment of court-fees on solatium would depend upon the intepretation to be put upon the provisions of the Act already referred to. We are therefore unable, with great respect, to persuade ourselves to accept the reasoning of the learned Judge in Koppaka Brahmanandam v. The Secretary of State for India in Council 57 MLJ 357 : 1930 AIR(Mad) 45 as correct. Consequently, we hold that solatium does not form part of the subject matter of a claim as such by a person interested in the land acquired and that with reference to the award of solatium, the concerned authorities and court merely discharge a statutory duty imposed on them and under those circumstances, no court-fee need be paid on solatium. Accordingly, we hold that the appellant is entitled to be paid compensation at the rate of Rs.175/- per cent in respect of the lands acquired with solatium at 30% and interest at 9% per annum from the date of taking possession till the date of payment of the enhanced compensation. The appeal is allowed accordingly to the extent indicated. There will be no order as to costs. 15. M. A. SATHAR SAYEED, J. :- I agree with the views and reasonings of my learned brother. But, however, I would add a few words on the point whether court-fee has to be paid on 'solatium' in the present appeal filed by the claimant Sec.23 of the Land Acquisition Act deals with matters to be concerned in determining compensation. Sec. 23(2) of the Act is to the effect that in addition to the market value of the land as provided under Sec.23(1), the court shall in every case, award a sum of 30 percentum of such market value, in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition. This award of compensation, in addition to the market value of the land is by way of solatium. Solatium is merely an adjunct to the main amount of compensation under Sec.23(1) of the Act and the claim of solatium stands or fails with the decision on the main claim. Whether it is claimed or not, awarding the amount of solatium, is the statutory obligation on the part of the court. Solatium is merely an adjunct to the main amount of compensation under Sec.23(1) of the Act and the claim of solatium stands or fails with the decision on the main claim. Whether it is claimed or not, awarding the amount of solatium, is the statutory obligation on the part of the court. The wordings of Sec.23(2) are so clear that the court shall in every case award a sum i.e. 30 percentum on such market value in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition. When the statute itself provides that the court shall award solatium under Sec.23(2) of the Act, failure to award solatium will be contrary to the statute. 16.Disputes arise between the parties on the acquisition of property by the State, either on the point that the acquisition is bad, or on the point that the market value is low. The court may differ on the facts of a particular case on the rate of the market value claimed by the claimant. But disputes between the parties never arise on the grant of solatium for it is the duty of the court under the statute to award solatium on a fixed percentage in view of taking over or acquiring of the land of the person by the State. In other words, under the statute, solatium is granted to the claimant over and above the actual market value on a fixed percentage, as a solace for the injured feelings and to alleviate sorrow, distress or discomfort of the person from whom land is acquired. 17. The award of solatium cannot be the subject matter of dispute to warrant its inclusion in the memorandum of appeal filed by the aggreieved person in order to pay court-fee. On the other hand, awarding solatium is a reminder to court to perform its obligation under Sec.23(2) of the Act and thus it cannot be an adjudication of any controversy like that of the market value of the land acquired, between the claimant and the State. I am of the view that payment of court-fee in this case under the Court-fees Act on solatium does not arise, as has been well discussed in detail in the judgment just delivered by my learned brother. Appeal allowed.