JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) WHEN the application for leave to defend is disposed of, what remains thereafter? The proceeding would then commence in terms of sub-section (2) of section 23-D of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act,1961, for short, the act. How the "enquiry" contemplated thereunder has to be held ? That indeed, is the short and moot question that has been agitated in this hotly contested petition. Case-law galore has been cited and arguments - very elaborate, extending over 11/2 hours are made, to which I have given my best attention and earnest consideration. Now, the decision. ( 2. ) THE revisionist is a tenant. He is not fully satisfied with the impugned order and has impugned only a part of the order. He is happy that he is granted leave to defend, but he is unhappy that the Rent Controlling Authority, for short, the authority, has given him, which Shri Mangal, appearing for the non-petitioner, submits, is "a restricted leave. ". The question, therefore, is, could the leave be restricted in the manner as is done in this case ? ( 3. ) A landlord can seek eviction of a tenant on the ground of "bona fide" requirement of the premises let out, in virtue of the provisions of Section 23-A of the act. It is true, the provision illustratively defines the term "bona fide", as appears from bare reading of clauses (a) and (b) of Section 23-A, but whether the requirement is bona fide or not has to be ascertained by the Authority on the facts pleaded and proved in each case. Indeed, for grant of leave to the tenant to defend landlords application, it is required by Section 23-C that he should "disclose such facta as would disentitle the landlord" from obtaining an order of eviction against the tenant on the ground specified in Section 23. Thus for, parties have choice and volition. Would the same situation not prevail thereafter ? Do the parties lose their independence to raise or litigate plea at the subsequent stage of the same proceeding though they are continued for a different purpose under sub-section (2) of Section 23-D ? Thus for, parties have choice and volition. Would the same situation not prevail thereafter ? Do the parties lose their independence to raise or litigate plea at the subsequent stage of the same proceeding though they are continued for a different purpose under sub-section (2) of Section 23-D ? Because I have had "occasion" to deal with the interpretation of the several provisions on several occasions, and have expressed the view that the issues of "leave" and "eviction" must be tried separately as several and distinct issues, I find no difficulty in dealing with the contentions now raised in the instant case (See, Jyoti Swarup, 1985 MPWN 655 et. el.) ( 4. ) A few facts however, may be stated to explain the genesis of this lis. In his application for "leave to defend", the revisionist tenant had disclosed "several facts" to suggest that the landlord-nonpetitioners requirement was not "bona fide". The several facts were treated by the Authority as special pleas and in its order rendered on tenants application the Authority, while giving him the leave prayed, still held that in the enquiry, which had to follow under Section 23-D (2), the tenant would not be able to plead some facts and to prove those facts. Some of the facts are (i) the landlord had been demanding enhancement of rent and on tenants refusal to pay the same, eviction proceedings being undertaken, the same must be held to be mala fide; (ii) the tenant having incurred some expenditure in repairing the premises and demanded reimbursement in respect thereof,the suit for eviction was instituted as a counter-blast and there was no bona fide requirement of the landlord to obtain possession of the premises; (iii) there was the want of notice contemplated under the lease; and (iv) the suit was premature in that the lease contemplated a renewal clause. The Authority held that the tenant was exclusively debarred from pleading all these facts in the eviction proceedings. ( 5. ) LANDLORDs counsel, Shri Mangal, has very fairly made one concession, though he has very forcefully contested the application and has supported the impugned order. His sole concession is that a decision of a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in chatar Sain (AIR 1981 Delhi 239) is the sheetanchor of his case. That is so. ( 5. ) LANDLORDs counsel, Shri Mangal, has very fairly made one concession, though he has very forcefully contested the application and has supported the impugned order. His sole concession is that a decision of a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in chatar Sain (AIR 1981 Delhi 239) is the sheetanchor of his case. That is so. He has taken great pains to convince me that the view taken by their Lordships is a reasonable and commendable view and the impugned order finds full support from the said decision. As to the latter part of his submission, I have nothing to say. But, I must confess, I have failed to persuade myself to accept the view which found favour with the Delhi High - Court in the decision above referred. Saying so, I would still like to guard myself from being misunderstood. I have not been able to compare the relevant provisions as the delhi provisions are not cited in the judgment though Shri Mangal contends that they are in pari materia with the parallel provisions of the M. P. Act. Their Lordships referred to the earlier decisions rendered on the point by other Judges of the same Court and concluded that almost consistently the view of the Court was that restricted leave" was contemplated in law. What I find reading para 5 of the Judgment is that for speeding trial only, because of "summary trial" being explicitly contemplated statutorily, there would be legal sanction for such a proceeding. "keeping in view this legislative intent, we find difficult in holding that leave could be restricted to one or more point and the other point, we find to be without substance. " This was indeed said in the context of landlords plea of bona fide requirement of the suit premises. Rent Controllers order granting permission to the tenant to defend landlords application for eviction only on the plea that landlord was not in occupation of reasonably suitable accommodation was upheld. ( 6. ) SHRI Mangal has also placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Vijaikumar dubey (1985 MPRCJ 78), but I do not read anything in the decision to find any merit for the contention that the decision at all decided the question of "restricted leave". ( 6. ) SHRI Mangal has also placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Vijaikumar dubey (1985 MPRCJ 78), but I do not read anything in the decision to find any merit for the contention that the decision at all decided the question of "restricted leave". It is true that what facts could be pleaded by the tenant to counter landlords plea of bona fide requirement were taken note of in that case and the Authoritys order rejecting tenants application to defend the landlords action was upheld. That was, therefore, a decision on the question as to whether leave was rightly rejected to the tenant; and I do not read anything beyond that. My attention is also drawn to some other decisions of this court, but I find little assistance from those decisions, which may have any bearing on the issue agitated in this case. However, I must do justice to the labour expended by counsel, who took great pains to place those decisions for my consideration and I shall be failing in my duty if I do not refer to the same in my judgment. These are : (i) Habibul Rehman vs. Abbasbhai, 1985 MPRCJ 68, (ii) Madan Mohan Joshi vs. Dattatraya 1984 MPWNSN 425. ( 7. ) ON the other side, Shri Shinde, having fairly conceded lack of direct authority on the point, has as well relied on several decisions of the Apex Court to support his contention that a "restricted leave" is not contemplated in law. I may now, briefly, deal with these decisions. C. D. Korpal ( AIR 1982 SC 1455 ) is a short decision, but it pithily projects the essence of the matter. How an application for leave to defend is to be dealt with ? It says that if the "ground" of bona fide personal requirement on which eviction was sought was "disputed" by the tenant, the Rent Controller had no option but to grant leave. Precision Steel and Engineering Works ( AIR 1982 SC 1518 ) is a longish judgment, which minutely examined the legislative intent of the several provisions and said many things. However, as alluded, the focal point in this case, as in C. D. Korpal (supra), has been isolated, identified and imaginatively dealt with. Precision Steel and Engineering Works ( AIR 1982 SC 1518 ) is a longish judgment, which minutely examined the legislative intent of the several provisions and said many things. However, as alluded, the focal point in this case, as in C. D. Korpal (supra), has been isolated, identified and imaginatively dealt with. It also says that at the stage when the question of leave to defend has to be decided by the Authority, he has merely to address himself to one question. Whether tenants application disclosed "such facts" as would prima facie and not on contest, disentitle the landlord to obtain any order for recovery of possession. A detailed enquiry is not contemplated at this stage. Indeed, if the application can be disposed of on tenants admission and there being no proof of fact better than an admission, nothing remains in the matter and if the leave was refused, there could be an instant termination of the proceedings by which the legislative purpose of shortening the life of eviction proceedings was duly fulfilled. In his separate opinion, A. P. Sen, J. , who differed from the majority view expressed by Desai, J. , (speaking for himself and Bahrul Islam, J.) spoke that the defence of the tenant must also be bona fide; otherwise there was a risk of protraction of the proceedings. His lordship however did not take the view that any "restricted leave" could be granted though it was held that the Rent Controller had to apply his mind to all material on record to arrive at his decision not only to restrict his investigation merely to facts disclosed by the tenant in his application. The third decision was also rendered by a bench presided over by D. A. Desai, J. , in O. P. Salujas case ( AIR 1982 SC 1599 ) to lay down as the "only test" as tenants affidavit to find therefrom if the defence disclosed facts "which need investigation by evidence and trial. " ( 8. ) WHAT I have read in the decisions of Apex Court importantly in the O. P. Salujas case (supra), I must underscore to emphasise that the need for "investigation by evidence and trial" cannot be struck out as pointedly observed in that case. " ( 8. ) WHAT I have read in the decisions of Apex Court importantly in the O. P. Salujas case (supra), I must underscore to emphasise that the need for "investigation by evidence and trial" cannot be struck out as pointedly observed in that case. It Is not contested at the Bar that after the tenant is granted leave and the enquiry commences under Section 23-D (2) to determine the issue of "eviction", the tenant has a right to file a written statement and that the proceeding thereafter, conformed to the procedure prescribed for dealing and disposal of a case under the Provincial Small Causes Act. This is indeed the statutory madate under-written in sub-section (2) itself. If that be so, in my opinion, how does the Authority, which had granted leave to the tenant and triggered "enquiry", contemplated under Section 23-D (2), if becomes functus officio as the order is rendered by the Authority on proper satisfaction arrived on facts made available to it that plea of bona fide requirement raised by the landlord was contested and needed investigation by evidence and trial. A new Chapter then opened "up and even on the analogy of Rule 16 of Order 6, Civil Procedure Code, it cannot be said that such an order or direction could be made to prevent "an abuse of the process of the court". That question may arise only when there are pleadings before the Authority after the new Chapter had opened; not before that. It is true that the provisions of Civil procedure Code do not in terms, apply to a proceeding tried by the Authority. But, in virtue of the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 23-D, I do not see any let or hindrance in the way of the Authority to follow appropriate provisions of Civil procedure Code to deal with any particular stage of the case. Section 17 of the Small causes Court Act does provide that the provisions of Civil Procedure Code shall mutatis mutandis apply to a proceeding in the Court of Small Causes. That being the position, I must hold that the impugned direction in the impugned order must be held to be illegal and without jurisdiction. Not only there is no express or implicit mandate for. That being the position, I must hold that the impugned direction in the impugned order must be held to be illegal and without jurisdiction. Not only there is no express or implicit mandate for. the Authority to pass such an order in terms of sub-section (2) of Section 23-C in virtue of which powers, he had rendered the impugned order, the said direction could not have been made in anticipation, invoking the provisions of Order 6 Rule 16, Civil Procedure code. ( 9. ) IT is true that some of the facts on which tenants defence was pre-empted in this case would be outside the scope and ambit of enquiry under Section 23-D (2 ). But, that would not give the Authority any jurisdiction to make the direction. Without causing prejudice to any side at this stage, I may merely say that the question of notice on the question of suit being premature are questions on which there may be some dispute, but it cannot be said that the other questions were irrelevant in any manner. Indeed, those questions were very vital for the tenant to state and plead to contest landlords "bona fide" in the matter of institution of the suit, which was inextricably linked up with the question of bona fide requirements of the suit premises of the landlord; At this stage, I say no more than this, because the matter may have to be decided afresh if any objection is taken subsequently at appropriate stage of the proceeding. At this stage, I must say that the impugned direction is wholly without jurisdiction and must be quashed. ( 10. ) IN the result, the petition succeeds to the extent indicated. The tenant shall have the right to file the written statement uninhibitedly. It is submitted at the Bar that the tenant has already filed the written statement. So I leave it open to the landlord to contest the validity of any fact of statement mentioned in the written statement appropriately before the Authority, if he chooses to invoke Authoritys jurisdiction under Order 6 Rule 16, Civil Procedure Code. It shall be open to the Authority to consider such objection and decide the same after hearing parties and pass such order as he may deem fit and proper,, according to law. ( 11. It shall be open to the Authority to consider such objection and decide the same after hearing parties and pass such order as he may deem fit and proper,, according to law. ( 11. ) AT this stage, Shri Mangal stands up and impresses upon me the necessity to make a positive direction to the Authority. He submits that the case is pending trial since 1984, while the statutory mandate is for disposal of such proceedings within a period of six months. The prayer is reasonable and must be allowed. I direct that the Authority shall take steps to ensure expeditious disposal of the suit, if possible, within a period of two months. No costs. Order accordingly.