JUDGMENT K.N. Misra, J. - This revision is directed against the impugned judgment and order dated 781985 passed by the IVth Additional District Judge, Lucknow, by which application under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, for short, 'the H.M. Act', moved by the defendantrevisionist has been rejected. 2. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that respondent Shailendra Kumar Shukla filed a suit for divorce under section 13 of the H.M. Act, seeking dissolution of marriage which had taken place with the revisionistdefendant on 1721972, on the ground that the defendantrevisionist is leading adulterous life with her Jeeja Sri S. N. Trivedi, who was posted at Police Station, Malihabad, District, Lucknow. This petition was contested by the defendantrevisionist refuting all the said allegations regarding desertion and adultry. An application was moved by the defendant revisionist under Section 24 of the H.M. Act, asserting that she has no independent source of income to support herself and her child nor she can meet the expenses of the litigation. It was also stated that the plaintiff's monthly income is about Rs. 900. She thus prayed that she be awarded pendente lite a monthly maintenance allowance of Rs. 500 and also Rs. 660 to meet the litigation expenses. This application was opposed by the plaintiffrespondent who asserted that it is wrong to say that the defendant has no independent source of income or that she is unable to maintain herself and the child or to meet the litigation expenses. It was further alleged by the plaintiffrespondent that his monthly income is Rs. 477/ and not Rs. 900/ as asserted by the defendant. It was thus contended that the demand is also excessive. 3. The main ground on which the application was opposed by the plaintiffrespondent was that since the defendant has deserted plaintiff on her own accord and is living an adulterous life and so she is not entitled to any maintenance pendente lite nor she is entitled to get any amount for meeting the litigation expenses. 4. It appears that the learned Addl. 4. It appears that the learned Addl. District Judge after considering the various affidavits and counter affidavits, came to the conclusion that the defendantrevisionist is living with Sri S. N. Trivedi and her writing in Annexure1, referred to in the order also shows that she has illicit intercourse with her Jeeja and, as such, she is not leading the chaste life and she is, therefore, not entitled to any alimony. The learned District Judge thus rejected the application under Section 24 of the H.M. Act merely on the aforesaid grounds. This order has been challenged in the present revision. 5. Learned counsel for the defendantrevisionist has urged that the learned trial Judge should not have refused to grant interim maintenance allowance and the necessary expenses to meet the litigation on the ground that the defendantapplicant is leading an adulterous life. According to his submission the application moved under Section 24 of the Act, could not be rejected by the learned District Judge on the aforesaid grounds and it has not only prejudiced the defendantrevisionist on the main issue in petition but on such consideration application under section 24 of the H.M. Act could not be rejected by the learned District Judge. It was thus urged that the learned court below has acted illegally and with substantial irregularity in exercise of jurisdiction in rejecting the application of the defendantrevisionist for alimony under Section 24 of the Act on the aforesaid ground of desertion and adultry, which would be the main issue for deciding the petition on merits filed by the plaintiff under Section 13 of H.M. Act. 6. In reply learned counsel for the plaintiffrespondent has urged that the learned court below has recorded a finding after taking into consideration all the material evidence on record, and, as such, the findings to the effect that the defendant is leading adulterous life cannot be said to be erroneous and in face of such a finding, the defendant would not be entitled to get any alimony under Section 24 of the H. M. Act and the application under Section 24 of the H.M. Act has been rightly rejected. In support of his contention learned counsel has placed reliance on a case Smt. Jiwan Lata v. Shri Krishna Kumar, (1979 Matrimonial Law Reporter, 216), wherein Hon'ble B.S. Dhillon, J. of Punjab and Haryana, High Court, observed, that since the trial court had recorded a finding that the wife was leading unchaste life, and, as such, in view of such finding, the appellant would not be entitled to claim maintenance. This decision, in my opinion, is not applicable to the facts of the present case. 7. In Jiwan Lata's case (supra), an application under Section 24 of the H. M. Act was moved by Smt. Jiwan Lata for the grant of maintenance pendente lite and for meeting the litigation expenses at the appellate stage. The said application was rejected by the Hon'ble Judge on the ground that since a finding had been recorded by the trial court that the appellant was leading unchaste life and so she would not be entitled to claim maintenance. It was observed that in case she succeeds in appeal and the finding stands reversed, it would be open in that case for the court below to pass proper orders regarding the grant of past maintenance to her and also regarding the litigation expenses. Thus in Smt. Jiwan Lata's case (supra), a finding was recorded by the trial court after taking evidence of parties and so in view of that finding the application moved under Section 24 of the H. M. Act at appellate stage was rejected. 8. In the instant case the defendantapplicant Smt. Shashi Prabha Shukla had moved application before the trial court under Section 24 of the H. M. Act. It is not disputed that the case has not yet been decided on merits. Learned court below has rejected the application by recording a finding after taking into consideration various affidavits and counter affidavits and also the alleged writing contained in Annexure 1 annexed to the divorce petition. After referring to that evidence, so far available on record, he has recorded a finding that the defendantapplicant is leading an unchaste life and she is, therefore, not entitled to any alimony. After referring to that evidence, so far available on record, he has recorded a finding that the defendantapplicant is leading an unchaste life and she is, therefore, not entitled to any alimony. Such a finding at this stage should not have been recorded as it will be prejudging the issue in the present petition moved under Section 13 of the H.M. Act by the plaintiffrespondent for the dissolution of marriage seeking divorce mainly on the ground of desertion and adultry. Similar question cropped up for consideration in Smt. Gangu Pundlik Waghmare v. Pundlik Maroti Waghmare and another (AIR 1959 P. 264). On similar set of facts Hon'ble Ginwala, J. observed: Section 24 of the Act which provides for payment of maintenance pendente lite and expenses of proceedings, does not in terms provide that the spouse who makes the application under that section would not be entitled to a relief under it if he or she is guilty of any misconduct or any marital offence. Obviously this section is enacted with the object of providing maintenance to the spouse during pendency of the proceedings, who is not otherwise able to maintain himself or herself and has to depend upon the other spouse for that purpose. The same is the object for making provisions for the expenses of the proceedings. The Legislature by enacting this provision appears to have taken note of the fact that during the pendency of the proceedings under the Act, say for divorce or judicial separation, the unity of the family would be disrupted and one of the two spouses would be thrown out from the protection and shelter of the other and would be rendered without any means not only to maintain herself or himself but also to meet the expenses necessary for the proceedings which he or she has to undergo. It is in order to obviate such a hardship that the Legislature thought it fit to make a provision in the Act for maintenance pendente lite and expenses of the proceedings from the spouse who has means to pay the same, if the other has no means. If that be the purpose of the Legislature in enacting this provision, it appears that the question whether the spouse claiming relief under this section is guilty of any material misconduct or offence would be relevant for the purpose of directing payment. If that be the purpose of the Legislature in enacting this provision, it appears that the question whether the spouse claiming relief under this section is guilty of any material misconduct or offence would be relevant for the purpose of directing payment. It is presumed that the proceeding which is initiated under the Act for divorce, judicial separation or other matters would be based on certain allegations with regard to the misconduct or marital offences committed by the other spouse. Now if these allegations were to be gone into at the time of deciding as to whether the applicant, under Section 24 of the Act, is entitled to payment of maintenance or expenses, it would amount to prejudging the whole issue. It is needless to say that proceedings under Section 24 of the Act are intended to be summary in nature and it would be appropriate at that stage to decide if the spouse making the application under that section is or is not entitled to the said payment because of the misconduct or commission of material offence by him or her. 9. I am in full agreement with the view expressed in Smt. Gangu's case (Supra), and I find that the learned court below has committed material irregularity in recording a finding on the aforesaid vital question involved in the main petition of divorce filed by the plaintiffrespondent under Section 13 of the H.M. Act. To determine such issue at the stage while disposing of the application under Section 24 of the H. M. Act, would certainly amount to prejudging the whole issue. It would, thus, prejudice the parties. If on the consideration of such matters the application under Section 24 of the Act are disposed of, then suppose a finding would have been recorded to the effect that the defendantapplicant has not committed any material misconduct and is not guilty of leading an adulterous life then such a finding would have certainly prejudiced the case of the plaintiff. An adverse finding would also certainly operate to cause prejudice to the defendant in her defence to the petition of divorce which is yet to be disposed of on merits. An adverse finding would also certainly operate to cause prejudice to the defendant in her defence to the petition of divorce which is yet to be disposed of on merits. I am, therefore, of opinion that while dealing with the application under Section 24 of the Act, the sole question for consideration should be whether the applicant is not able to maintain himself or herself, during the pendency of the proceedings as alleged and that the applicant has got no other independent source of income of his own, sufficient to maintain himself or herself and to meet the necessary expenses of the proceedings. 10. The income of father, brother or other relatives with whom he or she, for the time being, is living will not be relevant for the purposes of determining the existence of independent source of income of the applicant referred in Section 24 of the H.M. Act. Thus the fact that the wife is supported by her father or brother or that she is living on the goodwill or charity of any other relation or friend, cannot be taken into consideration in the matter of alimony, and likewise, the mere fact that the applicant is educated and capable of earning cannot disentitle him or her to maintenance. It is well settled that sufficient independent income is not equivalent to her potential earning capacity. See Radhika Bai v. Suddhu Ram (AIR 1970 Madhya Pradesh 14). It may also be stated that the court is vested with a discretion to make an order pendente lite for maintenance of children although separate application has not been moved for the purpose, See D. Dhimappa v. M. Nagveni (AIR 1976 Karnataka 215). 11. In the instant case the learned trial court has not rejected the application of the defendant applicant on the ground that she has got some independent source of income sufficient to meet the expenses of the litigation or to maintain herself and her child but it has been rejected on the ground which is not legally sustainable. Thus, in my opinion, she is entitled to get sufficient amount for maintenance pendente lite and also to meet the necessary litigation expenses. The quantum of maintenance allowance and also of litigation expenses would depend on the monthly income of the plaintiffrespondent and his other financial resources. Thus, in my opinion, she is entitled to get sufficient amount for maintenance pendente lite and also to meet the necessary litigation expenses. The quantum of maintenance allowance and also of litigation expenses would depend on the monthly income of the plaintiffrespondent and his other financial resources. Since no finding on the point has been recorded by the learned trial Judge, and, as such, by setting aside the impugned order dated 781985, I direct the learned trial court to determine the quantum of monthly pendente lite maintenance allowance and also sufficient amount to meet necessary expenses of the litigation. 12. In the result the revision succeeds and is hereby allowed and the order dated 781985 passed by IVth Addl. Judge, Lucknow is hereby set aside and the case is remanded to him for deciding the application under Section 24 of the Act moved by the defendantrevisionist afresh on merits according to law and in the light of the observations made above. No order as to costs. It is expected that the trial court will decide the petition under Section 24 of H.M. Act expeditiously. (Revision allowed.)