JUDGMENT D. N. Jha, J. - Nand Kishore has directed this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, feeling aggrieved by the order passed by the U.P. Public Services Tribunal No. V, Lucknow, whereby the Tribunal dismissed the claim of the petitioner vide order dated 30.4.1986. 2. It may be mentioned that Annexure 1 to Annexure 2 is the impugned order which was questioned by the petitioner before the Services Tribunal. It shows that the petitioner was appointed in a temporary capacity as Mali and his services were terminated with notice. This order was challenged through a claim petition as mentioned above. The Tribunal held that the order was a simpliciter order of termination and it did not attach any stigma, hence it was not violative of Article 311(1) of the Constitution. 3. It may be mentioned that this order by the Tribunal was passed by a single Member (Judicial Member). I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and gone through the averments. Three questions have been raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner in this petition. Firstly, he contended that the order could not be passed by a single Judge in view of the provision of clause (2) of Section 3 of the U.P. Public Services (Tribunal) Act, 1976 (hereinafter to be referred as, the Act). Clause (2) provides that each Tribunal Shall .consist of a Judicial Member and an Administrative Member (emphasis provided by me). Learned counsel contends that the word 'shall' is in the form of a mandate that the Tribunal will consist of at least two Members, one of whom shall be a Judicial Member and another an Administrative Member. He, therefore, submitted that a single Member had no jurisdiction to constitute himself as a 'Tribunal and, therefore, the order passed by the Single Member of the Tribunal is without jurisdiction. In my opinion, the argument is devoid of merit. He, therefore, submitted that a single Member had no jurisdiction to constitute himself as a 'Tribunal and, therefore, the order passed by the Single Member of the Tribunal is without jurisdiction. In my opinion, the argument is devoid of merit. Section 4A introduced in the Act by U.P. Act No. 13 of 1985, which came into force on 28.1.1985, provided that a reference of claim wherein the validity of any order of dismissal or removal from service or reduction in rank is involved, shall be heard and finally decided by both Members of the Tribunal, provided that any order other than an order finally disposing of the case may be passed, evidence may be received and proceeding (except hearing of oral argument for final disposal of the case) may be conducted, by either of the members. In clause (2) of section 4A it is mentioned that a reference of claim other than that referred to in clause (1) may be heard and finally decided by a Single Member of the Tribunal. Under clause (3) it is provided that anything done by a Single Member of the Tribunal under clause (1) or clause (2) shall be deemed to have been done by the Tribunal. It is a wellsettled principle of interpretation of statutes that the provisions of the Act have to be read conjunctively so as to derive correct intention of the Legislature. Section 4A in fact enlarges the definition of the Tribunal described in clause (2) of Section 3. On account of increase in pressure of work it is open to the Legislature to provide that small matters should be disposed of by a single Member while important matters, such as, dismissal, removal or reduction in rank, should be heard by two Members but in that eventuality the Legislature made a provision that so far as recording of evidence or any other matters were concerned, a Single Member can do so and has limited jurisdiction of two Members to the extent of hearing of oral arguments and decision. Rest of the matters were to be dealt by a Single Member who also in term constitutes a Tribunal. I do not think that section 4A reduces the definition of clause (2) to a redundancy. The word Shall in term has to be read as 'May'. Rest of the matters were to be dealt by a Single Member who also in term constitutes a Tribunal. I do not think that section 4A reduces the definition of clause (2) to a redundancy. The word Shall in term has to be read as 'May'. When the Act had come into force the dispute was to be heard by a Judicial Member as well as an Administrative Member but when pressure of work increased, as is evident from the statement of object made by the Legislaturethen it had proceeded to incorporate section 4A in the Act. On a plain reading of the two sections mentioned above, I do not think that there is any merit in the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Single Member deciding the claim petition was without jurisdiction. 4. The learned counsel next contended that the termination order was bad as no opportunity was provided to him at any stage as provided by Article 311 (1) of the Constitution. This submission is also devoid of merit as termination order cannot be equated with an order of dismissal or removal. Termination is a weapon provided in the hands of the employer to do away with the services of a temporary employee whose services are no longer required and, therefore, no stigma attaches to the termination order, The learned counsel in order to substantiate his argument tried to unveil this order of termination in order to show that it was on account of bad entries that his services were terminated. Such an inference cannot be deduced from the phraseology used in the termination order. This court normally does not permit unveiling of the order unless cogent reasons are assigned. In the instant case 1 do not think any unveiling of the simpliciter order of termination is called for. This submission is also devoid of merit, 5. Lastly, It was urged that the rule referred to in the termination order is provided by delegated legislation. The Niyamawali of 1975 referred to in the termination order is formulated under the delegated legislation of powers. Therefore, it cannot override the effect of Articles 309 and 310 of the Constitution. This submission is also devoid of merit, 5. Lastly, It was urged that the rule referred to in the termination order is provided by delegated legislation. The Niyamawali of 1975 referred to in the termination order is formulated under the delegated legislation of powers. Therefore, it cannot override the effect of Articles 309 and 310 of the Constitution. It may be mentioned that there is no conflict in the Niyamawali formulated under the delegated legislation provided by the Legislature, If the Legislature in its wisdom provided certain provisions in the Niyamawali it cannot be said that it is in excess of jurisdiction so long it is not pointed out that it is in direct conflict with the provisions of Articles 309 and 310 of the Constitution. In my opinion, the learned counsel has only indulged in legal quibbling in order to make out a case for admission of this petition. 6. On giving my anxious consideration to the entire facts and circumstances involved in the matter I do not think it is a fit case where it can be said that the Tribunal committed an error in exercise of jurisdiction warranting interference by this Court in exercise of jurisdiction, under Article 226 of the Constitution which itself is discretionary in nature. 7. In view of the above observations the petition is dismissed in limine. 8. Soon after I had dictated judgment in open court dismissing the petition In limine learned counsel for the petitioner prayed that he may be granted a Certificate that t is a fit case for appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 134 A of the constitution of India. I do not think that the matter involves any substantial question of law of general importance which calls for decision by the Supreme Court. The certificate prayed for is accordingly refused.