JUDGMENT A.N. Verma, J. - This petition is directed against an order dated 29-8-1986 passed by the learned II Addl. District Judge, Meerut staying the operation of an order dated 26-8- 86 passed by the learned 1st Addl. Civil Judge, Meerut during the pendency of an appeal filed by one Sukhbir Singh Rana who was defendant No. 5 in a suit filed by the petitioners for appointment of a receiver for managing and controlling the affairs of Janta Intermediate College, Meerut. It is apparent that the impugned order is interlocutory in nature as the appeal is still pending. Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, submitted that the appellate Court has by the impugned order virtually disposed of the appeal itself. It has expressed its opinion on merits against the petitioners and consequently it has become necessary for the petitioners to approach this Court at this very stage. He accordingly invited the Court to dispose of the matter relating to the appointment of a' receiver on merits. 2. Having heard the learned Counsel for the petitioners as well as the respondents, I am clearly of the opinion that the appointment of a receiver in the present case was entirely uncalled for and its operation has rightly been suspended by the appellate Court. 3. Vidya Pracharan Sabha was a registered society established to run an educational institution called Janta Intermediate College, Sarurpur Khurd, Pargana and Tahsil Sardhana, District Meerut. At present, however, the society stands de-registered on account of non-renewal of the certificate of registration. Under the Scheme of Administration, the management of the College vests in the Committee of Management elected by the general body of the society in accordance with the Scheme of Administration. 4. The petitioners claiming to be life members of the said society filed a suit before the learned Civil Judge, Meerut on 20-8-1986 arraying the erstwhile Committee of Management which appears to have been in the control of the Management of the College on the date of the institution of the suit with Balbir Singh as its Manager and Dheer Singh, the President. They were arrayed respectively as defendants Nos. 2 and 3. The fifth respondent, Sukhbir Singh Rana, is the Principal of the institution. 5. The suit was filed on they e allegations. They were arrayed respectively as defendants Nos. 2 and 3. The fifth respondent, Sukhbir Singh Rana, is the Principal of the institution. 5. The suit was filed on they e allegations. The aforesaid Committee was elected on 15-8-1978 for a period of three years, but under the Scheme of Administration (as it then stood) it was entitled to continue till the new Committee took over. On 22-12-83 the Scheme of Administration of the College was amended as a result of which the term of the said erstwhile Committee automatically lapsed within a month from the expiry of three years after their election on 5-8-78. The amended Scheme enjoins the Deputy Director of Education to appoint an Administrator to run the institution and to hold fresh elections if the new Committee of Management is not elected within one month from the expiry of three years of the term of the previous Committee of Management. Despite, however, several complaints filed by the plaintiffs before the District Inspector of Schools, Meerut and Deputy Director of Education between 10-8-1986 and 16-8-86, no action was taken by the Deputy Director of Education. The affairs of the College were being mismanaged by the previous Committee. There were complaints of misfeasance and malfeasance of the College funds against the said Committee, and, even though the term of the Committee had expired, it was going ahead with the process of electing a new Committee of Management. The entire exercise of holding fresh elections undertaken by this Committee was nothing but a farce. Sukhbir Singh Rana, the election officer, had fixed 10-8-86 for publishing the list of voters and 15-8-86 for hearing objections against the electoral while 16-8-86 was scheduled for publication of the serial list. However, he did not turn up on any of these dates. The list was neither published nor finalised. In these circumstances, it had become necessary to seek the aid of the Court for the following reliefs : (i) A receiver may be appointed for the management and control of the Janta Intermediate College and to hold election of the members and office-bearers of the Committee of Management of the College according to the Scheme of Administration till a legal Committee of Management after approval by the District Inspector of Schools discharges of the management of the College. (ii) An injunction may be issued restraining the defendants from interfering with the work of the receiver appointed by the Court. 6. Simultaneously, with the institution of the suit, an application for appointment of a receiver in terms prayed for in the suit itself was filed. Immediately thereafter the defendants Nos. 1 to 3 filed what was only a pretence for an objection. In substance it was virtual surrender on the part of these defendants. In this so called objection they lukewarmly denied the allegation made against them namely, that they did not want to hold fresh elections was wrong. They said the duty for appointing an Administrator and holding fresh elections vested in the Deputy Director of Education. They could not hence be blamed for inaction of the authorities. After stating these facts, the three defendants said that they would have no objection to the appointment of receiver by the Court for the purpose of management of the institution and for holding elections. It is thus apparent that there was no contest by any of these defendants. In the counter-affidavit which has been filed on behalf of the respondents in the present case, it is asserted that these defendants are closely related to the plaintiffs and are undeniably colluding with the plaintiffs. 7. On the aforesaid material on the record the trial Court passed an order on 26-8-86 which leaves no manner of doubt that it is in the nature of a consent order. The following observations made in the judgment of the learned Civil Judge will confirm this : "By the above facts and assertions both the parties have admitted the need of appointment of receiver and both the parties have submitted separate applications. On behalf of the plaintiff 13-C is submitted by which the plaintiffs have prayed that out of the four persons named in the application one of them may be appointed as Interim Receiver, where- as defendants have filed 14-C. They have also mentioned four names in the said application and prayed for appointment of Interim Receiver from one of the these four persons. I have gone through the contents of these two applications. In both these applications the name of Sri Har Lal Yadav, Advocate, has been commonly preferred by both the parties. I have gone through the contents of these two applications. In both these applications the name of Sri Har Lal Yadav, Advocate, has been commonly preferred by both the parties. Both the parties were also asked whether they do agree with the name of Sri Har Lal Yadav and both the parties have given their consent for the same. In view of the above, Sri. Har Lal Yadav, Advocate, is appointed Interim Receiver for the management and control of the Janta Inter College........" 8. It will thus be seen that the learned Civil Judge himself did not make any serious effort to determine independently of the consent given by the parties to find out whether it will be just and convenient to appoint a receiver for the management of the institution. As I shall presently demonstrate this question had to be determined with reference to the relevant statutory provisions touching on the subject of the management of a recognised educational institution and the degree of rigorous 'control which is exercised by the educational authorities over the Committee of Management of a College. Nor did the learned Civil Judge consider it necessary or proper to insist on the presence of these authorities and to ascertain the stand taken by them. Neither the Deputy Director of Education nor the District Inspector of Schools was arrayed as a defendant in the suit. No directions were sought in the suit against the Deputy Director of Education nor even the District Inspector of Schools. I am of the considered opinion that in absence of educational authorities, the Court should not make any worthwhile and effective arrangement with regard to the Management of the Institution the affairs of which are almost wholly controlled by these authorities. I am clearly of the opinion that the suit suffered from a major defect in its frame. Both, the Deputy Director of Education and District Inspector of Schools were necessary parties for any relief pertaining to the Management of the College. 9. Section 16-A of the Intermediate Education Act provides that notwithstanding anything in any law, document, or decree or order of a Court or other instruments, there shall be a Scheme of Administration for every institution. The Scheme of Administration shall amongst other matters provides for the constitution of a Committee of Management vested with the authority to manage and conduct the affairs of the institution. The Scheme of Administration shall amongst other matters provides for the constitution of a Committee of Management vested with the authority to manage and conduct the affairs of the institution. The Scheme of Administration shall be subject to the approval of the Director. 10. It further provides that every recognised institution shall be managed in accordance with the Scheme of Administration framed under and in accordance with sub-section (1) to sub-section (5) of section 16-A and section 16-B and section 16-C of the Act. There is then section 16-D which provides that if on the receipt of information or otherwise, the Director is satisfied that the Committee of Management is not functioning in accordance with law and the provisions of the said Act, he may appoint an authorised controller for the management of the institution and its properties. 11. The payment of salary to the teachers and staff of a recognised institution is also regulated under the High School and Intermediate Colleges (Payment of Salaries of Teachers and other Employees) Act 1971 by the District Inspector of Schools and the Deputy Director of Education. Under certain circumstances the District Inspector of Schools is empowered, on the failure of the Management to comply with the directions issued by him to order single operation of the salaries account and thereby the management is excluded from the operation of this account. The Deputy Director of Education on the other hand is authorised under this Act to supersede the Management of a College in case when it fails to comply with the directions issued by him, and to appoint an Authorised Controller in respect thereof. 12. In the matter of service conditions of the teachers and staff too the Educational Authorised exercise extensive control over the management. 13. In this statutory background, I do venture to think, an order with regard to the management of the educational institution should not be passed without associating appropriate Educational Authorities in the adjudication of disputes touching the management and conduct of the College. No effective relief could thus be granted by the trial Court without impleading these authorities. 14. Learned Civil Judge did not address himself to these questions and straightway passed the order appointing receiver without realising its implications. In the plaint itself, it has been disclosed that good, bad or different, certain election process had already been set in motion. No effective relief could thus be granted by the trial Court without impleading these authorities. 14. Learned Civil Judge did not address himself to these questions and straightway passed the order appointing receiver without realising its implications. In the plaint itself, it has been disclosed that good, bad or different, certain election process had already been set in motion. In the subsequent order which he passed upon an objection filed by the defendant No. 5, and a third party, a certified copy of which has been annexed to the petition, the learned Civil Judge has observed that the receiver has been appointed only to manage the College and hold elections and there was no restraint order prohibiting the defendants from holding elections. He observed : "The defendant or anybody else was not restrained to interfere or to hold election of the management. Therefore, if some election of management is going to take place by some authorised or unauthorised persons then the same is not under stay vide order dated 26-8-86. However, the receiver may proceed vide order dated 26-8-86." 15. It is hardly necessary to stress that the Court should not have passed order which was bound to add to the confusion already prevailing, the worst sufferer being the Institution itself. Dual control would be exercised one by the Receiver and the other by the authorities, the latter being not parties to the suit. Neither is it difficult to visualise the serious complications which were bound to arise with the Receiver also holding election in addition to the one which had been started by the defendant. Far from being just and convenient, the appointment of a receiver was bound to lead to chaos and prove counterproductive in the context of well being of the College which alone was relevant for deciding whether appointment of receiver was just and convenient. If the Deputy Director of Education was not performing his duty as alleged by the plaintiffs, appropriate directions to the Educational Authorities, rather than appointment of a receiver would have been the more appropriate relief to seek because, on plaintiffs' own showing a new Committee of Management could not be elected save under the supervision of the Administrator appointed by the Deputy Director of Education. 16. 16. The order passed by the trial Court in these circumstances authorising the receiver to hold elections was thus clearly misconceived and unwarranted, apart from the fact that it ran counter to Scheme of Administration which has a statutory flavour. 17. further according to the plaintiffs, it was only as recently as 16-8-86 that complaints were filed before the Deputy Director of Education against the continuance of previous Committee of Management requesting him to take necessary steps. The suit was, however, instituted on 20-8-86, that is, within less than four days of these complaints and, that, too without impleading the Deputy Director of Education and without praying for any relief against him. If the plaintiffs had any grievance against the Deputy Director of Education the proper remedy would have been to seek appropriate directions against the Deputy Director of Education or District Inspector of Schools. They, however, did not do that. Instead they filed a suit of the nature and with the frame which clearly suffered from fundamental defects as found herein above. 18. 1, therefore, hold that the appellate Court was right in suspending the operation of such an order. It has passed the impugned order firstly on the ground that the plaintiffs and defendants Nos. 1 to 3 were in collusion and secondly that the order passed by the trial Court was void being contrary to Cl. (e) of Order 39, R. 2 of the C.P.C. which provides that no injunction shall be granted to stall any elections. The appellate Court has observed that even though the order purports to be one appointing a receiver, it has the effect of delaying election process which had already been set in motion. There is a lot to be said in favour of this legal view. As regards the finding of collusion between the plaintiffs and defendants, I do not wish to express any final opinion- on the same as the suit is still pending. But the circumstances in which the receiver was appointed do lend some credibility to the charge of collusion. In the counter-affidavit that has been filed in this Court on behalf of the respondents, it has been asserted that the plaintiffs and the defendants Nos. 1 to 3 are in collusion being closely related with each other. No rejoinder affidavit has been filed by the petitioners to controvert these assertions. In the counter-affidavit that has been filed in this Court on behalf of the respondents, it has been asserted that the plaintiffs and the defendants Nos. 1 to 3 are in collusion being closely related with each other. No rejoinder affidavit has been filed by the petitioners to controvert these assertions. Learned counsel did not even seek time to file a rejoinder affidavit. That being so, the finding recorded by the appellate Court prima facie seems unexceptionable, and, at any rate, cannot be interfered with in these proceedings, not having been demonstrated to be vitiated by any error of law or jurisdiction. 19. Lastly, learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently contended that on the material on the record, it is apparent that the erstwhile Committee of Management has long ceased to have any right to continue and in a situation like this the Deputy Director of Education ought to be directed by this Court to perform his duty which clearly lies on him under the Scheme of Administration. So far as this court is concerned, sitting singly, I can only look into the correctness or otherwise of the orders passed by the learned Addl. Distt. Judge within the parameters of the suit. For a relief independently of the suit and not flowing from that obtainable in respect of the impugned orders the petitioners have to approach a Division Bench according to the Rules of the Court. I am hence refraining from expressing any opinion on whether the petitioner is entitled to the issuance of a writ of mandamus against the Deputy Director of Education commanding him to perform his duties. So far as the impugned order is concerned, I have already made my comments here in above, and found no ground for interference. 20. In the result, the petition fails and is dismissed.