JUDGMENT - H.W. DHABE, J.:---This is the plaintiff's revision against the order of the learned lower Appellate Court which has dismissed the application for temporary injunction filed by him setting aside the temporary injunction granted by the learned trial Court. 2. Briefly, the facts are that the plaintiff claims that he is the owner of the truck bearing registration No. MHG 5155. According to him he purchased the said truck from one Pritamsingh Bhatia on 15-4-1983 and accordingly on 11-12-1984 his name was registered in the office of Regional Transport Officer as the owner of the said truck as per the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. A temporary permit was also granted in his name for plying the said truck and as per the said permit he carried on his business. It is his case that the defendant No. 3 (non-applicant No. 1) was working as a supervisor upon the said truck. On 19-3-1985, according to him he had sent the said truck to the office of the Regional Transport Officer by entrusting it to the defendant No. 3 for the purpose of getting the fitness certificate. All the papers relating to the registration of the truck were, therefore, with the said defendant No. 3. 3. Further, according to the plaintiff, when he, thereafter, enquired from the defendant No. 3, about the fitness certificate, he told him that the fitness certificate would be received within seven or eight days. Since the plaintiff had some urgent work and for that purpose needed the truck he went to the Regional Transport Office on 20-3-1985 when he found that the defendant No. 3 had entered his name in the relevant register of the Regional Transport Office (for short, "the R.T.O.") as the owner of the truck on the basis of the T.T.O. forms purported to be signed by the plaintiff. The plaintiff, however, still received the possession of the truck on 21-3-1985 from the office of the R.T.O. The plaintiff immediately lodged a complaint with the police that the defendant No. 3 had cheated him by getting the truck registered in his own name as the owner thereof. The plaintiff, however, still received the possession of the truck on 21-3-1985 from the office of the R.T.O. The plaintiff immediately lodged a complaint with the police that the defendant No. 3 had cheated him by getting the truck registered in his own name as the owner thereof. He also filed the instant suit for permanent injunction to restrain the defendant No. 3 from disturbing his possession of the suit truck and also claimed mandatory direction to the defendant No. 2 i.e. the District Transport Officer (non-applicant No. 3) to issue all the relevant documents and papers pertaining to the truck to him in his name. It may be stated at this stage that the relevant papers relating to the registration of the truck were, according to plaintiff, taken away by the defendant No. 3 from the office of the R.T.O. The instant suit was filed on 3-4-1985. 4. The plaintiff filed an application for temporary injunction under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short, "CPC") claiming an injunction to restrain the defendant No. 3 from disturbing his possession of the suit truck which was in his custody and possession and claiming also a mandatory injunction against the defendant No. 2 for issuing in his name all the relevant documents pertaining to the suit truck. The defendant No. 3 resisted the aforesaid application for temporary injunction for filing his reply raising also the ground that the instant suit without claiming a declaration was not maintainable. The learned trial Court on the basis of the material on record held that prima facie the plaintiff was the owner of the suit truck which was in his possession. He, therefore, restrained the defendant No. 3 from disturbing the possession of the plaintiff over the suit truck No. MHG 5155. He also directed the defendant No. 2 i.e. the District Transport Officer to receive all the taxes of the truck from the plaintiff whenever they become due. He further directed the defendant No. 2 not to prevent the plaintiff from plying the truck if he pays all the taxes of the suit truck and if he has the relevant documents. 5. The defendant No. 3 preferred an appeal in the District Court, Bhandara. He further directed the defendant No. 2 not to prevent the plaintiff from plying the truck if he pays all the taxes of the suit truck and if he has the relevant documents. 5. The defendant No. 3 preferred an appeal in the District Court, Bhandara. The learned Additional District Judge, Gondia held that since the certificate of registration under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 stood in the name of the defendant No. 3 he would be presumed to be the owner of the suit truck. He also held that mere possession by itself would not be a true criteria for granting custody. He therefore, allowed the appeal and set aside the temporary injunction granted by the learned trial Court. Being aggrieved, the plaintiff has preferred the instant revision in this Court. 6. Before proceeding to consider the contentions raised by the parties in this case, it is necessary to state a few further facts in this case. According to the plaintiff the suit truck was seized from his possession by the defendant No. 2 i.e. the District Transport Officer a day prior to the date of the order of the learned lower Appellate Court on the ground that the taxes were not paid and that the relevant papers relating to the truck were not in the truck. It is however the case of the plaintiff that the receipt of payment of taxes as well as the receipt of insurance were shown to the authorities of the RTO in spite of which the truck was seized. It may be seen that originally when the suit truck was purchased there was a temporary permit granted in the name of the plaintiff for plying the truck for four months which was to end on 31-3-1985. The plaintiff had, therefore, applied for getting a permanent permit as per the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act. However, the said matter remained pending because the defendant No. 3 had also applied for permanent permit and according to the defendant No. 3 he was granted a temporary permit for the subsequent period. 7. Turning to the contentions in this revision it is urged on behalf of the plaintiff that the plaintiff has a prima facie case as regards the ownership and possession of the suit truck. 7. Turning to the contentions in this revision it is urged on behalf of the plaintiff that the plaintiff has a prima facie case as regards the ownership and possession of the suit truck. In appreciating the said contention raised on behalf of the plaintiff it may be seen that it is not in dispute that the suit truck was purchased in the name of the plaintiff on 15-4-1983 from Pritamsingh Bhatia. It is further not in dispute that accordingly the name of the plaintiff was registered as the owner of the truck under the Motor Vehicles Act. It is, however, the case of the defendant No. 3 that it is he who has paid the consideration of the truck and that the last instalment of Rs. 17,000/- was paid by him through the plaintiff. What he actually means by payment through the plaintiff is that the cheque was issued by the plaintiff for the aforesaid payment of Rs. 17,000/- and the aforesaid amount was to be taken into consideration while making the accounts about the business of plying the truck. It is the case of the plaintiff that the said truck was purchased by him for Rs. 17,101/- and that he expended Rs. 60,000/- on its repairs whereas the defendant No. 3 contends that it was purchased for Rs. 75,000/-. 8. So far as the question of prima facie title to the suit truck is concerned the essential fact viz. the sale deed and the admission of the defendant No. 3 that the truck was purchased in the name of the plaintiff would show that the plaintiff had prima facie title to the truck because even according to the defendant No. 3 it was a benami purchase in the name of the plaintiff. Therefore, unless the defendant No. 3 establishes by leading cogent evidence in the suit that the plaintiff was only an ostensible owner of the truck and that he was the real owner of the truck it has to be assumed for a prima facie case that the plaintiff was prima facie the owner of the truck since the sale deed was in his name. The further fact that after its purchase the suit truck was registered in the name of the plaintiff would also show that the plaintiff was prima facie the owner of the suit truck. The further fact that after its purchase the suit truck was registered in the name of the plaintiff would also show that the plaintiff was prima facie the owner of the suit truck. The next question which is necessary to be examined as regards the prima facie case is the question of possessing of the suit truck on the date of the suit. It is not in dispute that until 19-3-1985 i.e. the date on which the suit truck was sent to the RTO the suit truck was in possession of the plaintiff and even thereafter it continued to be in possession of the plaintiff because he obtained its possession from the RTO for his work. What is contended on behalf of the defendant No. 3 is that although he was the owner of the suit truck it was given to the plaintiff only for his work. It is thus clear that the possession of the suit truck was with the plaintiff even though according to the defendant No. 3 it was registered in his name on 20-3-1985. Even thereafter the plaintiff continued to ply the suit truck till it was seized by the Regional Transport Authorities a day before the judgment of the appeal in the instant case. Thus the possession of the suit truck on the date of the suit i.e. 3-4-1985 and even thereafter till it was seized a day prior to the judgment in the appeal on the ground of non-payment of taxes and also on the ground of not carrying the relevant papers in the truck is proved. 9. Since, as found above, the prima facie title and possession of the truck was of the plaintiff, he would be entitled to a temporary injunction in his favour to restraint the defendant No. 3 from interfering with his possession. The difficulty has, however, arisen as it is strenuously urged that since the name of the defendant No. 3 is registered as the owner of the suit truck on 20-3-1985 under the Motor Vehicles Act he is alone the legal owner of the said truck as per the provisions of the said Act and is, therefore, alone entitled to ply the said truck being a registered owner. It is also urged that since the name of the defendant No. 3 is entered as a registered owner under the Motor Vehicles Act the possession of the truck should be his. It is further urged that the balance of convenience requires that no temporary injunction should be granted to the plaintiff because the obligations and all consequences arising out of the plying of the truck would be upon the defendant No. 3 whose name is registered as owner of the truck under the Motor Vehicles Act. 10. In support of the above contentions the learned Counsel for the defendant No. 3 has relied upon the following decisions: (Padmadevi v. Gurbakshsingh)1, A.I.R. 1973 Raj. 317; (Champalal v. Ramchander)2, A.I.R. 1967 Raj. 75 and (Nandiram v. State of Gujarat)3, A.I.R. 1967 Guj. 80. All the above decisions are relied upon to show that the person whose name is registered as the owner under section 31 of the Motor Vehicles Act is the person who is in law the owner of the truck. However, contesting this proposition the learned Counsel for the plaintiff has relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of (Kisen Pandurang v. Baldeosingh)4, 1977 Mh.L.J. 656 in which it is held that section 31 of the Motor Vehicles Act is only to the effect that after change of ownership corresponding change in registration certificate should be recorded and that section 31 of the said Act comes into operation after change of ownership. It is held in the said case that the sale of movable property is governed by the provisions of the Sale of Goods Act and not by the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and that the transfer of registration follows transfer of ownership and not vice versa. A similar view is also taken by the Delhi High Court in the cases of (Oriental Fire General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Vimal Rai and others)5, A.I.R. 1973 Delhi 115 which is also relied upon on behalf of the plaintiff. The above two decisions no doubt support the plaintiff's contention. The view taken by the Division Bench of this Court upon the construction of section 31 of the Motor Vehicles Act is binding upon me. Ltd. v. Smt. Vimal Rai and others)5, A.I.R. 1973 Delhi 115 which is also relied upon on behalf of the plaintiff. The above two decisions no doubt support the plaintiff's contention. The view taken by the Division Bench of this Court upon the construction of section 31 of the Motor Vehicles Act is binding upon me. It has, therefore, to be held that section 31 of the Motor Vehicles Act as such does not confer any right of ownership of the vehicle upon the person whose name is entered in the registration certificate. 11. The examination of the relevant provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act also makes it clear that the normal concept of ownership is not changed under the provisions of the said Act. Section 2(19) of the Motor Vehicles Act defines the expression "owner" to mean "where the person in possession of a motor vehicle is a minor, the guardian of such minor, and in relation to motor vehicle which is the subject of a hire purchase agreement, the person in possession of the vehicle under that agreement." The above definition of the expression 'owner' would show that it is not exhaustive. In contrast it may be seen that the Bombay Motor Vehicle Tax Act, 1958 defines the expression 'registered owner' in section 2(5) of the said Act from which it will be clear that for purposes of taxation the said Act fastens the liability upon the registered owner which means a person in whose name a motor vehicle is registered under the Motor Vehicles Act. 12. Section 31 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as already pointed out, provides for entering the name of the transferee if the vehicle is transferred after it is registered under the provisions of Chapter III of the said Act. It may be seen that section 22 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides that no person shall drive any motor vehicle and no owner of a motor vehicle shall cause or permit the vehicle to be driven in any public place or in any other place for the purpose of carrying passengers or goods unless the vehicle is registered in accordance with the provisions of Chapter III. Section 23 requires the owner of the motor vehicles to cause the vehicle to be registered by a registering authority in the State. Section 23 requires the owner of the motor vehicles to cause the vehicle to be registered by a registering authority in the State. It is, therefore, necessary that the owner has to get the vehicle registered under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and unless the said vehicle is registered he cannot ply the same. That explains the necessity for the name of the transferee being registered under section 31 of the Motor Vehicles Act as per the procedure provided by it. The effect of these provisions would be that the registration would be prime facie evidence of ownership but would not be itself create title in the transferee which is made sufficiently clear in the judgment of the Delhi High Court, cited supra. 13. It is next urged that if the plaintiff was aggrieved by the registration of the vehicle in the name of the defendant No. 3 he should have filed an appeal against the same under section 35 of the Motor Vehicles Act and till its final decision it should be presumed that the defendant No. 3 is the owner of the said truck. A perusal of section 35 of the Motor Vehicles Act would show that no such appeal is provided against the order passed under section 31 registering the name of the transferee. As already stated the registration of the vehicle was merely a ministerial act and it was open to the plaintiff to challenge the same by filling the instant suit based upon his title. The fact that he did not file any appeal would not come in his way in asking for the necessary relief about the changing of registration in his name on the basis of his ownership. 14 It is next urged that no permit can be granted in the name of the plaintiff because the registration of the vehicle is not in his name. According to the defendant No. 3 unless the vehicle is registered to the name of the plaintiff necessary permit to ply the vehicle as per provisions of section 42 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be granted to him. A bare perusal of section 42 of the said Act would show that the expression used therein is "owner" and not "a registered owner". A bare perusal of section 42 of the said Act would show that the expression used therein is "owner" and not "a registered owner". Therefore, registration is not a sine qua non for permit under section 42 although registration may be prima facie evidence of ownership of the vehicle for the purpose of the said Act. No other provision has been brought to my notice which would require that the name of the owner must be registered before he can make an application for permit to use the vehicle. There is, therefore, no legal bar in granting the permit to the plaintiff if he makes an application for the said purpose and satisfies that he is the true owner of the vehicle. 15. However, bearing all these aspects in mind the question to be considered would be if the temporary injunction were to be granted in favour of the plaintiff on the ground that he was prima facie owner and was in possession of the suit truck what incidental interim orders should be made so as to enable him to ply the vehicle if he would satisfy the requirements of the Motor Vehicles Act. The learned trial Court while granting the temporary injunction has directed the defendant No. 2 to receive the taxes of the truck from the plaintiff whenever they become due and to pass receipts for the same. He has also directed the plaintiff to pay all the taxes of the suit truck and after having relevant documents he directed the defendant No. 2 not to prevent the plaintiff from plying the truck. In this regard it is urged on behalf of the plaintiff that he has already paid the taxes of the truck and also holds the insurance for the truck in his name which is effected on 15-3-1985 upto 14-3-1986. He has further stated that he is ready to comply with all the requirements under the Motor Vehicles Act for getting the permit in his name and is ready to accept all consequences and incur all the liabilities for which an owner may be liable under the Motor Vehicles Act. 16. He has further stated that he is ready to comply with all the requirements under the Motor Vehicles Act for getting the permit in his name and is ready to accept all consequences and incur all the liabilities for which an owner may be liable under the Motor Vehicles Act. 16. It is, however, urged on behalf of the defendant No. 3 that since his name is entered as the owner of the suit truck under the Motor Vehicles Act he would be liable for all consequences and in particular in case of an accident according to him he would be held liable because his name is entered as the owner of the suit truck. The said apprehension is based upon the interpretation of the expression "owner" to mean a registered owner whose name is registered as the owner of the vehicle under the Motor Vehicles Act. However, as already shown there is no foundation for the above apprehension and by issuing suitable directions the interest of the defendant No. 3 can in this regard be protected. 17. All the challenges of the defendant No. 3 thus fail. Since the plaintiff has established his prima facie title and undisputed possession of the suit truck he would be entitled to temporary injunction in his favour to protect his interest and to ply the truck by complying with the necessary requirements under the Motor Vehicles Act. In the view which I have taken the impugned order of the learned lower Appellate Court deserves to be set aside. 18. In the result, the impugned order of the learned lower Appellate Court is set aside and the following order is passed in its place : (i) The defendant No. 3 is restrained from disturbing the possession of the plaintiff over the suit truck bearing No. MHG 5155 pending decision of this suit. 18. In the result, the impugned order of the learned lower Appellate Court is set aside and the following order is passed in its place : (i) The defendant No. 3 is restrained from disturbing the possession of the plaintiff over the suit truck bearing No. MHG 5155 pending decision of this suit. (ii) Pending decision of the instant suit, the defendant No. 2 is hereby directed to treat the plaintiff as the owner of the suit truck for the purposes of the Motor Vehicles Act and a registered owner for the purposes of the Bombay Motor Vehicles Tax Act, 1958, to hand over to him the possession of the suit truck and to issue him all necessary papers in relation to the same upon the said footing if he otherwise complies with the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, and to consider his application for temporary permit to ply the truck if he satisfies the requirements for the said purpose. (iii) Pending decision of the suit the plaintiff and not the defendant No. 3, shall be responsible for the payment of taxes of the suit truck, for its insurance and for payment of any other dues etc. and also for all the consequences arising out of ownership and possession of the suit truck and due to its plying by him. (iv) The plaintiff is directed to furnish within one month from the date of this order a solvent security for the temporary injunction in his favour and for plying the truck which should be to the satisfaction of the trial Court and in the amount fixed by him. In the circumstances, however, there would be no order as to costs of this revision. Order accordingly. -----