JUDGMENT : G.B. Patnaik, J. - The two Petitioners have challenged the order of the learned Sessions Judge, Koraput dated 21-1-1984 by which order the learned Sessions Judge set aside the order of the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Jeypore dated 17-8-1983 and directed to frame charges against the Petitioners under Sections 379/411, I.P.C. and Section 21 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957. 2. According to the prosecution case, the Officer-in charge, Jeypore town P.S. directed the Sub-Inspector Sri D.K. Deo to proceed to Baminigam Check-gate on 4-10-1982. The said Sri Deo while was checking at the check-gate, a jeep bearing registration No. ORH 2216 came from Malkangiri side with a high speed at 10.45 p.m. The Sub-Inspector gave signal to the driver of the vehicle to stop the same. But instead of stopping the vehicle, the driver speeded up and, therefore, the Sub-Inspector of Police with his staff followed the jeep and intercepted the same. On searching the jeep, the present accused persons were found inside the vehicle and gunny bags containing tin metals were also recovered. The S.I. of Police came to the conclusion that the tin metals belonged to the Government of Orissa in the Mining and Geology Department and the same were being dishonestly removed from the possession of the owner and, therefore, an F.I.R. was lodged at the town P.S. to that effect. After completion of investigation, charge-sheet was submitted against the accused persons u/s 379/411/34, I.P.C. and u/s 21 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 as well as under Sections 113/115/116 of the Motor Vehicles Act. 3. Before the charges were framed by the learned Magistrate, the accused persons contended that they were entitled to be discharged as the prosecution had not brought out a prima facie case against them. The learned Magistrate on consideration of the materials before him, came to the conclusion that in the absence of a written complaint by the person authorised in that behalf by the State Government, no Court would take cognisance for the offence u/s 21 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act and, therefore, the accused persons must be discharged from the said offence. Then coming to the other charges, the learned Magistrate also came to the conclusion that the prosecution had failed to establish a prima facie case that any movable property was taken out of the possession of a person dishonestly without his consent and, therefore, the offence u/s 379, I.P.C. was not established. The learned Magistrate also came to the conclusion that there were no prima facie materials to frame charge against the accused persons u/s 411, I.P.C. also. Accordingly he discharged the accused persons of the charges under Sections 379/411/34, I.P.C. So far as the offences under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act are concerned, he found that the evidence collected during investigation prima facie established the offence u/s 113 of the Motor Vehicles Act against accused Jugal Kishore Sahu, but there was no materials to frame the charges under Sections 115/116 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Accordingly, excepting framing charge against accused Jugal Kishore Sahu u/s 113 of the Motor Vehicles Act rest of the accused persons were discharged from the offences alleged against them in the charge-sheet. 4. Against this order of the learned Magistrate, the learned Sessions Judge started a criminal revision in exercise of his suo-motu jurisdiction being Criminal Revision No. 76/83 and the State also preferred a revision being numbered as Criminal Revision No. 80/83 and both these revisions were heard together and disposed of by a common judgment of the learned Sessions Judge. The learned Sessions Judge came to t he conclusion that there was no basis for the Magistrate to arrive at the conclusion that the properties in question were not the stolen properties and according to him the materials on record were sufficient to hold prima facie that there was prima facie evidence against the accused persons to prosecute them under Sections 379/411, I.P.C. as well as u/s 21 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act. 1957 and consequently, by the impugned order he has interfered with the order of discharge passed by the learned Magistrate. 5. Mr. 1957 and consequently, by the impugned order he has interfered with the order of discharge passed by the learned Magistrate. 5. Mr. Swain appearing for the Petitioners submits that the learned Sessions Judge committed serious error of fact and law in coming to the conclusion that the materials prima facie established the offence against the accused persons and further in the absence of a complaint of the competent authority the Court had no power to take cognisance of the offence u/s 21 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act. The learned Additional Standing Counsel, on the other hand, contends that at the stage of framing of charge the Court has to be satisfied as to the existence of a prima facie case and it is not open to the Court to make any sifting of evidence. If the materials on record are examined from the aforesaid stand-point, according to the learned Additional Standing Counsel, there are materials at least so far as the offences under Sections 379/411, I.P.C. are concerned, and therefore, this Court should not interfere with the order of the learned Sessions Judge. 6. A bare reading of the provisions contained in Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure indicates that the Judge at that stage will go through the records and hear the submissions of the accused and the prosecution if any, and will consider as to whether there are sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused if in his opinion, there are no such grounds, he shall discharge the accused. The purpose of the said section is to ensure that the accusation made against the accused is not frivolous. In the case of Union of lndia v. Prafulla Kumar Sarnal and Anr. 47 (1979) C.L.T. 385 S.C., the Supreme Court was considering the powers and duties of the Court u/s 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and in that context Fazal Ali, J. observed: The words not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused clearly show that the Judge is not a mere post-office to frame the charge at the behest of the prosecution but has to exercise his judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution. In assessing this fact, it is not necessary for the Court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really his function after the trial starts. At the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The sufficiency of ground would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the Court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him. After considering the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court on the point, the learned Judge observed: Thus on a consideration of the authorities mentioned above the following principles emerge; (1) That the Judge while considering the question of framing the charges u/s 227 of the Code has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. (2) Where the materials placed before the Court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained the Court will be fully justified in framing charge and proceeding with the trial. (3) The test to determine a prima facie case would naturally depend upon the facts of each case and it is difficult to lay down a rule of universal application. By and large however if two views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him while giving rise to some suspicion hut not grave suspicion against the accused, he will be fully within his right to discharge the accused. (4) That in exercising his jurisdiction u/s 227 of the Code the Judge which under the present Code is a senior and experienced Court cannot act merely as a Post-Office or a mouth-piece of the prosecution, but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the Court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. This however does not mean that the Judge should make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial. The same view has been re-iterated in the case of Supdt. and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal Vs. Anil Kumar Bhunja and Others. Applying the principles enunciated above let me now examine whether the Magistrate was legally justified in discharging the Petitioners and whether the Sessions Judge committed any error in setting aside the said order of the learned Magistrate. 7. Coming to the charge u/s 21 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957, the said provision indicates that whoever contravenes the provisions of Sub-section (1) of Section 4 shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year or with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees or with both. Section 4(1) of the said Act prohibits prospecting or mining operations in any area except under and in accordance with the terms and conditions of prospecting licence or a lease granted under the Act and the rules made thereunder. There are no materials on the records of the case from which any Court can prima facie be satisfied that the Petitioners undertook any prospecting or mining operation. That apart, Section 22 of the said Act puts an embargo on the power of the Court to take cognisance of any offence punishable under the Act unless a complaint, in writing, is made by a person authorised by the State Government. Addmittedly, no such complaint has been filed in writing in the present case. In that view of the matter, no Court can take cognisance of the offence u/s 21 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act. Therefore, the order of the learned Sessions Judge on this aspect is wholly without jurisdiction and cannot be sustained. 8. Coming to the offences under Sections 379 and 411, I.P.C. I have carefully examined the materials on record as found in the case/diary. In my opinion, there is not an iota of evidence to satisfy a Court prima facie that the accused-Petitioners intending to take away dishonestly removed the tin metals out of the possession of the State Government without its consent. The basic ingredients to attract the offence u/s 379, I.P.C. are absent. In my opinion, there is not an iota of evidence to satisfy a Court prima facie that the accused-Petitioners intending to take away dishonestly removed the tin metals out of the possession of the State Government without its consent. The basic ingredients to attract the offence u/s 379, I.P.C. are absent. Similarly there are no materials to prove that the accused had knowledge that the tin metals were the stolen property and the accused got possession of the same knowing the property to be stolen. This being the position, I am firmly of the opinion that the learned Sessions Judge committed gross error in setting aside the order of the learned Magistrate and directing him to frame charges against the Petitioners. I would therefore, set aside the order of the learned Sessions Judge and affirm the order passed by the learned Magistrate. The Criminal Revision is accordingly allowed. Final Result : Allowed