Judgment P. S. Mishra, J. 1. This appeal has been admitted to hearing on two questions- (1) Whether stranger purchaser can institute a suit for partition with respect to the said property alone as against stranger purchaser, purchasing from another co-sharer the very said property, by impleading the two vendors only in the said suit and (2) whether the plaintiff purchaser having purchased a specified property, in order to sue for partition of the said property qua the other purcha-ser of a part of the said property, is required to sue for partition by bringing in all the properties of the family of the co-sharer vendor, impieading all the other co-sharers of the family as party to the suit, even though the relief claimed is confined to the vended property only In answering the said two questions, some of the facts in is issue are necessary. 2. It is not disputed that the properties in dispute belonging to the family of one Deoki Prasad, the common ancestor. The plaintiff-appellant purchased i Bigha, 10 Kathas and 3 Dhoors of the land being 3/4th share of 2 Bighas 4 dhoors on 4-9-1967 from defendants 1, 2, 3, and 6. Defendants 9 to 11on 12-1-1967 purchased 2 Bighas 8 Kathas 3 dhoors from defendants 7 and 8. The purchase by the plaintiff is with respect to a portion of the purchase by the defendants 9 to 11. According to the plaintiff, his vendors are entitled to 3/4th share in the joint estate and excluding a previous sale are entitled to 2 Bighas 4 dhoors of land described in schedule 3 of the plaint. They have vended their share as there has already been a separation and thus severence of the coparcenery, but there has been no partition metes and bounds. According to defendants 9 to 11 there had been a mutual partition, in which defendants 7 and 8 were allotted the said 2 Bighas 8 Kathas 13 dhoors which is transferred in their favour. Although the trial court entered into all the controversies between the parties and decreed the plaintiffs suit, the Court of appeal below has rejected the plaint holding that the suit is not maintainable for partial partition. 3. The Courts in India have always recognised the general rule that a property held in common by two or more co-owners, cannot be partitioned in fragments. 3. The Courts in India have always recognised the general rule that a property held in common by two or more co-owners, cannot be partitioned in fragments. A property may be held in common by two or more persons, either as joint tenants or tenants in common. To Hindu Jaw in the case of the joint property of an Undivided Hindu Family governed by the Mitakshara law, in which inheritance by survivorship is recognised as the rule, a purchaser is an alienee. He has got only an equitable right to partition unlike the right of a person who has a legal right to claim partition. 4. A Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Iburamsa Rowthan and another V/s. Thirumalai Muthuveera Therurenkatasami Naick, ILR 34 Madras 269, has recapitulated the law in the following words : ". . . . . . . We may begin with the proposition that a member of an Undivided hindu Family cannot enforce a partial partition against the other members of the family. That is not disputed. The next proposition which is also beyond question is that a stranger purchasing the interest of one or more members of the family in certain items of family property cannot enforce a partition of those items only against the will of the other members without suing for a joint partition of the entire family property. The principle of this rule is that there may be equities which those other members have against the vendor of the plaintiff which can only be worked out in a general suit for partition and in working out those equities the plaintiffs vendor and hence the plaintiff may be assigned a different item from the items he purported to buy or even a smaller share than those items represented. We come next to the suit by a member of the family against the purchaser of a part of the family property for the recovery of his share in the part elienated without claiming a division of the entirety of the family property. Such a suit has been held to lie in a series of cases as pointed in the referring order. We may add two further cases in support of the same view Venkatrayudu v. Sri Bodohu Venkatrayudu and Banwari Lal V/s. Daya Sunker Misser. Such a suit has been held to lie in a series of cases as pointed in the referring order. We may add two further cases in support of the same view Venkatrayudu v. Sri Bodohu Venkatrayudu and Banwari Lal V/s. Daya Sunker Misser. If this view be correct, the learned Government Advocate general does not impugn, what is almost a corollary from it, that the purchaser from a member of his share of property alienated by others can sue the alienees of those others for the share of his vendor in that property unless the alienation bound the entire family intersets. . . . . " The corollary drawn in the opinion of the Full Bench of the Madras High Court is the answer to the first question. 5 The Madras Court has proceeded to examine the contention of the learned Advocate General disputing, however, the correctness of the rule that a member of an undivided family can sue for his share in the item alienated to stranger purchaser of that item without asking at the same time for a general partition of the entire family property. After considering a number of authorities including two decisions of the Privy Council, the Courts opinion has been expressed in the following words :- "these decisions are clear authority for the position that the existence of any equities in favour of the purchaser does not entitle him to resist the claim of the members not bound by the alienation to possession. " The corollary thus has been pronounced as the rule to hold a suit by the purchaser from a member of his share of property questioning alienation by others not maintainable but a suit by a member of the joint family maintainable unless the alienation bound the entire family interest. 6. In this Court a judgment by Laxmi Kant Jha, C. J. , speaking for a division Bench of this Court, is an authority of an unparellel exposition of the ancient wisdom in various treaties, texts and pronouncements of eminent jurists and the judgments of the Courts. In Jagannath V/s. Diccession Corporation, ILR 29 Patna 1065, Jha, C. J. has said- "the ordinary rule applicable to suits for coparcenery property is that when a suit for partition is between coparceners it should embarace the whole family property subject to the exceptions already stated. In Jagannath V/s. Diccession Corporation, ILR 29 Patna 1065, Jha, C. J. has said- "the ordinary rule applicable to suits for coparcenery property is that when a suit for partition is between coparceners it should embarace the whole family property subject to the exceptions already stated. If however, a suit for partition is by a transferee who has purchased from a tenant-in-common a definite share in the common land, such a suit cannot be defeated simply on the ground that it does not embrace properties of which the co-sharers are in joint possession but in which the alienee has got no interest at all. But there is a conflict of judicial opinion as to whether a purchaser of an undivided interest in the coparcenery property from a coparcener without the consent of other co-partners can sue for partition of that pro-petty alone in which he has an interest as a purchaser or whether his remedies is to sue for a general partition. " Answer to the second question is available in the words of Jha, CJ. because in the instant case it can hardly be said that in the absence of partition metes and bounds vendors of the plaintiff and the vendors of the defendants 9 to 11 are joint tenants and coparceners. They at the best are tenants in common because co-parcenery to which the rule of survivorship is applied existed only until the co-parceners did not express their intention to separate. Until the properties are partitioned by metes and bounds, they hold as tenants in common but not as joint tenants. But after a survey of the law and the masterly elucidation, Jha, c. J. has concluded- "the analysis as made by me above shows that a distinction has been drawn between the joint family property and property held in tenancy-in-common as regards the effect of a transfer of a co-owners interest in a portion of the property. In the former case the transferee gets merely the right to have his share ascertained by a partition. There is a conflict of decisions as to whether his suit for partition must relate to the whole of the joint family estate. In the former case the transferee gets merely the right to have his share ascertained by a partition. There is a conflict of decisions as to whether his suit for partition must relate to the whole of the joint family estate. The better view, in my opinion, is that it need not the view taken in delo Singh V/s. Jagdip Singh, 1947 1lr 26 Patna 398, that a suit for partition must cover : he entire property held jointly, or in common by the parties is not a rule of Hindu law or of statute law, but is merely a rule of equity and convenience Iburamsa Rowthan V/s. Thirumalai Muthuveera Theruvenkatasami, 1910 1lr 34 Mad 269, 270 ; V. Subba Row V/s. Annathanarayana Aiyar, 1912 ILR 23 Mad lj 64, 68, 70. As regards the property held in common tenancy the courts are agreed that the purchaser can sue for partition of the particular property in respect of which he has acquired an interest. In both cases the interest acquired by the transferee is subject to the equities as between the transferring co-owners and the other co-owners uda Ram Sitaram V/s. Ranu Panduji, (1875)11 Pom. HCR 76, S2 and V. Subba Row V/s. Annathanarayana but in a suit filed by a transferee it is for the opposing co-sharers to raise and establish the existence of such equities. Srimati Davi V/s. Srimati Jagdamba dasi, 1871 Beng. LR 134 ; Umasundari Devi V/s. Benode Lal Pakrashi, (1907) ILR 34 Cal 1026, Pakkiri Kami V/s. Haji Mohammad manjoor Sahib, 1923 ILR 46 Mad.844 ; Sitaram Vinayak Hasabin v. Narayan Shankarrao Hasabins, 1943 AIR (Bom.) 216 and Delo singh V/s. Jagdip Singh, (1947) ILR 26 Pat.-96. The maintainability of a partition suit relating to a portion only of the entire common property follows logically from the fact that it is open to the co-tenants or the coparceners, as the case may be, by agreement between themselves to partition a portion of the common estate and leave the remainder in status quo ante. The consent of all the co-owners being necessary it further follows that it should not be open to one co-owners, to the prejudice of the other co-owners, to effect a severance by transfer of his interest in a portion of the common estate. It is for this reason that the consideration of the equities between the co-owners is necessary. . . . It is for this reason that the consideration of the equities between the co-owners is necessary. . . . . . . . . " It is plain that unless equities are pleaded by the co-owners, and it appears in the instant case no such equity has been pleaded by any of the vendors or their co-owners, a suit by a transferee from some of the co-owners for partition of the share of his or their vendors is maintainable with respect to the property vended only. The second question, in my view, has to be answered accordingly. 7 In the instant case all the co-owers of the vended property besides the vendors and purchasers from some of the co-owners have been impleaded as party and the suit has been instituted for partition in respect of the vended property only. The suit, in my view, is maintainable and it does not suffer either for any defect of party or for partial partition. 8. Since the Court of appeal below has dismissed the suit only on the ground of partial partition and has not gone to the issues of fact and law, which are relevant and should have been decided before the judgment and decree of the trial court is affirmed or set aside, the only proper course, in my view, is to set aside the judgment and decree of the Court of Appeal below and remit the case for a re-hearing and decision in accordance with law. 9. For the reasons stated above, the judgment and decree of the Court of the Second Additional District Judge, Bettiah in Title Appeal No.10 of 1977 are set aside and the case is remitted to his court for a re-hearing and decision in accordance with law. There shall be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.