Judgment A.P. Misra, J. 1. THE present first appeal arises out of a judgment and decree dated 24-7-1976 passed by the Civil Judge, Azamgarh by which the suit of the plaintiff-respondent for declaration and injunction was decreed. 2. THE plaintiff-respondent filed a suit for declaration that his order of suspension dated November 16, 1968 suspending him from service as Godown Keeper in the State Bank of India, Azamgarh is illegal. He claimed the relief of an injunction directing the appellant-defendant not to interfere in his discharge of the duty as a Godown Keeper. He also claimed the relief of recovery of Rs. 36,396.16 as arrear of his salary. He also claimed his salary till he is reinstated. The brief facts of the case, as per plaintiff, are that Sri Kedar Nath Yadav, plaintiff, was appointed as a Godown Keeper on 26-12-67 and was confirmed on 27-9-68. According to him, during this period his work was entirely satisfactory to the department. But as he was implicated in an Excise Case falsely on account of enmity, he was suspended on 16-11-68. Subsequently, he was acquitted in Criminal Case under the Excise Act on 30-4-75. Thereafter, the plaintiff intimated the Bank about his acquittal and requested for his reinstatement. When the plaintiff was not reinstated then he filed the said suit. 3. THE case of the defendant-appellants was that the plaintiff was appointed temporarily for a fixed period as a Godown Keeper and his appointment as such was extended from time to time by fresh orders for a fixed period only and the last of his such appointment as temporary Godown Keeper was made on 17-9-68 for a period of two months and that period of two months came to an end on 16-11-68. Thus on that date his service automatically came to an end. THE allegation of the plaintiff that he was suspended on 16-11-68 and was confirmed as Godown Keeper with effect from 27-9-68 was vehementally denied. According to defendant, neither any suspension order, nor any confirmation order was ever issued by the Bank. THE case of the appellant Bank was that there was no question of paying any arrear of salary as with effect from 16-11-68 he (plaintiff) was no more in service. It was also pleaded that the plaintiff is not entitled to reinstatement and that the suit of the plaintiff is not maintainable. 4. THE case of the appellant Bank was that there was no question of paying any arrear of salary as with effect from 16-11-68 he (plaintiff) was no more in service. It was also pleaded that the plaintiff is not entitled to reinstatement and that the suit of the plaintiff is not maintainable. 4. THE trial court came to the conclusion that the suspension order and the confirmation order were issued by the Bank and the service of the plaintiff was never terminated and that since after his suspension on 16-11-68 no enquiry appears to have taken place the said suspension order of the plaintiff was illegal. It was held that no suspension should have been made due to false implication of the plaintiff in the criminal case under the Excise Act, which ultimately ended in favour of the plaintiff on 30-9-75. THE trial court further held that the plaintiff deserves to be reinstated with effect from the date of his suspension. A relief of declaration was also granted by the trial court that the plaintiff shall be deemed to be continuing in services. THE trial court also held the suit of the plaintiff to be maintainable. THE trial court also decreed the suit of the plaintiff for the recovery of Rs. 36,396.16 as arrears of his salary and also for his salary till he is reinstated. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and decree of the trial court, the defendant-appellants have preferred the present first appeal. Learned counsel for the Bank, Sri S. N. Varma challenged the judgment and decree of the trial court mainly on three grounds. Firstly, that the present dispute is an industrial dispute and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to try such suit. Secondly, that the suit is barred by the Specific Relief Act and no such injunction for declaration as prayed for could be granted by the Civil Court. Finally, that the plaintiff was never appointed permanently as a Godown Keeper. His appointment remained temporary for a fixed period and it came to an end on 16-11-68. His last appointment letter dated 16-9-68 specifically mentioned that his appointment was for a period of two months only. This last appointment letter has not been disputed by the plaintiff-respondent. Finally, that the plaintiff was never appointed permanently as a Godown Keeper. His appointment remained temporary for a fixed period and it came to an end on 16-11-68. His last appointment letter dated 16-9-68 specifically mentioned that his appointment was for a period of two months only. This last appointment letter has not been disputed by the plaintiff-respondent. He urged that the only basis of the claim made by the plaintiff was two forged letters, namely the letter of suspension dated 16-11-68 and the letters of confirmation dated 27-9-68. According to him, none of these letters were proved by the plaintiff and thus the decree in favour of the plaintiff passed by the trial court is not sustainable even on facts of this case. 5. IN support of his first contention, learned counsel for the Bank urged that admittedly, the State Bank of India is an industry within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act and as the plaintiff was the employee of the State Bank, such a dispute between the plaintiff-employee and the Bank, would be an industrial dispute. For this he relied on a decision given by a single Judge of this Court in Second Appeal No. 1554 of 1971, Govind Prasad Agarwal v. State Bank of India, through the Agent, State Bank of India, decided on 14-5-85. IN the decision, it was held that even in the case of the public employment, the question whether the Civil Court would have or not the jurisdiction would depend upon the manner in which the right was created. Where it was created under the Special Act which was sought to be enforced, then the remedy would lie only within the four corners of the Special Act and the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts would be impliedly barred. IN this case it was further held that the service conditions of an employee of the State Bank of India is governed by the Shastri Award under the Special Act, viz. The Industrial Disputes Act. The learned Judge has given good reasons for holding this, with which I am in full concurrence. To the similar effect is the decision given by a single Judge of this Court in Second Appeal No. 1791 of 1981, Sri Bhagwan Saraswat v. State Bank of India, decided on 23-5-86. The Industrial Disputes Act. The learned Judge has given good reasons for holding this, with which I am in full concurrence. To the similar effect is the decision given by a single Judge of this Court in Second Appeal No. 1791 of 1981, Sri Bhagwan Saraswat v. State Bank of India, decided on 23-5-86. IN this case also, with which 1 am in full concurrence, the learned Single Judge held the same thing. However, the learned Single Judge in this case on the facts and the circumstances of the said case suggested the respondent to consider the possibility of the plaintiff being re-employed in the Bank sympathetically keeping in view the principle of natural justice, to which I am not concerned in the present case. 6. LEARNED counsel for the Bank then strongly relied both for his first and the second grounds in a case The Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kamlakar Shantaram Wadke, AIR 1975 SC 2238 . In this case principles of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in relation to an industrial dispute have been laid down. The relevant paragraphs 23 and 24 of the said decision for the first ground is quoted below : "23. To sum up, the principles applicable to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in relation to an industrial dispute may be stated thus : (1) If the dispute is not an industrial dispute, nor does it relate to enforcement of any other right under the Act the remedy lies only in the Civil Court. (2) If the dispute is an industrial dispute arising out of a right or liability under the general or common Jaw and not under the Act, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is alternative, leaving it to the election of the senior concerned to choose his remedy for the relief which is competent to be granted in a particular remedy. (3) If the industrial dispute relates to the enforcement of a right or an obligation created under the Act, then the only remedy available to the suitor is to get an adjudication under the Act. (4) If the right which is sought to be enforced is a right created under the Act as Chapter VA then the remedy for its enforcement is either section 33-C or the raising of an industrial dispute, as the case may be. 24. (4) If the right which is sought to be enforced is a right created under the Act as Chapter VA then the remedy for its enforcement is either section 33-C or the raising of an industrial dispute, as the case may be. 24. We may, however, in relation to principle 2 stated above hasten to add that there will hardly be a dispute which will be an industrial dispute within the meaning of section 2 (i) of the Act and yet will be one arising out of a right or liability under the general or common law only and not under the Act. Such a contingency, for example, may arise in regard to the dismissal of an unsponsored workman which in view of the provisions of law contained in section 2-A of the Act will be an industrial dispute even though it may otherwise be an individual dispute. Civil Courts, will have hardly an occasion to deal with the type of cases of industrial disputes by and large, almost invariably, are bound to be covered by principle 3 stated above." In relation to the second ground that the suit was barred by the Specific Relief Act, the law has also been clearly laid down in this case. The relevant paragraph is quoted hereunder : "29. One more difficulty in the way of the sustainability of the order of injunction may also be indicated. Temporary injunction can be granted under sub-section (1) of section 37 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 but a decree for perpetual injunction is made under sub-section (2). Grant of perpetual injunction is subject to the provision contained in Chapter 8, under section 38 (1) a perpetual injunction may be granted to the plaintiff to prevent the breach of an obligation existing in his favour irrespective of the fact whether the obligation arises at common law, under a contract or under a special statute (subject to the point of jurisdiction). But sub-section (2) provides that when any such obligation arises out of contract the courts shall be guided by the rules and provisions contained in Chapter 2. Section 14 (1) (c) occurring in that Chapter says that a contract which is in its nature determinable cannot be specifically enforced. But sub-section (2) provides that when any such obligation arises out of contract the courts shall be guided by the rules and provisions contained in Chapter 2. Section 14 (1) (c) occurring in that Chapter says that a contract which is in its nature determinable cannot be specifically enforced. The contract in question embodied in the written agreement dated the 31st December, 1966 was in its nature determinable under section 19 (2) of the Act or could be varried by following the procedure under section 9-A. Section 41 (a) of the Specific Relief Act says that an injunction cannot be granted to prevent the breach of a contract the performance of which would not be specifically enforced. Section 42 providing an exception to this is not attracted in this case. The decree or order of injunction made therein, therefore, is not sustainable on this account too." 7. LEARNED counsel for the plaintiff-respondent Sri K. M. Dayal, urged that in this decision the Supreme Court carved out four classes, classes (3) and (4) are clear cases which would be governed by the Industrial Disputes Act. But there may be cases falling under classes (1) and (2) in which Civil Court would have still jurisdiction. 8. EVEN in respect of the cases falling under class (2) the Hon'ble Supreme Court further held that there will hardly be a dispute which will be an industrial dispute within the meaning of Section 2 (k) of the Act and yet will be one arising out of the right or liability under the general or common law only and not under the Act. It was further held that the Civil Court will have hardly any occasion to deal with the type of cases falling under principle (2). Learned counsel for the respondent could not show how his case falls under category (2). 9. ACCORDING to the learned counsel for the Bank services or the Bank employees are governed by Shastri Award given under the Industrial Disputes Act. He argued that there is no other rule in existence for such employees. However, counsel for the respondent could not show any rule which governs service conditions of the respondent. At one stage he also half-heartedly urged that Shastri Award would not govern his case. He argued that there is no other rule in existence for such employees. However, counsel for the respondent could not show any rule which governs service conditions of the respondent. At one stage he also half-heartedly urged that Shastri Award would not govern his case. If the case is governed by the Shastri Award, it could not be doubted that it would be a case which would be squarely covered within the Industrial Dispute Act and such a dispute could only be raised before the Industrial Tribunal under the said Act and the Civil Court would have no jurisdiction. However, if respondent's service conditions are not governed by the Shastri Award, then it is for the respondent to show as to which service conditions govern his case. 10. THE question of interference by the Court in the matter of contract in service has been categorised in three classes, namely (1) which relates in relationship of a Master and servant governed by contract of service, any breach of which is not specifically enforceable. This is enforced through claim of damages. Termination of such employee is not declared to be a nullity howsoever illegal it may be. (2) THE type of cases of master and servant arising under the industrial law and under that a servant when wrongly dismissed or discharged could be reinstated under the industrial law by the Special Tribunal constituted under the Industrial Dispute Act. This provision has been made because the Indian Contract Act and the Indian Specific Relief Act do not contain the provision of reinstatement of a servant, and (3). THE type of cases of master and servant arising in regard to the servant under the employment of the State, or other public and Local Bodies created under the Statutes. Under the third category of cases the Court only interferes when there is breach of any statutory rule or regulation or breach of any mandatory obligation. In such cases, the service of the employee could also be reinstated. 11. IN regard to the public servants, there are three exceptions where dismissed employee might in appropriate case obtain a declaratory order that his dismissal was wrongly made. First are the cases of public servants falling under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India. The second cases are falling under the industrial law. 11. IN regard to the public servants, there are three exceptions where dismissed employee might in appropriate case obtain a declaratory order that his dismissal was wrongly made. First are the cases of public servants falling under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India. The second cases are falling under the industrial law. The third cases are where acts are of statutory breaches or of breaches of mandatory obligation imposed by a statute. Thus a declaration can be given only in a case falling under the aforesaid three exceptions. IN the present case, the case of the plaintiff does not fall under any of the aforesaid exceptions. Admittedly, he is not a servant to whom Article 311 of the Constitution applies; he has not shown any statutory breach or mandatory obligation which has been violated. His case may only fall in the second type of cases. If he accepts the Shastri Award then the Civil Court will have no jurisdiction. The aforesaid three exceptions have been clearly laid down in various decisions of the Supreme Court. IN view of this, on the facts and the circumstances of the present case, it is clear that no such declaration could be granted in favour of the present plaintiff-respondent. The plaintiff is in the employment of State Bank of India, which is an Industry and if his service is governed by Shastri Award then his case would be exclusively triable by the Court or Tribunal under the Industrial Dispute Act. If his case is that he is not governed by the Shastri Award then his service would be like that of ordinary master and servant. IN such a case, a declaration of unlawful termination and restoration of service would be an instance of specific performance of contract for personal covenant and such declaration is not permissible under the Specific Relief Act. Thus the plaintiff-respondent would not be entitled to persue his remedy in the Civil Court for such a relief. As I have pointed out above, in the Premeir Automobiles Case (supra), it was clearly laid down that such a suit would be barred. 12. LEARNED counsel for the plaintiff-respondent relied on the decision taken in the case of Sirai Municipality by its President v. Cacelia Kom Francis Tekkis, AIR 1973 SC 855 . As I have pointed out above, in the Premeir Automobiles Case (supra), it was clearly laid down that such a suit would be barred. 12. LEARNED counsel for the plaintiff-respondent relied on the decision taken in the case of Sirai Municipality by its President v. Cacelia Kom Francis Tekkis, AIR 1973 SC 855 . On the basis of this case it was urged that the State Bank of India is the instrumentality of the State and it would be covered within the definition of ' State ' under Article 12 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, the dismissal of the employees of such statutory body could obtain such a relief. Reliance was placed on paras 30 and 31 of the said decision. This decision does not help the plaintiff in any way. The principle as laid down in this case is the same as held in the Premier Automobiles case (supra). Thus unless it could be shown that there is breach of statutory rule or failure to comply with any mandatory obligation, no relief could be granted. LEARNED counsel for the plaintiff-respondent has not been able to show that there was violation of either any statutory rule or mandatory obligation by the Bank. On the contrary, in para 18 of the judgment in Sirai Municipality case (supra) the Supreme Court very clearly held that apart from breach of statute there would not be a declaration of nullity in the case of termination or dismissal of a servant of the State or of other local authorities or statutory bodies. Next it was urged that the question of jurisdiction was neither raised in the pleadings, nor was it decided by the trial court. Thus the appellant should not be permitted to raise this question for the first time in the first appeal. He relied for this purpose on Section 21 of the CPC. His argument was that under this Section the objection of jurisdiction has to be raised at the earliest and if such an objection was not taken before the settlement of issues and further unless the appellate court finds that it leads to failure of justice, such objection should not be entertained. His argument was that under this Section the objection of jurisdiction has to be raised at the earliest and if such an objection was not taken before the settlement of issues and further unless the appellate court finds that it leads to failure of justice, such objection should not be entertained. In this case neither the appellant has taken this question of jurisdiction at the earliest possible opportunity as referred to in the said Section, nor there is anything to show that it would lead to failure of justice. Reliance was placed on the decisions given in the cases of Hira Lal Patni v. Kali Nath, AIR 1962 SC 199 , Bahrein Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. P. J. Pappu, AIR 1966 SC 634 and Koopilan Uneen's daughter Pathumma v. Koopilan Uneen's son Kuntalam Kutly dead by Lrs., AIR 1981 SC 1683 . These decisions are decision under Section 21 CPC. Section 21 CPC itself makes it clear that an objection has to be raised at the earliest possible opportunity and that the appellant has to prove that it results into failure of justice. Section 21 CPC speaks of cases of lack of pecuniary or territorial jurisdiction. Principle "as laid down in Section 21 CPC could not be applied in respect of cases of inherent lack of jurisdiction. Present case is neither of territorial or pecuniary jurisdiction but about inherent lack of jurisdiction of the Civil Court. Thus contention of the respondent and the cases relied by him are without any force and inapplicable in the present case. Under Section 9 of the CPC the Civil Courts have jurisdiction to try all civil suits except those whose cognizance has been either expressly or impliedly barred and such a case would not fall under Section 21 CPC. In the present case argument on behalf of the Bank is that the present suit is barred either on account of being an industrial dispute, which is triable exclusively by the Industrial Tribunal or under the Specific Relief Act. Such a question goes to the very root of the question of jurisdiction and if the case falls under it, it would be a case of inherent lack of jurisdiction of the Civil Court. Such a question goes to the very root of the question of jurisdiction and if the case falls under it, it would be a case of inherent lack of jurisdiction of the Civil Court. There is a clear distinction between the jurisdiction of error on account of territorial or pecuniary or the order passed by the authority beyond its power and the case of inherent lack of jurisdiction. The later question goes to the very root of jurisdiction which even by consent of the party cannot be cured. The present case is a case of inherent lack of jurisdiction. So even if the question was not raised could be raised in the present appeal. Admittedly, in the present case even specific ground has been raised about the question of jurisdiction while filing the present appeal. 13. LASTLY, learned counsel for the appellant urged that the appointment of the plaintiff was purely temporary. Various letters filed by the appellant also show that his service was continued and was for a fixed period of time and last of his appointment was made on 16-9-68 for a period of two months only and so on the expiry of two months, i. e. on 16-11-68, his service automatically came to an end. Learned Counsel for the appellant denied any order of suspension dated 16-11-68 or order of confirmation dated 27-9-68 was ever issued by the Bank. Two exhibits, 45 Ka and 46 Ka filed by the plaintiff, which are alleged suspension and confirmation order, are forged documents and the same has been denied by the person under whose signature it was alleged to have been issued and the plaintiff has not been able to prove the same. Similarly, 84 Ga 1 and 85 Ga 1, were never filed on behalf of the Bank as list 83, signature of the defendant's himself moved the application on behalf of the appellant stating that those documents should not be treated to have been filed by him. He further alleged that the plaintiff in the present case has not filed his appointment letter showing any condition of his service and in the absence of any other evidence on record his suspension and confirmation are attempted to be proved merely on the basis of sole oral testimony of the plaintiff himself. He further alleged that the plaintiff in the present case has not filed his appointment letter showing any condition of his service and in the absence of any other evidence on record his suspension and confirmation are attempted to be proved merely on the basis of sole oral testimony of the plaintiff himself. On the other hand, counsel for the respondent urged that papers 84 Ga 1 and 85 Ga 1 were filed on behalf of the defendant even though the defendant's counsel has moved the application on behalf of the defendant that no such signature was made by him, defendant's counsel has neither filed his affidavit, nor has stated on oath and thus it should be treated to have been filed on behalf of the defendant. He further raised objection in respect of the admissibility of some other documents on the reverse of which though it was written either admitted or formal proof dispensed with. In the said documents all the details as required under Order 13, Rule 4 of the CPC have not been written and in the absence of it, even though party admitted it, it should not be read in evidence. 14. WHEN law requires something to be done in certain manners, if it was not done in the same way then such a document should not be read in evidence. He referred to Section 36 of the Indian Stamp Act and Section 49 of the Indian Registration Act, where the legislature has given certain mandate under it and if compliance is not made the same cannot be read. In reply to the later portion of the argument, learned counsel for the Bank relied on the cases, Harnath Malhotra v. Dhannu Devi Agarwal, AIR 1975 Cal. 98 and Messrs Lienel Edwards Ltd. v. State of West Bangal, AIR 1967 Cal. 191 in which it was held that if formal proof is dispensed with, it will be read in evidence. Similarly, he relied on the case, Gana Saran v. Narain Das, AIR 1971 Alld. 43 and Badri Nath v. Wazir Ram Saran, AIR 1973 H. P. 62 under Order 13, Rule 4 CPC to show that if strict compliance as referred to in the order has not been made it can only be an irregularity but it would not make the document as inadmissible. 43 and Badri Nath v. Wazir Ram Saran, AIR 1973 H. P. 62 under Order 13, Rule 4 CPC to show that if strict compliance as referred to in the order has not been made it can only be an irregularity but it would not make the document as inadmissible. Learned counsel for the respondent then urged that even if document is admitted by a party proof of the document has to be made by the party if law requires. He relied on the case, Pratap Singh v. Additional Sessions Judge, Hardoi, 1986 AWC 764 in which it was held that even if a party has conceded the concession it would not be legally valid because the admissibility or relevancy of evidence is a question of law and cannot be governed by admissions. However, since I have held earlier that Civil Court will have no jurisdiction to try such a suit, therefore, I am not deciding the third question raised by the counsel for the appellant. I have deliberately not gone into this question of fact so that any decision on this question may not affect either parties in the subsequent proceedings if taken. 15. LASTLY, learned Counsel for the respondent urged that looking into the relief in the present case atleast relief (a) in the plaint could be granted by the Civil Court. Relief (a) in the plaint is a declaration that the plaintiff-respondent be treated to be still in service and that the order dated 16-11-68, his suspension order, be declared not binding on the plaintiff-respondent and that the Bank should not interfere with his working in the Bank, even by looking into this relief it is abundantly clear that he conceded that his service has been suspended. It is not a case where he continues in service and he wants a declaration that the defendant may not interfere with his working. In the relief (a) itself he seeks declaration that his suspension order is illegal. In fact, he is seeking declaration and also a relief of injunction as against the defendant to treat him in service which would be a relief specifically covered under the Specific Relief Act. In order to examine whether this relief could be granted by the Civil Court or not court need not confine to the relief claimed. In fact, he is seeking declaration and also a relief of injunction as against the defendant to treat him in service which would be a relief specifically covered under the Specific Relief Act. In order to examine whether this relief could be granted by the Civil Court or not court need not confine to the relief claimed. In fact, Court must examine the substance of the relief claimed after perusing the whole plaint. On the facts of this case, it cannot be doubted that the plaintiff has sought the relief of injunction, which is specifically barred under the Specific Relief Act. This point is well settled that the question of jurisdiction cannot be decided only on the basis of the relief but also on the basis of the substance of the relief as would be grasped from the plaint. This view finds support from the decision taken in the case of Ram Awalamb v. Jata Shanker, 1968 AWR 731 and Mohd. Umar Khan v. Idris Mohd. Ghani, AIR 1980 Alld. 89. 16. NO person can create jurisdiction in a Court or oust its jurisdiction merely by couching the relief in a particular way. In view of the aforesaid discussions, I am clearly of the opinion that the present appeal must succeed and the judgment and the decree passed by the Civil Court, Azamgarh by his order dated 24-7-76 in Original Suit No. 29 of 1976 must be set aside. 17. IN the result, the appeal is allowed and the judgment and decree dated 27-7-76 passed by the Civil Judge, Azamgarh in Original Suit No. 29 of 76 is set aside. On the facts and the circumstances of this case, the costs on parties. Appeal allowed.