This defendants' second appeal is from the judgment and decree of the learned District Judge, West Tripura at Agartala in Title Appeal No. 4 of 1983. The aforesaid judgment and decree the learned lower appellate court reversed the judgment and decree of the Munsiff, Sadar, Agartala, passed in Title Suit No. 158 of 1979. 2. The respondent-plaintiff filed the above Title Suit in representative character for self and on behalf of the freedom fighters. In the year 1972, appellant-defendant No. 1, that is, the Union of India introduced a scheme, namely, Freedom Fig­hters' Pension Scheme, 1972, (hereinafter referred to as the 1972 Scheme'), inter alia, providing for grant of pension to living freedom fighters, their families if they were no more alive and to the families of martyrs. According to the Scheme (Ext. 8), a freedom fighter is a person who has suffered a minimum im­prisonment of six months in the main-land jails before indepe­ndence for the freedom of the country. However, regarding Ext. I. N. A. and/or Ex-Military Personnel, imprisonment/ detention suffered outside the country will be counted. It was also provided that to prove imprisonment/detention certificates from concerned jail authorities. District Magistrates or the State Government and in case of non-availabilities of such certificates, co-prisoner certificate from sitting M. P. or M. L. A. or from an Ex-M. P. or Ex-M. L, A. specifying the jail period shall be necessary. It was also provided that pension will be sanctioned to those persons whose annual income from all sources was be­low Rs. 5,000/-, It may, however, be mentioned that prior to this Scheme another Scheme was also introduced by the Admi­nistration of Tripura in the year 1959 (Ext. 7), hereinafter refe­rred to as the 1959 Scheme', for grant of scholarship/other ed­ucational facilities to the children of political sufferers. In the said Scheme, definition of political sufferer was given, which is as follows :- "Political sufferer mean a person who suffered imprison­ment or detention of not less than 6 months or died or was killed in action (Page-3) or in detention or was awarded capital punishment became permanently incapacitated due to firings or lathi charges etc. Or lost his job or means of livelihood or a part or whole of property on account of participation in the national movement for emancipation of India.” 3. Or lost his job or means of livelihood or a part or whole of property on account of participation in the national movement for emancipation of India.” 3. The plaintiff respondent No. 1 filed the present suit for self and on behalf of 249 other freedom fighters under Or. I. R. 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for short, 'the Code', be­fore the learned Munsiff, Sadar at Agartala. It was alleged that the plaintiff and other freedom fighters, for and on whose behalf the suit was filed suffered imprisonment in jails of undi­vided East Bengal, now Bangladesh, for six months or more for the cause of freedom and after partition of the country they came to the State of Tripura and have been residing permanently. The plaintiff alleged that the Government of Tripura issued a notification under 1959 Scheme inviting application for registrat­ion of political sufferers and accordingly the plaintiff and others applied to the District Magistrate in the prescribed form and accordingly concerned Sub Divisional Officers issued such certificates in the years between 1960 and 1970. According to plaintiff, certificates issued by the Sub-Divisional Officers are equivalent to the certificates issued by the District Magistrate and the plaintiff and others applied for pension under 1972 Scheme along with the certificates granted by Sub-Divisional Officers. The Govern­ment of India, appellant-defendant No. 1, being satisfied sanctioned a sum of Rs. 200/- per month to the plaintiff and others with effect from 15th August, 1972, and they were drawing the yard pension for about two and half years but on 3.3.76 the appe­llant-defendant No. 3 issued an order suspending the said pen­sion and the plaintiff and others were asked to produce certificate from the concerned jail authorities or District Magistrate or co-prisoner certificate from M. P., Ex-M. P., M.L.A or Ex M.L.A. The appellant-defendant No. 1 also subsequently on 3.8.76 infor­med the plaintiff and others regarding the suspension of their pension and asked them to show cause through the State Govern­ment. It has been alleged that the appellant-defendants No. 1,2 and 3 granted pension to proforma-defendants on the basis of the certificate issued by the Sub-Divisional Officer and the said proforma-defendants are still drawing their pension and as such, the plaintiff has alleged that the suspension order was illegal as it was issued in violation of the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution. At the direction of the Union of India, appellant-defendant No. 1, the Government of Tripura, appellant defendant No. 2, set up a Review Committee to scrutinise the pending pen­sion applications of freedom fighters including the suspended pen­sion cases of the plaintiff and others and for making their nece­ssary recommendation. The plaintiff has impleaded the members of the said committee as second party defendants No. 4 to 8. The plaintiff prayed, inter alia, for a declaration that the plain­tiff and other freedom fighters are entitled to receive their pen­sions as sanctioned by the Government of India and also for a declaration that the orders of suspension, withdrawal and can­cellation of the pension by the defendants are void, ultra vires and inoperative and also for a direction by way of mandatory injunction on the Government of Tripura to recommend to the Government of India to withdraw the suspension/cancellation order of pension. 4. The suit was contested by appellants-defendants No. 1,2 and 3, that is Union of India, State of Tripura and Deputy Sec­retary, Government of Tripura, Political Department. The Union of India filed written statement and a joint written statement was filed on behalf of appellants-defendants No. 2 and 3. 5. The defendants pleaded that the plaintiff has no cause of action or right to sue, that the suit is barred by limitation and that the suit is not maintainable under Or. I, R. 8 of the to appellants defendants, 1959 Scheme and 1972 Scheme are two different Schemes, 1959 Scheme being a Scheme completely under the State Government whereas 1972 Scheme is a Central Scheme and pension is paid from Central revenue. It was staled that 1972 Scheme is in the nature of pure ex-gratia grant and did not confer any statutory or other right on the plaintiff and others and as such the suit is barred under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. According to the defendants, a person who alleged to have suffered imprisonment for six months or more cannot automatically be taken as a freedom fighter under the Scheme of 1972, unless he can prove the said fact by furnishing necessary certificate as stated earlier. According to the defendants, a person who alleged to have suffered imprisonment for six months or more cannot automatically be taken as a freedom fighter under the Scheme of 1972, unless he can prove the said fact by furnishing necessary certificate as stated earlier. Defendants have further stated that under the 1972 Scheme neither the Central Government nor the State Government authorised the Sub-Divi­sional Officer to grant certificate and as such the plaintiff and others cannot claim as a matter of right pension on the strength of the said certificate. Considering the fact that some freedom fighters found it difficult to produce the required certificate, the Government of India directed the State Government of Tripura to form a committee with veteran freedom fighters and other reliable persons for the purpose of scrutinising such cases and accordingly the Review Committee was constituted by the Govern­ment of Tripura. 6. It came to the notice of the defendants that some fake freedom fighters managed to get pension by producing false documents and as complaint was received the pension of the plain­tiff and others were suspended and they were asked to shorans;. The defendants-appellants have denied that defendant-appellant No. 3 had no authority to issue the suspension order as alleged and stated that being Deputy Secretary to the Government be was a competent person to authenticate government orders. It has also been denied that the suspension of pension was discri­minatory, arbitrary OF against the provisions of law or that there was any violation of the provisions of Article 14 of the Cons­titution. Since pension was granted on provisional basis, the Government of India has a right to suspend or cancel it. 7. OD the pleadings, the learned trial court framed as many as 10 issues and held that the suit is maintainable and not barred by limitation, that there was no misjoinder or non-joinder of parties, that the suit is not barred under Or. I, R. 8, CPC, that there was valid notice under section 80 CPC and that it was not barred by principle of estoppel. However, the learned trial court came to the finding that the certificates in support of the imprisonment submitted by the plaintiff and others cannot be recognised as valid certificates under 1972 Scheme and as such the suit was dismissed. However, the learned trial court came to the finding that the certificates in support of the imprisonment submitted by the plaintiff and others cannot be recognised as valid certificates under 1972 Scheme and as such the suit was dismissed. However, the learned trial court direct­ed the Review Committee to scrutinise afresh the cases of sus­pension of the plaintiff and others and also directed the Gove­rnment of Tripura to submit its report, after considering the report of the Review Committee, to the Government of India. 8. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and order of the learned Munsiff the plaintiff filed an appeal before the le­arned District Judge, West Tripura at Agartala. The learned lower appellate court allowed the appeal by setting aside the judgment and decree of the learned trial court. According to the learned lower appellate court, the definition of political suffe­rers and freedom fighters under both 1959 and 1972 Schemes was same and as the Sub-Divisional Officer granted certificates of political sufferers to the plaintiff and others they are entitled to get pension under 1972 Scheme. The learned lower appeared court relied heavily on the written statements and also observed that "So, the certificates as issued by the S. D. O. cannot be said that the S. D. O. was not authorized to issue such certificates. In is clearly proved that the S. D. O. as the mouth piece of the Govt. issued the certificates to the effect that the plaintiff and others are political sufferers." The learned lower appellate court was of the view that furnishing a certificate to prove the period of imprisonment as mentioned in 1972 Scheme was required'' only for expeditious finalisation of the case of granting pension and not a condition precedent for grant of pension. According to the learned lower appellate court, the defendants-appellants admitted the facts that proforma-defendants No. 9 to 31 have been granted pension as freedom fighters under 1972 Scheme on the basis of the certificates issued by the Sub-Divisional Officer and as the pension has not been cancelled or suspended, it was a pick and choose policy adopted by the defendants and as such the suspension order was illegal. The learned lower appe­llate court agreed with the findings of the learned trial court in respect of other issues. 9. The learned lower appe­llate court agreed with the findings of the learned trial court in respect of other issues. 9. At the time of admission of this appeal, the following substantial questions of law were formulated, namely- (1) Whether the suit of the plaintiffs was governed by Article 113 of the Limitation Actor Article 100 of the said Act ? (2) Whether the plaintiffs could prove that they were free­dom fighters within the scope and meaning of the free­dom fighters under the Schemes of 1959 and 1972, and whether the learned courts below wrongly placed onus on the defendants ? Liberty was also given to the defendants-appellants to raise any other substantial question of law at the time of hearing of the appeal. 10. At the time of bearing of this appeal, Mr. Kundu, lear­ned Advocate General formulated some other substantial ques­tions of law which I shall deal with at the appropriate place. Let me first deal with the questions of law which were formulated at the time of admission. 11. Both the learned trial court and the learned lower appe­llate Court came to the finding that the present suit is governed by Article 113 of the Limitation Act. 12. Article 113 of the Limitation Act is a residuary Article and it applies to any suit for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in the Schedule. Article 100 prescribes the period of limitation for suit "To alter or set aside any decision or order of a civil court in any proceeding other than a suit or any act or order of an officer of Government in his official capa­city''. The period of limitation is one year and the time from which the period begins to run is the date of the final decision or order by the court or the date of the act or order of the officer, as the case may be. From the legislative history, I find that this Article 100 was introduced in the Limitation Act of 1963 by combining Articles 13 and 14 of the Limitation Act of 1908. The said Articles 13 and 14 run as follows : "13. To alter or set aside a decision or order of a Civil Court in any proceeding other than a suit." “14. The said Articles 13 and 14 run as follows : "13. To alter or set aside a decision or order of a Civil Court in any proceeding other than a suit." “14. To set aside any act or order of an officer of Govern­ment in his official capacity, not herein otherwise expre­ssly provided for.” 13. For the above Articles the period of limitation pres­cribed was also for one year and the time used to run from the date of the final decision or order or act. Thus, it is clear that under the Act of 1908, in respect of suit to set aside any act or order of an officer of the Government in his official capacity Article 14 used to apply. Since in Article 100 of the present Limitation Act of 1963 both Articles 13 and 14 have been com­bined, lam of the opinion that to set aside any act or order of an officer of Government in his official capacity Article 100 will be attracted and not Article 113, that, the residuary Article. 14. In support of his contention that in the instant appeal Article 100 will be attracted, Mr. Kundu has drawn my attention to Peary lal Ray Chaudhuri, AIR 1924 Cal. 913 and Vasireddi. AIR 1920 Mad. 1013. In Peary lal (supra), it was held that Article 14 of the Act of 1908 applies to acts or orders done in the exercise of powers legally exercisable by the executive autho­rity. From Vasireddi (supra) I also find that Article 14 of the Act of 1908 used to be is attracted where a suit was for setting aside an order which was an executive order. In Chhandra Bahan AIR 1956 Bom. 601 , a suit was filed against Union of India by an officer of the Indian Army for a declaration that his dismissal from service was wrongful and the Union of India took up the.plea of limitation. In that case, it was held that in a suit for declaration of such a nature provisions of Article 14oftbeLimi-tasion Act, 1908 would be attracted. 15. Mr. Lodh, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent urged that since the present suit is sot a suit for cancellation of any order of the Government but, a suit for declaration and injun­ction, Article 113 will apply. Mr. 15. Mr. Lodh, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent urged that since the present suit is sot a suit for cancellation of any order of the Government but, a suit for declaration and injun­ction, Article 113 will apply. Mr. Lodh has further urged that Article 100 will apply only when an order is passed under any law. According to Mr. Lodh, where an order is made without any jurisdiction Article 100 will not be attracted and in support of his contention, he has drawn my attention to Pearly (supra). 16. Admittedly, the pension of the plaintiff and others was suspended and as such the plaintiff cannot get any declara­tion as prayed for cafes the said cancellation or suspension order of pension is set aside. In Peary lal (supra), what their Lordships had said was that Article 14 applies to act or orders which require to be set aside and it does not apply where juris­diction has been usurped and the order is ultra vires, A order made without jurisdiction is a nullity and atelic fee set aside. In the instant case, the order of suspension was neither a nullity nor was passed without jurisdiction and as such for a suit for setting aside the said suspension order old Article 14 would have been attracted. A declaration for injunction in the present suit also cannot be granted unless the aforesaid order is declared illegal and set aside. Therefore, the contention of Mr. Lodh has no force. I am also unable to accept his submission that Arti­cle 100 will apply only when an order is pissed under any law in view of the clear language of Article 100 and also the deci­sions of Bombay and Calcutta High Courts cited above in res­pect of Article 14 of the Limitation Act of 1908. 17. I, therefore, hold that Article 100 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which combines and reproduces old Articles 13 and 14 of the Limitation Act, 19,8. prescribes period of limitation for two types of suits, namely, (i) suit to set aside or alter any de­cision or order of a civil court in any proceeding other than a suit and (ii) suit to set aside or alter any act or order of an officer of the Government in his official capacity. prescribes period of limitation for two types of suits, namely, (i) suit to set aside or alter any de­cision or order of a civil court in any proceeding other than a suit and (ii) suit to set aside or alter any act or order of an officer of the Government in his official capacity. In the instant suit, no relief, as prayed for, can be granted without setting aside the order of suspension of pension and as such, the said Arti­cle 100 will be attracted. The suspension order was issued by the defendant ND. 3 on 3.3.76 and by the Government of India on 3.8.76 (vide paras 10 and 13 of the plaint). As the order of defen­dant No. 3 has been disputed as without authority which prima facie does not appear to be correct, let me accept the subsequent date of order 3.8.76 of the Government of India for the purpose of time from which the period of limitation begins to run. The present suit was filed on 21.8.1979, that is, after the period of one year. So, the present suit is barred by limitation and it is liable to be dismissed. 18. Now the next question is whether the plaintiffs could prove that they were freedom fighters within the scope and meaning of freedom lighters under 1959 Scheme and 1972 Schering and whether the learned courts below wrongly placed tae onus on the defendants. Mr. Lodh, learned counsel for the res­pondent-plaintiff urged that this is not a substantial question of law and a such, it cannot be raised in this second appeal. 19. Mr. Kundu, learned Advocate General urged that the question whether evidence to support a finding of facts exists is a question of law and that since this question depends on the construction of the Scheme, which are the foundation of the ri­ghts of the parties, such construction is a question of law. In su­pport of his contention, Mr. Kundu has relied upon Mis. New Durgabari Tea Co. Ltd, AIR 1970 Tripura 76 and Sir Chunilal v. Mehta and Sons Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 1314 . 20. In Sir Chunilal vs. Mehta (supra), their Lordships held that it is well settled that the construction of a document of title or of a document which is the foundation of the rights of parties necessarily raises a question of law. In Mis New Du­rgabari Tea Co. 20. In Sir Chunilal vs. Mehta (supra), their Lordships held that it is well settled that the construction of a document of title or of a document which is the foundation of the rights of parties necessarily raises a question of law. In Mis New Du­rgabari Tea Co. Ltd. (supra), it was held that where a finding is not based on any evidence the aggrieved party can challenge its correctness on the footing that a question of law arises for determination. 21. In the case in hand, the question is whether the plai­ntiff and other freedom fighters on whose behalf the present suit has been filed are freedom fighters or not according to 1972 Scheme. As stated earlier, the learned lower appellate court considered both the Schemes, namely, 1959 Scheme and 1972 Scheme and was of the view that as the plaintiff was a politi­cal sufferer under 1959 Scheme he is entitled to the benefit of free­dom fighters under 1972 Scheme. Thus the basis of the present suit is the interpretation of 1972 Scheme as it is not disputed that the plaintiff was recognised as a political sufferer under 1959 Scheme. I am, therefore, of the opinion that this is a substa­ntial question of law as this Court has to interpret the 1972 Scheme which is the foundation of the present suit. 22. On examination of 1959 Scheme (Ext. 7), it is clear that this Scheme was meant for political sufferers and the ben­efit given under the Scheme is not pension but other benefits, such as. Scholarship, other educational facilities to the children of political sufferers. On the other band, 1972 Scheme is meant for freedom fighters who had suffered a minimum period of impris­onment of 6 months and it was provided that the freedom fighters or their families would get pension only, other benefits are not available under this Scheme. 23. It is a well settled law that a document has to be read as a whole and I need not burden this judgment by cit­ing authorities on this point. The learned lower appellate court instead of reading these two documents as a whole and separa­tely mixed up the Schemes and came to the finding that as the plaintiff was a political sufferer under 1959 Scheme and acco­rdingly he got a certificate from the Sub-Divisional Officer, he is entitled to get pension under 1972 Scheme. The learned lower appellate court instead of reading these two documents as a whole and separa­tely mixed up the Schemes and came to the finding that as the plaintiff was a political sufferer under 1959 Scheme and acco­rdingly he got a certificate from the Sub-Divisional Officer, he is entitled to get pension under 1972 Scheme. In my opinion the learned lower appellate court committed an error of law in arriving at the above decision inasmuch as the learned court did not read the 1972 Scheme as a whole. 1972 Scheme is a comprehensive and self contained Scheme. Any parson who is a fre­edom fighter in terms of the said Scheme must prove the fact as per procedure laid down in the said Scheme. No person can claim as a matter of right the benefit under the said Sc­heme merely because he was recognised as a political sufferer under 1959 Scheme which is a separate and also self-contained Scheme. 1 am of the view that in the instant case the plain­tiff has failed to prove as per the terms of 1972 Scheme that he was a freedom fighter for the purpose of said Scheme. 24. In view of what has been stated above, I hold that the construction of the two Schemes, more particularly 1972 Sc­heme which is the foundation of the present suit, is a substa­ntial question of law and that the finding of the learned lower appellate court that the plaintiff is entitled to the benefit under 1972 Scheme as he was given the benefit under 1958 Scheme is erroneous and is liable to be set aside, which I hereby do. 25. Mr. Kundu learned Advocate General urged the follow­ing questions of law, namely, that the plaintiff-respondent has no legal right or status to approach the civil court under the provisions of section 9 of the Code, that the suit is not maintainable in view of provisions of sec. 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, and that the suit is hit by Order I, Rule 8 of the Code. Mr. Lodh urged that at this stage the above le­gal questions cannot be raised as those were not formulated at the time of admission of this second appeal. Undoubtedly the above questions are substantial questions of law. 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, and that the suit is hit by Order I, Rule 8 of the Code. Mr. Lodh urged that at this stage the above le­gal questions cannot be raised as those were not formulated at the time of admission of this second appeal. Undoubtedly the above questions are substantial questions of law. The proviso to sub-section (5) of section 100 of the Code empowers the Co­urt to allow the appellant to raise any other substantial quest­ion of law not formulated by it under sub-section (4) but the Court has to record reasons. Since these are substantial questions of law touching the merit of the case, I was satisfied that these could be raised at the time of argument and as such Mr. Kundu was allowed to press the above points. 26. Now, question is whether I should discuss and decide the above points of law. The learned trial court while dismiss­ing the suit directed that "The newly constituted Review Commi­ttee (Ext. 6 and Ext. T- 56) shall examine afresh the cases of freedom fighters whose pension has been suspended and also that 0f the proforma-defendants and the No. 2 (State Government) shall submit its report to the Central Government for fresh consideration of all these cases keeping in view my observation made while dis­cussing issue nos. 5, 7 and 10 " From the written statement filed on behalf of the defendants, it appears that the defendants have taken a very fair stand that the pension could not be granted as the plaintiff and others could not produce any valid docu­ment to establish the fact of imprisonment and that the pension was only suspended giving an opportunity to the plaintiff and others to show cause. In para 26 of the written statement filed by defendant appellant No. 1, it has been specifically seated that era receipt of several representations the Government of India directed the State Government to review the cases of the affec­ted freedom fighters by the State Review Committee and accor­dingly a new Review Committee has been set up and is still functioning. Thus, it appears that the plaintiff and others whose pension was only suspended can definitely get pension if they cart satisfy the said Review Committee and/or appellants that they are entitled to get pension under 1972 Scheme. Thus, it appears that the plaintiff and others whose pension was only suspended can definitely get pension if they cart satisfy the said Review Committee and/or appellants that they are entitled to get pension under 1972 Scheme. In review of the above position, I feel that decisions on the new questions rai­sed by Mr. Kundu. learned Advocate-General are not necessary as may affect adversely the case of the plaintiff and other freedom fighters. I propose to keep these questions open to be decided, if necessary, in future. I would like also to mention that in para 32 of the written statement of the Union of India it bas been stated that the present suit of the plaintiff is pre-nature and this shows that defendants have kept the matter men. 27. In view of the foregoing discussion, I hold that the present suit is barred by limitation and that the plaintiff-respon­dent failed to show that be is a freedom fighter under 1972 Scheme and as such, the decree of the trial court has to be restored and that of the lower appellate court has to be set aside, which I hereby do. 28. This decision will not, however, prejudice the right of the plaintiff and other freedom fighters to place their cases be­fore the Review Committee as per direction of the learned trial court. 29. In the result, the appeal is allowed. However, under the facts and circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs.