JUDGMENT : G.B. Pattnaik, J. - The petitioner has been convicted u/s 409, I. P. C, and has been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 2000/- or in default to undergo further imprisonment for six months by the Chief Judicial Magistrate. Puri, and on appeal, the said conviction and sentence have been affirmed by the learned Additional Sessions judge, Puri. 2. According to the prosecution case the petitioner was the Sarpanch of Uchhupur Grama Panchayat in the year 1976. In accordance with the resolution of the Panchayat to deal with the controlled commodities, the petitioner filed an application before the Block Development Officer to make arrangement for supply of controlled commodities to the Panchayat for distribution amongst the villagers. On 21.9.1976 the petitioner as the Sarpanch lifted 14 quintals of sugar from the Food Corporation of India in accordance with the orders of the Block Development Officer, Nimapara and the said stock was being kept by the petitioner in his office room and the petitioner was retaining the key of the said room. On 2.2.1976 the Panchayat Extension Officer (P.W.2.) visited the Panchayat and made a physical verification of the stock of sugar and found that in the stock only seven quintals of sugar in seven gunny bags was there He also inspected the Panchayat cash register and found that the value of the missing seven quintals of sugar amounting to Rs. 1,505/- had not been deposited. As the petitioner could not give any account for the shortage of sugar, he reported the matter to the Block Development Officer who obtained necessary orders from the District Magistrate, Puri, for prosecuting the petitioner and then lodged the F. I. R. In course of investigation it was revealed that the sugar in question had not been sold to any of the consumers of the Panchayat and further on 30-6-1976, the petitioner had filed an application before the Block Development Officer to allow him to deposit the entire amount. After completion of the investigation the police submitted the charge-sheet against the petitioner in February, 1977. 3. After completion of the investigation the police submitted the charge-sheet against the petitioner in February, 1977. 3. The petitioner in his defence admitted to have received 14 quintals of sugar on behalf of the Panchayat as alleged, but took the plea for shortage of sugar in question that it is the Secretary who was answerable as he was in charge of the room where sugar had been stored. He also took the alternative plea, as appears from the suggestion given to the prosecution witnesses, that seven bags of sugar had been sold to the consumers and sale proceeds had been given to the Secretary for purchase of other essential commodities like wheat and kerosene. As regards the document purported to have been given by him to the Block Development Officer seeking permission to deposit the amount in question, his plea was that the Secretary had taken his signature on a blank piece of paper which had been converted to a document without the knowledge of the petitioner. 4. In support of the prosecution case, eight witnesses were examined and a large number of documents were produced. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate considered the evidence and came to hold that the prosecution had been able to bring home the charge against the petitioner beyond all reasonable doubt and accordingly convicted him. On appeal, the learned Additional Sessions judge re-appraised the evidence and affirmed the conclusion of the learned trying. Magistrate. Both the Courts below on consideration of the evidence came to hold that the prosecution had been able to establish the entrustment of sugar to the petitioner and it was the petitioner who was in custody of the sugar in question. So far as the shortage is concerned, it has also been found that the prosecution has been able to establish the shortage of seven quintals of sugar and the Courts below have rejected both the defence pleas. Since the entrustment has been proved and the accused could not explain as to the manner in which he dealt with the sugar in question, the offence of criminal breach of trust within the meaning of Section 409, I. P. C, has been held to be well-established. 5. Mr. Patnaik, the learned counsel for the petitioner appearing in this revision does not challenge the finding of entrustment of the sugar to the petitioner by the two Courts below. 5. Mr. Patnaik, the learned counsel for the petitioner appearing in this revision does not challenge the finding of entrustment of the sugar to the petitioner by the two Courts below. He, however, raises two submissions for consideration of this Court : (i) The petitioner being a public servant and the distribution of the sugar being in discharge of his official duty as Sarpanch, for the offence in question, sanction of the State Government is necessary as required u/s 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and no such sanction having been obtained, the conviction cannot be sustained ; (ii) To attract the offence u/s 409, I. P. C, the prosecution should not only prove entrustment but also the misappropriation and in the facts and circumstances of the present case, misappropriation not having been established, the conviction should be held to be bad in law. 6. Coming to the first submission, the question that arises for consideration is whether the alleged misappropriation can be said to have been committed by the petitioner while acting or purporting to act in discharge of his official duty. This matter has come up for consideration before the Supreme Court on several occasions. The learned counsel for the petitioner places reliance on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Shreekantiah Ramayya Munipalli Vs. The State of Bombay, and R.R. Chari Vs. State of U.P.. The Supreme Court in the case reported in Shreekantiah Ramayya Munipalli Vs. The State of Bombay, no doubt indicated that the provisions of Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should not be construed too narrowly as in that event, it can never apply, for it is no part of an official's duty to commit an offence and never it can be and, therefore, the Court is to first concentrate on the word 'offence'. Analysing the facts and circumstances of that case as alleged, the Supreme Court held that the provisions u/s 197, Cr. P. C, would apply. Analysing the facts and circumstances of that case as alleged, the Supreme Court held that the provisions u/s 197, Cr. P. C, would apply. The Supreme Court quoted with approval a passage from the judgment of the Federal Court in the case of AIR 1939 43 (Federal Court) which is extracted hereunder : " I would observe at the outset that the question is substantially one of facts to be determined with reference to the act complained of and the attendant circumstances, it seems neither useful nor desirable to paraphrase the language of the section in attempting to lay down hard and fast tests." The other case R.R. Chari Vs. State of U.P., on which the learned counsel for, the petitioner relies was a case where for the offence alleged, sanction had been accorded by the Governor-General of India u/s 197 of the Code. But the challenge was that the said sanction was not the sanction, of the Governor-General. There were no materials that Governor-General applied his mind to the facts and accorded the sanction in question. Another question which arose in that case was that for the offences under Sections 161 and 155, I. P. C, sanction under the provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act was necessary and, therefore, the trial was vitiated. The ratio of that case, therefore, has no application to the present case. After carefully considering the aforesaid two cases on which the learned counsel for the petitioner relies, I am of the opinion that those two cases cannot have any application in the present case. 7. The question which has been urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner in this case came up directly before the Supreme Court in the case of P. Arulswami Vs. The State of Madras, where the elected President of a Panchayat Board was being prosecuted u/s 409, I. P. C, and the main contention before the Supreme Court was that sanction as provided u/s 106 of the Madras Village Panchayat Act which is an identical provision as in Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code, was necessary to prosecute the accused. The Supreme Court took into consideration a large number of authorities on the point and came to hold : "Section 106 of the Madras Act is similar in language to Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code and for the reasons already expressed we are of the opinion that the sanction of the State Government was not necessary for prosecution of the appellant u/s 409 of the Indian Penal Code". In this case, the Supreme Court relied upon the decision of the Privy Council in the case of AIR 1948 128 (Privy Council) the decision of the Federal Court in AIR 1939 43 (Federal Court) and some earlier decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of Om Prakash Gupta Vs. State of U.P., : K. Satwant Singh Vs. The State of Punjab, and Baijnath Gupta and Others Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh. In Om Prakash Gupta's case referred to supra, it was observed by the Supreme Court that sanction to the prosecution of a public servant u/s 409 of the Indian Penal Code was not necessary since the public servant was not acting in his official capacity in committing criminal breach of trust. The same view has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in the case of B. Saha and Others Vs. M.S. Kochar. It was held in the said case that in a case u/s 409 I. P. C. the official capacity is material only in connection with the entrustment and does not necessarily enter into the later act of misappropriation or conversion which is the act complained of. It was further observed that : "Where the act complained of is dishonest misappropriation or conversion of the goods by the accused persons, which they had seized, and as such were holding in trust to be dealt with in accordance with law, sanction of the appropriate Government was not necessary for the prosecution of the accused for an offence under Sections. 409/120B., I. P. C., because the alleged act; criminal misappropriation complained of was not committed by them while they were acting or purporting to act in the discharge of their official duty, the commission of the offence having no direct connection or inseparable link with their duties is public servant". (Quoted from the Headnote). 409/120B., I. P. C., because the alleged act; criminal misappropriation complained of was not committed by them while they were acting or purporting to act in the discharge of their official duty, the commission of the offence having no direct connection or inseparable link with their duties is public servant". (Quoted from the Headnote). This being the position of law and applying the same to the facts and circumstances of the present case, I am firmly of the opinion that Section 197 of the Code has no application and, therefore, the contention of Mr. Patnaik, the learned counsel for the petitioner is devoid of force. 8. Coming to the second submission of the learned counsel, I also do not find any force in the same. The prosecution has proved the entrustment of 14 quintals of sugar and the accused admits the same. The prosecution further proves the shortage of seven quintals of sugar by the oral evidence of the District Panchayat Officer. The petitioner does not dispute these facts. The prosecution also further established from the Cash Book of the Panchayat that the sale proceeds of the seven quintals of sugar which was not found on the stock on 2-2-1976 had not been entered. The defence plea that the Secretary was in the custody as well as the sugar had been sold, has been disbelieved. In that view of the matter, when the entrustment and shortage have been proved by the prosecution and further it is established that it is the accused who was in charge of the sugar, it was for the accused to explain as to how he dealt with the same and admittedly this has not been done by the accused. In the premises, I do not find any substance in the second submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner. 9. In the ultimate result, therefore, both the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner fail and this criminal revision is accordingly dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed