K. C. AGARWAL, J. ( 1 ) M/s Dhampur Sugar Mills limited Dhampur district, Bijnor, has filed this petition under article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the order of the Asstt. Collector, Central Excise, moradabad, dated 25-8-1986 by which the application of the petitioner made for refund of the excise duty or for granting an additional rebate has been rejected on the ground inter alia, that it was time barred. ( 2 ) THE petitioners counsel urged that the view taken by the Asstt. Collector was incorrect. For the argument advanced, he relied on Section 11b of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. By reading the relevant provisions, specially clause (e) of Sub-section 5 of Section 11b, learned counsel submitted that since the provisional assessment had been made against the petitioner, the cause of action for claiming refund could not be said to have become barred by time. It was submitted that under the aforesaid clause of Section 11b (5) the period of six months stated in sub-section 1 of Section 11b would start running from the date of making of the final assessment. Counsel contended by referring to us the writ petition as well as its annexure and also the counter affidavit that since no final assessment had been made, the question of the petitioners claim becoming time-barred did not arise. When we go through the judgment and order of the Assitt. Collector we find that the Asstt. Collector has given a number of points for holding that the claim of the petitioner was time barred. ( 3 ) COUNSEL for the petitioner contended that it will not be necessary for this Court to go into the various points decided by the Asstt. Collector on the question of limitation when this court holds that under clause (e) of Sub-section 5 of Section 11b, the view taken by the Asstt. Collector was erroneous. It is not possible at this stage of the proceedings to express any concluded opinion on this argument of the petitioners counsel. Since the statute under which the claim has been preferred by the petitioner provides for an appeal, it appears to us that the petitioner must avail that right by preferring an appeal. ( 4 ) COUNSEL relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Ram and Shyam Company v. State of haryana and Ors. AIR 1985 SC 1147 . Since the statute under which the claim has been preferred by the petitioner provides for an appeal, it appears to us that the petitioner must avail that right by preferring an appeal. ( 4 ) COUNSEL relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Ram and Shyam Company v. State of haryana and Ors. AIR 1985 SC 1147 . The decision of this case is based on its peculiar facts. On the findings arrived at, the Supreme Court held that to compel the appellant to file an appeal would be futile. The decision of this case, therefore, does not assist us in clinching the controversy in favour of the petitioner. We may make a reference to another decision of the supreme Court reported in Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Chandan Nagar v. Dunlop india Limited and Ors. , AIR 1985 SC 330 . In this case the Supreme Court observed: "article 226 is not meant to short circuit or circumvent statutory procedures. It is only where statutory remedies are entirely ill-suited to meet the demands of extraordinary situations, as for instance where the very vives of the statute is in question or where private or public wrongs are so inextricably mixed up and the prevention of public injury and the vindication of public justice require it that recourse may be had to Article 226 of the Constitution. But then the court must have good and sufficient reason to bypass the alternative remedy provided by statute. " the observations, quoted above, apply to the facts of the present case fully. Neither could anything be shown to us nor we find any justification for permitting the petitioner to bypass the alternative remedy provided for by the Central Excises and Salt Act 1944. In this view of the matter, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the preliminary ground that the petitioner has an alternative remedy. There is substance in the argument of the petitioners counsel that a direction be issued to the collector, before whom appeals are filed, to decide the appeal of the petitioner, when filed, within five months, we issue a direction to this effect. With these observations we dismiss the writ petition summarily. .