Judgment :- The petitioner is the tenant against whom an order of eviction was passed in R.C.O.P.No.2344 of 1982 under section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 18 of 1960 hereinafter referred to as the Act. The tenant took the matter up to the Supreme Court, but was unsuccessful throughout. The landlady passed away on 16th December, 1983. The Special Leave Petition filed by the tenant against the dismissal of the civil revision petition, namely C.R.P.No.4074/83, was after the death of the landlady and in that proceeding before the Supreme Court, the respondent herein was shown as the respondent. The respondent filed E.P.No.667/84 and M.P.No.493/84 to enforce the said order of eviction. In M.P.No.493/84 he wanted that he should be impleaded as the legal representative of the deceased landlady Kannammal. The petitioner-tenant resisted that application on the ground that the respondent is not the legal representative, nor is he the legal heir of the deceased Kannammal and that the petition not having been filed within 30 days from the date of the death of the landlady, it is liable to be dismissed as barred by time. The Rent Controller ordered the said petition. The petitioners appeal, R.C.A.No.784/85 was also dismissed. Hence the present revision. 2. Let me first of all advert to the argument based on rule 25 of the rules framed under the Act. The said rule runs as follows: "25. Time-limit for bringing the legal representatives on record in proceedings: Every application for making the legal representative or representatives of a deceased person, party to a proceeding under the Act shall be preferred within one month from the date of having knowledge of the death of the person concerned." In view of the decision in Ramanujam Naidu v. Panchanatha Mudaliar, (1980)1 M.L.J.232, the petitioners contention that the petition, M.P.No.493 of 1984 is time-barred has to be rejected. It is enough to quote the relevant passage in paragraph 5 of the said decision below: "Rule 25 in terms is not applicable to a death occurring after the decree in execution proceedings as it in terms is applicable only to proceedings pending before the Rent Controller. Though the Rent Controller is now executing the decree, he is not executing an order of the Rent Controller but an order which shall be deemed to be an order of the Civil Court which he is executing. Though the Rent Controller is now executing the decree, he is not executing an order of the Rent Controller but an order which shall be deemed to be an order of the Civil Court which he is executing. In such a proceeding, rule 25 is not applicable. The ratio of the decision in Subramania Pillai. v. Rajakanni Nadar, (1971)1 M.L.J.223= (1971) R.C.J.459= 83 L.W.758= A.I.R.197I Mad.310, therefore still holds good and is applicable. It may also be mentioned that in executing the order of eviction as if it were an order of the Civil Court, the Controller shall also have all the powers of the Civil Court, In proceedings in execution in civil courts, the provision of section 5 of the Limitation Act is (sic) applicable and, therefore, an application for excusing delay in filing the petition for bringing on record the legal representative, if there is any delay, could also be maintained." Secondly, in C.R.P.No.4774/83 the petitioner was granted nine months time since 30th September, 1983, that is, the petitioner had time till 30th June, 1984 to vacate. The present petition M.P.No.493/84 was presented on 4th July, 1984. It cannot be disputed that the landlady or her legal representative could not have levied execution til! 30th June, 1984. In other words, the execution could be levied only on and after 1st July, 1984. The order of eviction, when it is put in execution, becomes a decree of civil court under section 18 of the Act. According to section 18, "every order made under section 23 or on revision under section 25 shall be executed by the Controller, as if such order is an order of a civil Court and for this purpose, "a civil court" (emphasis supplied by me). A decree of a civil court can be executed till it is barred by time. This will indisputably indicate that an application to bring on record the legal representatives can be presented til! then because they only put the decree in execution. Therefore, 1 find no substance in the argument advanced by Mr.V.S.Subra-manyan that even without an execution petition, a petition to bring on the legal representative could be filed within 30 days from the date of the death of the deceased landlady. It is also relevant to point out that there is no such provision in the Act or in the rules. 3. It is true in Ghose Khar. It is also relevant to point out that there is no such provision in the Act or in the rules. 3. It is true in Ghose Khar. v. Rent Controller, Coimbatore, (1971) 84 L.W.568, Ratnavel Pandian, J, has observed as follows: "Therefore, the Rent Controller ought to have seen that the fiction created by section 18 of the Act can be extended only for the limited purpose of exercising the powers vested in a civil court while executing the orders of eviction, such as, those provided under Order 21 of the Code, but cannot be extended to matter such as those contained in Order 22 and other provisions of the Code relating to the execution of a decree." It is interesting to note that the decision of V.Ramaswami, J. in Ramanujam Naidu v. Panchanatha Mudaliar, (1980)1 M.L.J.232, was not brought to the notice of Ratnavel Pandian, J. when the learned Judge rendered the decision in Ghose Khan v. Rent Controller, Coimbatore, (1971) 84 L.W.568. Be that as it may, I prefer to follow the ratio laid down by V.Rama-swami, J. in Ramanujam Naidu v. Panchanatha Mudaliar, (1981) M.L.J.232. Here are my reasons: Order 22, rule 12 of the Civil Procedure Code, provides that nothing in Rules 3, 4 and 8 shall apply to proceedings in execution of a decree or order. As already pointed out by me, after a valid decree is passed, it can be enforced till it is barred by time, as provided in law. As long as a decree can be enforced, it is obvious that an application to bring on record the legal representative can be presented within that period. 4. Again, in view of the ratio of the Supreme Court in Krishna Singh v. Mathura Ahir, A.I.R.1980 S.C.707= (1980)2 S.C.R. 660, the respondent herein is a legal representative within the meaning of section 2(11) of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is relevant to notice that the Act does not define ‘legal representative. When the order of eviction shall be deemed to be a decree of civil court and when it is put in execution, section 2(11) of the Code of Civil Procedure is simply attracted. It is relevant to notice that the Act does not define ‘legal representative. When the order of eviction shall be deemed to be a decree of civil court and when it is put in execution, section 2(11) of the Code of Civil Procedure is simply attracted. The ratio in Krishna Singh v. Mathura Ahir, (1980)2 S.C.R.660= A.I.R. 1980 S.C.707 cited above, says that an intermeddler cannot only be sued, as held in Firm Balkisan v. Mt.Jainabai, A.I.R. 1938 Nag.298; Jai Kishen Dass v. Karimud-din, A.I.R.1939 Lah.321 and The Kalyammal Mills Limited v. Wali Mohammed, A.I.R. 1965 M.P.72= I.L.R. (1964) M.P.801, but he is also entitled to sue. The learned Counsel for the petitioner would try to distinguish the Supreme Court decision on the ground that on the facts before the Supreme Court, the legal representative was brought on record pending the proceeding and not after the decree was passed. The definition of ‘legal representative in section 2(13) of the "Code of Civil Procedure makes no such discrimination. If so, the ratio of the Supreme Court is simply attracted to the instant case as well. In view of the above authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court,the decisions in Firm Balkisan v. Mt.Jaian-bai, A.I.R.1938 Nag.298; Jai Kishan Dass v. Karimuddin, A.I.R.1939 Lahore 321 and The Kalyammal Mills Limited v. Wali Mohammed, A.I.R.1965 M.P.72= I.L.R. (1964) M.P.801 cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioner may not be good law. 5. A reference to Suraj Prasad v. Kukher Kuer, A.I.R.1939 Patna 117 and Mst. Nare v. Harbans Lal, A.I.R.1962 Punjab 457 will show that in those cases the Court found that the legal representative was not the legal heir of the deceased. Therefore in my view, these decisions will not render any real assistance to the learned counsel for the petitioner. 6. In this case there is ample evidence to prove that the respondent is an intermeddler and is therefore a legal representative within the meaning of section 2(11) of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the first place the petitioner himself impleaded the respondent as a respondent in the Special Leave Petition in which he challenged the order of eviction. Secondly it is the evidence of the respondent as P.W.1 in this proceeding that the petitioner withdrew his petition to deposit the rent into the Rent Controllers Court and that thereafter he has been paying the rents to him (the respondent). Secondly it is the evidence of the respondent as P.W.1 in this proceeding that the petitioner withdrew his petition to deposit the rent into the Rent Controllers Court and that thereafter he has been paying the rents to him (the respondent). This testimony of the respondent as P.W.1 was not challenged in his cross-examination. Above all, as already pointed out by me, in the teeth of the settlement deed Exhibit P-1 executed by Muthuswamy, the husband of Kannammal, according to which the petition property should be enjoyed by Kannammal for her life and after her lifetime by the respondent herein, the heirs of Kannammal cannot have any claim over the petition-property and so the said heirs are not entitled to execute that order. I am unable to grapple the argument advanced by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the legal representatives have nexus only to orders of eviction and not to the property in respect of which orders of eviction are passed. I have to point out that without the property, an order of eviction cannot be executed. Thus the legal representatives have to be determined vis-a-vis the property. 7. In the view I have taken, I am not adverting to the arguments advanced with reference to section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act. 8. The learned Counsel for the petitioner would not press his contention that the order of eviction is inexecutable in that the order was passed under section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act, and since the matter is pending consideration in an application under section 27 of the Act, pending before the learned Rent Controller. So I am not adverting to the same. 9. Thus, all the points fail and so the civil revision petition is dismissed with costs.