JUDGMENT 1. - In this writ petition, the petitioner Challenges the legality of the order Annexure 6, dated October 11, 1977, by which the petitioner was advised to take out a licence and pay duty on dross and skimmings. 2. Briefly recounted, the relevant facts are that the petitioner is a private limited company dealing in the manufacture of the aluminium rods out of aluminium ingots. In the manufacturing process undertaken by the petitioner for the purpose of extracting pure aluminium and separating impurity, ingots are put into furnace. While pure aluminium stands extracted by this process, the impurities are thrown out. This impurity is known as dross and skimmings. The contention of the petitioner is that no Excise duty is leviable on this dross and skimmings under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 ("the Act" hereinafter). However, on June 18, 1977, Item No. 68 came to be inserted in the First Schedule, which provided that duty shall be levied at 10% ad valorem on all other goods not elsewhere specified. The Inspector, Central Excise, Sojat City, thereafter called upon the petitioner to take out a licence for the manufacture of dross and skimmings and to pay duty on them. The petitioner raised protest and contended that no excise duty can be levied on dross and skimmings as they are not "excisable goods" nor are they manufactured products. The matter went to the Assistant Collector, Central Excise and Customs, Jodhpur, who concurred with the Inspector and advised the petitioner to take a licence and pay duty by his impugned letter Annexure 6. It was contended by the petitioner that dross and skimmings thrown out in the process of manufacture of aluminium rods and sheets are not manufactured goods and as such not covered by Item 68 of the Schedule. It was prayed that a declaration be granted that no duty is leviable on dross and skimmings and suitable directions be issued to the respondents not to charge duty on them. 3. While maintaining that dross and skimmings are assessable to Excise duty under Item 68 of the Schedule, it was contended by the respondents that the petition is not maintainable, because efficacious alternate remedy is available to the petitioner. The petitioner should first exhaust the alternate remedy provided in Chapter VIA of the Act. The remedy under the said Chapter is still available to him. The petitioner should first exhaust the alternate remedy provided in Chapter VIA of the Act. The remedy under the said Chapter is still available to him. Annexure 6 has not finally decided the matter. Under Annexure 6, the petitioner has been called upon for personal hearing -before the Assistant Collector. The matter is yet to be finally decided by the Department whether duty can be levied on dross and skimmings and it will be done after giving an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. The petition is, therefore, premature. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length. 4. As regards the alternate remedy, it was contended by Mr. Mridul that the writ petition was admitted after a notice to the respondents. It would not be a sound exercise of discretion now to refuse to hear the petition on merits. The petition was admitted long back in 1977. It would be, therefore, against the well settled cannons of justice now to refuse the hearing on merits of the case. The submission of Mr. Joshi is that though the petition was admitted long back, the alternate remedy has not become time barred as yet. No prejudice is to be caused to the petitioner in case he exhausts the alternate remedy first before coming to this Court. 5. Admittedly, the alternate remedy was and is available to the petitioner under Chapter VIA of the Act. This Chapter deals with appeal, second appeal, reference to the High Court and even a reference to the apex Court of the country. The petitioner has not availed of the alternate remedy available to him under this Chapter. The alternate remedy available to him is not illusory. It is a real one. It is true that when the alternate remedy is illusory, it should be disregarded. But here Chapter VIA of the Act provides a real and efficacious method and a machinery and the matter can travel to the highest Court to decide the question whether the particular goods are leviable to duty under the Act. 6. The petitioner has rushed to this Court as soon as Annexure 6 was served on him. It was open to him to appear before the Assistant Collector in pursuance to Annexure 6 and contend before him that no licence is necessary and no duty is leviable for dross and skimmings. 6. The petitioner has rushed to this Court as soon as Annexure 6 was served on him. It was open to him to appear before the Assistant Collector in pursuance to Annexure 6 and contend before him that no licence is necessary and no duty is leviable for dross and skimmings. In Annexure 6 itself, the petitioner was called upon for personal hearing before final order is passed. It was also asked to pay duty under protest. It is strange that the petitioner did not want to appear before the Assistant Collector and to contest before him that duty cannot be levied on dross and skimmings. The petition is premature as the petitioner has made no efforts to avail of the alternate remedy provided in the Act and had failed to give any adequate reasons for its not resorting (to) the same. Reference in this connection may be made to the case of Titagarh Paper Mills Company Ltd. - AIR 1983 Supreme Court 603 and Dunlop India Ltd. - AIR 1985 Supreme Court 330. In Titagarh's case, their Lordships observed that where the statute itself provides the petitioner with an efficacious alternate remedy by way of an appeal to the prescribed Authority, a second appeal to the Tribunal and thereafter to have the case stated to the High Court, it was not for the High Court to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, ignoring, as it were, the complete statutory machinery. In the case of Dunlop India Ltd. - 1985 (19) ELT 22 (S.C.), their Lordships observed:- "Article 226 is not meant to short circuit or circumvent statutory procedures. It is only where statutory remedies are entirely ill-suited to meet the demands of extraordinary situations, as for instance where the very vires of the statute is in question or where private or public wrongs are so inextricably mixed up and the prevention of public injury and the vindication of public justice require it that recourse may be had to Article 226 of the Constitution. But then the Court must have good and sufficient reason to by-pass the alternative remedy provided by statute. Surely matters involving the revenue where statutory remedies are available are not such matters. But then the Court must have good and sufficient reason to by-pass the alternative remedy provided by statute. Surely matters involving the revenue where statutory remedies are available are not such matters. We can also take judicial notice of the fact that the vast majority of the petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution are filed solely for the purpose of obtaining interim orders and thereafter prolong the proceedings by one device or the other. The practice certainly needs to be strongly discouraged." 7. In the instant case, it may be reiterated that the petitioner did not avail of the alternate remedy available to it under Chapter VIA of the Act. The petition should, therefore, be dismissed. 8. It is true that if a petition is once admitted, it is generally not proper to refuse to hear the petition on merits on the ground that the alternate remedy has not been exhausted first. But this practice is subject to the condition that at the stage of hearing the alternate remedy should not (sic) have become time barred or the circumstances are such that it is not available to the petitioner. The alternate remedy has not become time barred as yet. The whole matter is still open to the petitioner to appear before the Assistant Collector and to contest the legality of Annexure 6 by showing that no licence for manufacturing is necessary and no duty is leviable on dross and skimmings under Item 68 of the First Schedule. It is, thus, open to the petitioner still now to avail of the alternate remedy available to him under Chapter VIA of the Act. The matter would have been otherwise if the alternate remedy would have become barred for one or the other reason. No prejudice has been caused to the rights of the petitioner for availing the alternate remedy by the pendency of this writ petition since, 1977. 9. Mr. Mridul contended that in view of the decision given by a learned single Judge of Bombay High Court in Indian Aluminium Company Ltd. and Ors. v. A.K. Bandopadhyay and Ors. - 1980 ELT 146 , in which dross and skimmings have been taken (to be) neither "goods" nor "end-products", it would not be proper to dismiss the writ petition on the ground that alternate remedy was not exhausted first by the petitioner. v. A.K. Bandopadhyay and Ors. - 1980 ELT 146 , in which dross and skimmings have been taken (to be) neither "goods" nor "end-products", it would not be proper to dismiss the writ petition on the ground that alternate remedy was not exhausted first by the petitioner. I may hasten to add that in the aforesaid case, it was Tariff Item No. 27 which was dealt with and dross and skimmings were taken (to be) neither "goods" nor "end-products" in view of Explanation III occurring in Item 27 of the First Schedule. The aforesaid case does not relate to item No. 68. The explanation occurring in Item No. 68 makes the Explanation III in Item No. 27 inapplicable. However, without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case, as to whether duty is leviable on dross and skimmings, I decline to interfere in this writ petition for the sole reason that the petitioner has not exhausted the alternate remedy available to him under Chapter VIA of the Act, especially when it is still open to him to avail the same. The alternate remedy is still open to him and he can have a recourse to it. 10. The writ petition is consequently dismissed, but with no order as to costs.Writ dismissed. *******