JUDGMENT M.M. Gopal, Member. - This is a second appeal against the judgment of the learned Additional Commissioner dated 12.10.1982 by which he dismissed the appeal and upheld the judgment of the trial court dated 17.4.1980 by which it decreed the suit. 2. Heard the learned counsels and have perused the records. 3. The facts of the case are that a plaint has been filed by Babu Lal on 27.1.1977 against Balkaran and others 5 sons of Sukul and Higulal, Panna. Gram Subha and State Government. It is prayed that the plaintiff may be declared as a cotenant after the death of Sahti. It is alleged that he became the heir of Sahti on the basis of adoption. One written statement has been filed by Balkaran and others (except Lal Chand). They denied the allegations of the plaint and also denied the auction sale ; inter alia alleged that they became the sole tenant as there was private partition and Sahti cannot be declared as cotenant. Sukul was the sole tenant on the basis of the private partition and moreover if adoption is disproved Sukul being the brother of Sahti is the heir and he is sole tenant of the land in suit. 4. The suit was decreed by the trial court and the Additional Commissioner has dismissed the appeal. That means both the courts have upheld that there was no private partition and that the plaintiff is adopted son of Sahti. 5. The learned counsel for the appellant has contended that the factum of private partition has wrongly been decided by the courts below and the presumption of the registered adoption deed has also been raised against provisions of law. Moreover on the question of partition oral evidence has got its own weight and it should have been given importance by the courts below. The learned counsel for the opposite party has contended that the two concurrent findings of facts are based on some evidence and the evidence relied on by the courts below cannot be said to be irrelevant or no evidence in the eye of law and if two inferences can be drawn on the basis of some document or evidence and the inference drawn by the lower courts even if wrong, it should not be scrutinised or set aside by the second appellate court. 6. 6. The learned counsel for the appellant has relied on the ruling Ashraf Khan and others v. Sahab Khan, 1940 RD page 285 and tried to impress that long standing entry shall be believed but from this judgment it is clear that admittedly the land was ancestral but all the subsequent evidence proved that there had been separation. For over 60 years and over a settlement only one branch of the family has been shown. Hence the entry was believed and the claim of joint tenancy was dismissed. In the present ruling the private partition or separation was accepted by the courts and then the entries over the revenue papers were accepted to be correct. But in the present case the plea of private partition has been disbelieved by both the courts below and both the courts have held that the plaintiff is the adopted son of Sahti. Admittedly the land in suit was ancestral land. The alleged private partition has not been proved and both the courts have disbelieved this private partition and both the courts have also held that the plaintiff was adopted by Sahti. Under such circumstances the recording of the name of one branch of family does not debar the other branch to claim cotenancy right. 7. Apart from this these two points have in a way been admitted by the defendant in his written statement. In paragraph 16 it is admitted that Sahti was cultivating some portion of the land in suit. In paragraph 19 of the written statement it is admitted that there was a customary adoption of plaintiff by Sahti and in paragraph 14 it is admitted that the land originally belonged to Khaderu. 8. When the land belonged to Khaderu father of Sukul & Sahti, the cotenancy of Sahti cannot be denied on the face of the fact that the plea of private partition has been rejected by the courts below. 9. Thus it is clear that there is a concurrent finding of fact, and the nature of the property (being ancestral) and the plea of adoption are admitted in a way by the defendant. I, therefore see no reason to interfere with the finding of the courts below. 10. I, therefore, dismiss the second appeal. Costs easy.