JUDGMENT A.N. Varma, J. - Having heard the learned counsels for the parties and with their consent, this petition is being disposed of at the stage of admission of the petition. 2. The petitioner is the management being the proprietors of the concern in regard to which a dispute has been referred by the State Government under S. 4K of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act. After the parties filed their written statements, a preliminary issue was framed which reads as follows : "Whether or not the Allahabad Samachar Patra Karmachari Union, 16, Motilal Nehru Road, is competent, to raise the present dispute." On this preliminary issue the parties led evidence and thereafter dates were fixed for arguments and finally on 22 May 1986, orders were reserved on this preliminary issue. On 12 June 1986, the Industrial Tribunal delivered its order by which petitioners are aggrieved. The Industrial Tribunal has stated in the order that this issue shall be decided while giving the main award. 3. The petitioner contends that the impugned order is on the face of the record wholly unsustainable in law. It is urged that the Industrial Tribunal has passed the impugned order on the erroneous assumption that the workmen had not been afforded opportunity to lead evidence on the point of espousal. Learned counsel submitted that the parties had clearly understood that the aforesaid preliminary issue was on the question whether the Allahabad Samachar Patra Karmachari Union at the instance of which the present dispute was referred for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal was competent to espouse the cause of the workmen of the concern. Learned counsel further submitted that the parties had been specifically invited by the Industrial Tribunal to lead evidence on the issue of deposal, i.e., whether the aforesaid union was competent to espouse the cause of the concern in question. That being so, it was urged, the Industrial Tribunal fell into a manifest error of law and jurisdiction in postponing the decision of the aforesaid issue until the final disposal of the adjudication case, i.e., till the award was rendered by the Industrial Tribunal. 4. Learned counsel for the aforesaid union, however, submitted that this Court ought not to interfere with the impugned order at this stage. 4. Learned counsel for the aforesaid union, however, submitted that this Court ought not to interfere with the impugned order at this stage. He placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Maheshwari (D.P.) v. Delhi Administration [1984 - I L.L.N. 1], in support of this contention. 5. In my opinion, the Industrial Tribunal clearly went wrong in postponing the decision on this preliminary issue until the final disposal of the dispute on all the other issues. The principal ground on which the Industrial Tribunal has passed the impugned order postponing the decision is that the workmen had not been given opportunity to lead evidence on the question of espousal. 6. This assumption of the Tribunal is clearly wrong. A perusal of the written statement filed by the management leaves no manner of doubt that the only ground of challenge to the competence of the aforesaid union to represent the workmen of the concern was that it had a very small membership consisting of only two workmen and consequently it was not competent to espouse the cause of the workmen concerned. It is on this objection in the written statement that the preliminary issue quoted above was framed. Not only this, but the various orders passed by the Tribunal from time to time make it abundantly clear that the right of the aforesaid union to espouse the cause of the workmen was the only point at issue. Thus in its order, dated 31 May 1985, the Tribunal states : "The written statements have been filed by parties. Employer requested for a preliminary issue being framed on the question of right of espousal by Allahabad Samachar Patra Karmachari Union and referred to C.B. proceedings. They would be applying for the C. B. file concerned. The question of framing of appropriate issue shall be considered after rejoinder and documents to be filed on or by 11 July." Again the order-sheet of 11 July 1985, says : "The employers file their rejoinder and documents. The workmens representative is not present. The employers representative referred to his request for framing and deciding the preliminary issue first. The workmens representative has arrived. He would be filing documents, etc. Case is fixed for framing of preliminary issue regarding competency for espousal of the case and evidence on the same on 19 July 1985. The workmens representative is not present. The employers representative referred to his request for framing and deciding the preliminary issue first. The workmens representative has arrived. He would be filing documents, etc. Case is fixed for framing of preliminary issue regarding competency for espousal of the case and evidence on the same on 19 July 1985. Thereafter the question whether the dispute needs to be decided in totality or the preliminary point disposal first shall be considered." Thereafter on 19 July 1985, the aforesaid preliminary issue was framed. The order-sheet of that date runs thus : "Parties are present. Following issue is framed : Whether or not the Allahabad Samachar Patra Karmachari Union, 16, Motilal Nehru Road, is competent to raise the present dispute." The workmen have filed the documents required of them in connection with the point in issue. The C.B. file in question has been sent for but has not been received even though the employers seem to have applied to the D.L.C. on 1 June 1985. The workmen pressed for an issue being framed as to whether Maya Press (Private), Ltd. and Mitra Prakashan (Private), Ltd., are one and the same establishment. The point has been raised in the rejoinder although both have bean referred to as separate entities. The workers representative pointed out that inter-transfers are common. That the two have been held to be sister or same concern. They can take advantage of the decided cases. They can also adduce evidence to show that inter-transfers are made and use the fact if proved to argue a point. But the issue that the two companies are one and the same does not arise in the context of Government order of reference and proceedings. Employers produced three witnesses evidence recorded 8 August 1985, fixed for further evidence of employers if any and evidence of workmen." 7. Finally on 18 September 1985, the said union adduced oral evidence on the preliminary issue and the Tribunal fixed 7 October 1985, for arguments on this issue. The case was then argued by the parties on 7 October 1985 and 22 May 1986, and upon conclusion of submissions orders on the preliminary issue were reserved. 8. Finally on 18 September 1985, the said union adduced oral evidence on the preliminary issue and the Tribunal fixed 7 October 1985, for arguments on this issue. The case was then argued by the parties on 7 October 1985 and 22 May 1986, and upon conclusion of submissions orders on the preliminary issue were reserved. 8. It will thus be seen that the question whether the aforesaid union was competent to espouse the cause of the workmen was very much in issue and the attention of the parties was fully for accused on the same. There was no scope for misunderstanding or misapprehension. The parties had clearly understood the issue in that sense and had led evidence on the right of espousal claimed by the respondent-union. The union had filed documents as well as adduced oral evidence on their right to espouse the cause of the workmen. The Tribunal was thus entirely wrong in thinking that the union had not had opportunity to adduce evidence on the question of espousal. 9. In this view, the Tribunal was wholly unjustified in postponing the decision on this issue till the making of the final award. The parties having led evidence on the issue the Tribunal should not have hesitated in giving its decision thereon. Further, in my opinion, the issue was broad enough to include the controversy whether the said union was competent to espouse the cause of the workmen. In the case in Deepak Industries, Ltd. v. State of West Bengal [1975 - 11 L.L.N. 168], their Lordships of the Calcutta High Court held that an issue regarding the competency of the union to raise an industrial dispute includes the issue whether the union in question was competent to espouse the cause of the workmen. 10. Moreover, the issue whether the aforesaid union was competent to espouse the cause of the workmen was wholly independent of the issue raised in the main dispute referred by the Government. 11. At this point it is necessary to mention that while presenting this petition on 21 July 1986, Sri P. K. Mukerji, learned counsel for the petitioner, had stated before this Court that in case the preliminary issue is answered against the management, it will not question the correctness of that decision until the Tribunal had given its award. He has reiterated that statement before me today. He has reiterated that statement before me today. That statement fully takes care of the caution sounded by the Supreme Court in Maheshwari (D.P.) case [1984 - T L.L.N. 1] (vide supra). 12. In the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order, dated 12 June 1986, passed by the Presiding Officer of the First Industrial Tribunal, Allahabad, in Adjudication Case No. 42 of 1985, is quashed. The said Tribunal is directed to dispose of the aforesaid preliminary issue first and give its decision thereon before proceeding to consider the other issues arising in the case. The petitioner shall abide by the statement given on its behalf by the learned counsel before this Court after the Tribunal has given its decision on the preliminary issue. The Tribunal shall dispose of the preliminary issue within a month of the date on which a certified copy of this order is filed before it by either of the two parties. In the circumstances, the parties shall bear their own costs of this petition.